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In this thesis the position of parties under a fixed-term agreement under section 14 
of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 is analysed critically. The purpose of this 
thesis is first to establish whether parties to a fixed-term agreement are better 
protected in terms of section 14 of the CPA when the consumer needs to terminate 
the contract based on the material failure to perform by the supplier, than under the 
common law. Second, this thesis explores whether the maximum duration of fixed-
term agreements should be limited by statute. Various aspects affecting parties to 
these agreements, for instance the freedom to contract, pacta servanda sunt, and 
standard-form agreements, are considered. The South African position is then 
compared to the position in Singapore under the Consumer Protection (Fair 
Trading) Act, and to the United Kingdom under the Consumer Rights Act, to gain 
perspective and objectively evaluate the provisions of section 14 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008 to establish whether South Africa can benefit from lessons 
learnt from these jurisdictions. Finally, principle-based amendments to the 
provisions of the CPA are recommended to improve the position of the consumer 
under fixed-term agreements to effect best practice solutions and ensure adherence 
to the aims and purposes of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and 
international guidelines. 
This thesis is based on the law as at 18 June 2020, found in sources available in 
South Africa, and Singaporean law available in the database of the National 
University of Singapore. 
Key terms 
Consumer Protection Act; common law; consumer protection; fixed-term 
agreement; standard-form agreement; inferior bargaining position; freedom of 
contract; material failure to perform; premature termination; reasonable cancellation 







Hierdie proefskrif is ’n kritiese analise van die posisie van partye tot 
vastetermynkontrakte ingevolge artikel 14 van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
verbruikersbeskermingswetgewing, die Consumer Protection Act 68 van 2008 
(CPA). Die doel van die analise is eerstens om vas te stel of partye tot ’n 
vastetermynkontrak ingevolge artikel 14 van die CPA beter beskerming geniet 
ingevolge die CPA wanneer die verbruiker die vastetermynkontrak moet beëindig 
weens die wesenlike wanprestasie deur die verskaffer, as ingevolge die 
gemenereg. Tweedens ondersoek die proefskrif of dit wenslik is dat die maksimum 
duur van vastetermynkontrakte deur wetgewing beperk word. Verskeie aspekte wat 
die posisie van partye tot vastetermynkontrakte beïnvloed word ondersoek, onder 
andere kontrakteervryheid, die leerstuk pacta servanda sunt en standaardkontrakte. 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse posisie word dan vergelyk met dié in Singapoer, ingevolge die 
Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (CPFTA), en die Verenigde Koninkryk, 
ingevolge die Consumer Rights Act (CRA) om perspektief te kry op die studie, en 
ten einde die bepalings van artikel 14 objektief te oorweeg om vas te stel of Suid-
Afrika kan kersopsteek by hierdie jurisdiksies. Laastens word voorstelle gemaak om 
die posisie van die verbruiker tot vastetermynkontrakte ingevolge die CPA te 
verbeter om beste gebruikspraktyke te implementeer, en te verseker dat die 
doelwitte van die CPA en internasionale verbruikersriglyne bereik word. 
Hierdie studie weerspieël die regsposisie soos op 18 Junie 2020 in bronne wat 
plaaslik beskikbaar is, asook in bronne aan my beskikbaar gestel deur die Nasionale 






Kule thesisi isimo sezinhlangano ezingaphansi kwesivumelwano sesikhathi 
esinqunyiwe, ngaphansi kwesigaba 14 koMthetho 68 ka 2008, uMthetho 
weZokuvikelwa koMthengi uhlaziywa ngendlela egxekayo. Inhloso yalolu cwaningo 
ukusungula ukuthi mhlawumbe lezi zinhlangano ezingaphansi kwesivumelwano 
sesikhathi esinqunyiwe sivikeleke kangcono ngaphansi kwesigaba 14 se-CPA uma 
kunesidingo sabathengi sokuqedwa kwesivumelwano esencike phezu 
kokwehluleka ukwenza umsebenzi waloyo ongumthumeli wempahla, okwehlukile 
emthethweni owejwayelekile. Okwesibili, le thesis iphenya ukuthi mhlawumbe 
isikhathi isikhathi esinde sesivumelwano sesikhathi esinqunyiwe kufanele 
sincishiswe ngokomthetho oshayiwe. Izinto ezahlukahlukene ezithinta lezi 
zivumelwano, njengesibonelo, inkululeko yokungena esivumelwaneni pacta 
servanda sunt, kanye nesivumelwano ezingaguquki, kuyizinto ezibhekwayo. Isimo 
seNingizimu Afrika siqhathaniswa nesimo sezwe laseSingapore ngaphansi 
koMthetho wezokuVikelwa kwabaThengi (Fair Trading), kanye nasezweni 
laseUnited Kingdom ngaphansi koMthetho owaMalungelo abaThengi, ukuthola 
umqondo kanye nokuhlola izimiso ngaphansi kwesigaba 14 soMthetho 68 ka 2008, 
uMthetho oVikela abaThengi ukuthola ukuthi ngabe iNingizimu Afrika kukhona 
ekuzuzile kwizifundo ezifundwe kulezi zakhiwo zemithetho. Okokugcina, izichibiyelo 
ezisuselwe kwimigomo mayelana nalokho okushiwo yi-CPA inconywe ukuthi yenze 
ngcono isimo sezinhlangano ezingaphansi kwezivumelwano zesikhathi 
esinqunyiwe ukuletha izisombululo ezingcono kanye nokuqinisekisa ukuthi 
kulandelwa izinhloso kanye nemisebenzi yoMthetho 68 ka 2008, okunguMthetho 
oVikela abaThengi kanye nemihlahlandlela yezizwe zomhlaba.  
Lolu cwaningo lususelwe phezu komthetho kusukela mhla zi 18 uNhlangulana 
2020, luyatholakala emithonjeni yaseNingizimu Afrika, kanye nomthetho 
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USE OF SOURCES AND TERMINOLOGY 
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strictly limited to the duration of my visit. Internet sources could not be justified 
similar to usual text, and in some cases the long web references in footnotes will 
not seem neat - however, this is an inherent problem in the software used and the 
format of internet sources. 
The terminology used in the specific jurisdiction analysed will be used as far as 
possible in a specific chapter, for instance trader, supplier or seller, purchaser, 
consumer, or lessor. The terms contract and agreement are also used 
interchangeably in this thesis. The spelling of ‘time-share’ is different in each 
jurisdiction. Therefore, I have used ‘time-share’ for purposes of uniformity 
throughout this thesis, except where specific legislation or terminology is quoted, in 
which case the spelling in the relevant jurisdiction’s legislation is reflected. 
In some instances, it was not possible to access the prescribed or usual form of 
reference of court judgments, and in these circumstances the reference of the 
source as found, is used. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and background 
The purpose of consumer protection legislation is to strike a balance between the 
rights and perceived vulnerabilities of the consumer on the one hand, and the rights 
and obligations of the supplier of goods or services on the other.1 Consumer 
protection legislation aims, in the main, to give consumers the confidence to contract 
freely under regulated conditions.2 But ill-considered consumer legislation could 
potentially be detrimental to the consumer and adversely affect established 
common-law principles intended to treat all parties to an agreement fairly.3 Although 
the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 20084 regulates consumer law, consumer 
agreements are still governed by the common law unless specifically otherwise 
provided by legislation. It is further notable that section 2(10) of the CPA provides 
that, ‘[n]o provision of this Act must be interpreted so as to preclude a consumer 
from exercising any rights afforded in terms of the common law’. 
The common law has developed over centuries and aims to treat all parties to a 
contract fairly.5 Despite this laudable objective, the indiscriminate and strict 
enforcement of certain common-law maxims and principles can prejudice 
consumers. 
The first common-law principle that could result in consumer exploitation is 
contractual freedom. Freedom of contract allows parties to decide, without 
interference, whether or not, with whom, and on what terms to contract. As 
consumers are generally in an unequal bargaining position compared to suppliers,6 
freedom of contract can lead to a take-it-or-leave-it situation for many consumers. 
This results in the consumer having limited or no freedom to negotiate individual 
contract terms to his or her benefit. 
An important common-law principle aimed at preserving the sanctity of 
agreements,7 is pacta servanda sunt – honour the agreement.8  By encouraging 
 
1 Department of Trade and Industry Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 
published in Government Gazette (hereafter GG) 26774 of 9 September 2004 under Government 
Notice 1957 of 2004 (hereafter Green Paper) 4; s 3(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008 (hereafter the CPA); Barnard LLD 1. 
2 Green Paper 4. 
3 Du Preez (2009) TSAR 63; Stoop (2015) PER 1118. 
4 Hereafter CPA. 
5 See Ch 3 para 3.6; Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Ltd and 
Another 2016 (1) SA 621 (CC) para [37] (Mighty Solutions); Pearl Assurance Co v Union 
Government 1934 AD 563. 
6 For a discussion of inferior or unequal bargaining positions, see Ch 2 paras 2.4.2 and 2.5. 
7 Sharrock Business Transactions 94; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 12-13, 518-519, 548. 
The Appeal Court recently confirmed, interpreted, and applied this principle in Mohamed’s Leisure 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 314 (SCA) para [32] 
(hereafter Mohamed’s Leisure); Eiselen (1989) THRHR 517-523. 




parties to perform their contractual duties and obligations pacta servanda sunt 
further promotes legal certainty and predictability in business.9 The fulfilment of a 
contract in case of a breach by either party, can take the form of specific 
performance, or the remedy of awarding damages as a substitute for performance.10 
Rescission of contracts is regarded as a serious remedy because it does not follow 
and apply the maxim pacta servanda sunt and is therefore limited to exceptional 
circumstances.11 When pacta servanda sunt is enforced indiscriminately, 
consumers could be bound by contracts containing onerous conditions for an 
extended period. 
Caveat emptor,12 is a third, well-established common-law principle. Literally 
translated it means ‘buyer beware’ and can also negatively affect consumers in that 
given their inferior bargaining position,13 their only option is to conclude the contract 
or to walk away, even while they are aware of potentially onerous terms and 
conditions. As many consumers are not financially able to pay cash for a purchase 
(eg, a cell phone) they have no choice but to enter into a standard-form agreement 
which might or might not suit their individual circumstances. Therefore, consumers 
can often not benefit from the maxim caveat emptor as they are not in a position to 
re-negotiate the prejudicial terms and conditions of a standard-form contract. 
At common law, a contract comes into existence when two or more parties agree to 
its essential terms and so create rights and obligations resulting in a legally binding 
agreement.14  In the normal course of business, an agreement terminates once the 
contracting parties have fulfilled the rights and obligations undertaken.15 Breach of 
contract occurs when one or more of the parties to the agreement fails to fulfil the 
obligations undertaken as a result of repudiation, failure to perform, positive default, 
or when performance is prevented.16 The common-law remedies for breach of 
 
9 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 661; Mohamed’s Leisure para [23]; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 
517-523. 
10 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 882-885; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 189-192; Bradfield 
Christie’s Law of Contract 616-618; Mohamed’s Leisure para [23]. See the discussion in Ch 3 para 
3.4. 
11 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 877; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 619; Mohamed’s Leisure 
para [32]. See the discussion of this aspect in Ch 3 paras 3.2.2 and 3.4.3 and Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.7 
and par 4.4.5. 
12 Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 163. 
13 For a discussion of inferior or unequal bargaining positions see Ch 2 paras 2.4.2 and 2.5. 
14 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 736; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 7; Bradfield Christie’s Law 
of Contract 28. 
15 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 829; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 503; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 3. Contracts can also terminate because of impossibility of performance in terms of 
the contract, insolvency or death of one of the parties, mutual agreement, effluxion of time, due 
notice, and merger, Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 570-588.  
16 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 858; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 142; Bradfield Christie’s 




contract are aimed either at the fulfilment of the contract (specific performance), or 
at its rescission.17 
In the CPA an ‘agreement’ is defined as, ‘an arrangement or understanding between 
two or more parties that purports to establish a relationship in law between or among 
them’.18 The CPA differs conceptually from the common-law principle of pacta 
servanda sunt as can be seen in section 14 which regulates the premature 
termination of fixed-term contracts. Section 14(2)(b)(i) specifically provides that a 
consumer may cancel an agreement upon expiry, subject to section 14(3)(a); or at 
any other time by giving 20 days’ notice to the supplier, again subject to subsections 
14(3)(a) and (b). When a consumer cancels a fixed-term agreement because of the 
poor performance or lack of performance by the supplier, the consumer remains 
liable, under section 14(3), for amounts owing to the supplier up to the date of 
cancellation. The supplier may also impose a reasonable cancellation penalty in 
contemplation of the agreement running its term.19 Section 14(3) may indeed 
prejudice a consumer if a supplier fails to perform or performs inadequately. 
The CPA, therefore aims, amongst other objectives, to protect consumers against 
the shortcomings and strict interpretation and application of the common-law 
maxims freedom of contract, pacta servanda sunt, and caveat emptor. 
1.2 Problem statement and research question 
The problem researched in this thesis is whether the consumer in a fixed-term 
agreement under section 14 of the CPA is in a better position than he or she would 
be as party to a similar agreement under the common law. This thesis focuses, in 
the main, on two aspects of section 14. First, is a consumer who, based on poor or 
non-performance by the supplier, terminates a fixed-term contract prematurely 
under section 14(2)(b) of the CPA,20 in a worse position than he or she would be 
when doing so under South African common law? And second, should the duration 
of fixed-term contracts be limited by statute? 
 
17 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 872-875, 877-882; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 188-211; 
Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 616; Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 149-151. See the 
discussion in Ch 3 paras 3.3 and 3.4. 
18 Section 1 CPA. 
19 Similar to the common-law ‘roukoop’, see De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 216. 
20 Section 2(10) provides that the CPA will not deprive a consumer of his common-law rights. In 
practice, a consumer will have to approach the ombud, consumer court, alternative dispute 
resolution, the Commission or the Tribunal, most of which are creatures of statute and in practice 
do not necessarily have the experience or knowledge to adjudicate on common-law issues or 
develop the common law. Therefore, it appears that the CPA does not assist the consumer in 
these circumstances to the same extent as it does the supplier by explicitly providing an express 
remedy (the consumer remains liable for amounts owed, and the supplier is entitled to a 
reasonable cancellation penalty) in s 14 in these circumstances. Section 69(d) further complicates 
the matter as that section provides that a consumer may only approach a court if all other remedies 
in terms of the national laws of South Africa have been exhausted. This naturally has time and cost 
implications that would discourage the ordinary consumer wanting to act upon, for instance, a cell 
phone or gym membership agreement, as the amount in question would not justify the legal costs. 




To consider these and related issues objectively, I undertake a comparative study 
of the positions in Singapore and the United Kingdom21 (both common-law systems). 
I evaluate the position of fixed-term contracts under the CPA to establish whether 
South Africa can learn from these jurisdictions’ consumer protection legislation. 
Apart from their common-law systems, Singapore and the UK are suitable subjects 
for comparison in that both have modern consumer legislation adopted in the recent 
past.22 Singapore regularly updates and amends its Consumer Protection (Fair 
Trading) Act (CPFTA),23 and has recently expanded the mandate of its Competition 
and Consumer Commission to allow it to act more proactively.24 The CPFTA, for 
example, specifically provides for a blacklist in section 11 of its Second Schedule 
which caters for terms that are so ‘harsh, oppressive, or excessively one-sided so 
as to be unconscionable’. The Consumer Protection Association in Singapore 
(CASE) is very active; it advocates for amendments, releases consumer guides, 
and publishes a consumer magazine.25  
The UK has recently consolidated its consumer protection legislation into a new Act 
– the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA).26 The CRA is intended to modernise 
consumer law and keep pace with technological advances.27 In addition, European 
Union28 law has been incorporated into UK law,29 which has enriched UK law with 
EU Directives, Guidance on EU Directives and judgments from all countries within 
the EU.30 Although neither Singapore nor the UK has a single provision specifically 
 
21 Hereafter UK. 
22 Yu available at www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/sec/library/ 1011in11-e.pdf (date of use: 10 
May 2018). 
23 (Chapter 52A) Original Enactment 27 of 2003 came into operation on 1 March 2004. 
24 Chia available at https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/caveat-emptor-the-new-face-of-consumer-
protection-in-singapore (date of use: 23 June 2020); https://www.cccs.gov.sg/about-cccs (date of 
use: 23 June 2020).  
25 The organisation’s website address is https://www.case.org.sg/consumer_guides_cpfta.aspx 
(date of use: 10 May 2018). 
26 This Act came into operation on 1 October 2015. 
27 Conway ‘The House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP6588’ of 18 May 2017 1-8 available at 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06588/SN06588.pdf (date of use: 10 May 
2018). 
28 Hereafter EU. The EU is a European political and economic union established in 1993 when the 
Maastricht Treaty came into force. The EU has developed an internal EU market with standardised 
legislation. See https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union (date of use: 16 January 
2020).The EU was preceded by the EEC that was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. See 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union/Creation-of-the-European-Economic-Community 
(date of use: 16 January 2020). 
29 The UK incorporated EU law while still a member of the EU. 
30 As the UK was part of the EU, it remains to be seen how its exit from the Union will affect this 
position in future. The UK’s decision to leave the EU will be referred to as Brexit. See 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/europe/what-is-brexit.html (date of use: 21 June 
2019); https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brexit (date of use: 21 June 2019). For a general discussion of 
the effects of Brexit, see https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/brexit-european-union-britain-
united-kingdom-theresamay-uk-election-result-latest-europe-news-today-97421/ (date of use: 21 
June 2019) and for an analysis of the legal implications of Brexit, see Gee et al 
https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/collegeartslaw/law /iel/leaving-EU-legal-impact-brexit-





regulating fixed-term agreements in its consumer legislation, I will examine other 
provisions in their consumer legislation which regulate aspects covered by section 
14 of the CPA. This perspective enables an objective analysis to establish the true 
purpose, role, effect, necessity and merit of section 14 of the CPA. In addition, this 
perspective further assists in considering whether general principle-based 
provisions in the CPA would fulfill the same purpose, and perhaps improve the 
position of parties in cases of early termination of the agreement based on breach 
by the supplier, and by not unnecessarily limiting the duration of fixed-term 
agreements.  
1.3 Research objectives 
In addressing the problem statement, and to answer the research questions posed 
above, section 14 is analysed under the following themes: 
• The philosophy underlying the trend to protect consumers by introducing 
consumer protection legislation. 
• The common-law position of parties to an agreement terminated 
prematurely by a consumer on the basis of the supplier’s poor or non-
performance. 
• An analysis, evaluation, and critique of the legal position of the parties to 
an agreement when a consumer prematurely terminates a fixed-term 
contract under section 14 of the CPA based on the supplier’s poor or 
non-performance. 
• A comparison between the premature termination of an agreement under 
section 14 of the CPA and under common law and an evaluation of which 
better serves the consumer. 
• An examination of whether the limitation on the duration of fixed-term 
contracts is advantageous to the parties to these contracts. 
• An evaluation of whether the CPA achieves the purposes and aims 
stated in its preamble, in its section 3, in terms of the philosophy 
underpinning consumer protection, the Green Paper, and the 
introduction of the CPA in respect of fixed-term agreements. 
• I compare the position of the South African consumer in these 
circumstances to those of consumers in Singapore and the UK 
respectively, to evaluate the fixed-term provisions under the CPA 
objectively. 
• If necessary, I will make suitable recommendations for the amendment 
of section 14 of the CPA, or other relevant provisions that affect 
consumers in fixed-term contracts, in order to provide adequate 
protection for consumers under fixed-term contracts under the CPA. 
 
Many factors potentially play a role in the interpretation and application of section 
14 of the CPA. When these are not addressed directly in section 14, they are 
regarded as secondary themes and are set out under the scope and limitations 




parties under fixed-term contracts are excluded from the thesis, and listed as such 
under the exclusions below. 
1.4 Scope and limitations of the thesis  
The main focus of this thesis is section 14 of the CPA. However, before considering 
the position of consumers in fixed-term contracts under section 14 and the common 
law, it is important to reflect on the philosophy of, the arguments for, and the 
movement towards consumer protection legislation, both internationally and in 
South Africa. 
The study then shifts to examine the position of the consumer and supplier in 
consumer-type agreements under the common law with due regard to the Green 
Paper, constitutional principles, and the purposes and aims of the CPA. An in-depth 
analysis of section 14 of the CPA follows, in which I study the positions of the 
consumer and the supplier on premature termination of a fixed-term contract, and 
highlight other aspects of the CPA relevant to fixed-term contracts. 
Following this, I evaluate the provisions of the CPA by comparing the position of 
parties under section 14 of the CPA to that of parties in fixed-term agreements under 
consumer protection legislation in Singapore and the UK with reference to the 
duration of agreements, the right of the consumer to terminate the agreement due 
to breach of contract by the supplier, and other aspects affecting consumers in fixed-
term agreements. Finally, I will conclude the thesis and propose amendments to the 
CPA to improve the position of consumers if necessary. 
Although various factors, including but not limited to general principles of contract 
law, fairness, ubuntu,31 and the Constitution may, in certain circumstances, play a 
role, these aspects are not considered in detail as they are neither expressly dealt 
with in section 14, nor generally of particular relevance to standard section 14 fixed-
term agreements – eg, an agreement to purchase a cell-phone, or for the provision 
of airtime or similar services by the cell phone service provider. Other secondary 
aspects not considered in detail are the application, enforcement, and jurisdiction of 
enforcement agencies and the courts, public policy, and bona fides. 
1.5 Exclusions 
Aspects of contract law – under both common law and legislation – which do not 
impact directly on section 14 agreements, are excluded. In the chapters dealing with 
Singapore and the UK, I discuss only those aspects or principles of the common 
law of contract pertinent to the regulation of fixed-term contracts. 
 
31 Because ubuntu originated in South Africa, and is in one of the official languages, the word is not 






In this thesis the research takes the form of a literature review. Textbooks, statutes, 
journal articles, case law, dissertations, theses, online sources,32 and other related 
materials have been consulted to research, analyse, comment on, study, and make 
legal comparison of the problem statement and research objectives so as to 
propose a possible solution to the problem.  
1.7 The proposed structure of the research 
Chapter 1 – provides a roadmap to this thesis by introducing the topic, stating the 
research question, objectives and scope, limitations, and exclusions. 
Chapter 2 – offers a brief history and highlights the philosophy behind the protection 
of consumers and the trend to protect vulnerable consumers, before introducing the 
United Nations’ guidelines for consumer protection. 
Chapter 3 – is an analysis of the common-law position of consumers in South Africa 
who terminate a fixed-term agreement prematurely because of the poor or non-
performance of the supplier. Chapter 3 also considers the duration of contracts. 
Chapter 4 – is a critical analysis of the Green Paper, the purpose and aims of the 
CPA impacting directly on fixed-term contracts, section 14 of the CPA, and other 
relevant provisions in the CPA, to establish the advantages and disadvantages of 
the provisions of section 14. Chapter 4 will also consider whether section 14 has 
fulfilled the objectives, aims and purposes envisaged in the Green Paper, the 
preamble of the CPA, and section 3 of the CPA which sets out the purposes and 
policy of the CPA. 
Chapter 5 – compares the situations in South Africa and Singapore. 
Chapter 6 – consumers under fixed-term contracts in South Africa and the UK are 
compared. 
Chapter 7 – summarises and concludes the thesis and offers recommendations for 
possible legislative amendments to improve the position of the consumer under 
fixed-term contracts where expedient. 
 
32 The electronic references provided may in certain cases have been moved, or no longer be 
available. Regarding the electronic sources referred to in Ch 5 dealing with Singapore, these were 
kindly made available to me while I was a visiting researcher at the National University of 
Singapore, and are only available to registered students and researchers during the actual 
research or registration period at the University. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  The historical and philosophical context of consumer 
protection 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I draw some early examples of measures for consumer protection 
from history to illustrate how timeless these concepts are, before considering 
general philosophical principles applicable to consumer protection. This leads me 
to detail the move from individualism – illustrated by the laissez-faire doctrine – to 
collectivism, which sees the rise of standard-form contracts. The focus then shifts 
to the ever-increasing use of standard-form contracts, and international attempts to 
control the content of these contracts via the United Nations ‘Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection’.1 
Within the limited scope of this study, no exhaustive analysis of the history, theories, 
philosophies, and historical movements which contributed to the evolution of 
consumer protection law and standard-form contracts, is possible. I have, therefore, 
selected certain aspects which illustrate the principles and theories of consumer 
protection measures and highlight important developments that have a direct 
bearing on my thesis topic.2 
2.2 Early history 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Historically, one may discern a universal desire to act fairly and eliminate 
unconscionable trade practices in the interests of both suppliers and consumers. I 
have selected a few interesting and diverse historical texts to illustrate early 
manifestations of consumer protection in religious texts or moral codes. The 
importance of these measures is that although early, informal forms of consumer 
protection existed, they already show the areas of concern which over time 
developed into the consumer protection measures we know today. These measures 
are without exception based on honesty, fairness, justice, and the prevention of 
unconscionable trade practices.3  The examples are presented chronologically with 
 
1 The United Nations (UN) was founded after the Second World War to work towards international 
peace and security, to develop better diplomatic relations between nations, and to promote human 
rights, social progress, and better living conditions. For more information on the history and 
purposes of the UN see https://www.un.org/un70/en/content/history/index.html (date of use: 16 
March 2020). The UN adopted general guidelines for consumer protection on 9 April 1985 see 
https://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/consumption_en.pdf (date of use: 11 February 2020); 
(UN Guidelines). See para 2.6 on the legal status of these Guidelines. 
2 For a detailed discussion of the freedom of contract principle, see Atiyah Freedom of Contract; 
Aronstam Freedom of Contract; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 519; Pretorius (2003) THRHR 640-641; 
Hawthorne (1995) THRHR 162-167. 
3 These attributes show similarities to ubuntu and South African constitutional values in the Bill of 
Rights. 
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no clear division between religious and secular texts, a division which was, in any 
event, foreign to early religious, ethical, and legal codes. 
2.2.2 Babylonian Code 
The codified laws of King Hammurabi of Babylon contain clauses which may be 
regarded as early written examples of consumer protection measures.4 So, clause 
229 provides that if a builder erects a house and it collapses on the owner, the 
builder shall be sentenced to death.5  The Code also regulated the sale of liquor and 
fixed a fair price for beer;6 the cost of shipbuilding was regulated and the shipbuilder 
was obliged to provide a one-year guarantee of the ship’s seaworthiness;7 loans 
and bonds were regulated, and a high interest rate was charged on overdue loans.8 
This early dispensation already illustrates principles of justice and fairness and 
concomitant penalties for perpetrators of fraud. 
2.2.3 The Bible 
Most Old Testament proscriptions deal with health and other societal rules for the 
Israelites. However, various books in the Old Testament condemn false weights and 
measures – one of the earliest consumer protection problems. For example, Amos 
8:4-6 provides:  
‘Hear this, O ye that swallow up the needy, even to make the poor of the land fail, 
Saying, When will the new moon be gone, that we may sell corn and the Sabbath, 
that we may set forth wheat, making the ephah small,9 and the shekel great,10 and 
falsifying the balances by deceit? That we may buy the poor for silver, and the 
needy for a pair of shoes; yea, and sell the refuse of wheat?’11  
 
4 Generally referred to as the Code of Hammurabi, the Code was written between 1792 and 1750 
BC, see https://www.britannica.com/topic/Code-of-Hammurabi (date of use: 1 November 2018); 
Wood Consumer Protection 633. 
5 Wood Consumer Protection 634; Lord Buckmaster referred to this specific Babylonian law in 
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 577-578 (hereafter Donoghue). 
6 Clause 108 of the Code of Hammurabi available at http://iws.collin.edu/mbailey/hammurabi's 
%20laws.htm (date of use: 6 December 2018). 
7 Clause 235 Code of Hammurabi available at http://iws.collin.edu/mbailey/hammurabi's% 
20laws.htm (date of use: 6 December 2018). 
8 For a brief discussion on Babylonian loan agreements, see Schulze LLD 26-27. 
9 Hebrew measure used for dry produce, approximately a third of a bushel (35 litres) available at 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ephah (date of use: 26 September 2018). 
10 Babylonian unit of weight equal to about a quarter to half an ounce available at 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/shekel?s=t (date of use: 26 September 2018). 
11 King James Version The Bible Amos 8:4-6 available at www.christianity.com/bible/bible.php 
?q=Amos+8&ver=kjv (date of use: 24 August 2018). The book of Amos was written in 
approximately the 8th century BC, see https://www.britannica.com/topic/Book-of-Amos (date of use: 
1 November 2018). Other similar texts are Leviticus 19:35-36; Deuteronomy 25:13-16; Ezekiel 
45:9-10; Hosea 12:7-8; Micah 6:10-14; and  Proverbs 10:10. 
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Similarly, Micah chapter 6:10-11 reads: ‘Are there yet the treasures of wickedness 
in the house of the wicked, and the scant measure that is abominable? Shall I count 
them pure with the wicked balances, and with the bag of deceitful weights?’12 
These and other examples deal with fairness – in particular the standardisation of 
measures used to sell wheat – and are aimed at preventing fraudulent behaviour by 
merchants resulting in the exploitation of the poor. 
2.2.4 Indian texts13 
In ancient India, texts estimated to have been written between the eighth century 
BC and the second century AC,14 deal with economic life by introducing codes and 
guidelines based on human rights, values, and fair-trade practices.15 These codes 
are divided into Dharmashastras16 that deal with the religious, moral, social, and 
legal duties of the individual; and the Arthashastra, that deals with the duties of the 
authorities or rulers to punish offenders.17 
Among the matters regulated by these codes are debt, loans, and interest rates; 
strict control over services delivered to customers; control measures on weights, 
substitutions, and pilfering of precious materials; regulations on the washing of 
clothes for customers; and measures controlling weavers to prevent extra weighting 
of fabrics by soaking threads in rice gruel. Even medical practitioners were regulated 
– doctors had to inform authorities if a proposed medical procedure posed a risk to 
the life of a patient.18 
 
12 See https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Micah+6&version=KJV (date of use: 20 
September 2019). 
13 Although I do not formally compare the position in India in this study, I chose India for this 
historical background because of the interesting and comprehensive nature of these historical 
measures – and the fact that they illustrate a sophisticated system which even provided for 
competition law aspects that have a direct bearing on consumer protection measures. 
14 Such as the Manu Smitri, Laws of Manu  available at https://www.britannica.com/topic/Manu-
smriti (date of use: 24 January 2019); Narada Smitri, procedural and substantive law ascribed to 
Narada, a divine sage, see https://www.sandiegoreader.com/news/2012/feb/16/excerpts-narada-
smriti/# (date of use: 24 January 2019); Brihaspati Smitri – the Smitris were Hindu religious texts in 
Sanskrit that contained traditional teachings on religion, the word literally means remembrance, 
see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/smitri (date of use: 24 October 2018); Prasad 
(2008) JTCL 133; and Arthashastra, a work attributed to Kautilya, mainly concerned with public 
law, competition law, tax and administration, see https://www.britannica.com/topic/Artha-shastra 
(date of use: 24 January 2019). The Arthashastra dealt with punishments by rulers or the state; 
Prasad (2008) JTCL 133. 
15 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 147; Prasad (2008) JTCL 133. 
16 Text mainly concerned with Hindu family law and legal administration, see 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dharma-shastra (date of use: 24 January 2019). 
17 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 148. For a detailed discussion of the link between consumer law and 
competition law – and a proposal that there should be a unified theory on competition and 
consumer protection law—see Lande & Averitt (1997) Antitrust LJ 713-756; Albors-Llorens (2014) 
Yearbook of European Law 163-193. 
18 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 151. 
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If services or goods were not performed or delivered in accordance with the 
agreement concerned, it was regarded as a breach of contract and the customer 
did not have to pay the purchase price. The fine or punishment for these offences 
was severe and the guilty party could be banished by the king and obliged to pay a 
fine as compensation to the customer.19 Both the Manu Smitri and the Narada Smitri 
provided that a dissatisfied purchaser could return the item and was entitled to a 
refund of the purchase price according to prescribed tables and within periods 
prescribed for the return of the item.20 
The purchase prices of all goods were fixed by guilds or the state, depending on 
their quality, origin, the time and expertise required to produce the item, how long 
the item had been stored, and the seller’s outlay.21 This emphasises the importance 
of fairness in trade and was aimed at the protection of consumers.22 A head of 
commerce regulated monopolies, and unfair trade practices were prohibited, even 
state monopolies, like mines, minerals, and salt mines all of which belonged to the 
king, were checked by the superintendent of commerce.23 Weights and measures 
were strictly regulated and inspected every six months.24 
There were also laws regulating the consumer who was required to act responsibly 
and not purchase items at an unreasonably low price. He or she had to inspect the 
res vendita carefully, and after approving it could not return it. The period allowed 
for inspection and approval differed depending on the merchandise concerned – eg, 
five days for beasts of burden, while seven days were allowed for precious stones.25 
According to Manu, a consumer should only pay a deposit to a person of good 
standing,26 which points to the level of care and responsibility required of 
consumers, and reflects a balanced approach which also protects suppliers and 
merchants. 
Here, for the first time, we see more sophisticated consumer protection measures 
regulating not only merchants and suppliers, but also consumers, government 
officials, and even the king.27 
 
19 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 152-153. 
20 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 154. These rules are similar to modern-day guarantees and warranties, 
‘appro’, and cooling-off periods. See the discussion in Ch 3 para 3.2.13 and Ch 4 para 4.3.3.4. 
21 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 155; Prasad (2008) JTCL 133. 
22 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 155. 
23 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 155; Prasad (2008) JTCL 133. 
24 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 156; Prasad (2008) JTCL 133. 
25 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 156; Prasad (2008) JTCL 133. Similar to ‘appro’, see the discussion in 
Ch 3 para 3.2.13 and Ch 4 para 4.3.3.4. 
26 Goyal et al (2013) JHV 157. This shows similarities to the caveat emptor maxim. 
27 Consequently also providing for public competition-law aspects of the economy. 




Islamic law refers to and regulates the position of the consumer, and provides 
general principles to ensure honesty and protect consumers.29 Numerous verses in 
the Quran record the obligation to act honestly and justly.30 Surah Mutaffifin31 
stipulates in Quran 83:1-3: ‘Woe to the stinters;32 those who, when they take from 
others by measure, take their full share; but who, when they measure or weigh for 
others, give less than their due.’33 
These religious rules, based on honesty and fairness, show a remarkable similarity 
to those contained in other religious texts. 
2.2.6 Roman law 
Information on and sources of law in early Roman times are rare as the Gaelic Fire 
destroyed virtually all legal sources in approximately 387 BC.34 While not much is 
known about early Roman history, in approximately 300 BC Rome was primarily an 
agrarian society with each household forming a community. The paterfamilias35 
stood at the head of the family, which included his wife, children, and slaves, all of 
whom were subject to his power and discretion.36 Between the third and first 
centuries BC, the Romans extended their power and eventually controlled a large 
part of the ancient world, including Asia Minor,37 Egypt, and other areas of North 
Africa, the Southern and Western parts of Europe, and the Near East. As a result, 
societies changed from a rural to an urban lifestyle, which, in turn, resulted in the 
development of commerce, industry, and finance, and a more sophisticated legal 
system.  
 
28 Written between 609 and 632 AD see https://www.quora.com/According-to-Islam-when-was-the-
first-Quran-written (date of use: 1 November 2018). 
29 Khan (2011) Islamabad LR 87; Bakar & Amin (2011) IJSPS 37-38; Islamic law is also known as 
Shari’ah. 
30 Only a few examples are provided – Surah Al-Humazah 104:1-4; Surah Al-Rahman 55:9 and 
Surah Al-Baqarah 2:190. 
31 Surah is a chapter in the Quran, see https://www.britannica.com/topic/surah (date of use: 24 
January 2019) and Mutaffifin is derived from tatfif which means inferior – generally used in the 
sense of indicating a short weight or measure that is provided fraudulently. See 
http://www.islamicstudies.info/tafheem.php?sura=83 (date of use: 24 January 2019). 
32 This means fraudsters, see https://www.islamicstudies.info/tafheem.php?sura=83 (date of use: 
21 September 2019). 
33 See https://www.islamicstudies.info/tafheem.php?sura=83 (date of use: 21 September 2019). 
34 Van Zyl Geskiedenis 21. 
35 ‘Head of the family’ see Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 253; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 
7. 
36 The Twelve Tables developed through interpretation and formed the basis of statutory law during 
this period. See Kaser Roman Law 3; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 4. 
37 Anatolia, today a part of Turkey, see https://www.britannica.com/place/Anatolia  (date of use: 6 
November 2018). 
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The Romans were influenced greatly by Greek culture, and this was an important 
factor in the development of a more sophisticated, ordered legal system.38 The 
Roman legal system reached its pinnacle during the Principate,39 with jurists of the 
time described as creative, precise, and subtle in their application and analysis of 
the law.40 
Although the concept of contractual freedom was unknown at that time, contracts 
were freely negotiated in Roman law because of the flexibility of the stipulatio.41 It 
follows, therefore, that a considerable degree of freedom already existed in practice 
in Roman law, although this freedom was limited by formalities.42 However, freedom 
of contract as a formally accepted principle of law only emerged during the Middle 
Ages43 with the development of the maxim pacta servanda sunt.44 
Roman law knew several measures for the protection of purchasers – a seller was 
obliged to protect the purchaser against the risk of damage to or loss of the res 
vendita before delivery;45 he or she had to deliver the res vendita to the purchaser;46 
provide vacant possession of the res vendita; and indemnify the purchaser against 
both excussion,47 and latent defects.48 
The decline of the Roman Empire49 led to the decline of the legal system and 
eventually, to the disappearance of the classical way of thinking, resulting in the 
development of so-called vulgar law during the Middle Ages.50 
The outstanding characteristic of the Roman law heritage is that it is sophisticated, 
fair, and based on justice for all. While it was the first purely legal system to develop, 
it has retained value, and Roman law is still highly regarded and applied today.51 
 
38 Based on analysis and synthesis. 
39 27 BC – 284 AD; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 4-5. 
40 Kaser Roman Law 4; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 5. Roman jurisprudence always tended to be 
practical and less theoretical. See Kaser Roman Law 5. 
41 Eiselen (1989) THRHR 519. The stipulatio developed from a verbal agreement that was an 
important legal action in Roman law. It was a one-sided contract based on a promise or pledge, 
and only one right and one obligation were created by the stipulatio. See Van Zyl Geskiedenis 281-
283. 
42 Eiselen (1989) THRHR 519-520. 
43 Roughly between 500 AD and approximately 1400. See 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Middle-Ages (date of use: 16 March 2020). 
44 Eiselen (1989) THRHR 520. 
45 Van Zyl Geskiedenis 290-291. 
46 Van Zyl Geskiedenis 291-292; Kaser Roman Law 214. 
47 Van Zyl Geskiedenis 293; Kaser Roman Law 215. 
48 Van Zyl Geskiedenis 294-295; Kaser Roman Law 217-218. 
49 307-337 AC Kaser Roman Law 5. 
50 Vulgar law can be described as the law of laymen. See Kaser Roman Law 5. 
51 See, eg, the recent decision Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Ltd 
and Another 2016 (1) SA 621 (CC) para [1] (hereafter Mighty Solutions). 
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For purposes of this study, the importance of Roman law is that our common-law of 
contract is based on Roman law principles to which our courts frequently refer.52 
Both religious and legal systems had similar rules aimed at the just and fair 
treatment of consumers and merchants alike, and at providing the parties with 
remedies in cases of breach. These measures further aimed at preventing 
fraudulent and unconscionable behaviour by merchants, and the exploitation of the 
poor. The characteristic of these early consumer protection measures is the 
standardisation of weights and measures for basic commodities like wheat and ale. 
 
2.3 History from the Middle Ages onwards 
2.3.1 England 
In England, measures controlling uniform weight date back to the first version of the 
Magna Carta Libertatum,53 commonly known as the Magna Carta, a document 
initially drafted by the Archbishop of Canterbury and first agreed to by King John of 
England on 15 June 1215. Lord Denning regarded the Magna Carta as ‘…the 
greatest constitutional document of all times – the foundation of the freedom of the 
individual against the arbitrary authority of the despot’.54 Clause 35 of the Charter 
contains consumer protection measures:55  
‘There shall be standard measures of wine, ale, and corn (the London quarter),56 
throughout the kingdom. There shall also be a standard width of dyed cloth, 
russett, and haberject,57 namely two ells within the selvedges.58 Weights are to be 
standardised similarly.’59 
 
52 Baines Motors v Piek 1955 (1) SA 534 (A), 540-547 (Baines); Mighty Solutions 629.  
53 The Great Charter of the Liberties, commonly referred to as the Magna Carta available at 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Magna-Carta (date of use: 24 January 2019). 
54 Lord Dyson available at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/mor-speech-
magna-carta-religion1.pdf (date of use: 22 September 2019). 
55 The clauses in the original document were not numbered, this was done in 1759 by Sir William 
Blackstone, see Prest (2016) NCLR 1495. 
56 For a discussion of the standardisation of measures see 
https://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/read/magna_carta_1215/Clause_35 (date of use: 8 June 2020). 
57 Russett was a reddish-brown fabric worn mainly by the poor, and haberject was a cloth of mixed 
colour often worn by monks. See https://thehistoryofengland.co.uk/resource/magna-carta-the-
great-charter-of-liberties-of-king-john-1215/ (date of use: 2 November 2018). 
58 A selvedge is the edge of fabric, woven to prevent raveling. See 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/selvedge (date of use: 12 December 2018). 
59 English translation available at 
https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/academics/founders/MagnaCarta.pdf (date of use: 12 
December 2018). The original Clause 35 reads: ‘Una mensura vini sit per totum regnum nostrum, 
et una mensura cervisie, et una mensura bladi, scilicet quarterium Londoniense, et una latitudo 
pannorum tinctorum et russetorum et halbergettorum, scilicet due ulne infra listas; de ponderibus 
autem sit ut de mensuris’, see http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/magnacarta.html (date of use: 12 
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Clause 45 deals with the enforcement of law and court officials: ‘We will appoint as 
justices, constables, sheriffs, or other officials, only men that know the law of the 
realm and are minded to keep it well.’60 Both of these clauses accentuate the 
importance and need for preventative measures against the exploitation of 
defenceless consumers. 
The principle (pacta servanda sunt) originated from the medieval canonists who 
adopted Roman law concepts to serve their own purposes. A pact could extinguish 
an obligation, but was not a cause of action. Grotius was instrumental in establishing 
the principle in Roman-Dutch law and he regarded the maxim as the basis of 
positive law.61 
In the pre-industrial period consumers had little choice of product. There were also 
virtually no measures to prevent the exploitation of consumers who were expected 
to fend for themselves in line with the maxim caveat emptor.62 The relationship 
between seller and consumer was much more personal than in the industrial period, 
and if a seller failed to deliver good service, or was dishonest, he or she would more 
than likely struggle to find customers.63 There were basic laws regulating the pricing, 
weight, and quality of bread, and the measure of ale – eg, the Assize of Bread and 
Ale dating from 1226.64 Leet courts which sought to protect consumers developed 
in England during the seventeenth century.65 The purpose of these courts was to 
 
December 2018). Clause 45: ‘Nos non faciemus justiciarios, constabularios, vicecomites, vel 
ballivos, nisi de talibus qui sciant legem regni et eam bene velint observare’. Available at 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/magnacarta.html (date of use: 12 December 2018). 
60 English translation available at 
www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/academics/founders/MagnaCarta.pdf (date of use: 12 December 
2018). Clause 45: ‘Nos non faciemus justiciarios, constabularios, vicecomites, vel ballivos, nisi de 
talibus qui sciant legem regni et eam bene velint observare’. Available at 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/magnacarta.html (date of use: 12 December 20180. 
61 See Eiselen (1989) THRHR 521. For an analysis of the history and development of this principle 
see Visser (1984) SALJ 641-655. Visser explains that this principle originated from Roman law and 
related to pacta or pacts, a term originally used in the sense of an agreement to redeem an 
obligation for liability in respect of a personal injury. Also see Visser (1984) SALJ 649-651; Eiselen 
(1989) THRHR 521-522. Grotius (De Groot) accepted limitations on the principle, amongst others 
in respect of employment agreements and usurious profits. See Eiselen (1989) THRHR 522; De 
Groot 3 19 6; 3 19 13 De iure belli ac pacis; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 530; De Groot 3 10 9; 3 10 10; 
De iure belli ac pacis 2 12 20. 
62 For a discussion of the development of the maxim caveat emptor see Hamilton 1133-1187 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=3488&conte
xt=ylj (date of use: 19 September 2019). 
63 Khan (2017) JAASSH 40. 
64 Later measures were the Weight and Measures Act of 1795 and the Bread Act of 1836. See 
Khan (2017) JAASSH 41; see also https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-
0289.1956.tb00665.x (date of use: 6 April 2019). 
65 Khan (2017) JAASSH 40. These courts were criminal courts for petty offences, see 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/court-leet (date of use: 9 October 2018). 
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regulate trading standards and proper measures, amongst others for the pricing and 
measuring of ale and bread.66 
The Industrial Revolution67 brought radical change. When machine manufacture 
developed, society changed from agrarian to urban as people moved from rural 
areas to cities to work in factories. The trade sector became less personal, and 
consumers did not necessarily know who manufactured their goods. A large variety 
of products became available and the different producers or manufacturers 
competed fiercely for business. As a result, the quality of goods improved and 
producers became more competitive.68 
As society became more industrialised during the nineteenth century, it developed 
from a subsistence population to a mass consumer society.69 This led to 
circumstances where consumers did not know producers personally, and could 
therefore easily be misled, as the theory of individualism and the maxim caveat 
emptor prevailed.70  
The 1892 judgment in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company71 marked a definite 
move towards improved protection for consumers. In this case the sellers, 
manufacturers of a medicine called the Carbolic Smoke Ball, claimed in newspaper 
advertisements they would pay £100 to anyone who contracted influenza after 
having used their Carbolic Smoke Ball as directed. The purchaser, a Mrs Carlill, 
used the Smoke Ball as directed but still contracted flu. The sellers argued that the 
advertisement was not an agreement with any specific person. The court found that 
in such a case there was no need to inform the seller of acceptance of the offer, as 
mere performance of the required conditions amounted to acceptance of the offer 
as advertised,72 and it accordingly found in favour of Mrs Carlill.73  
 
66 Khan (2017) JAASSH 40-41; see also https://www.britannica.com/topic/court-leet (date of use: 6 
April 2019). 
67 The Industrial Revolution took place between approximately 1760 and 1840, and refers to 
technological, socio-economic and cultural change when the agrarian and handicraft-based 
economy evolved into an economy in which industry and machine-manufactured goods 
predominated. See https://www.britannica.com/event/Industrial-Revolution (date of use: 16 March 
2020). 
68 Khan (2017) JAASSH 40. 
69 Also referred to as the Industrial Society, see Khan (2017) JAASSH 40; Atiyah Freedom of 
Contract 572-574. 
70 In the decision Parkinson v Lee 102 Eng Rep 389 (hereafter Parkinson) in 1802, the King’s 
Bench still denied the implied warranty of goods sold. The purchaser bought five packets of hops 
seeds from the seller. When the purchaser received the hops, it soon became evident that the 
product he received had been treated with water to increase its weight. At the time of the purchase 
it was impossible for the purchaser to establish that the product was worthless. Although the jury 
found in favour of the purchaser, the court denied the existence of an implied warranty and granted 
absolution from the instance (391-393). See Khan (2017) JAASSH 40; Hawthorne (1995) THRHR 
164. 
71 [1893] 1 QB 256 (1892) (hereafter Carbolic Smoke); Atiyah Freedom of Contract 576. 
72 Carbolic Smoke 262-263. 
73 Carbolic Smoke 269-270. 
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Initially, there was no government intervention to protect consumers, but the many 
cases concerning the law of purchase and sale during the period resulted in the 
Sale of Goods Act 1893, which codified the common law on purchase and sale.74 
Despite this, consumers still did not have a right to safe products or services. 
The twentieth century saw major developments in British consumer law with the 
emergence of large retail shops, large-scale advertising, and greater availability of 
credit to consumers.75  The adjudication of consumer protection-related cases, too, 
saw important movement, notably in the 1932 Scottish case of Donoghue v 
Stevenson.76 In this case, Ms Donoghue bought a sealed, opaque, dark glass bottle 
of ginger beer. Having drunk the ginger beer, she discovered a decomposed snail 
in the bottle. It had been impossible to see the snail while drinking the ginger beer. 
Donoghue claimed to have suffered shock and a serious case of gastro-enteritis as 
a result and claimed damages from the manufacturer. She based her claim on the 
manufacturer’s negligence as she claimed it had a duty to ensure that there were 
no harmful substances or ingredients in its product. The court found that a 
manufacturer owes the consumer a duty of reasonable care to ensure that a product 
that cannot be inspected by the consumer is not harmful to his or her health.77 The 
majority of the court ruled that a manufacturer has a legal duty to take reasonable 
care to ensure the product is not harmful or causes injury.78 
2.3.2 United States79 
In the United States of America (USA), courts also recognised a responsibility on 
the part of manufacturers towards consumers in the 1916 case of MacPherson v 
Buick Motor Company.80 The court held a manufacturer responsible for testing its 
products to verify their safety.81 It further held that a manufacturer is obliged to 
inspect the merx, and that this obligation varies according to the nature and use of 
the merx.82 
2.3.3 Concluding remarks: History of consumer protection 
Technological advances, mass production, the increase in the number of products 
and services available to consumers, and the increased remoteness of transactions, 
made consumers increasingly vulnerable to problems related to quality, safety, and 
in seeking remedies. Internationally this led to a move towards consumer activism 
and the awareness of governments of their need to protect consumers. It became 
 
74 Khan (2017) JAASSH 41-42. 
75 Atiyah Freedom of Contract 573-577. 
76 [1932] AC 562 (hereafter Donoghue). 
77 Donoghue 564. 
78 Donoghue 562, 599, 604, and 620. 
79 I specifically mention the United States of America (USA) here because it was a leader in 
developing consumer protection measures. 
80 217 NY 382 (hereafter Buick). 
81 Buick 394. 
82 Buick 395. 
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clear that, despite consumers’ duty to inform themselves and make rational 
decisions before entering into agreements, they were in need of protection in the 
form of consumer organisations and consumer legislation to improve and promote 
fairness and protection and prevent exploitation.83 
 
2.4 Legal philosophy on freedom to contract and consumer protection 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Legal philosophy plays an important role in the interpretation, application, and 
adjudication of contracts, as well as in the process, thought, and reasons for the 
drafting of legislation and the specific method, approach, and wording of such 
legislation.84 Legal philosophy is a living, ever-changing theory that morphs with the 
changes in society and its values, its beliefs, its changing technologies and politics, 
changing ethical and moral values, and changing socio-economic circumstances. 
The purpose of legal theory is to describe, form, and protect the standards, moral 
values, ethics, and integrity of society.85 There are three main branches of legal 
philosophy:86 
• Descriptive jurisprudence which analyses the law, legal concepts, and 
ideas and does not depend on any single theory or principle.87 
• Normative jurisprudence which seeks to find the purpose of law – it 
studies values, politics, and morals to establish the foundation of law. It 
further seeks to find the ideal. This branch of jurisprudence focuses on 
criticism and reform.88 
• Critical legal theory which acknowledges that the law is intertwined with 
social issues and questions the notion that law is based on reason.89 
 
83 Khan (2017) JAASSH 43; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 533, 539; Hawthorne (1995) THRHR 166; 
Stoop LLD 20-23. As an aside, the secondary purpose of some of the early regulatory measures, 
in India for instance, was to regulate prices, monopolies, and even the king. In other words, these 
regulations fell within the public competition law sphere, and although they protected consumers 
indirectly, the measures were not primarily enacted to protect consumers. This principle still rings 
true today. For more information on the interaction between these two areas of the law see Lande 
& Averitt (1997) Antitrust LJ 713-756. 
84 This study is not a philosophical study, but a brief background is necessary for an understanding 
of the development of consumer protection. A complete philosophical study and analysis cannot be 
undertaken, as that would justify a thesis on its own. Also see Atiyah Freedom of Contract 685-
708; Wacks Understanding Jurisprudence 1. 
85 Wacks Understanding Jurisprudence 13. 
86 This is based on Wacks’s exposition in Understanding Jurisprudence 6-7. 
87 See https://thelawdictionary.org/analytical-jurisprudence/ (date of use: 24 October 2018). 
88 Wacks Understanding Jurisprudence 7; and see 
http://assets.cambridge.org/97805214/60002/frontmatter/9780521460002_frontmatter.pdf (date of 
use: 24 October 2018). 
89 See https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/critical_legal_theory (date of use: 24 October 2018); Wacks 
Understanding Jurisprudence 7. 
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As background to this study, it suffices to mention two main schools of thought in 
legal philosophy – legal positivism, and natural law.90 
Historically, scholars and philosophers have agreed that the ideal circumstances in 
matters of trade were for an individual to have the freedom to exercise his or her 
rights without interference, and that he or she could negotiate the terms and 
conditions of any agreement precisely as he or she wished. Further, the terms 
negotiated would be adhered to and enforced strictly.91 The basis of this idealistic 
theory, which declared that all parties are equal, 92 is believed to lie in the philosophy 
of the libertarian philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.93 
2.4.2 The movement from individualism to collectivism 
The freedom to contract is generally thought to consist of four facets: the freedom 
to contract without interference from government or impositions by government; the 
freedom to contract with whomever one wishes; the freedom to decide not to enter 
into an agreement; and finally, the freedom not to have the concluded agreement 
tampered or interfered with in any way.94 Eiselen adds a fifth dimension, the principle 
that no formal requirements are needed and that mere consensus between 
contracting parties is sufficient to establish a contract. I agree with this view in both 
theory and principle, but experience has shown that in practice this fifth dimension 
is idealistic and does not sufficiently address practical problems – eg, parties failing 
to remember intricate details or dates of an agreement after a few months, and 
difficulty in proving certain conditions in court when an oral agreement is disputed.95 
Freedom of contract is based on the individualist theory which turns on the idea that 
the individual is of vital moral importance, should be autonomous, and has inviolable 
rights.96 In addition, the theory is based on the equality of the parties, and does not 
acknowledge the possibility of the abuse and exploitation of a vulnerable party.97 
Grotius argued that the right to contract was a basic human right related to the 
freedom of choice.98 In England, similar views were held by Locke who advocated 
perfect freedom. He developed his theory around the idea that liberty could be 
 
90 ‘Legal positivism is the thesis that the existence and content of law depends on social facts and 
not on its merits.’ Green L https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legalpositivism/ (date of use: 24 
January 2019). Natural law links morals (what ought to be) to law, see Wacks A Philosophy 1-2. 
91 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 1-16; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 516, 521-522; Pretorius (2003) 
THRHR 640. 
92 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 3; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 525; Pretorius (2003) THRHR 640. 
93 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 1; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 524. 
94 Khan Contract & Mercantile Law 32-33; Aronstam Freedom of Contract 13-14; Eiselen (1989) 
THRHR 518. Also see Pretorius 2003 THRHR 640. 
95 See Eiselen (1989) THRHR 516, 518. 
96 Wacks Understanding Jurisprudence 364; Atiyah Freedom of Contract 256–263; Pretorius 
(2003) THRHR 639-640. 
97 Hawthorne (1995) THRHR 157, 176; Hawthorne (2006) THRHR 53-56; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 
538-539. 
98 Grotius was a stalwart of the natural-law philosophy. See Aronstam Freedom of Contract 1. 
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stated or expressed in terms of fundamental rights.99 Mill100 subsequently contended 
that there should be minimum interference by government in the affairs of society, 
as this would be an impediment to basic freedom and freedom of contract.101 He 
supported the utilitarian philosophy that man is free to do as he or she wishes 
provided that it does not harm others.102 Other philosophers also subscribed to the 
idea that legislation should not interfere with the freedom of contract, and that this 
freedom is important for trade and industry. 103 Adam Smith, for instance, played a 
major role in the laissez-faire104 economic era of the nineteenth century.105 Kessler 
argues that freedom of contract is not only of moral or philosophical importance, but 
that it has value as a practical principle, thus contract law bears and should bear 
characteristics of individualism and of the freedom to contract as one pleases – 
laissez-faire.106 ‘Contract, the language of the cases tells us, is a private affair and 
not a social institution.’107 Freedom of contract forms the basis for the principle that 
parties have the widest possible freedom to contract, that courts cannot and will not 
contract on behalf of parties, that courts will only interpret the terms that parties 
have agreed upon, and that a contract will be enforced by courts.108 
These legal philosophers all believed in minimum state interference, and 
individualism is key to all their theories. 
Laissez-faire embraces the idea that individuals should act in their own interest with 
no interference from government.109 This, ideally, would lead to gain in profits and 
ultimately, to a wealthy society. Therefore, parties were deemed to have entered 
 
99 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 3; Atiyah Freedom of Contract 292-323. It is not possible to even 
scratch the surface of all the important and relevant philosophers who played a role. See Atiyah 
Freedom of Contract 292-323. Only a few are mentioned very briefly. 
100 John Stuart Mill. 
101 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 4. Freedom of contract is the freedom to enter into agreements 
without government restrictions. See https://www.merriam-
webster.com/legal/freedom%20of%20contract (date of use: 16 March 2020). Freedom of contract 
implies that a party to a contract can choose with whom to contract, whether to contract or not, and 
also on what terms to contract. 
102 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 4. 
103 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 4-5. 
104 Laissez–faire literally means ‘allow to do’. See https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/laissez-faire (date of use: 28 January 2019). Figuratively, it is interpreted 
as a philosophy that advocates abstention from interference in individual freedom of choice and 
action. 
105 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 4-5; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 526, 528. Also see Atiyah Freedom 
of Contract for a detailed discussion and numerous references to Adam Smith, especially 221, 299, 
and 304. 
106 Kessler (1943) Colum L Rev 630. 
107 Kessler (1943) Colum L Rev 630. This principle has since changed from individually negotiated 
contracts to standard-form contracts, see Slawson (1984) U Pitt L Rev 23-28; Barnes (2007) WLR 
228-230. 
108 Kessler (1943) Colum L Rev 630-631; Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson LR 19 
Eq 462, 465 (1875). Also see Kessler & Fine (1964) HLR 409-412. 
109 See https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/laissez-faire (date of use: 24 January 
2019). 
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into agreements of their own will and courts upheld these contracts on this basis.110 
This libertarian philosophy also had an important impact on court decisions, both in 
South Africa and elsewhere. Jessel MR observed in Printing and Numerical 
Registries Co v Sampson111 that people should have freedom to contract and that 
contracts entered into freely should be binding and enforced by courts. He held that 
public policy should not lightly interfere with voluntary and free contracts.112 This 
enforcement of contracts entered into freely is known as the principle pacta 
servanda sunt, and is important from the perspective of this study.113 
In South Africa, relying on the judgment by Jessel MR in the Printing case, the 
freedom of contract principle was set out in Wells v South African Alumenite Co.114 
Innes J stated that even if conditions in an agreement are onerous and strict,115 
parties should be held bound by those conditions if the contract was entered into 
freely and in the absence of fraud.116 
This idealistic approach to freedom of contract more often than not led to the 
exploitation of consumers – but this was realised only in the early twentieth 
century.117 Almost immediately, there was criticism of the strict application of the 
freedom of contract principle. Pound, for example, was critical of certain of the USA 
courts’ approach to freedom of contract. As early as 1909 he pointed out that 
common law does not recognise freedom of contract in the form stated by courts in 
 
110 The principle pacta servanda sunt. See Visser (1984) SALJ 641-655; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 
527. 
111 (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 (hereafter Printing). 
112 Printing 465. 
113 This principle is relevant in respect of common-law agreements, standard-form contracts, and 
contracts under s 14 of the CPA because it is crucial in governing the relationship between 
contractual parties as regards fairness, justice, constitutional principles, and ubuntu. For a detailed 
background analysis of this maxim see Visser (1984) SALJ 641-655; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 520-
523. 
114 1927 AD 69 (hereafter Alumenite). 
115 This principle (pacta servanda sunt) originated from the medieval canonists who adopted 
Roman law concepts to serve their own purposes. See Eiselen (1989) THRHR 521. For an 
analysis of the history and development of this principle see Visser (1984) SALJ 641-655. Visser 
explains that this principle originated from Roman law and related to pacta or pacts, a term 
originally used in the sense of an agreement to redeem an obligation for liability in respect of a 
personal injury. A pact could extinguish an obligation, but was not a cause of action. Grotius was 
instrumental in establishing the principle in Roman-Dutch law and he regarded the maxim as the 
basis of positive law. See Visser (1984) SALJ 649-651; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 521-522. Grotius 
(De Groot) accepted limitations on the principle, amongst others in respect of employment 
agreements and usurious profits. See Eiselen (1989) THRHR 522; De Groot 3 19 6; 3 19 13 De 
iure belli ac pacis; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 530; De Groot 3 10 9; 3 10 10; De iure belli ac pacis 2 
12 20. 
116 Alumenite para [73]. Aronstam criticises this harsh point of view by courts in Freedom of 
Contract 182-184. 
117 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 9. Also see Pound (1909) YLJ 454-487 for a full critique. 
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certain states.118 His view on the role of the courts is summarised in the following 
citations:  
‘It has been said that the common law will not help a fool. But, equity exists to help 
and protect him. It is because there are fools to be defrauded and imposed upon, 
and unfortunates to meet with accidents and careless to make mistakes, that we 
have courts of equity.’ 119 
And, on the very strict application of freedom of contract: 
‘The attitude of many of our courts on the subject of liberty of contract is so certain 
to be misapprehended, is so out of the range of the ordinary understanding, the 
decisions themselves are so academic and so artificial in their reasoning.(!) that 
they cannot fail to engender such feeling. Thus, those decisions do an injury 
beyond the failure of a few acts. These acts can be replaced as legislatures learn 
how to comply with the letter of the decisions and to evade the spirit of them. But 
the lost respect for our courts and law cannot be replaced. The evil of those cases 
will live after them in impaired authority of the courts long after the decisions 
themselves are forgotten.’120 
Atiyah regards the classical theory of contract as a failure.121 He ascribes this to its 
potential effect on third parties, the fact that the theory does not address 
competition-related aspects, the ignorance of consumers, and that the law appears 
to be more concerned with the actions of parties than with the contents of the original 
agreements.122 From this, it is submitted that the theory was not sufficiently flexible 
or practical to keep up with real life challenges, sociological circumstances, the 
changing economic environment, fast developing technology, and international 
trends in consumer protection. In addition, Atiyah also observed a general 
deterioration in free choice and in the significance of consent as a contractual 
factor.123 At this point, it is important to reiterate that freedom of contract has never 
been absolute – there have always been limits in all legal systems, especially where 
general interest dictated otherwise.124 Many factors can influence freedom of 
contract: factual, economic, and legal – eg, monopolies and unequal bargaining 
positions. In South Africa, Eiselen recommends that factors such as legislative 
 
118 Pound (1909) YLJ 482-483, 487. He based this criticism mainly on the decision in Godcharles v 
Wigeman 113 Pa St 431. 
119 Pound (1909) YLJ 483. 
120 Pound (1909) YLJ 487. Aronstam Freedom of Contract 211 agrees with this principle and 
suggests that courts in South Africa should also exercise their discretion to advance equity when 
dealing with the doctrine of freedom of contract. 
121 Atiyah Freedom of Contract 693-715. For a critique of Atiyah see Mensch (1981) SLR 753-772, 
especially 767-769. 
122 Atiyah Freedom of Contract 693-715. 
123 Atiyah Freedom of Contract 727-734. 
124 Khan Contract and Mercantile Law vol 1 31. Examples of this principle include legislation to 
regulate basic working conditions, minimum wages, interest rates, and other Acts in the public 
interest. The Constitution is also relevant, eg, ss 13, 23, 36-39. 
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limitations, monopolies, and differences in bargaining position be taken into account 
when investigating the influence and scope of contractual freedom. 125 
Collins regards contracts as a way of distributing wealth.126 He contends that 
contract is based on justice on two levels. First, contract should effect justice in 
exchange where parties contract to acquire services or goods; and second, it should 
effect justice in the social market.127 Hawthorne regards Collins’s view of contracts 
as ideally suited for the 21st century. For Hawthorne the classical theory of contract 
is a perpetuation of colonial exploitation.128 While she welcomes consumer 
protection in the form of legislation, she regards the retention of the freedom of 
contract principle in the common law as a ‘schizophrenic’ situation.129 She proposes 
a co-operative theory for South African contract law to ensure justice and keep 
abreast with international developments.130 
Collectivism gained support as a solution to the deficiencies, shortcomings, and 
criticisms of the philosophy of freedom to contract.131 As a theory, collectivism 
opposes individualism and attempts to address the shortcomings identified by the 
individualist approach, by valuing the greater good of society as a collective above 
that of the individual.132 This theory has gained support internationally and has led 
to the introduction of, amongst others, consumer protection measures.133 This 
philosophy aligns with South Africa’s constitutional democracy, public interest, and 
ubuntu.134 
2.4.3 Concluding remarks: Legal philosophy of freedom of contract 
The individualist theory waned in the face of technological advances, mass 
production, the increase in the number of products and services available to 
consumers, and the increased remoteness of transactions. Consumers became 
more vulnerable to quality and safety issues, and were in need of protection, 
suitable remedies, and assistance when they had been exploited. 
The application and interpretation of the principle of freedom of contract was 
deemed unfair to vulnerable consumers because of the strict interpretation of 
freedom of contract by the courts, the rigid application of pacta servanda sunt, and 
the potential detriment to vulnerable consumers. This led to a move towards 
collectivism135 and resulted in, amongst others, consumer protection measures. As 
 
125 Eiselen (1989) THRHR 519. 
126 Collins Law of Contract 10-11; Hawthorne (2006) THRHR 56. 
127 Collins Law of Contract 10-14. 
128 Hawthorne (2006) THRHR 49, 59 and 62. 
129 Hawthorne (2006) THRHR 63. 
130 Hawthorne (2006) THRHR 63. 
131 Pretorius (2003) THRHR 645; Barnes (2007) WLR 235. 
132 Cockrell (1992) SALJ 40, 42; Stoop LLD 28-29; Pretorius (2003) THRHR 639-642, 644-645. 
133 Stoop LLD 29. 
134 Du Plessis LLD 389-391. 
135 Pretorius (2003) THRHR 638-645. 
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a result, legislatures internationally intervened with measures to protect 
consumers,136 because, despite consumers’ duty to become informed and make 
rational decisions on their own before entering into agreements, they needed 
additional protection in the form of consumer protection legislation to improve and 
promote fairness and protection.137 
Before I discuss these international legislative measures, I briefly consider the 
history and general characteristics of standard-form contracts – the agreement most 
commonly encountered in commerce, particularly when dealing with fixed-term 
contracts. 
 
2.5 Standard-form contracts 
2.5.1 Introduction 
With the development of commerce and industry coupled with mass-production, 
came the need for standardised mass contracts which would save time and money 
and promote efficiency.138 The idealistic laissez-faire theory was relatively 
successful when contracts were negotiated individually. However, once most goods 
were mass produced and profit margins dropped, it became imperative for suppliers 
to operate efficiently and speedily, and the standard-form contract emerged to serve 
these needs.139 
2.5.2 What is a standard-form contract? 
The term ‘standard-form contract’ has three possible meanings. The first indicates 
that a model specimen is used to draft a contract, and this contract is then amended 
to meet the needs of the contracting parties in given circumstances. Second, it may 
refer to a contract that is frequently used and has come to be accepted as the form 
of contract always used for certain transactions. One thinks here typically of a cell 
phone service agreement – a so-called ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ contract. Third, it could 
mean a contract with terms prescribed by statute.140 
 
136 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 188-210. 
137 Khan (2017) JAASSH 43; Stoop LLD 29. 
138 For a brief history of the use of standard-form contracts, see Aronstam Freedom of Contract 16-
18; Kessler (1943) Colum L Rev 631; Ahdieh (2006) Mich LR 1034. 
139 Gluck (1979) ICLQ 73; Ahdieh (2006) Mich LR 1034; Aronstam Freedom of Contract 20. 
140 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 18-19. 
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The terms ‘inequality of bargaining position’, ‘boilerplate’ and ‘contracts of adhesion’ 
originated in the USA and are used to describe characteristics or components of 
standard-form contracts.141 
‘Boilerplate’ refers to the so-called ‘building-blocks’ of the standard-form contract,142 
and are standard clauses that can be copied and used in the drafting of 
agreements.143 
Contracts of adhesion refer to contracts entered into between parties with unequal 
bargaining power, for example, a cell phone company and an individual consumer. 
The consumer generally lacks the bargaining power to negotiate freely for bespoke 
terms and conditions, and is in a take-it-or-leave-it position.144 
The typical attributes of a standard-form contract are:145 
• it is generally a printed document containing several clauses in the form 
of an agreement; 
• the contract is drafted by the supplier or seller;146 
• the supplier generally enters into many identical or near-identical 
agreements; 
• the agreement is entered into on a take-it-or-leave-basis, without any real 
opportunity or scope for the consumer to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of the agreement; 
• the purchaser or consumer just has to sign the agreement; 
• unlike the supplier, the consumer normally does not enter into many of 
these agreements on a daily basis; and 
• normally the only or most important obligation the consumer has is to pay 
the amounts stipulated in the agreement. 
 
141 Kessler (1943) Colum L Rev 629-642; Patterson ‘invented’ the term ‘contracts of adhesion’ 
(standard- form contracts) in his article – see Patterson (1919-1920) HLR 222 –  and further states 
that this term is not strictly speaking an official legal term. Patterson apparently started using the 
term contracts of adhesion in the USA. See also Rakoff (1983) HLR 1173-1284; Slawson (1984) U 
Pitt L Rev 21-74; Gluck (1979) ICLQ 72-90. The doctrine of inequality of bargaining position was 
successfully applied in, eg, Clifford Davis Management v WEA Records [1975] 1 WLR 61 (CA). 
Also see Aronstam Freedom of Contract 20 on the South African position. 
142 Ben-Shahar (2006) Mich LR 821. 
143 Cambridge Dictionary available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/boilerplate 
(date of use: 23 October 2018); English Oxford Living Dictionaries available at 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/boilerplate (date of use: 23 October 2018). 
144 Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute available at 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/adhesion_contract_%28contract_of_adhesion%29 (date of use: 
23 October 2018). 
145 Identified as such by Rakoff (1983) HLR 1177; also see Barnes (2007) WLR 234-35. An 
example is a cell phone service agreement. 
146 The seller will probably seek legal advice to have this agreement drafted, and therefore is in an 
even stronger bargaining position. 
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The view of consumers towards standard-form contracts can be summarised as 
follows:147 
• Consumers accept that they cannot negotiate the individual terms of 
these agreements. 
• Consumers accept that these agreements contain provisions for 
circumstances that are unlikely to occur. 
• Standard-form agreements are often entered into or based, not on the 
terms of the agreement, but rather on the reputation of the supplier. 
• Consumers only read, or deem as important, certain of the 
indispensable, essential terms and conditions, like the purchase price or 
monthly instalment, the duration of the agreement, and the delivery date. 
2.5.3 Criticism of standard-form contracts 
Because standard-form contracts are typically used by large businesses with 
bargaining power, Kessler developed the theory of inequality of bargaining power in 
the USA.148 This implies that the consumer – the party who wants the goods – is not 
in a position to bargain freely, and ends up in a take-it-or-leave-it situation.149 This is 
because the seller has a monopoly on the specific product sought, or that all 
competitors in that specific market sector use the same type of contract. He argues 
that this practice leads to the formation of industrial empires.150 
Contracts of adhesion are relevant internationally, and interesting aspects of these 
contracts have been discussed and extensively argued, especially in the USA.151 
Because of the uniformity created by these contracts of adhesion and the lack of 
‘irrationality’, Kessler is of the view that they could be regarded as having similar 
binding power to codifications and ‘restatements’.152 
 
147 Barnes (2007) WLR 237. 
148 Kessler is generally regarded as the father of the inequality of bargaining power theory in the 
USA, see Kessler (1943) Colum L Rev 629-642; Slawson (1984) U Pitt L Rev 32. However, Atiyah 
argues that long before Kessler, in his book Wealth of Nations written between 1783 and 1784, 
Adam Smith was aware that labourers were not in an equal bargaining position with their 
employers. See Atiyah Freedom of Contract 301 and Smith 
https://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf 56 (date of use: 17 March 2020). 
Also see Aronstam Freedom of Contract 15, where he refers to other writers and judges who also 
recognised inequality of bargaining position before Kessler’s article in 1943. 
149 South African courts and parliament have acknowledged inequality of bargaining power. 
Aronstam Freedom of Contract 23-24; Linstrom v Venter 1957 (1) SA 125 (SWA) 127-128, 131. 
150 Kessler (1943) Colum L Rev 632; this also illustrates the intricate relationship between law, 
economy and sociology. 
151 See for instance the symposium exclusively for that purpose 2005 at the University of Michigan, 
and the edition of (2006) Michigan LR 821. 
152 Kessler (1943) Colum L Rev 632-633. A ‘restatement’ means something that has authority but 
is not a statute or a court judgment – see https://definitions.uslegal.com/r/restatement/ (date of use: 
2 November 2018). On a slightly different note related to restatement, for a perspective on the 
restatement of the law on consumer contracts in South Africa, and a comparison with the use, 
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Aronstam discusses the view that every country’s economy should be subjected to 
the economic power of huge corporations that suppress the influence of the 
individual. He contends these corporations have to become independent of the 
individual consumer and the standard-form contract is the means by which to 
achieve this.153 Aronstam concludes that the crux of the matter is that huge 
companies can abuse their substantial economic power to dominate a market sector 
by way of the standard-form contract. This strengthens these companies’ grip on 
that specific market sector.154 
Slawson points out that profitability for the supplier and the modern way of life imply 
the necessity for the consumer to acquire services or goods by way of standard-
form contracts. The fact that the products acquired are technologically advanced, 
that the legal consequences resulting from their use have increased greatly, and 
finally, the large-scale promotion and advertisement in public media of these 
products and services, have led to increased expectations from consumers.155 
Consumers accept that the supplier’s competition in the marketplace will also make 
use of a standard-form contract with similar terms and conditions, and therefore 
offer no resistance to signing these agreements.156 
2.5.4 Consequences of standard-form contracts 
The consequences of standard-form contracts, as well as the attitude of consumers 
towards these, are accurately captured by Rakoff in the following remark:  
‘The consumer’s experience of modern commercial life is not one of freedom in 
the full sense posited by traditional contract law, but rather one of submission to 
organizational domination, leavened by the ability to choose the organization by 
which he will be dominated.’157 
Initially, courts applied the same principles of enforcement to standard-form 
contracts as to individually negotiated contracts,158 and did not entertain ‘fools’ who 
signed documents without reading them.159 In time, however, courts realised the 
strict application of rules does not necessarily ensure a fair and just outcome and 
resorted to the fundamental breach rule as a rule of construction.160 This rule implies 
that a contracting party must perform the essence of the agreement before he or 
she can claim assistance from the courts. Another way to effect fairness was the 
 
problems, and purpose thereof in the USA, and the practical pitfalls in the consumer-law regime for 
the South African consumer, see Du Plessis (2018) SA Merc LJ 189-215. 
153 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 22. 
154 Aronstam Freedom of Contract 23. 
155 Slawson (1984) U Pitt L Rev 24-25; Barnes (2007) WLR 235. 
156 Barnes (2007) WLR 237. 
157 Rakoff (1983) HLR 1229. See also Barnes (2007) WLR 237. 
158 Slawson (1984) U Pitt L Rev 46-47; Gluck (1979) ICLQ 74-81. 
159 Also see Pound (1909) YLJ 454-487 especially 483. The L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 
KB 394, 404 and 407 is a case in point. See Spencer (1973) CLJ 104-122 for a discussion of this 
and other similar cases. 
160 Gluck (1979) ICLQ 75-77. 
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inequality of bargaining power rule.161 Yet another theory implemented in an attempt 
to ensure fairness, was the doctrine of informed notice.162 As seen from the 
measures used by courts in their efforts to act fairly when deciding disputes based 
on standard-form contracts, their opinions differed on how to deal with this problem. 
Writers have debated the treatment and meaning of contract and of standard-form 
contracts for years, but there is still no clear answer. Barnes quotes a few writers’ 
remarks on contract law: ‘contract law has died, and been resurrected, 
reconstructed, and transformed’.163 Slawson argues the new meaning of contract is 
‘the parties’ reasonable expectations from whatever sources they may derive’.164 
Another complicating factor to bear in mind when interpreting and adjudicating 
standard-form contracts, is that the law generally fails to keep up with the latest 
social and technological advances.165 The legal consequences arising from these 
new advances, whether technological, sociological, or economic, have increased 
exponentially as courts attempt to develop the common law so as to keep abreast 
of these latest developments.166 
Important and interesting aspects of standard-form agreements and clauses are the 
following:167 
• their ambiguity and the resultant use of the contra proferentem168 rule by 
courts to interpret the contracts/terms and conditions;169 
• other theories or rules courts have used to effect fairness when 
interpreting standard-form contracts, as discussed above; 
• the argument that standard-form contracts now virtually have the binding 
power of legislation or so-called restatement;170 
 
161 Clifford Davis Management Ltd v WEA Records et al [1975] 1 WLR 61 (CA); Barnes (2007) 
WLR 267. 
162 Gluck (1979) ICLQ 84-86, 90. 
163 Barnes (2007) WLR 228-229. 
164 Slawson (1984) U Pitt L Rev 23. This new meaning was first accepted and applied by the courts 
in the USA in C&J Fertilizer Inc v Allied Mutual Insurance Co 227 NW 2d 169 (Iowa 1975) 
(hereafter C&J Fertilizer). In this decision the court found for the plaintiff based, inter alia, on 
reasonable expectations and unconscionability. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co v Sandbulte 
302 NW 2d 104 (Iowa 1981) followed the C&J Fertilizer dictum based on reasonable expectations. 
Also see Elliot Leases Cars Inc v Quigley 373 A 2d 810 (RI1977); Darner Motor Sales Inc v 
Universal Underwriters Insurance Co 682 P 2d 388 (Ariz 1984). 
165 Slawson (1984) U Pitt L Rev 23. 
166 Slawson (1984) U Pitt L Rev 25. Also relevant, to an extent, is Bant (2017) MLR 895. 
167 These and other important aspects of boilerplate were discussed at a symposium held 
specifically on this topic at the University of Michigan in 2005. See 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6b3c/06f4b623c0741b2455a5a649df5da8650348.pdf (date of use: 
23 October 2018). 
168 This means that words are interpreted against the party who has used them and is also referred 
to as the ‘doubtful provenance rule’. Also see verba fortius, which means the same. See Hiemstra 
& Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 169 read together with 304. 
169 Boardman (2006) Mich LR 1105-1128. 
170 Choi & Gulati (2006) Mich LR 1129-173; Kessler (1943) Colum L Rev 641. 
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• the fact or possibility that standard-form contracts have changed the 
contract theory;171 
• the possibility and legal binding nature of online disclosure of boilerplate 
standard terms;172 
• the effect standard-form contracts have on the ideal of freedom of 
contract;173 
• the effect of standard-form contracts, especially in terms of legislation, 
on the common-law of contract, its principles, and its policies;174 
• the argument that the terms and conditions of standard-form agreements 
should be presumed unenforceable;175 
• the potential unfairness and unconscionability of standard-form 
contracts;176 and 
• the question whether courts should treat standard-form contracts, and 
normally-negotiated and free contracts the same?177 
These factors will, where applicable, be taken into account and discussed in the 
relevant jurisdictions in the following chapters of this study. 
2.5.5 Concluding remarks: Standard-form contracts 
It was soon realised that merely because a consumer signed a standard-form 
agreement, did not mean he or she had read and understood it.178 Standard-form 
contracts, boilerplate contracts, and contracts of adhesion are all manifestations of 
the demise of the ideals of freedom to contract, individualism, free and open 
negotiation, equal bargaining status, and ultimately, the sanctity of contract and 
signify the rise of collectivism. However, standard-form contracts are a reality that 
we have to face – a reality which has created industrial empires and impacts on the 
economy. Standard-form contracts affect the rights of sellers or suppliers and 




171 Gluck (1979) ICLQ 72-90; Slawson (1984) U Pitt L Rev 23; Barnes (2007) WLR 236-239. 
172 Hillman (2006) Mich LR 837-856. 
173 Kessler (1943) Colum L Rev 629-642. 
174 Also see Bant (2017) MLR 895 on the effect of consumer legislation, and standard-form 
contracts in terms thereof, on the interpretation and logical development of the common-law of 
contract and its principles and policies. 
175 Rakoff (1983) HLR 1174-1284. 
176 Khan Contract and Mercantile Law vol 1 35; Mann (2006) Mich LR 918-919; Slawson (1984) U 
Pitt L Rev 46-47, 52-53; Barnes (2007) WLR 272-273. 
177 Barnes (2007) WLR 252-274. 
178 Unico v Owen (1967) 50 NJ 101 232 A. 
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2.6 The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection179 
2.6.1 Introduction 
The need for international guidelines for consumer protection legislation dates back 
to the late 1970s when governments realised that consumer protection was 
essential for a healthy economy and a country’s social development.180 In 1979 the 
United Nations181 investigated the needs in consumer protection and after reviewing 
the resulting research and reports, adopted the first version of the Guidelines in 
1985. The philosophy underlying the Guidelines is that consumer protection is a 
basic right of all people. An important principle the UN emphasised was that the 
Guidelines would result in higher standards of living and social development,182 and 
that consumer protection is not a luxury but an essential requirement for developing 
countries and poor and disadvantaged societies.183 
2.6.2 The Guidelines 
The purposes of the Guidelines are: 
• to assist countries to protect consumers; 
• to facilitate production and distribution to the needs of consumers; 
• to ensure high levels of ethical conduct; 
• to eliminate abusive trade practices; 
• to enable consumers to develop consumer activism; 
• to promote international co-operation in consumer protection; 
• to develop markets so as to offer consumers a better array of choices at 
more competitive prices; and finally 
• to develop consumerism in a way that ensures sustainable 
consumption.184 
The Guidelines also provide general principles in Part II, sections 2-8, to ensure, 
inter alia, that governments have a strong consumer protection policy that ensures 
the health and safety of consumers. The policy should also guard consumers’ 
economic interests and provide them with sufficient information to make informed 
 
179 Available at https://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/consumption_en.pdf (date of use: 11 
February 2020). See para 1. 
180 Harland (1991) JILI 189. 
181 Hereafter UN. The UN was founded after the Second World War to work towards international 
peace and security, to develop better diplomatic relations between nations, and to promote human 
rights, social progress, and better living conditions. For more information on the history and 
purposes of the UN see https://www.un.org/un70/en/content/history/index.html (date of use: 16 
March 2020). The UN adopted general guidelines for consumer protection on 9 April 1985 see 
https://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/consumption_en.pdf (date of use: 11 February 2020); 
(UN Guidelines). 
182 UN Charter art 55 1(a). 
183 Harland (1991) JILI 193. 
184 Section 1 of the UN Guidelines. 
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decisions. In addition, it should educate consumers, provide them with redress, and 
encourage consumer activism and participation. In addition, Part III provides 
guidelines relating to the above objectives and principles. The Guidelines have been 
criticised for not addressing consumer representation as this could pose problems 
in practice.185 
2.6.3 The legal nature of the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection 
The UN Guidelines are neither compulsory nor binding internationally.186 Uruguay, 
Ecuador, South Korea, Australia, and Malaysia are among the countries which have 
implemented the Guidelines.187 The legal nature of legislation enacted to implement 
these guidelines also differs. The approach of countries to implementing consumer 
protection legislation can be divided into two main schools of thought. On the one 
hand, common-law countries such as England, Singapore, South Africa, and 
Malaysia, base their legislation on the prohibition of certain types of conduct. On the 
other hand, countries like Germany and the Scandinavian countries base their 
consumer legislation on a general clause, based on principle, prohibiting general 
unfair and misleading conduct.188 According to Harland, legislation needs to 
combine both these approaches to be effective,189 for example, the Australian 
legislation. 
2.6.4 Concluding remarks: UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection 
It is safe to say the Guidelines have proved successful to the extent that many 
countries have realised the importance of addressing consumer protection 
measures on an ongoing basis in order to stimulate economic and social 
development and growth. They have ensured a greater measure of uniformity in the 
resulting protective measures internationally. Benöhr contends the fact that the 
Guidelines have been adopted and applied internationally, is evidence that 
consumer rights are regarded as human rights.190 
 
2.7 Conclusion: Chapter 2 
Historically, consumer protection measures have been regulated in various ways, 
initially through laws, religious prescripts, moral codes, and quasi-constitutional 
documents. Although the philosophy of absolute freedom of contract appears ideal 
 
185 Harland (1991) JILI 195. 
186 Harland (1991) JILI 196. 
187 Harland (1991) JILI 197-198. 
188 Harland (1991) JILI 204-205. 
189 Harland (1991) JILI 205-206. 
190 Benöhr EU Consumer Law and Human Rights 45, 46, 75. The South African Constitution does 
not specifically refer to consumer rights. However, when the Constitution and the CPA are read 
together, it is safe to assume they can be regarded as an aspect of human rights in South Africa. 
As this aspect is merely an aside, it is only mentioned very briefly in Ch 4. 
 The historical and philosophical context of consumer protection 
35 
 
from a theoretical, philosophical, and academic perspective, unfortunately reality 
has proven quite different. The theory proved inadequate in ensuring adequate 
contractual justice, fairness, and protection for all parties involved, especially in a 
modern consumer society. This is because consumers are not necessarily equal – 
levels of literacy, education, sophistication, care, economic knowledge, and 
proficiency differ widely.  This, in turn, complicates their equitable competition with 
large companies191 as regards financial and legal expertise, and a high level of 
technical knowledge.192 
The recognition of this need for consumer protection was realised and culminated 
in the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection. The Guidelines set uniform 
international standards and have been well accepted and implemented. When 
researching and analysing consumer legislation it is imperative to bear in mind that 
the mere fact that a party may not have unlimited freedom, or has no freedom at all 
to contract, does not necessarily result in him or her suffering harm.193 Standard-
form contracts and legislation imposing measures or prescribed forms for contracts 
can have many advantages. For instance, standard-form contracts and legislative 
provisions can save time, are cost effective, assist in economic growth, ease 
administration, and could even contribute to the equal treatment of all consumers. 
However, the potential for exploitation remains, and the legislature and courts 
should bear this in mind. 
Having examined the relevant historical and philosophical aspects of consumer law, 
I can proceed to analyse selected aspects of the common law that are relevant when 




191 As seen from the brief historical background, apart from consumer protection measures, 
competition law is the other side of the consumer-law coin. See, eg, the Indian texts referred to in 
para 2.2.4. When public competition law is regulated effectively it will simultaneously result in the 
protection of consumers as collusion, monopolies, oligarchies, price fixing, etc are regulated to 
benefit the economy, sellers, and ultimately consumers. See Brassey Competition Law 2; the 
Competition Act 89 of 1998 (Competition Act). Because of the limited scope of this thesis an in-
depth discussion of competition law and the full extent of the interaction between consumer law 
and competition law is not possible. 
192 Slawson (1984) U Pitt L Rev 61-62. 
193 This principle was stated clearly by Coetzee J in Western Bank Ltd v Sparta Construction Co 
[1975] 1 All SA 224 (W) 226. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  South Africa: The common-law position of consumers 
under fixed-term contracts 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Introduction and background 
In this chapter, I analyse and discuss the common-law position of contracting 
parties, what protection is at their disposal, and their respective rights and remedies 
in the event of material default, breach, or premature termination of an agreement. 
The common-law position of parties remains relevant as section 2(10) of the CPA 
expressly retains consumers’ common-law rights.1 When a consumer enters into a 
fixed-term agreement, the provisions of section 14 apply to the contract. In the event 
of a dispute based on a fixed-term agreement, a consumer can choose to base his 
or her claim either on the provisions of the CPA, or on the common law as both 
systems apply. The common-law principles and the CPA framework are intertwined, 
as many principles in the CPA are based on the common law, and the provisions of 
the CPA cannot be interpreted or applied without using common-law principles.2 In 
some circumstances, it may be difficult for a consumer to choose between basing 
his or her claim on the common law or on the CPA provisions.3 
This discussion is limited to terms in contracts contemplated in section 14 of the 
CPA. As it is impractical to discuss all common-law aspects of consumer law in 
detail, I offer an overview of the common-law principles relevant to fixed-term 
agreements. I also sketch the common-law rights and remedies available to parties 
on default, breach, or termination of an agreement. In this way, the chapter offers 
perspective on the common-law position so as to identify how it differs from (or is in 
line with) the position under section 14 of the CPA which is analysed in Chapter 4. 
While Roman-Dutch law forms the basis of South African common law there are, 
for historical reasons, many English sources and principles incorporated in our legal 
system and precedents.4 
 
1 Section 2(10) of the CPA provides: ‘No provision of this Act must be interpreted so as to preclude 
a consumer from exercising any rights afforded in terms of the common law.’ Section 2(10) of the 
CPA, its meaning, and its interpretation will be discussed in greater detail in Ch 4 para 4.2.4. 
2 Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 59-60. 
3 See the discussion in Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 404-406, 529. 
4 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 3-4; Williams (1909-1910) Yale LJ 157; Otto (2010) 
Fundamina 257; Pretorius (2004) THRHR 185-186. 
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The common law is an uncodified body of law consisting of court judgments and 
legal rules, and is largely based on precedent.5 The Constitution6 – the Bill of Rights 
in particular7 – has an important impact, as in a constitutional democracy the 
constitution binds all courts. Therefore, our courts must apply and develop the law 
in accordance with the purpose, substance, character and scope of the Bill of 
Rights.8 
While it is accepted that in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution the common 
law must be developed to reflect the ‘spirit, purport and objects’ of the Bill of Rights,9 
the Constitutional Court has also warned that not all pre-Constitution decisions were 
inherently tainted or immoral. Courts must, therefore, be cautious not to jeopardise 
legal certainty while developing the common law.10 The Constitutional Court 
identified the following rules for the development of the common law in Mighty 
Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Ltd and Another:11 
• The court must establish exactly what the common-law position is on a 
particular aspect. 
• The court must examine the purpose of the common-law principle. 
• The court must consider whether the common-law principle conflicts with 
the Bill of Rights and should be reformed. 
• If the common-law rule or principle is contrary to the Bill of Rights, the 
court can decide how it should be amended or developed in accordance 
with constitutional principles. 
• Finally, the court should consider and anticipate the consequences of the 
amendment or development on the field of law involved. 
 
5 See the article by Maswazi (2017) De Rebus 28 for a discussion of the intricacies of stare decisis 
in practice and the effect of s 39(2) of the Constitution on the stare decisis rule. Also see Camps 
Bay Ratepayers’ and Resident Association and Another v Harrison and Another 2011 (4) SA 42 
(CC) (hereafter Camps Bay) for an explanation by Brand AJ, as he then was, of the stare decisis 
rule. He states that stare decisis does not merely imply the slavish following of orders of courts of 
higher authority, but is the epitome of the rule of law itself, which in turn, is an essential element of 
the Constitution. He emphasised that deviation from the rule could lead to legal disorder, para [28]. 
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (the Constitution). 
7 Section 39(2) Ch 2 of the Constitution. Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 25 (CC) paras [31]–[34], [36]–[37] (hereafter Everfresh). 
8 Van Rensburg & Van der Merwe Law of Contract 11; Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Limited v 
Gründlingh and Others 2006 (8) BCLA 883 (CC) paras [26]-[27] (hereafter Phumelela). 
9 Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides:´When interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ 
10 The court also emphasised that courts should not be the main source of legal reform – that 
obligation lies with the legislature. See Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen 
Petroleum Ltd and Another 2016 (1) SA 621 (CC) para [40]. 
11 2016 (1) SA 621 (CC) para [39] (hereafter Mighty Solutions). Also see Beadica 231 CC and 
Others v Trustees for the time being of the Oregon Trust and Others (CCT109/19) [2020] ZACC 13 
(17 June 2020). 
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In addition, ubuntu, a customary-law principle12 which implies the consideration of 
empathy, humanity, respect, fairness,13 and good faith,14 also plays an important role 
in the courts’ application and interpretation of the law.15 
3.1.2 History and development of the common law 
Roman law, which plays an important role in our common-law of contract, developed 
and was refined during the Principate16 between 27 BC and 284 AD.17 Justinian 
ordered a codification of Roman law – the Corpus Iuris Civilis18 – during his reign 
from 527 AD to 565 AD.19 
After Justinian’s death, Roman law entered a period of stagnation to be 
rediscovered only in the eleventh century by Pepo, a law teacher at the University 
of Bologna in Italy.20 While the existing local tribal, regional, and provincial legislation 
on the continent met the needs of a simple agricultural community, it was not 
sufficiently sophisticated for a fast-developing commercial society.21 As a result, the 
effective Roman law principles were received and applied in Europe, and especially 
in the Netherlands, from the sixteenth century onwards.22 The writings of Dutch 
 
12 See Mighty Solutions para [1] where the Constitutional Court acknowledges the importance of 
customary law. 
13 See Stoop LLD 210-216 for a full discussion of fairness in the regulation of contracts under the 
CPA. 
14 The exact application, role and importance of the requirement of parties’ good faith remains 
controversial in the South African common law, see Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika v 
Saayman 1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA), specifically the judgment of Olivier JA, and in contrast to that the 
majority judgment in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). See also Hutchison Good Faith 240 
where he says that it appears South African law is leaning towards recognising good faith – of 
course this was before the decision in Brisley v Drotsky. See Beatson & Friedman Good Faith 56 
for the English law position; Louw (2013) PELJ 44-110; Van der Sijde LLM 18-25, 29, 32, 37-38; 
Brand (2009) SALJ 71, 81-83, 87-89. For an American perspective see Burton (1980) HLR 369, 
371, 385-387, 403; Hoeben et al available at https://www.ensafrica.com/news/Ubuntu-and-the-law-
promoting-good-faith-and-fairness (date of use: 4 October 2018); Hutchison (2011) SALJ 273, 295-
296. 
15 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC); Everfresh paras [23]–[24]. For an in-depth analysis 
and discussion of ubuntu see Du Plessis LLD, especially 391; Bennett (2011) PELJ 30, 44-46; 
Layton-McCann LLM 5-16. 
16 The first period of the Roman Empire, starting with emperor Augustus until the Imperial Crisis in 
284 AD, Van Zyl Geskiedenis 4-5; Kaser Roman Law 4. 
17 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 2; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 5, 21; Kaser Roman Law 2. 
18 Meaning ‘body of civil law’ see Cassells Latin Dictionary 154. It comprised of four parts, namely 
the Digest – the codification of the opinions of Roman jurists mainly on private law; the Institutes – 
a textbook for students; the Codex – a compendium of existing legislation and the update thereof; 
and the Novellae – a compendium of all legislation enacted after the abovementioned works to 
update the codification of the law. Van Zyl Geskiedenis 65, 331, 109; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen 
Handelsreg 2; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 59-64, 66; Kaser Roman Law 7. 
19 Van Zyl Geskiedenis 7; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 2. 
20 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 2; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 68-69; Kaser Roman Law 9. 
21 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 2; Kaser Roman Law 10. 
22 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 2; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 69; Kaser Roman Law 10. 
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jurists such as De Groot (Grotius), Voet, Van Leeuwen, Van Bynkershoek, Van der 
Keessel and Van der Linden,23 are still held in high regard by South African courts.24 
The Dutch occupation of the Cape by the VOC in 165225 brought Roman-Dutch 
principles to South Africa. Despite subsequent British occupation(s) of South Africa 
or parts of South Africa, English law was never formally imported into the South 
African legal system.26 However, South African law and precedent, in particular 
procedural law, were influenced by English law as a result of British judges and 
magistrates who came to South Africa and South African lawyers who studied in 
England. At certain times in our history, our courts also relied on English court 
decisions.27 Finally, many pieces of South African legislation, in particular in the field 
of mercantile law, are based on corresponding English legislation.28 
 
3.2 South African law of obligation and contract 
3.2.1 Introduction 
I here discuss the common law as it relates to fixed-term contracts. The common 
law of contract remains relevant in that it forms the foundation of all contracts, 
whether concluded under the common law or the CPA. 
I will start by briefly considering concepts relevant or important to the common law 
of contract, deal with the parties to an agreement, and mention the importance of 
consensus as a requirement for a valid agreement. After that, I will proceed to 
discuss the importance of the iusta causa of an agreement, and touch on the 
lawfulness of contracts, possibility of performance, and set out the formalities 
required for the conclusion of agreements. Then, I will examine the parol evidence 
rule, the duration of contracts, penalty clauses and other conditions that parties can 
use in agreements to protect themselves, or provide for anticipated events. Next, I 
will touch on misrepresentation, look at the fictional fulfilment of agreements, and 
 
23 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 3; Williams (1909-1910) Yale LJ 156. 
24 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 3. The Privy Council confirmed this in Pearl Assurance 
Co v Union Government 1934 AD 560, 563; Preller and Others v Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 (A) 
483-506; also see the minority judgment in Le Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para [198]; and 
Cloete v Van Meyeren [2019] 1 All SA 662 (ECP) paras [20], [22], [34]. 
25 Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or Dutch East India Company (DEIC), a Dutch corporation 
established to trade with India and other South-East Asian countries. See 
https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/rijksstudio/timeline-dutch-history/1602-trade-with-the-east-voc (date 
of use: 19 June 2018). 
26 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 4; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 9-10; Otto 
(2010) Fundamina 257-258. 
27 For instance, the Turquand rule that was formulated in the case of Royal British Bank v 
Turquand (1856) 6 E & B 327. This rule was accepted as part of South African law in Mine 
Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 (3) SA 831 (A). 
28 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 4. For example, company law, law of negotiable 
instruments, and insolvency law. See Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 11; Naudé (2018) JCP 
412; Pretorius (2004) THRHR 179,186-188. 
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consider leases, as fixed-term agreements have an important effect on lease 
agreements. After that I will summarise the position on breach of agreements, 
highlight the remedies parties have, and then consider the termination of 
agreements, before concluding this chapter. 
3.2.2  Definitions and concepts 
A contract is an agreement entered into by two or more parties with the aim of 
creating a binding legal relationship between them.29 A more comprehensive 
definition is:  
‘A contract is an agreement between two or more persons (parties) that is intended 
by them to create and define, or vary, or extinguish, a right or rights in personam30 
(the correlative being an obligation or obligations) between the parties to the 
agreement, such right or rights pertaining to the giving or doing of, or the refraining 
from doing, something.’31 
A contract is one of the ways in which an obligation is created.32 The Roman concept 
of an obligation (obligatio) is a legal tie in terms of which one party is obliged to 
deliver a service or goods to another, generally in return for payment.33 This principle 
still applies, and the relationship results in a right to act against the debtor (actio in 
personam). It, therefore, creates both the concepts ‘obligation to deliver’ and 
‘liability’.34 The creditor has the right to claim performance of the debtor’s obligation, 
and the debtor has the obligation to either pay a service fee or purchase price, or 
 
29 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 736; Sharrock Business Transactions 54; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 4; Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 1; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen 
Handelsreg 19; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 10; Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 276, 279 
(hereafter Conradie). For historical background and a detailed discussion see Khan et al Contract 
and Mercantile Law vol 1, 1-11. 
30 When discussing the basic principles of our common law I use the Latin terminology which is 
more concise to express the principle at stake. 
31 Khan et al Contract and Mercantile Law vol 1, 2. 
32 The other being delict or a variety of other causes including, but not limited to unjust enrichment. 
Gaius Institutiones 3.88 available at 
http://legalhistorysources.com/Law508/Roman%20Law/GaiusInstitutesCommentary.htm#hd_lf053
3_head_133 (date of use: 4 November 2019) ‘... omnis enim obligatio vel ex contractu nascitur vel 
ex delicto’, meaning ‘indeed every obligation comes into existence either by way of contract or by 
way of delict’. See van Zyl Geskiedenis 3-4; Kaser Roman Law 167 states that this obligation came 
into existence in place of membrum ruptum which literally meant breaking or tearing a limb as 
vengeance, the state intervened and instituted pecuniary damages by introduction in the XII 
Tables. Literally, the latter means ‘ruptured limb’. See Cassell’s Latin Dictionary 527, 367; Du Bois 
et al Wille’s Principles 1091-1092, Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 5; Sharrock Business 
Transactions 3-7. 
33 Van Zyl Geskiedenis 247; Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 2; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 1; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 738; Sharrock Business Transactions 88-89. The 
doctrine of consideration does not form part of South African law after the Conradie case where the 
court decided that the intention to contract is sufficient for the contract to come into existence and 
that there is no need for consideration to be agreed upon. In normal circumstances, and especially 
in contracts relevant to this thesis, there will be a purchase price or remuneration in the agreement. 
34 Van Zyl Geskiedenis 247; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1; Hutchison (2013) Stell LR 28-29. 
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perform a service.35 For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the basic form of 
agreement involving one party on either side, and the most common commercial 
contracts36 as the emphasis of the thesis is on fixed-term consumer agreements 
under section 14 of the CPA.37 
In general, the most important requirement for the creation of a contract is 
consensus or agreement between the parties38 – no obligation arises if the parties 
do not intend to create one.39 However, there are other general legal requirements 
which must be met if there is to be a valid and binding contract. Parties to the 
agreement must have contractual capacity, must comply with any formal 
requirements, the agreement must be physically and legally possible, and 
performance of the contract must be lawful.40 
Once parties have concluded an agreement, the maxim pacta servanda sunt41 
applies. This maxim is one of the basic principles of contract law and its purpose is 
to ensure certainty in commerce.42 It is a maxim which the courts have always 
applied.43 
Agreements consist of clauses and stipulations divided into: 
• essentialia – the essential elements of a legal act or contract;44 
 
35 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 738; Sharrock Business 
Transactions 3, 747. 
36 The most pertinent example being the purchase of a cell phone with airtime included, from a 
cellular service provider. 
37 Although a contract can also have more than one party on either side, and the relationship can 
be intricate depending on the type of agreement, the basis of the obligation remains that of a 
debtor on the one side, and a creditor on the other. De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 2; Van Zyl 
Geskiedenis 268. 
38 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 20; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 255; Bradfield Christie’s Law 
of Contract 2, 29; Pretorius (2004) THRHR 388; Pretorius (2004) THRHR 565. 
39 Conradie 287-290; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 255. 
40 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 21; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 6; Du Bois et al 
Wille’s Principles 736. 
41 Meaning that agreements are binding and should be observed. See Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige 
Regswoordeboek 251. 
42 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 737; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 10-11 Hutchison et al Law of 
Contract 34. See Ch 2 para 2.4.2; Eiselen (1989) THRHR 516, 520-523. For a detailed discussion 
of the historical development of this maxim see Visser (1984) SALJ 641-655. See the recent 
judgment of Beadica 231 CC and Others v Trustees for the time being of the Oregon Trust and 
Others (CCT109/19) [2020] ZACC 13 (17 June 2020) [83-87]. 
43 See Hawthorne (2014) PER 2822-2839 for a discussion of the court’s duty to balance the 
constitutional values of freedom and dignity and the maxim pacta servanda sunt; Mohamed’s 
Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 314 (SCA) para 
[32] (Mohamed’s Leisure); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 
(SCA). 
44 Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 184; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 276; Du 
Bois et al Wille’s Principles 971; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 22. These aspects are 
important as they form the essence of consumer agreements. These are, depending on the legal 
nature of the agreement, the parties to the agreement, the legal nature of the agreement, for 
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• naturalia – the natural components of a contract;45 and 
• incidentalia – the non-essential components of a contract.46 
 
The requirements for valid and binding contracts are now analysed and applied to 
fixed-term contracts. 
3.2.3 Parties to an agreement and the capacity to contract 
Freedom of contract is the cornerstone of the law of contract.47 The parties to an 
agreement can, as a rule, enter into an agreement, contract, negotiate, and arrange 
their affairs with whom they wish and in any way they wish.48 Even if a party 
concludes a contract to his or her detriment,49 the courts cannot come to his or her 
assistance unless grounds for repudiation can be established.50 However, freedom 
of contract is not unlimited in that the Constitution,51 public interest,52 ubuntu,53 and 
good faith54 must all be considered when interpreting the concept.55 Furthermore, 
 
instance sale or lease, the purchase price or consideration, and when and where it is to be paid, 
the merx and the delivery or transfer thereof. For more information on the essentialia see 
Hutchison et al Law of Contract 237. 
45 Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 232; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 404-405; Du 
Bois et al Wille’s Principles 790; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 276-277; Van Jaarsveld & 
Oosthuizen Handelsreg 22. These terms are also relevant, although not regarded as important as 
the essential elements. 
46 Also sometimes referred to as accidentalia, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 149; 
Hutchison et al Law of Contract 405; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 277-278; Van Jaarsveld & 
Oosthuizen Handelsreg 22; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 1020. These aspects will normally be 
regarded as irrelevant as regards a dispute, Hutchison et al Law of Contract 405. 
47 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 402; Law Union and Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Carmichael’s 
Executor 1917 AD 593, 598. The history, philosophy, interpretation and development of this 
principle is discussed in greater detail in Ch 2 para 2.4. 
48 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 6 and 130; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 10; Bradfield 
Christie’s Law of Contract 210, 402, 518; Printing Law Union and Rock Insurance Co Ltd v 
Carmichael’s Executor 1917 AD 593, 598; Printing and Numerical Registering Company v 
Sampson 1875 LR 19 Eq 462, 465. 
49 Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69, 73; Burger v Central South African 
Railways 1903 TS 571 (hereafter Burger); Printing and Numerical Registering Company v 
Sampson 1875 LR 19 Eq 462, 465. 
50 Burger 578-579. This principle was confirmed in Brink v Humphries and Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 (2) 
SA 419 (SCA) para [11] (hereafter Brink); also see in general Khan et al Contract and Mercantile 
Law vol 1 31-36. 
51 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 16-22 (hereafter Brisley); Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) 
SA 1 (SCA) 8-9. 
52 Burger 579; Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 742 (A); Ep Minister of Justice: in re Nedbank Ltd v 
Abstein Distributors and Other 1995 (3) SA 1 (A) 20-21. 
53 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC); Everfresh paras [23]−[24]; for an in-depth analysis 
and discussion of ubuntu see Du Plessis LLD 391; Bennett (2011) PELJ 30, 44-46. 
54 Layton-McCann LLM 5-16; Louw (2013) PELJ 45-110; Van Huyssteen Contract 195; Hutchison 
et al Law of Contract 21. 
55 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 737; Brisley paras [69]−[76], [93]. 
 South Africa: The common-law position of consumers under fixed-term contracts 
46 
 
the principle of freedom of contract, socio-economic changes, and international 
legislative trends ensure that freedom of contract is constantly evolving.56 
The maxim caveat subscriptor57 is linked to the principle of freedom of contract. 
Caveat subscriptor warns a signatory to read and understand any document he or 
she signs,58 as signature of an agreement has serious consequences for contracting 
parties. Signatories are bound by the terms and conditions to which they have 
agreed, even if they have failed to read them.59 Sharrock concludes that a signatory 
to an agreement will only be able to escape liability if he or she can prove that there 
was no consensus;60 that this lack of consensus was material; and that he or she 
communicated his or her dissent to the other contracting party.61 
A party to an agreement must have contractual capacity, that is, the ability to both 
enter into an agreement and to be bound by its terms and conditions.62 All persons 
are deemed to have capacity to contract unless proven otherwise.63 
 
56 See Ch 2 para 2.4. For a discussion of the ideology of contract law see Pretorius (2003) THRHR 
638. 
57 Meaning beware he who signs, also known as caveat emptor (buyer beware) or caveat scriptor 
Cassell’s Latin Dictionary 96, 578. For a detailed discussion see Bradfield Christie’s Law of 
Contract 205-210. 
58 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 205; Burger. This maxim is especially significant in standard-
form contracts in which purchasers have no freedom to negotiate individual terms and conditions. 
This principle is discussed in greater detail in Ch 2 para 2.4; George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) 
SA 465 (A) 471-473 (hereafter Fairmead); Sharrock Business Transactions 77-78; Brink v 
Humphries and Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 (2) SA 419 (SCA) paras [10]-[12] and the dissenting 
judgment para [35] (hereafter Brink); Sharrock (1989) SALJ 458. 
59 Fairmead 471-473; also see standard form contracts on this principle as discussed in Ch 2 para 
2.5. In Brink para [12] this principle was relaxed somewhat as the majority ruled that the 
respondent’s conduct was misleading to such an extent that the appellant erroneously signed an 
application for credit without realising that he was also signing a suretyship. This principle was also 
relaxed in Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) para [33]. I submit that the dissenting 
judgment in Brink is correct, and that the respondent’s conduct cannot be viewed as 
misrepresentation because the suretyship was clearly printed at the bottom of the application form, 
just above the appellant’s signature, although the heading of the document did not reveal this – 
see Brink paras [35]−[37]. 
60 See discussion of consensus in para 3.2.4. 
61 Sharrock Business Transactions 78; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
62 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 55; Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 3; Van 
Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 20; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 265; Conradie 276. 
63 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 55; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 165; Du Bois et al 
Wille’s Principles 146-147; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 61-62. Examples of parties 
who do not have the capacity to contract are persons under the influence of alcohol or narcotics, 
persons of unsound mind, minors, prodigals, and spouses married in community of property and 
acting without the assistance of the other spouse when required. See De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 55-82; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 752; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 
61-62; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 265-293; Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 (hereafter 
Matrimonial Property Act) specifically s 15 dealing with the powers of spouses; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 69-82; Although some authors give the impression that only women married in 
community of property lack the capacity to enter into agreements without assistance, both parties 
to the marriage in community of property are affected equally by s 15 of the Matrimonial Property 
Act, see Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 20-23 in this regard; Bradfield Christie’s 
Law of Contract 268-271. 
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No agreement comes into being without consensus between the parties.64 The 
parties must agree on the nature and performance of the agreement,65 the purchase 
price or economic value of the agreement,66 and parties must have the intention to 
conclude contractual obligations with commercial consequences.  
There are different theories on the types of consensus required, which can all play 
a role when entering into a contract under section 14 of the CPA. Three theories are 
considered, each of which has a specific focus. These are the consensus theory 
(also known as the will theory); the declaration theory; and the confidence theory 
(also known as the reliance theory):67 
• The consensus or will theory, focuses on the fact that parties must be 
unanimous in their intention regarding the agreement.68 They must agree 
on all aspects of the agreement and must be aware that they have agreed 
 
64 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 9, 130; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 737; Sharrock Business 
Transactions 54, 75; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 29-30; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 20, 
23. There are two distinct forms of consensus: namely actual consensus between the parties, and, 
ostensible consensus, which means that there is no actual consensus but the law recognises 
contractual liability. See the discussion by Sharrock of immaterial dissensus and reasonable 
reliance in Business Transactions 75-83, 88. 
65 Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 55-56; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 23. 
66 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 7. For purposes of this thesis, I will focus on contracts with 
commercial consequences, as s 14 of the CPA provides for agreements with commercial 
consequences. Note that economic value is not a requirement for all types of agreement, for 
example, an agreement to donate does not require quid pro quo consideration or reciprocity, but is 
still a valid and binding agreement in South Africa. However, commercial agreements like purchase 
and sale, and leases require economic value and reciprocity to be valid, as these form part of the 
essentialia of the specific type of agreement. Economic value in this sense differs from the doctrine 
of consideration, as the doctrine of consideration is a doctrine of English origin, and English law 
does not acknowledge or enforce promises (or, for example, the donation agreement referred to 
above). Only agreements with a quid pro quo are acknowledged in English law. See Bradfield 
Christie’s Law of Contract 9. See Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 25 on contractual 
obligations with commercial consequences. The English doctrine of consideration, which relates to 
the iusta causa of the contract, no longer forms part of the South African law of contract. For a full 
discussion on this aspect see Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 9-11; Hutchison et al Law of 
Contract 12. 
67 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 16; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 15-16; Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract 21-33; Pretorius (2004) THRHR 383-393, 550-565. There are further theories, 
subdivisions, and refinements of these theories, but these three theories will suffice for the 
purposes and scope of this thesis. 
68 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 22; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 9; Hutchison et al Law of 
Contract 13-14; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 29-30; Sharrock Business Transactions 75. 
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on these aspects.69 Opponents of this theory are of the view that if applied 
consistently this theory could lead to unacceptable results.70 
• The focus of the declaration theory is the corresponding declarations of 
intent by the parties to an agreement.71 Therefore, the declaration theory 
should not necessarily be regarded as acting in opposition to the 
consensus theory, but rather as a qualified form of the consensus theory. 
This theory can be criticised on the ground that the parties may declare 
one thing but intend or understand something different.72 
• The third theory, the confidence or reliance theory, is based on the 
confidence or belief which the declaration by one of the parties instills in 
the other.73 This theory can also be criticised in that the confidence 
instilled by a party may indeed by misplaced. The supporters of this 
theory qualify it further by stating that the confidence instilled should be 
reasonable, thereby adding an objective element. 74 
 
It is clear from the above analysis that the differences between these theories are 
subtle, academic, and largely artificial. They can and do overlap, are directly or 
 
69 Sharrock Business Transactions 54, 75; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 30, 32; De Wet & 
Van Wyk Kontraktereg 9-12. 
70 An example is that of a person who is under the impression that his or her car has been stolen 
and as a result enters into an agreement to purchase a new car. Although this misconception leads 
to the conclusion of a car-purchase agreement, it does not affect the intention of the parties to the 
agreement. Other instances of errors or mistakes can include a party to an agreement not 
expressing himself clearly, making a spelling error which leads to a misconception, a message 
sent to an incorrect person, or mistaken identity. In all of these circumstances, one or both of the 
parties is of the opinion that they have consensus, while clearly there is error in one or both 
instances. See par 3.2.4.2 for a discussion of material errors, and par 3.2.4.3 for a discussion of 
non-material errors. Related to this is reservatio mentalis (inner reserve or mental reservation) 
where a party leads the other to believe that he or she wants to do something, while in fact, he or 
she does not. See Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 280; Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract 31; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 9 11 26; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 14. 
71 The declaration can be written or oral, provided that the intention is communicated to the other 
party. De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 12; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 34; Saambou v Friedman 
1979 (3) SA 978 (A) 994; SA Railway and Harbours v National Bank 1924 AD 704 715-716. 
72 The declaration theory is based on an objective approach to the basis of a contract and is 
regarded as controversial by some writers. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 91. There is 
difference of opinion as to whether the declaration theory was formally recognised by Wessels JA 
in South African Railways and Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704, 715-
716, although the theory was applied by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Sonap Petroleum (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A). 
Pretorius notes in Hutchison et al Law of Contract 98-107 that a more acceptable version of the 
declaration theory could be to use it in conjunction with the iustus error doctrine thereby 
establishing a generally objective approach. For a contrary view see Bradfield Christie’s Law of 
Contract 1, 25 and Van Huyssteen et al Contract 21-22. 
73 The confidence or reliance theory was accepted in South African law in the decision in I Pieters 
& Company v Salomon 1911 AD 121, 137 in the judgment by Innes JA. It was confirmed in 
subsequent decisions, eg, Hodgson Bros v South African Railways 1928 CPD 257; Spes Bona 
Bank Ltd v Portals Water Treatment South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 978 (A); Sonap Petroleum 
(SA) (Pty Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis 1983 (1) SA 978 (A) 
984; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 17-19. 
74 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 14; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 35-42; Constantia Insurance 
Company Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) 345 (A) 355-356. 
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indirectly linked, and can give rise to confusion in practice.75 Pretorius argues that 
South African contract law is a fusion of various principles and theories that together 
form the foundation of contractual liability.76 
To summarise, the common law regards the consensus theory as the basis for 
contractual liability,77 although it is not without limitations.78 Consensus consists of 
three elements: 
• consensus as to the consequences of the agreement; 
• the parties must have the animus contrahendi;79 and 
• the parties must be aware of the existence of the agreement.80 
Consensus on the consequences of the agreement means that the parties must be 
unanimous as to the obligations created by the agreement. If there is not a meeting 
of minds on the specific type of obligation created, or on the parties involved in the 
agreement, or on the type of agreement or legal tie created by the agreement, there 
is no consensus to enter into an agreement.81 
The requirement of animus contrahendi is the basis of the agreement as a contract 
can only come into being when parties intend it to have legal consequences. 
Therefore, an offer to go for a walk, or an offer clearly made as a joke, will not have 
 
75 In addition to these theories, the doctrine of estoppel is relevant in instances where party A 
made a misrepresentation, party B relied and acted on that misrepresentation and entered into an 
agreement and suffered prejudice because of the reasonable impression created by A. See De 
Wet LLD 16; Cilliers & Benade et al Corporate Law 193; Oosthuizen (1979) TSAR 9-10; Bradfield 
Christie’s Law of Contract 35 who criticises prejudice as a requirement 35; Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract 33; Sonnekus Estoppel 2-3. Should A try to escape liability in terms of the agreement, 
relying on his own misrepresentation, estoppel prevents him from doing so on the basis of the 
Roman law maxim obstringitur ne in suum factum veniat which means, ‘he is prevented from going 
against his own act’. Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 247; Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract 33. De Wet discusses the possibility that estoppel is an extended application of the 
exceptio doli in his LLD thesis, De Wet LLD 84-89. He concludes that estoppel is not a form of the 
exceptio doli, as the exceptio is the basis of liability for damages caused by malicious 
misrepresentation, but is not wide enough to cover all instances of estoppel. Estoppel is not a 
cause of action, but only a defence to either a claim or a counterclaim. See Sonnekus Estoppel 30-
34; Low v Boverie 1891 3 Ch 82 [1891–1894] AD, ER 348; De Wet LLD 16,30; see the 
Constitutional Court case of Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Makate 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) where this aspect 
and the difference between ostensible authority and estoppel is discussed in detail. To summarise: 
estoppel is a defence available to a bona fide party, who has been misled by the misrepresentation 
of the other party, when held liable by the other party. However, estoppel should not regularly be 
encountered in fixed-term consumer agreements as it is more generally a defence in corporate law 
matters where representation and the authority of company representatives are at stake. 
76 Pretorius (2006) THRHR 97, 120-121. 
77 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 22; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 32. 
78 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 32-33; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 15; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 15. 
79 The intention to contract and be legally bound thereby, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige 
Regswoordeboek 157. 
80 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 23; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 13-14. 
81 There is only one exception, when parties would have concluded the agreement despite the 
error in question. 
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legal consequences; neither will contracts containing an element of 
misrepresentation or so-called simulated contracts.82 
The final requirement for consensus listed above – awareness of the agreement – 
sounds obvious, but if all concerned parties are not aware that they have in fact 
reached consensus and that the contract has come into existence, there is no valid 
agreement. To reach a level of agreement sufficient to create a contract this 
awareness must be effectively communicated to each party and be reciprocal.83 
Several types of error may lead to parties not reaching consensus on an agreement 
or its essentialia. De Wet argues that neither Roman nor Roman-Dutch scholars 
were absolutely clear on what constituted an error and on when errors affected the 
validity of contracts.84 
In South African law, errors are divided into material and non-material errors and I 
turn now to a further examination of error and how it can affect a contract.85 
3.2.4.2 Material errors 
Material errors affect consensus and can therefore be used as a valid defence by 
the party in error. 
3.2.4.2.1 Iustus error86  
Iustus error implies a reasonable mistake. This defence aims to protect a party 
entering into an agreement based on a reasonable and material mistake for which 
he or she is not to blame.87 An example of a iustus error is where the purchaser is 
reasonably mistaken regarding an essential aspect of the agreement.88  
 
82 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 24; this principle is based on the plus valet agitur quam qoud 
simulate concipitur maxim. This means that the real intention of the parties carries more weight 
than a fraudulent or simulated formulation thereof, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 
256; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 24; Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 6-7; 
Zandberg v van Zyl 1910 AD 302; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 24; Du Bois et al 
Wille’s Principles 805-806. 
83 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 25 49; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 26; De Wet & Van 
Wyk Kontraktereg 31-32; Sharrock Business Transactions 54. 
84 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 18-19. 
85 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 17-31; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 746-750; Van Huyssteen 
et al Contract 82-90; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 365. 
86 Meaning reasonable error Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 218; Bradfield 
describes it as an error of which ‘the law will take notice’, Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 365. 
87 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 99-102; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 48-50; 
Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 367 contends that this type of error will not occur frequently in 
practice, as demonstrated in case law. See too Fairmead; National and Overseas Distributors Corp 
(Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 (2) SA 473 (A). 
88 A classic example of this is the judgment of Maritz v Pratley (1894) 11 SC 345 346 where the 
purchaser at an auction was under the impression that he was purchasing a mantelpiece and the 
mirror displayed thereon, while in fact only the mantelpiece was part of the lot he bid on. This was 
held to be a reasonable mistake. 
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3.2.4.2.2 Error in corpore89 
Error in corpore normally relates to the res vendita.90 For example, when a person 
purchases a tablet device, specifically requiring one that can also be used to make 
phone calls, but the tablet does not comply with this requirement despite assurances 
by the seller. This error will be material as there clearly was no consensus in respect 
of the merx and its qualities. The purchaser is not able to use the tablet for the 
intended purpose. 
3.2.4.2.3 Error in negotio91 
Error in negotio occurs when the parties are not ad idem on the legal nature of the 
agreement they are concluding. For instance, A is under the impression that he is 
purchasing a cell phone by paying instalments over a period of 24 months, while he 
is in fact renting the cell phone for a period of 24 months. This error affects 
consensus, which is essential to the agreement, as A will not become the owner of 
the phone on termination of the agreement.92 
3.2.4.2.4 Error in substantia sive materia93 
Error in substantia sive materia relates to the attributes or characteristics of the 
merx. The error must relate to an essential characteristic of the merx to be classified 
as a material mistake. This error is discussed in the Digesta where a few examples, 
such as buying vinegar instead of wine, bronze for gold, or buying lead instead of 
silver, are mentioned.94 Some writers argue that an error in substantia is not a 
material error.95 If a purchaser is under the impression that he or she is purchasing 
gold, and is in fact sold bronze, this clearly is a material error as it affects 
consensus.96 An example relevant to fixed-term contracts is if a consumer 
purchases a waterproof cell phone. When he or she uses it to take underwater 
photographs, the cell phone stops working and is permanently damaged. The 
 
89 Error regarding the type of the merx, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 183; Van 
Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 45; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 27. 
90 Thing purchased, Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 45; Heatlie v Union Government 
1887 SC 351. 
91 Error regarding the nature of the agreement or juridical act, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige 
Regswoordeboek 183 and 234; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 88; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen 
Handelsreg 41; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 27. 
92 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 90. 
93 Error regarding an essential quality of the thing sold, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige 
Regswoordeboek 183. 
94 Digesta 18.1.9.2 ‘… ut puta si acetum pro vino veneat, aes pro auro vel plumbum pro argento…’ 
available at http://legalhistorysources.com/Law508/Roman%20Law/JustinianDigest.htm (date of 
use: 4 November 2019); Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 57-58; Van Jaarsveld & 
Oosthuizen Handelsreg 45-46; Trollip v Jordaan 1961 (1) SA 238. 
95 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 90. 
96 Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 57-58; Trollip v Jordaan 1961 (1) SA 238. 
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purchaser will not be able to use his or her purchase for its intended purpose as 
there was an error regarding its physical attributes. 
3.2.4.3 Non-material errors 
Non-material errors do not affect the essential aspects of the agreement, as there 
is consensus between the parties on the essentialia of the agreement. For example, 
a very specific aspect of the performance of the merx,97 the specific details of 
obligations in terms of the agreement, or the identity of the parties. These errors 
include mistakes such as when the seller simply calculates the purchase price 
incorrectly by making a slight counting mistake,98 or when a purchaser thinks his or 
her cell phone is irreparably broken, buys a new phone, and then discovers that the 
original cell phone was not broken but that the battery was faulty. In some instances, 
the difference between material and non-material errors is subtle,99 and not all errors 
relating to the performance of the merx or the parties are material errors.100 
A few instances of non-material errors are:  
• Error in nomine101 which is an error regarding the name of a party. 
• Error in persona,102 which is an error regarding the contracting parties. 
• Error iuris,103 which is an error regarding the law. 
 
 
97 For instance, a car only reaching a speed of 180 km/h instead of the 185 km/h as presented by 
the car dealer, but being effective and in perfect working order in every other way. 
98 For instance, where the purchaser buys 85 sheets of paper and the seller counts 86 sheets of 
paper by mistake. 
99 Trollip v Jordaan 1961 (1) SA 238 (A); Allen v Sixteen Stirling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (4) SA 
164 (D). The Allen v Stirling decision was confirmed in Brink. 
100 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 26; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 89-90; Trust Bank of Africa 
Ltd v Frysch 1977 (3) SA 562D. For the test for iustus error see National and Overseas Distributors 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 (2) SA 473 (A) 479 [G-H]; Van Aartsen v Van Aartsen 
2006 (4) SA 131 (T) paras [17]−[19], [22]−[23]. 
101 Cassell’s Latin Dictionary 218, 395, this differs from the error in persona. Here is no consensus 
regarding the specific name of one of the parties, eg, when the seller thinks he or she is 
contracting with John Smith, and he or she is in fact contracting with Jan Schmidt. This error does 
not affect the essence of the agreement, and will not be a valid defence in a contract under the 
common law or in a fixed-term agreement; error regarding the name Cassells Latin Dictionary 218, 
395; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 45. 
102 Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 183; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 27; error in 
persona is an error regarding the identity of one or both parties, where the identity of such party is 
essential to the nature or the agreement. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 90; an example is 
when the owner of a racehorse enters into a training agreement with a well-known experienced 
and successful trainer and the trainer is in fact someone else, not the experienced and proven 
successful racehorse trainer. 
103 Error regarding the law or the legal position, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 183 
– generally this error is not material, see Hutchison et al Law of Contract 90. For example, where a 
party was under the impression that a specific agreement had to be in writing when, in fact, it was 
not a legal requirement for the agreement to be in writing. 
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3.2.4.4 Concluding remarks: Consensus and error 
Parties must be ad idem on the consequences of the agreement they conclude, they 
must have animus contrahendi, or the serious intention to be bound by the 
agreement, and they must be aware of the existence of the agreement. In addition, 
there should be no material errors that affect consensus, for example, an error as 
to the essential characteristics of the goods in respect of a sales agreement. 
3.2.5 Justa causa104 
A prerequisite for the existence of all contracts is a causa or justa causa.105 This 
means that there must be a valid and legal reason for entering into the contract as 
an agreement which is contra bonos mores106 is unenforceable.107 Examples of 
causae for purposes of this thesis, are the purchase of a cell phone combined with 
a service agreement to provide airtime and mobile data, and a lease agreement.108 
3.2.6 Lawfulness 
An unlawful agreement is void.109 It is therefore important to establish the lawfulness 
of all agreements, whether concluded in terms of the common law or under the CPA. 
An agreement is unlawful if it is illegal in terms of either legislation or the common 
law, or if it is contra bonos mores.110 Interestingly, even a contract that prima facie 
appears to be lawful – eg, a regular lease agreement – may in fact prove to be 
unlawful – eg, the lease of premises for the manufacture of cocaine.111 This principle 
is based on the Roman law maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio.112 Watermeyer 
AJP criticised the maxim in Kennedy v Steenkamp113 as being too restrictive to 
provide a conclusive and comprehensive test to establish the enforceability of 
 
104 Meaning lawful reason, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 218. 
105 Van Zyl Geskiedenis 138, 144, 169; iusta causa is a lawful ground or reason for entering into 
the agreement, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 218 (hereafter causa or cause). 
106 The phrase means against good morals, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 169. 
107 Van Zyl Geskiedenis 253. See Brisley para [93] on the possibilities for misinterpretation of the 
boni mores, and Cameron AJ who recommends rather referring to the Constitution for guidance on 
an ‘objective value system’. 
108 A causa is not consideration, and should not be confused with the consideration theory which 
does not form part of our law. See Rood v Wallach 1904 TS 187, 201; Conradie 289, 320. 
109 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 89; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 446; Colonial Banking 
and Trust Co Ltd v Hill’s Trustee 1927 AD 488; Tannenbaum’s Executors and Tannenbaum v 
Quakley and the Liquidator of Varachia Store (Pty) Ltd 1940 WLD 209, 230; Cape Dairy & General 
Livestock Auctioneers v Sim 1924 AD 167, 170; Cameron v Bray Gibb & Co (Pvt) Ltd 1966 (3) SA 
675 (R) 676-677 (hereafter Cameron); Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 401; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v 
Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 7-9. 
110 Meaning against good morals, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 169. 
111 For a general discussion of the principle see Kennedy v Steenkamp 1936 CPD 113, 116-118; 
De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 90; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 414-415. 
112 No action arises from an immoral or illegal cause, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige 
Regswoordeboek 186. 
113 1936 CPD 113 (hereafter Kennedy). 
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agreements.114 He argued that Grotius clearly explained the difference between 
unlawfulness in the causa itself, unlawfulness in the contract, and unlawfulness in 
the aim or purpose of the agreement.115 Therefore, if the agreement, or certain of its 
clauses, are unlawful the transaction can either not be enforced,116 or the unlawful 
clause or part of the agreement becomes severable,117 depending on 
circumstances.118 An example of such an agreement relevant to fixed-term 
agreements is when a consumer, who is an illegal immigrant, enters into a cell 
phone agreement with a supplier and provides falsified information and 
documentation to satisfy the provisions of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act.119 
This agreement will not be lawful, and as a result would be unenforceable. 
3.2.7 Possibility of performance 
For any agreement to be valid and binding, whether concluded in terms of the 
common law or under section 14 of the CPA, performance must be possible.120 This 
principle stems from Roman law, was incorporated into Roman-Dutch law, and is 
still valid today.121 Bradfield identifies four requirements for impossibility of 
performance.122 First, the performance must be impossible not merely improbable. 
The performance must be entirely impossible not only relatively impossible. The 
impossibility must not be the fault of either party.123 Finally, it must be the common 
intention of both parties that impossibility will lead to the contract being void.124 An 
example of this is when a consumer leases a property and after conclusion of the 
agreement, but before the lessee takes occupation, the property is destroyed by 
runaway veld fires which cannot be attributed to the actions of either of the parties 
to the lease. 
Our law distinguishes between initial impossibility of performance and supervening 
impossibility.125 Not only is the impossible performance not due, but the counter-
 
114 Kennedy 117. 
115 Kennedy 117. 
116 Kennedy 118; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 454-458. 
117 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 448-454; Eastwood v Shepstone 1902 TS 294, 303-305; 
Sharrock Business Transactions 195-196. 
118 It is difficult to lay down a hard and fast rule for when this will be the case. See Bradfield 
Christie’s Law of Contract 451-454; Cameron 676-677; Smith v Rand Bank Bpk 1979 (4) SA 228 
(N) 233; Vogel v Volkersz 1977 (1) SA 537 (T) 548F; Kuhn v Karp 1948 (4) SA 825 (T) 838-840; 
Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 401-407. Note that severance in respect of restraint of trade 
clauses will not be dealt with as that falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
119 Act 38 of 2001. 
120 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 85; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 109-110. 
121 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 84-85; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 109; Peters, 
Flamman & Co v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427 434; Merrill Lynch SA (Pty) Ltd v Moosa 
[2003] All SA 431 (C) para [20]. 
122 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 109-110. 
123 Van der Westhuizen v James 1898 5 Off Rep 90, 90-91(hereafter James). 
124 A court will look at the circumstances and the contract itself to establish this. 
125 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 109-112, 620-621. 
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performance is also not due or enforceable.126 It is important to note the performance 
of the contract must be impossible, not the objectives resulting from the contract,127 
for example, if the res vendita128 does not exist.129 Impossibility of performance must 
be objective, otherwise, the contract will commence.130 
The effect of impossibility differs depending on the circumstances.131 If a party 
warranted the possibility of performance, the warrantor will be liable for breach of 
contract.132 If a party has incurred expenses based on his or her belief in the 
possibility of performance, he or she may be compensated for his or her loss 
depending on circumstances.133 
3.2.8 Formalities134 
Common law does not prescribe formalities for the conclusion of an agreement,135 
neither are they generally a legislative requirement.136 However, parties to an 
agreement can agree on formalities – eg, that the contract and any amendments 
thereto must be in writing.137 Section 14 of the CPA which regulates fixed-term 
contracts, by implication requires fixed-term agreements to be in writing.138 
Formalities serve a protective function to ensure a true record of the agreement 
reached between the parties so preventing litigation based on incorrectly 
remembered terms or even fraudulent allegations regarding the terms agreed to.139 
When formalities are prescribed by statute but not adhered to, the position is 
 
126 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 85. 
127 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 109 n 677; Rosebank Mall (Pty) Ltd v Cradock Heights (Pty) 
Ltd [2003] All SA 471 (W) para [64]. 
128 The thing bought or sold. Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 426. 
129 James 91-92. 
130 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 85; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 183. 
131 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 184-185. 
132 Note that this claim will be delictual not contractual. See Van Huyssteen et al Contract 185. 
133 James 91-92. 
134 The requirements set by s 14 of the CPA for fixed-term contracts are discussed in Ch 4. This 
discussion relates to general principles that may be relevant. 
135 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 83; Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 71; Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 146. 
136 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 146, 156-158; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 129-131; Du 
Bois et al Wille’s Principles 755. There are exceptions, eg, the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 in 
respect of alienation of land; s 6 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1966 in respect of 
suretyships; and the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 in respect of credit agreements. 
137 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 147-148; SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren en 
Andere 1964 (4) SA 760 (A) 766. 
138 Section 14 of the CPA, read with reg 5(1). The duration of the agreement is calculated from 
date of signature by the consumer, which implies a written agreement. Because s 14 of the CPA 
fixed-term contracts are by implication required to be in writing, and suppliers use standard-form 
contracts — many common-law doctrines like quasi-mutual assent are not relevant to this thesis, 
and will not be discussed. 
139 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 129; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 161; Du Bois et al Wille’s 
Principles 755-756; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 159-160. 
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regulated by the particular statute. As a rule, non-adherence to a statutory 
requirement results in a void agreement.140 
When an agreement is in writing, the parol evidence rule applies,141 and because of 
the importance of the rule, especially for the consumer who is generally in an inferior 
bargaining position, further explanation is required. 
3.2.9 Parol evidence rule142 
The parol evidence rule applies to written common-law contracts and fixed-term 
contracts under section 14 of the CPA.143 Originating in English law, the rule entails 
that when parties enter into a written contract, the original document with its written 
amendments, additions, or alterations, represents the only source of the terms and 
conditions of the agreement.144 In general, no extrinsic evidence may be led to alter 
the written agreement as the purpose of requiring writing is to ensure legal and 
factual certainty regarding the terms and conditions of the agreement.145 Certain 
exceptions – eg, memoranda, local commercial practice, invalid juristic acts, 
simulated contracts, collateral agreements,146 later amendments to agreements, 
suspensive conditions, and additional parties to the agreement – have been allowed 
by courts.147 The parol evidence rule does not apply if its application would be to the 
detriment of bona fide third parties.148 
Courts have permitted evidence in certain circumstances.149 The purpose of the 
parol evidence rule is to prevent uncertainty regarding the content of written 
 
140 For instance, s 28 of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. 
141 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 84; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 167. 
142 Also known as the integration rule or the golden rule, Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 806. A full 
discussion of parol evidence falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
143 Section 14 read with reg 5(1). In certain circumstances, the parol evidence rule is limited or 
abolished by sections of the CPA, eg, s 52(2). See Ch 4 para 4.3.2.7. 
144 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 807; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 111; Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 167; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 226. 
145 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 807; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 84; Van Jaarsveld & 
Oosthuizen Handelsreg 111; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 257-258; Lowrey v Steedman 1914 
AD 532, 543; Union Government v Vianini Ferro-Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 43, 47; Meyer v 
Merchants Trust Ltd 1942 AD 244, 253; Harlin Properties v Los Angeles Hotel 1962 (3) SA 143 
(A); Venter v Birchholtz 1972 (1) SA 276 (A) 282; Strydom v Coach Motors 1975 (4) SA 838 (T); 
National Board (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd v Estate Swanepoel 1975 (3) SA 16 (A) 25; Reilly v Seligson 
and Clare Ltd 1977 (1) SA 626 (A) 637; Johnson v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) 938, 943. Also see the 
case discussion by Cornelius (2009) TSAR 775. 
146 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 233; Du Plessis v Nel 1952 (1) SA 513 (A) 519-520, 529, 
530. 
147 Bekker (2014) PELJ 1141-1142. 
148 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 179. 
149 Where the evidence will not modify or vary the terms of the agreement; when the dispute relates 
to the existence or validity of the agreement; to explain the terms used in the agreement; where 
collateral agreements are not inconsistent with the main agreement; in connection with an oral 
agreement after the written agreement was completed; when the parties want to establish what 
their respective rights and obligations are in terms of the agreement; where the evidence relates to 
 
 South Africa: The common-law position of consumers under fixed-term contracts 
57 
 
agreements, and to regulate the type and degree of evidence allowed in suitable 
circumstances.150 However, rectification of contracts is allowed to mitigate the harsh 
and unfair application of the parol evidence rule where the written agreement does 
not reflect the true intention of the parties because of a mutual error or mistake.151 
The consequences of rectification are that after rectification the agreement reflects 
the true intention of the parties.152 
Scholars, judges, and practitioners have for decades grappled with the 
interpretation, extent, application, and components of the parol evidence rule. One 
school of thought advocates the abolition of the rule, while another proposes a 
virtually unlimited discretion for courts to hear any evidence to clarify and determine 
the exact intention of parties to an agreement.153 
In the important case of KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd154 the 
court held that the parol evidence rule still forms part of our law. It reiterated that 
practitioners do not often resort to the rule and courts often fail to enforce it.155 Harms 
AJ expressly stated the interpretation of a written document is a legal matter, not a 
 
a prior oral agreement that stipulates when the written agreement becomes effective. See Du Bois 
et al Wille’s Principles 807-809; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 170; Peter v Thomas (1908) EDC 
140; Avis v Verseput 1943 AD 331. 
150 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 167. The rule is divided into two principles; namely, the 
integration rule and the interpretation rule. The integration rule forms the essence of the parol 
evidence rule and regulates if, and to what degree extrinsic evidence may be led to alter, amend or 
contradict the terms of the written agreement. Therefore, this rule speaks to the body or contents of 
the agreement, and forms the first leg of the rule. The interpretation rule, on the other hand, guides 
as to the degree of extrinsic evidence and the circumstances when evidence may be brought to 
construe or interpret the words or terms already in the written agreement. Another rule, closely 
related to the parol evidence rule prohibits extrinsic evidence to alter or amend clear and 
unambiguous words and provisions in an agreement, see Cornelius (2009) TSAR 768; Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 168. See the Delmas Milling Co Ltd v du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A) 
judgment that was fundamental in the development of the parol evidence rule, as it set three rules 
for the admission of parol evidence. For a discussion of this judgment and the Coopers & Lybrand 
v Bryant 1995 3 SA 761 (A) judgment, see Cornelius (2009) TSAR 770-771 where he discusses 
these two judgments and their effect on the development of the rule. These terms and similar 
remedies obviously lead to confusion, Van Huyssteen et al Contract 168; Bekker (2013) Litnet 
Akademies 111-151; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 240.  
151 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 111-112; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 172; Bekker 
(2014) PELJ 1142; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 384-390. There are strict requirements for 
the allegations in pleadings when a party wishes to make use of rectification. See Strydom v 
Coach Motors 1975 (4) SA 838 (T) 840-841. 
152 In Akasia Road Surfacing v Shoredits Holdings 2002 (3) SA 346 (SCA) paras [16]−[17] the court 
held that vagueness in the agreement, although it affected the validity of the rectified agreement, 
did not prevent the defendant from applying to court to have the agreement rectified. 
153 Bekker LLD 530-532 proposes that courts should be able to consider any kind of evidence to 
decide disputes in pleadings. Courts should hold the wording and terminology in agreements in 
high regard – especially where the wording is clear and unambiguous. He concludes that courts 
should have an unlimited discretion to determine the true intention of parties to an agreement. Note 
that the CPA and agreements in terms of the CPA are interpreted in accordance with the 
provisions of s 4 thereof. This aspect is dealt with in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.3. 
154 [2009] 2 All SA 523 (SCA) (hereafter KPMG). 
155 KPMG para [39]. 
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factual matter and, therefore, only the court can interpret the agreement,156 and that 
the normal rules of evidence apply.157 
Over the years, courts have become more liberal in their approach to and 
application of the parol evidence rule, and have elected not to distinguish between 
surrounding circumstances and background circumstances.158 However, they 
remain justifiably cautious of allowing external evidence in interpreting the meaning 
of clauses in contracts,159 and the parol evidence rule still applies. 
Sections 4(3) and 4(4) of the CPA provide how a court or the tribunal should interpret 
provisions of the CPA, and standard forms, contracts, and other documents 
prepared or published by suppliers. However, as common-law rights are preserved 
in section 2(10) of the CPA, the common-law principles of the parol evidence rule 
remain relevant.160 
In the following paragraph, I move on to discuss the duration of contracts as this is 
a pertinent aspect of this thesis. 
3.2.10 Duration of agreement 
Although a stipulation on the duration of the contract is not an essential element of 
the agreement, it is usual and advisable to agree on the duration of the agreement. 
If the agreement is valid for a certain, determinable period it is referred to as a fixed-
term agreement.161 If not, it could be an ad hoc agreement or even an indefinite 
 
156 KPMG para [39]. 
157 KPMG para [39]. In his discussion of the KPMG case, Cornelius observes contractual evidence 
can be divided into four categories: (i) Evidence about the circumstances at the time of negotiation 
and conclusion of the agreement, which is admissible; (ii) evidence regarding what one of the 
parties detected at the time of conclusion of the agreement, which is generally not admissible, 
except to establish to what extent consensus exists; (iii) evidence on the parties’ collective 
intention whilst negotiations were taking place, which is admissible after KPMG; (iv) evidence of 
the background conditions that demonstrates the parties’ respective intentions or quasi mutual 
consensus during negotiations and conclusion of the agreement, which is generally not allowed, 
although this could be relevant to establish if, and to what extent, there was consensus on the 
matter. See Cornelius (2009) TSAR 774-775. 
158 KPMG para [39]; Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) 
Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA) para [12]. 
159 KPMG para [39]; Cornelius (2009) TSAR 775. 
160 The parol evidence rule has only been limited or abolished to a certain extent by a few 
provisions in the CPA, see Ch 4 para 4.3.2.7. 
161 Most fixed-term agreements contain a clause that stipulates when and how parties should give 
notice of termination, see for instance on lease agreements Sharrock Business Transactions 321. 
See De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 146 and Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 195 on the 
termination of contracts in general, and Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 184 on 
termination of contract by compliance. For a discussion of the termination of fixed-term contracts 
see Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7. When fixed-term contracts are governed by legislation such as the CPA, the 
legislation normally prescribes the termination notice period. See s 14 CPA. 
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contract162 which may give rise to problems when one of the parties wishes or needs 
to terminate the agreement.163 
The Supreme Court of Appeal considered this question in Plaaskem (Pty) Ltd v 
Nippon Africa Chemicals (Pty) Ltd.164 It found that the agreement in question had no 
specific clause governing duration and also no suggestion that the parties planned 
to be bound in perpetuity. Therefore, the court investigated the nature of the 
relationship between the parties and the surrounding circumstances when the 
agreement was concluded. The agreement required the parties to maintain a close 
working relationship and communicate regularly. The court saw this as signifying 
that the relationship could not continue in perpetuity as its continued application 
depended on numerous factors such as production costs and exchange rates. It 
was therefore necessary to import a tacit term to the effect that either party could 
terminate the agreement by way of reasonable notice to the other party.165 The 
judgment in Plaaskem shows that the courts will use their discretion to protect 
parties and ensure a reasonable and fair result, even if the parties had not initially 
foreseen or expressly provided for such an eventuality.166 
The duration of contracts is of special importance for the purpose of this thesis as 
regulation 5 of the CPA regulations limits the maximum duration of fixed-term 
contracts to 24 months.167 
3.2.11 The penalty clause168 
3.2.11.1 Introduction 
A penalty clause is a protective measure in an agreement in terms of which the 
parties agree – generally when concluding the agreement – to a predetermined 
amount of damages in case of breach.169 A penalty clause serves two purposes. 
First, it discourages breach of contract;170 and second, where breach occurs, it 
 
162 Mudzviti (2018) De Rebus 18-19. 
163 Mudzviti (2018) De Rebus 19. 
164 2014 (5) SA 287 (SCA) (hereafter Plaaskem). 
165 Plaaskem paras [21]−[27]. Also see the discussion of Plaaskem by Mudzviti (2018) De Rebus 
18-19; Trident Sales (Pty) Ltd v AH Pillman & Son (Pty) Ltd 1984 (1) SA 433 (W). On the 
interpretation of the duration of agreements also see Llanelly Railway and Dock Company v 
London and North-Western Railway Company (1873) LR 8 Ch App 942 (CA) 950; Putco Ltd v TV 
& Radio Guarantee Co (Pty) Ltd 1985 (4) SA 809 (A); Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd v 
Rond Vista Wholesalers 2004 (1) SA 538 (SCA); Carnegie (1969) LQR 411-412. 
166 Also see Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 504-506 for a general discussion of the 
termination of contracts entered into for an unspecified period. 
167 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7. 
168 Also known as the stipulatio poenae, De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 234. 
169 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 234; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 242; Bradfield Christie’s 
Law of Contract 661-665; Sharrock Business Transactions 768-769. 
170 Referred to as a clause in terrorem which means a clause to frighten a party and thereby 
discourage him or her from breaching the agreement, Cassell’s Latin Dictionary 601; Van 
Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 178. 
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prevents the time-consuming, difficult, and often expensive procedure of calculating 
and proving a specific amount of damages. 
In Roman law a penalty clause was enforceable without reduction or discount.171 It 
was accessory to the principal obligation and therefore the creditor could not claim 
both performance in terms of the agreement and the penalty clause amount.172 In 
medieval times, penalty clauses were not often used, but did not disappear 
altogether.173 
Different types of penalty clause have developed to cover a variety of 
eventualities.174 It is important to differentiate between contractual penalty clauses, 
and penalty stipulations to which the Conventional Penalties Act175 applies.176 In 
terms of the Penalties Act a stipulation will be a penalty stipulation (falling under the 
Act) if the clause comes into operation upon breach of a contract.177 The other type 
of penalty clause is one to which the parties have agreed, and does not depend on 
breach by either or both parties. In such an instance the Penalties Act does not 
apply.178  
The effect and treatment of these two types of clause are the same, and the law 
treats them equally, regardless of whether they were intended to discourage breach 
of contract or penalise the party in breach.179 Even if the stipulation is not covered 
by the Penalties Act, a court always has the discretion to reduce the amount of a 
penalty clause if it finds it excessive.180 The innocent party cannot claim both 
damages and the amount stipulated in a penalty clause.181 
Penalty clauses are relevant for the purpose of fixed-term contracts under section 
14 of the CPA, as section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) of the CPA entitles the consumer to 
terminate the agreement at any time during the contract term, by giving the supplier 
20 days’ notice. However, section 14(3)(b)(i) entitles the supplier to impose a 
reasonable cancellation penalty because of the termination. This penalty is not 
 
171 D 22.1.44 available at 
http://legalhistorysources.com/Law508/Roman%20Law/JustinianDigest.htm (date of use: 4 
November 2019); De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 234. 
172 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 235. 
173 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 235. 
174 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 177; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 234. 
175 Act 15 of 1962 (Penalties Act). In cases of conflict between the Penalties Act and the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005 (Credit Act) the provisions of the Credit Act prevail. 
176 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 179; the court will look at the true intention of the 
parties when deciding if the Penalties Act applies, and not merely at simulated acts. 
177 Section 1 of the Penalties Act; Sharrock Business Transactions 768-769. This aspect is 
discussed in greater detail in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.10. 
178 For example, roukoop and arrha. See paras 3.2.11.6 and 3.2.11.7. 
179 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 178; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 662. 
180 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 235; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 178; Bradfield 
Christie’s Law of Contract 662; Western Credit Bank Ltd v Kajee 1967 (4) SA 386 (N) 391. 
181 Section 2(1) of the Penalties Act; Sharrock Business Transactions 769. 
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based on breach of the agreement, but is expressly authorised by statute and is not 
subject to the provisions of the Penalties Act.182 
Most common-law penalty clauses have been prohibited by the CPA,183 but it 
remains important to consider these clauses, because if provided for and regulated 
in the CPA they could work to the advantage of either party. For example, if the 
amount of the reasonable penalty in section 14(3)(b)(i) of the CPA is agreed on 
beforehand and disclosed in the fixed-term contract, the consumer knows how much 
he or she must pay when cancelling the agreement under section 14(2)(b)(i) of the 
CPA. The consumer could then also avoid having to turn to the ombud to establish 
if the cancellation penalty is reasonable.184 I briefly consider a few penalty clauses 
to establish the purpose, the protection provided to the innocent party, and the value 
and use of each in commercial practice under the common law. 
3.2.11.2 Lex commissoria185 
The lex commissoria operates as a resolutive condition and stipulates that in the 
event of default by the purchaser, the seller will have the right to cancel or resile 
from the contract, at his or her choice.186 Van den Heever AJ explained in Baines 
Motors v Piek187 that it is irrelevant whether or not the purchaser benefits from the 
exercise of the lex commissoria.188 An example of this in a fixed-term agreement is 
where a lessee is required to pay a deposit under a lease agreement, failing which 
the supplier has the right to cancel or resile from the agreement.189 
3.2.11.3 Pre-estimation of damages 
A pre-estimation of damages clause contains an approximation of the amount of 
damages the innocent party will suffer in the event of breach by the other party. As 
it is based on breach, it is covered by the provisions of the Penalties Act.190 
 
182 See the discussion of this aspect in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.10; Sharrock Business Transactions 768-
769. 
183 For example, clauses provided for in s 51(1)(h) of the CPA. 
184 See, eg, the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.4.2. 
185 ‘Resolutive condition’ Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 220. The lex commissoria 
is a form of pactum adiectum, which means additional agreement, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige 
Regswoordeboek 251. The pacta adiecta are terms or clauses used in contracts that oblige either 
party to undertake an additional or ancillary obligation apart from the main purpose of the contract. 
See Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 92. Other forms of pacta adiecta are the 
addictio in diem, pactum displicentiae, pactum de retrovendendo, and pactum de retroemendo. 
See para 3.2.13 for a brief discussion of these terms. 
186 Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 220. 
187 1955 (1) SA 534 (A) (hereafter Baines). 
188 Baines 542. 
189 Depending on the wording it could also be a suspensive condition. 
190 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 341. See s 1 of the Penalties Act. However, when the contract 
is terminated lawfully, either in terms of the agreement or in terms of legislation, eg s 
14(2)(b)(i)(bb), the termination should not be subject to the provisions of the Penalties Act – see 
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However, if the CPA is amended to include a sliding scale or formula for the pre-
estimation of damages it would benefit the consumer as he or she would know the 
exact amount payable should he or she decide to cancel in terms of section 
14(2)(b)(i) of the CPA. If the amount is unreasonable, it may be adjusted by a court 
of law. At this stage there is uncertainty regarding the calculation of the reasonable 
amount for the penalty provided for in regulation 5 of the CPA.191 When such formula 
for pre-estimation is provided for in the CPA, and the cancellation is one intended 
in section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb), the Penalties Act will not apply. 
3.2.11.4 Forfeiture clause 
A forfeiture clause is aimed at negating the effects of restitutio in integrum192 where 
the purchaser breaches the contract after having made initial payments. The 
forfeiture clause entitles the seller to retain the instalments already paid in the event 
of breach by the purchaser, even though the purchaser must return the merx. Under 
normal circumstances, the general rule on the rescission of an agreement is that 
both parties must make restitution.193 
It is clear that a forfeiture clause can be just as prejudicial as a penalty clause, as 
the amount retained by the seller is not necessarily in line with the damages he or 
she suffered.194 The legislature noted Van den Heever JA’s judgment in Baines 
where he held that the position in South African law on forfeiture clauses gave rise 
to an ‘illogical situation’ as a pre-estimation of damages could be more detrimental 
than a penalty.195 As a result, the legislature introduced the Penalties Act which also 
applies to forfeiture clauses. The forfeiture clause can be used or activated at the 
instance of the seller, and the Penalties Act applies to forfeiture clauses. 
In practice, when a supplier prematurely terminates a cell phone purchase 
agreement linked to voice, data, and other services, based on default or non-
performance by the consumer, the consumer would have to return the cell phone to 
the supplier. In these circumstances, the consumer would not be entitled to be 
 
the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.10. A pre-estimation or a formula for the calculation of the 
penalty in s 14 would provide certainty on the amount payable in the event of the consumer 
cancelling under s 14. As the penalty is not for a breach in that the cancellation in this case is 
provided for in s 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) of the CPA, the Penalties Act will not apply to this amount. 
191 See discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.10. 
192 Meaning restore to the previous position, see Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 
281; Cassell’s Latin Dictionary 519, 317. 
193 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 236; Barenblatt & Son v Dixon 1917 CPD 319, 324. 
194 De Wet argues that this is the position because the courts followed a maxim by Voet, and erred 
in blindly following an incorrect judgment in Mangold Bros v Greyling’s Trustee 1910 EDL 471. De 
Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 236-237. De Wet is of the opinion that Voet neglected to qualify this 
maxim in the specific instance, although he referred to the qualification (to reduce the amount if 
unreasonable) later in the text, and so perhaps did not see the need to qualify it earlier. Also see 
the judgment by Van den Heever AJ in Baines. 
195 Baines 543. 
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reimbursed for instalments already paid, and it can be argued that the effect is 
similar to that of the forfeiture clause. 
3.2.11.5 Acceleration clauses 
The purpose of an acceleration clause is to accelerate payment(s) in terms of an 
agreement in the event of non-payment of a part of the purchase price by the debtor. 
The acceleration clause does not commence automatically, the creditor can choose 
to use it or not.196 Because the clause does not notably increase the total amount 
payable by the debtor, but merely accelerates payment in terms of the agreement, 
the general understanding is the Penalties Act does not apply to acceleration 
clauses197 save when the clause also entitles the creditor to claim all finance charges 
on commencement of the acceleration clause.198 
Where goods and services are sold under a fixed-term agreement coupled with a 
credit agreement as payment for the goods,199 one could argue that on termination 
of the agreement by the supplier, based on default or non-performance by the 
consumer, the NCA would apply to the goods in terms of the credit agreement, and 
that an acceleration clause could apply to the goods part of the agreement.200 
3.2.11.6 Roukoop201 
Roukoop is an amount the purchaser is prepared to pay to withdraw from an 
agreement.202 Roukoop can be paid where A purchases an item from B, and then 
decides not to proceed with the purchase. A now contacts B and offers B an amount 
of R10 000 to withdraw from the agreement. B accepts the R10 000 as roukoop and 
the agreement is cancelled. A roukoop clause can also be inserted or agreed upon 
in the agreement, so providing the purchaser with the option to withdraw from the 
agreement without committing breach of contract. This is referred to as a ius 
poenitendi.203 Roukoop is used at the sole discretion of the purchaser, and so differs 
from the penalty clause, the forfeiture clause, and the lex commissoria.204 The 
 
196 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 178 nn 332 and 333; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 
311, 343. 
197 Sharrock Business Transactions 769; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 178; Hutchison 
et al Law of Contract 343 differ from this and claim that the position of acceleration clauses is not 
clear in the Penalties Act. See also Claude Neon Lights SA Ltd v Schlemmer 1974 (1) SA 143 (N); 
Premier Finance Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Rotainers (Pty) Ltd & Another 1975 (1) SA 79 (W) 83; 
Parekh v Shah Jehan Cinemas 1982 (3) SA 618 (D) 628. 
198 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 178. 
199 For example, where an expensive item is sold and the consumer secures credit to pay for the 
item. 
200 For a discussion of the applicability of the CPA to credit agreements see Melville (2010) SA 
Merc LJ 272-278. 
201 Sometimes spelt rouwkoop, literally meaning regret money see 
https://www.yourdictionary.com/roukoop (date of use: 13 January 2019). 
202 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 240; Van den Heever JA Baines 542 [D]−[E]. Related to 
roukoop, but with differences in principle, is arrha, see the discussion of arrha in para 3.2.11.7. 
203 The right to pay money as atonement – see Cassell’s Latin Dictionary 454. 
204 Van den Heever JA in Baines 542[D−F]. 
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Penalties Act does not apply to roukoop as the purchaser chooses to implement it 
and therefore does not commit breach of contract.205 However, roukoop could prove 
useful to the consumer in the circumstances of section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) of the CPA, 
as the consumer would know the extent of the cancellation penalty beforehand. 
However, as the CPA currently reads, roukoop would probably be prohibited in 
terms of section 51(1)(h) of the CPA.206 
3.2.11.7 Arrha207 
Arrha is an amount paid as proof of the earnest intention to do business.208 Normally 
arrha is an insignificant amount and does not affect the parties’ contractual 
relationship.209 When a party commits a breach of contract, he or she not only forfeits 
the arrha, the other party can still claim damages.210 This of course, is the main 
difference between roukoop and arrha, as roukoop is not a breach of contract.211 
Nowadays, arrha is rarely used in practice. 
3.2.11.8 Concluding remarks: Penalty clauses 
The debtor can approach a court to decide whether the amount in a penalty clause 
is in proportion to the creditor’s damages suffered.212 To establish whether the 
amount of the penalty is reasonable the court will take into account all factors 
affecting the creditor’s interests that could possibly have been caused by the 
debtor’s breach or omission.213 The advantage of inserting a penalty clause is that 
the amount is determinable and becomes due and payable on breach of contract.214 
 
205 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 342-343; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 179; De Wet 
& Van Wyk Kontraktereg 240; 
206 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.3.2.3.3. 
207 Arrha means earnest money, see Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 159. Arrha is 
sometimes spelt arra, see Van Zyl Geskiedenis 287. 
208 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 239; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 179; Joubert 
General Principles 264. 
209 There are two types of arrha: arrha pacto imperfecto data (earnest money at preliminary 
negotiations, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 159) which is paid as earnest money 
to show serious intention with and during the negotiations and is forfeited when the party withdraws 
from the negotiations – see De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 239-240; Van Jaarsveld & 
Oosthuizen Handelsreg 179; Joubert General Principles 264. The second form, arrha confirmatoria 
(confirmatory earnest money, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 159) on the other 
hand, shows the earnest intention to enter into, and fulfil contractual obligations, and is paid at 
conclusion of the agreement – see Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 179; Joubert General 
Principles 264. This amount must be returned when the party has fulfilled his obligations in terms 
of the agreement. If he does not fulfil his obligations the arrha is not returned and the contract 
remains valid. Therefore arrha is not a deposit, and does not form part of the purchase price. It is 
merely symbolic, as a token to prove the purchaser’s serious intent to enter into an agreement.. 
Also, see Van den Heever JA in Baines 542[F-G]. 
210 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 239-240. 
211 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 240. 
212 Section 3 of the Penalties Act. The burden of proof lies with the debtor. 
213 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 886; Van Staden v Central SA Lands & Mines 1969 (4) SA 349 
(W) 352. 
214 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 243. 
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A party penalised in terms of section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) can, therefore, always approach 
a court to establish if the penalty is reasonable. It is important to note that the penalty 
provided for in section 14 of the CPA is not a penalty in the normal sense that 
penalises the consumer for a breach of contract.215 Section 14 allows the consumer 
to cancel, and the penalty is therefore not damages for a breach of contract and is 
not subject to the Penalties Act.216 However, a pre-estimation of damages could 
prove useful to a consumer when deciding to cancel in terms of section 
14(2)(b)(i)(bb) of the CPA as he or she would know beforehand exactly what amount 
would be due on cancellation.  
3.2.12 Other terms and conditions217 
There is a range of conditional clauses either party can use to protect him- or herself 
– generally in anticipation of a specific event or a potential risk. Some of these 
conditional clauses are considered below and explained by way of examples. 
3.2.12.1 Voetstoots218 
A voetstoots clause protects the seller by excluding a warranty against latent defects 
in the merx.219 The merx is sold as is, and the seller is not responsible for latent 
defects unless he or she was aware of these, or made misrepresentations about 
the merx. A mala fide seller is, therefore, not protected by a voetstoots clause.220 
The CPA limits voetstoots clauses in consumer transactions, as they in all likelihood 
contravene the provisions of section 51(1)(a)-(c) of the CPA.221 However, the 
voetstoots clause is still used regularly in, for instance, sales agreements of 
immovable property by individuals. 
 
215 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.10. 
216 Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Juta’s Commentary 14-13. This aspect and the calculation and 
guidelines in reg 5 to calculate a reasonable penalty is discussed in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.10. 
217 A purchaser or consumer will not normally have the option of making use of these conditions, 
unless he is in strong bargaining position. Therefore, as consumers will normally not be in a 
position to make use of these conditions in a standard-form agreement, they are not discussed in 
detail. If inserted in an agreement in terms of s 14 of the CPA it will be at the instance and to the 
advantage of the supplier/seller. Measures such as modal clauses are also not discussed as they 
are very rarely used and should in all probability never be used in connection with a s 14 fixed-term 
agreement. 
218 Meaning without a warranty or as it stands – Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 
489. 
219 Joubert General Principles 52. Voetstoots clauses are not permitted in contracts that fall under 
the National Credit Act, and the Consumer Protection Act appears to limit the protection provided 
to sellers. See Sharrock Business Transactions 302, 684; Otto (2011) THRHR 525, 535-544. This 
aspect is dealt with in greater detail in Ch 4. 
220 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 365. The position of the seller who misleads a 
purchaser by innocent misrepresentation is uncertain, see De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 345. 
Also related to misrepresentation is puffing, dicta et promissa, warranties, sales talk, and mere 
opinion. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 119-120 for a detailed discussion and a Venn 
diagram depicting and explaining the overlap and importance of these terms to establish liability. 
221 For a full discussion see Stoop (2018) THRHR 650; Barnard (2012) De Jure 455; Morissey & 
Coetzee (2010) Without Prejudice 12 contend that there is uncertainty surrounding this issue. 
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3.2.12.2 Suspensive conditions 
Suspensive conditions aim to delay the commencement of the agreement, normally 
for practical reasons – eg, when the purchaser needs to apply for a loan or bond to 
finance the purchase price of the merx. So, if a purchaser purchases immovable 
property but needs to apply for a bond, the commencement of the agreement is 
suspended until the purchaser has obtained sufficient funds to proceed with the 
agreement. 222 Suspensive conditions remain relevant for the purpose of the CPA, 
as one could argue that the financial investigation to establish whether a consumer 
can afford a particular cell phone in a fixed-term contract under the CPA is similar 
to a suspensive condition. 
3.2.13 Various measures not generally used 
There are various conditional clauses that protect both parties under the common 
law, which will probably not be encountered in the common-law format in fixed-term 
contracts under the CPA. I mention these to illustrate the extent to which the 
common law provides flexibility for parties to negotiate all terms and conditions in 
an agreement individually. Some of these conditions are entrenched in the CPA in 
a different format or wording, but have a similar effect in practice. These include, 
but are not limited to: 
• Resolutive conditions that aim to dissolve the agreement on the 
occurrence of a specific eventuality.223 A resolutive condition can, for 
example, stipulate that a person acts as surety for another’s obligations 
for 60 days. On expiry of the agreed period, the surety agreement will 
lapse. 
• Addictio in diem,224 which is a special condition that means although the 
seller has entered into an agreement of sale in respect of the merx, he 
or she retains the right to accept a better offer within a specified period.225 
 
222 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 146. 
223 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 146; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 167. 





20diem%22&f=false (date of use: 22 January 2019). 
225 In practice this is referred to as the ‘back door’ clause. A back door clause is mainly used in 
agreements of sale of immovable property, especially where the sale is subject to the approval of a 
bond for the balance of the purchase price. Its purpose is to protect the seller whose property is 
being actively marketed against non-approval of the purchaser’s bond after a long waiting period 
as stipulated in a suspensive condition. When using the back door clause the seller can continue 
marketing his or her property while awaiting approval of the purchaser’s bond, and can accept a 
better offer, whether it is a better price, or a cash offer for the same amount or even less if 
immediately available in cash, as stipulated in the addictio in diem, within the agreed period. 
Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 92. 
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• Pactum displicentiae226 is a clause which provides that if the purchaser is 
not satisfied with the res vendita, he or she can return it. This clause is 
known as an agreement subject to approval by the purchaser within a 
specified period, or commonly as ‘appro’.227 It is similar to the statutory 
cooling-off period in section 16 of the CPA, or to a warranty under section 
55 of the CPA. 
• Pactum de retrovendendo228 is a clause that protects the seller by 
entitling him or her to repurchase the merx from the purchaser within a 
specified period, on demand, or when a specific event occurs, as agreed 
in the contract.229 
• Pactum de retroemendo230 obliges the seller to repurchase the merx 
either on demand or when a certain event takes place, thereby in effect 
entitling the purchaser to a cancellation of the agreement and the 
reimbursement of the purchase price in specific pre-determined 
circumstances.231 
• Supposition clauses are based on a supposition,232 and are another 
protective measure.233 Here parties enter into an agreement based on a 
certain supposition of existing facts. If or when the facts do not 
materialise, or turn out not to be as supposed, the agreement does not 
take effect.234 
3.2.13.1 Guarantees 
A guarantee is a safeguard that a specific payment or performance will take place. 
For example, where the purchase price of immovable property must be paid to the 
seller against registration of the property in the name of the purchaser.235 In practice, 
the purchaser cannot risk paying the purchase price to the seller before receiving 
transfer of the property. Should transfer not be effected into his or her name, he or 
she risks losing the purchase price. He or she therefore arranges with a financial 
institution to issue guarantees payable to the seller on date of registration of the 
 
226 A cancellation clause or agreement, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 251. 
227 Many clothing stores allow customers to take merchandise on approval for a specified period. 
This clause protects the purchaser and enables him or her to try out the merx in order to satisfy 
him- or herself that it complies with his or her requirements. If not satisfied the purchaser can 
return the item within the prescribed period and be refunded. Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase 
and Sale 97. 
228 An agreement to repurchase the item sold, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 251. 
229 Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 98, Mouton v Hanekom 1959 (3) SA 35 (A) 39. 
230 An agreement to buy back, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 251. 
231 Zulman & Dicks Norman’s Purchase and Sale 98; Black v Le Voy 1924 EDL 176, 182-183. 
232 Supposition means that parties have an idea, or suppose that something is true, but are not 
certain. See https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/supposition (date of use: 4 
February 2020). 
233 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 155; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 131. 
234 Rossouw v Hauman 1949 (4) SA 796 (C) 801-802; Dickinson Motors (Pty) Ltd v Oberholzer 
1952 (1) SA 443 (A) 449-450. 
235 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 479-480. 
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property in his or her name. This is one of the practical ways of ensuring reciprocity 
where simultaneous performance is difficult or potentially risky. 
3.2.13.2 Warranties 
The purpose of a warranty is slightly different to a guarantee.236 A warranty 
guarantees certain qualities or characteristics of a product for a specific period 
during normal use. It is generally printed on a leaflet accompanying a merx. A 
warranty is important for purposes of fixed-term agreements, as sections 55-57 of 
the CPA provides for the consumer’s right to safe and good-quality goods, implied 
warranties, and a warranty on repaired goods.237 
3.2.13.3 Entrenchment clauses238 
Entrenchment clauses aim to protect certain clauses or contracts, for example by 
providing that a clause(s) or contract can only be amended by way of written 
amendments,239 or with the approval of a certain prescribed voting percentage, or 
perhaps, not at all.240 These clauses are not limited to contracts, and are also used 
in constitutions.241 
3.2.13.4 Exclusion clauses242 
An exclusion clause aims to exclude liability as stipulated in the agreement. There 
is no legal prohibition on exclusion clauses except those prohibited by legislation.243 
The CPA prohibits or limits certain exclusions in section 51(1). 
3.2.13.5 Concluding remarks: Various other terms and conditions 
It is clear that many of the terms and conditions used in the common-law of contract 
to protect either party, can and still do play a role in consumer agreements, 
 
236 Although the terms warranty and guarantee are sometimes used interchangeably. 
237 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.3.3.4. 
238 Section 49 of the CPA provides that material changes to an agreement are to be advised in 
writing, and is therefore similar to an entrenchment clause. 
239 Section 14(2)(c)(i) of the CPA could be viewed as similar to an entrenchment clause as it 
provides the supplier must notify the consumer in advance of material changes applicable to the 
renewal of the agreement. 
240 See https://www.translegal.com/legal-english-dictionary/entrenchmentclause (date of use: 15 
January 2019). 
241 For example, the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. 
242 Exclusions which exclude suppliers’ liability are normally not permitted in CPA contracts – see 
the blacklist in s 51 of the CPA, as well as the grey list. See Ch 4 paras 4.3.2.3.3 and 4.3.2.3.4. 
243 Voetstoots could qualify as an exclusion clause. Note that s 90(3) of the NCA prohibits clauses 
such as voetstoots, see Otto et al (2014) SA Merc LJ 256, and probably prohibited under the CPA, 
(ibid 261). See the prohibition of waivers in s 48(i)(c), exemption notice under s 48(2)(d) and reg 44 
of the CPA regulations for a list of terms deemed unfair. For a recent analysis of the status of 
exemption clauses, see Richards LLM. Also see Mupangavanhu (2014) PELJ 1178-1189. This 
aspect is discussed in further detail in Ch 4 para 4.3.3.4. 
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especially as the common law remains the foundation for all agreements concluded 
in terms of the CPA. 
3.2.14 Misrepresentation 
Misrepresentation takes place when a party makes a false material declaration 
before or during contractual negotiations which induces the other party to enter into 
the agreement.244 Misrepresentation, therefore, affects consensus between the 
parties.245 It is important to differentiate between misrepresentation and 
circumstances where there are ex lege and contractual warranties, as the remedies 
differ in each situation.246 
Misrepresentation must be distinguished from ‘sales talk’ or ‘puffing’247 in that puffing 
is not regarded as misrepresentation under common law, but as the expression of 
an opinion and the mere commendation and praising of a product.248 However, when 
a statement made by the seller is more than mere praise, and relates to the quality 
of the res vendita, it is regarded as a material statement and will be regarded as a 
dictum et promissum.249 A material statement, however, is strictly regulated in the 
CPA, specifically in section 41(1)(b). At first glance this section prohibits puffing, but 
as the section has not yet featured before the courts it remains to be seen how the 
courts will approach it. 
3.2.15 Fictional fulfilment 
The maxim of fictional fulfilment is relevant when an agreement is subject to the 
fulfilment of conditions, and either of the parties frustrates or prevents the fulfilment 
of the conditions. This maxim aims to protect the innocent party. Therefore, when 
an agreement is subject to a condition or conditions, also known as pendente 
 
244 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 41-48; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 357; Khan et 
al Contract and Mercantile Law vol 1 209; Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 223-227; Sharrock 
Business Transactions 137-142; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 116-117. For a discussion of 
misrepresentation see Van Huyssteen et al Contract 98-111; Trotman and Another v Edwick 1951 
(1) SA 443 (A) 447-448; Minister van Landbou-Tegniese Dienste v Scholtz 1971 (3) SA 188 (A); 
Davidson v Bonafede 1981 (2) SA 501 (C). Also see Orban v Stead & Another 1978 (2) SA 713 
(W) for a judgment that appears to have been incorrect. See also in this regard the criticism by 
Khan et al Contract and Mercantile Law vol 1 212. 
245 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 83-90. 
246 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 48; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 357; Hutchison 
et al Law of Contract 117-118, 122-125; Gannet Manufacturing Co v Postaflex 1981 (3) SA 216 (C) 
223-224. 
247 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 357; Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 225; Sharrock 
Business Transactions 142-143. 
248 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 357; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 104; Hutchison et 
al Law of Contract 118-119. In Corbett v Harris 1914 CPD 535, 543 the court points out that puffing 
is not actionable and that the maxim caveat emptor will apply. See the discussion of this aspect 
under the CPA, Ch 4 para 4.3.2.3.2. 
249 In these circumstances the purchaser will be entitled to restitution, see Van Rensburg & Van der 
Merwe Law of Contract 56; Phame v Paizes 1973 (3) SA 397 (A) 417. 
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condicione,250 there is an existing and binding legal relationship between the parties, 
even though the contract is not complete. Both parties are obliged to work towards 
fulfilling the condition(s). When a party prevents or frustrates the fulfilment of a 
condition, fictional fulfilment will assist the innocent party as this fiction will deem 
the condition to have been fulfilled and provide protection for the innocent party.251 
3.2.16 Leases 
Because of the importance of lease agreements for consumers, and the initial 
difference of opinion as to whether lease agreements fall under fixed-term contracts 
for purposes of section 14 of the CPA, I discuss the common-law principles of lease 
agreements. 
All lease agreements that qualify as consumer agreements are subject to the 
provisions of section 14 of the CPA.252 There was initial doubt as to whether the CPA 
applied to leases of immovable property, but the courts have decided that leases 
are fixed-term agreements as defined in section 14.253  
A lease agreement is a contract in which the lessor agrees to let his or her property 
to the lessee in return for payment.254 There are only two essentialia of a lease: first, 
the lessee enjoys the occupation and use of the property rented; and second, the 
lessee must pay rental to the lessor for such use or occupation. Glover emphasises 
that these are the only essential elements for lease, although some writers argue 
for a third essential: the lease period.255 
In Roman law, because the lessee was not the owner of the property, he only had 
a personal right to possession and occupation. When the property was sold during 
the lease term, the lessee was left open to eviction by the new owner.256 In Roman-
Dutch law this changed, and the lessee was granted a real right of possession and 
occupation for the duration of the lease term. A special remedy developed to protect 
lessees when the leased property was sold before expiry of the lease term – the 
‘huur gaat voor koop’ principle which literally means lease enjoys priority over 
sale.257 This maxim entitles lessees to remain in occupation of the leased property 
 
250 Subject to condition, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 254. 
251 Joubert General Principles 173; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 251; Bradfield Christie’s Law of 
Contract 173-174; Scott v Poupard 1971 (2) SA 373 (A) 378. See Joubert General Principles 173-
178 and Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 173-178 for a discussion, relevant sources, and the 
requirements for the implementation of this theory. 
252 Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 335-337; Barnard (2019) THRHR 164-175; ss 1, 5 and 14 of the 
CPA. For a discussion of lease agreements under the CPA see Ch 4 para 4.2.3.8. 
253 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.8. 
254 Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 329; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 355. 
255 Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 329. De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 356 argue that an 
indeterminate lease is not a lease, but could, for instance, be a quitrent. 
256 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 374. 
257 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 374-375; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 539-542. 
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until the lease expires. The sales agreement is, therefore, subject to the lease 
agreement.258 
A remedy intended to protect the lessor’s right to rental is the common-law residual 
hypothec, a personal right on the property of the lessee in respect of unpaid rent.259 
Some writers argue that this hypothec only applies to unpaid rent, not other 
obligations of the lessee.260 Glover contends that this argument is not necessarily 
supported by the authorities,261 and that in suitable circumstances a lessor may still 
apply to court for an interdict attaching the lessee’s goods on the premises.262 He 
also argues that it is not clear-cut that section 51(1)(i)(i) of the CPA prohibits the 
lessor’s residual hypothec as the hypothec cannot be excluded in an agreement, 
and, therefore, also not by implication in a statute.263 
These are the essential aspects of common-law lease agreements. I now discuss 
the legal position of parties when breach or material non-performance takes place. 
3.3 Breach of agreement 
Breach of contract takes place when one or both parties does not fulfil the 
obligations in terms of the agreement by failing to perform his or her obligations, by 
repudiating the contract, or when performance becomes impossible.264 The 
remedies for breach are specific performance, cancellation, damages,265 or a 
suitable combination of these remedies.266 
 
258 Special legislation applies to lease agreements, depending on the duration of the lease and the 
use of the premises, eg, the Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land Act 18 of 1969 (Leases of 
Land Act) and the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 (Rental Housing Act); premises used for 
residential purposes are subject to the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE Act), and of course the Constitution applies to all 
agreements, Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para [44]. 
259 Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 452-454; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 826-828; De 
Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 36. There is difference of opinion as to whether the hypothec applies 
only in respect of unpaid rent or for other monies/obligations as well. De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 365 are of the opinion that the residual hypothec only applies to unpaid rent and not 
for other obligations of the lessee. Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 826 support this 
argument. 
260 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 363-366; Webster v Ellison 1911 AD 73, 86. 
261 Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 453-454. 
262 Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 454. 
263 Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 453. This aspect is discussed in Ch 4. Also, see Kelly-Louw & 
Locke (2015) THRHR 293-306 for a discussion of a similar situation regarding the NCA. 
264 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 858; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 142; Bradfield Christie’s 
Law of Contract 585; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 181. 
265 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 366-367; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 280. 
266 The general remedies and general principles are discussed under heading 4 below. The 
specific remedies in suitable circumstances will be discussed under this heading where applicable. 




Mora is a (culpable) delay or default to perform contractual obligations by either 
party.268 Either party can commit a breach of contract by not performing at all, by 
performing but not adhering strictly to the contract terms, or by not performing his 
or her obligation(s) on time.269 Mora can only take place if performance of the 
obligation is possible.270 In addition, mora is only possible for a positive performance 
or act by a party to the agreement, and not for negative breach, in other words an 
obligation not to perform a certain act.271 If mora makes subsequent performance by 
the other contracting party impossible, rendering the performance will be 
impossible.272 Non-performance must meet certain cumulative requirements before 
it qualifies as mora: 
• The first requirement for mora is that the defaulter fails to perform before 
or on the date or time specified in the agreement for performance.273 If 
the time for performance is specified in the agreement, a party will 
automatically be in mora if he or she does not perform timeously. This is 
referred to as mora ex re,274 and the defaulting party is in default without 
having been notified of this by the other party.275  
• If the time or date of performance is not fixed or determinable in the 
agreement, a party will not automatically be in default when he or she 
does not perform before or at a certain time. When no date or time has 
been set for performance, the performance must take place within a 
‘reasonable’ time. Therefore, a contracting party is not guilty of a breach 
of the agreement if he or she does not perform immediately. The non-
defaulting party must notify the defaulter and specify a date or time for 
performance.276 This is referred to as mora ex persona.277 The time or 
date specified by the innocent party for performance must be reasonable, 
 
267 Meaning delay or default, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 231. 
268 Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 231. 
269 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 278-279. 
270 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 136. 
271 This is referred to as positive default, Hutchison et al Law of Contract 280. 
272 See para 3.3.4 below. 
273 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 136; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 282; Bradfield 
Christie’s Law of Contract 590-595. 
274 Default as a result of the lapse of the time set for performance, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige 
Regswoordeboek 231. 
275 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 136. 
276 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 136-137; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 282-284. 
277 Default after notice given, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 231. 
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failing which the notice of performance will not be effective.278 The 
demand must also clearly indicate what obligation(s) must be fulfilled.279 
• The debt must be due and payable. If the debt is not due and payable, 
or if a party is entitled to withhold performance, for example, where the 
creditor has not performed his or her contractual duties, the debtor is not 
in default.280 
• The default must be caused by the defaulter. If the default was caused 
by the other party to the agreement, the defaulter will not be in mora.281 
In addition, if the cause of the default was accidental, or resulted from vis 
maior,282 there will not be default.283 The innocent party does not have to 
prove that the default was caused by the defaulter; rather, the defaulter 
must raise this as a defence. If an employee, agent, or other person for 
whom the defaulter is responsible caused the default, the defaulter will 
not be permitted to allege that the default was not his or her fault.284 In 
addition, the defaulter must be aware that his or her performance is due, 
and he or she must know what the essence of the performance is.285 
The consequences of mora are that the innocent party can now enforce his or her 
remedies against the defaulter.286 
The CPA provides the supplier with a remedy when the consumer breaches the 
terms of an agreement under section 14(2)(b)(ii) of the CPA, thereby entitling him 
or her to cancel after giving the defaulting consumer twenty business days’ notice.287 
Section 14, however, does not provide the consumer with a corresponding remedy 
when the supplier is in default or does not perform at all. 
 
278 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 282; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 339; Bradfield Christie’s Law 
of Contract 597-598; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 160; St Martin’s Trust v Willowdene 
Landowners (Pty) Ltd 1970 (3) SA 132 (W) 135-136; Nel v Cloete 1972 (2) SA 150 (A) 164; 
Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 590 also mentions mora ex lege which he describes as the 
legal rules that apply in the case of theft, for example. The thief will then be considered in mora ex 
lege from the moment of the theft. 
279 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 598; West Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co 
Ltd 1926 AD 173, 195; Kragga Kamma Estates CC v Flanagan 1995 (2) SA 367 (A) 374-375. 
280 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 138; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 332; Hutchison et 
al Law of Contract 281; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 590. 
281 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 333; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 162; Hutchison et al Law of 
Contract 285. 
282 Act of God, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige Regswoordeboek 306. 
283 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 138; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 285. 
284 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 139; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 162. 
285 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 590. 
286 Fault is not a requirement for breach of contract when damages are claimed. See Administrator 
of Natal v Eduoard 1990 (3) SA 581 (A) para [47]; Scoin Trading (Pty) Ltd v Bernstein 2011 (2) SA 
118 (SCA) para [20]. Also see Cornelius (2012) PELJ 601-620 and the discussion in para 3.4.4 
below. 
287 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.7. 
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3.3.2 Positive breach 
A party is guilty of positive breach when he or she acts contrary to the undertaking 
or agreement with the other party.288 Positive breach, also known as positive default, 
can take two forms, depending on whether a party’s required performance is 
positive or negative. For example, the defaulter does something he or she undertook 
not to do such as acting against the terms of a restraint of trade undertaking;289 or 
his or her performance in terms of the agreement does not meet the requirements 
for performance set in the agreement.290 For example, he or she enters into an 
agreement to build a bridge; he or she builds the bridge but it does not comply with 
the requirements set out in the plans or the agreement. 
 
The requirements for positive default are: 
• the defaulter must have performed in terms of the agreement; and 
• the performance must have been materially defective.291 
It is generally accepted that no fault is required for positive default. 
3.3.3 Repudiation of the agreement 
Repudiation occurs when a contracting party implies or signifies that he or she plans 
to repudiate or reject his or her obligations in terms of the agreement.292 Repudiation 
is, therefore, a form of anticipatory breach. This points to a predicted or a reasonable 
certainty of breach, and such anticipatory breach takes place before actual 
performance.293 A party can further repudiate his or her contractual obligations both 
expressly or by implication.294 Some examples are where the defaulter acts contrary 
to the terms and conditions of the agreement; where he or she alleges that he or 
she cannot perform on the specified date; or alleges that it is impossible to perform. 
The defaulter’s conduct must be expressly intended to repudiate or reject his or her 
 
288 Also known as positive default, see Hutchison et al Law of Contract 294. 
289 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 294; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 136; Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 340. 
290 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 294; Sharrock Business Transactions 753; Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract 340. 
291 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 341-344. 
292 Repudiation is of English origin. See De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 168; Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract 348. 
293 This differs from prevention of performance where there is certainty of malperformance, see 
Van Huyssteen et al Contract 347. The principles on inquiring into alleged conduct amounting to 
repudiation were recently confirmed in Micaren Exel Petroleum Wholesaler (Pty) Ltd v Stella Quick 
Shop (Pty) Ltd and Another (471/2019) [2020] ZASCA 61 (9 June 2020) (hereafter Micaren) paras 
[11-12]; also see Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 610-612. 
294 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 144; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 169; Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 350-351; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 297. 
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obligations in terms of the agreement. A mere failure to fulfil his or her obligations 
on the date of performance cannot be regarded as repudiation.295 
Initially, repudiation was not deemed a breach of contract, as it was argued that 
such repudiation first had to be accepted by the other party.296 The current view is 
that the repudiation itself is a breach of the agreement.297 By electing to cancel the 
agreement, the innocent party merely exercises his or her option to resile from the 
agreement.298 Should he or she instead choose to uphold the agreement and ignore 
the repudiation, he or she exercises the right to hold the repudiating party bound by 
the agreement. 299 
A noteworthy characteristic of repudiation is that it is an ongoing breach of the 
agreement. This means that the innocent party, after initially opting to enforce the 
agreement, is entitled subsequently to elect to cancel the agreement.300 
The requirements for repudiation are:301 
• A party to an agreement should be able to infer from the conduct of the 
other party, that the offending party will not, or has not complied with his 
or her obligations under the agreement. This non-performance must be 
unlawful and can be an act or an omission to perform. The mere non-
performance by a party cannot be interpreted as repudiation – the 
 
295 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 106-107; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 170. For a 
discussion of the differences between repudiation and other forms of breach, see Van Huyssteen 
et al Contract 352-353. Also see Micaren para [11]. 
296 This view was based on a consensual cancellation of the agreement. De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 170-172 support this argument. 
297 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 348-350; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 298-299. 
298 Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 1977 (2) SA 943 (A) 953-954; Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 (1) SA 358 (A) 361; Datacolor International (Pty) 
Ltd v Intamerket (Pty) Ltd 2001 (2) SA 284 SCA paras [1], [16]−[20], [25], [33] and [35]. There has 
been movement to and fro between the two schools of thought as courts have referred to, but 
seemingly not applied the old view. See Van Huyssteen et al Contract 350 n 224 in this regard. 
299 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 348-349. 
300 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 298; Cohen v Orlowski 1930 SWA 125; Mahabeer v Sharma 
1985 (3) SA 729 (A) 736. An interesting question is whether the repudiator can, after initially 
repudiating the agreement and before acknowledgement thereof by the other party, decide to 
withdraw from the repudiation and continue with his obligations in terms of the agreement. See 
Hutchison et al Law of Contract 301. If one assumes that repudiation is a continuing breach of the 
agreement, surely the repudiator will be able to effect this in practice when the other party has not 
yet accepted or acted on the repudiation, or is perhaps still considering his or her options, or is not 
yet aware of the repudiation. Can it be repudiation if the other party is unaware? Hutchison Law of 
Contract 301 doubts if this will be possible, and Lubbe (1996) Stell LR 162 convincingly argues that 
this would be contrary to legal theory and the approach of South African courts. A factual approach 
to this question could simply be that in these circumstances the debtor has not yet effectively 
repudiated the agreement, or has not yet communicated his or her repudiation to the innocent 
party, which of course would mean that there is no repudiation yet. 
301 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 350-351; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 297-298; Micaren paras 
[11-12]. 
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offending party must, either by his or her conduct or expressly, refuse to 
perform.302 
• In addition, the innocent party must be aware of the repudiation and must 
be under the impression that the offending party will not perform.303 
The test for repudiation is an objective one, and therefore the intention of the 
repudiator is irrelevant.304 Neither fault nor mala fides is required for repudiation.305 
In practice, the advantage of relying on repudiation is that the innocent party is 
entitled to cancel the agreement without notice to the supplier.306 The common-law 
remedy for repudiation could therefore benefit the consumer in circumstances 
where the supplier fails to perform.307 
3.3.4 Where performance is impossible, or made impossible308 
In general, where performance is objectively impossible309 the contract does not 
come into existence, and the party or parties are not obliged to perform their 
respective contractual obligations.310 However, when a party intentionally or 
negligently causes performance in terms of the agreement to become impossible, 
irrespective of whether he or she does so personally or allows someone else for 
whom he or she is legally responsible to do this, he or she can be held liable for 
breach of contract.311 A party who guaranteed that performance is possible, or a 
party who assumed the risk of possibility of performance, can be held liable for 
breach of contract.312 
When performance is made impossible by a party, the innocent party cannot claim 
specific performance, but can still perform his or her obligations and claim 
 
302 For examples of parties’ conduct that can be interpreted as repudiation, see Van Huyssteen et 
al Contract 351; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 297. 
303 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 350-351; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 297. 
304 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 352; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 297. See Ponisammy and 
Another v Versailles Estates (Pty) Ltd 1973 (1) All SA 540 (A) 548-554; Van Rooyen v Minister van 
Openbare Werke en Gemeenskapsbou 1978 (2) SA 835 (A) 845-846; B Braun Medical (Pty) Ltd v 
Ambasaam CC 2015 (3) SA 22 (SCA) para [11]. 
305 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 297; Sharrock Business Transactions 754. 
306 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 352; Metalmil (Pty) Ltd v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd 
1994 (3) SA 673 (A) 683; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) 
342. 
307 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.7. 
308 Where performance is made impossible, it is also known as prevention of performance. See 
Sharrock Business Transactions 754. 
309 Where performance is impossible at the moment the agreement is concluded, (initial 
impossibility). See Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 147; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 
85; Sharrock Business Transactions 117-118. 
310 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 147; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 205-206; 
Marshall v LMM Investments 1977 (3) SA 55 (W) hereafter Marshall. 
311 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 142-144; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 519; Mposelo v Banks 
1902 SC 370, 373; Marshall 58; Stirling v Maitland and Another [1861-73] All ER Rep 358. 
312 Sharrock Business Transactions 118. 
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damages.313 The innocent party can also cancel the agreement and claim damages, 
even if the defaulter’s performance is not yet due.314 
 
3.4 General Remedies 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Remedies for breach of contract are divided into two classes: those aimed at 
specific performance; and those aimed at rescission of the agreement. The former 
have been referred to as natural remedies as they are aimed at the results the 
parties intended when entering into the agreement.315 The latter are referred to as 
extraordinary remedies as the aggrieved party is only entitled to them in exceptional 
circumstances.316 Both classes of remedy can include a claim for damages.317 
3.4.2 Specific performance 
The innocent party’s normal remedies in mora are those aimed at fulfilling the 
agreement and extinguishing the consequences of non-performance in accordance 
with the maxim pacta sunt servanda.318 Specific performance entitles a party to claim 
performance of the obligation(s) by the defaulter, and in addition, to claim damages 
for late performance, if applicable.319 
In theory, parties to an agreement must perform simultaneously and performance 
by one is dependent on performance by the other. Therefore, in order to claim 
specific performance a party has either to perform or tender performance of his or 
her own obligations.320 It is imperative that the plaintiff makes all necessary 
allegations, both when giving formal notice of his or her intention to claim specific 
 
313 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 519; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 174; Van Jaarsveld & 
Oosthuizen Handelsreg 147. 
314 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 148. If a defaulter intends to make performance 
impossible, but has not yet done so, the other party can apply for an interdict to prevent him or her 
from doing so. See Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 147; Barnard v Thelander 1977 (3) 
SA 932 (K) 938. 
315 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 148; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 195; Hutchison 
et al Law of Contract 310. 
316 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 148; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 195; Hutchison 
et al Law of Contract 310. 
317 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 195; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 148; Hutchison 
et al Law of Contract 312. 
318 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 285; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 616-618; Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 366-369; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 195-196. 
319 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 209-212. The creditor can in certain circumstances claim 
damages instead of performance. 
320 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 150; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 196; Hutchison 
et al Law of Contract 316; Wolpert v Steenkamp 1917 AD 493; Ambrose & Aitken v Johnson & 
Fletcher 1917 AD 327; Geldenhuys & Neethling v Beuthin 1918 AD 426, 438; Koenig v Johnson & 
Co 1935 AD 262, 276. 
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performance in terms of the agreement, and in litigation pleadings, as the defendant 
can otherwise raise the exceptio non adimpleti contractus.321 This exception cannot 
be used in instances where the debtor has to perform over a period before the 
creditor can or must perform.322 An example of this is the payment in instalments of 
a purchase price where the debtor is required to make a number of payments, and 
is in default in respect of an initial payment or instalment in an on-going series of 
payments, before the creditor can transfer the merx after full payment. In such a 
case, the creditor clearly need not tender performance of his or her obligation(s). 
Another example is when the obligation is not related to the defendant’s claim323 or 
where the plaintiff is excused from performance.324 
Simultaneous performance can present problems in practice, and third parties 
sometimes have to be used to effect payment or delivery of the merx. 325 In cases of 
partial performance, the exceptio non adimpleti contractus can be raised in respect 
of the outstanding performance.326 In cases of divisible performance this exception 
can be raised in respect of only a pro rata part of the claim.327 The exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus is a defence which can be used against a party who claims 
performance, although he or she has not yet performed his or her corresponding 
obligations. In theory, the party who receives full compensation must deliver full 
performance of his or her obligations, minus damages in respect of the faulty or 
incomplete performance. In practice, a plaintiff who has not performed in full is not 
permitted to claim counter-performance, but should be able to claim counter-
performance minus damages or costs to complete the performance, based on the 
principles of unjust enrichment.328 
A court can undoubtedly enforce a contractual obligation to make payment against 
a debtor, and allow an unpaid creditor to excuss a debtor in arrears.329 This right is 
 
321 Exception on the ground that the plaintiff is also in default, Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige 
Regswoordeboek 187; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 196-208; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen 
Handelsreg 150; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 316. 
322 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 198; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 318. 
323 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 151. 
324 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 151. 
325 Hutchison (2013) Stell LR 1-29; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 317. For example, in transfers 
of immovable property, the purchaser normally arranges for bank guarantees to be issued that are 
paid to the seller on date of registration. See Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 151; De Wet 
& Van Wyk Kontraktereg 199. 
326 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 151; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 318-319. 
327 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 151; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 319. 
328 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 151-152; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 319; 
Hauman v Nortje 1914 AD 293, 304-305. 
329 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 155; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 369; De Wet, 
Joubert and Bradfield argue convincingly that courts have erred in holding that they always have a 
discretion to refuse an order for specific performance where in their opinion it would be 
unreasonable to order the debtor to make payment instead of paying damages caused by non-
performance. De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 210-211; Joubert argues that the creditor can either 
insist on the performance due, or can agree to another performance in place of the original, but, he 
argues these are two different remedies for different circumstances. Joubert (1977) De Jure 29; 
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not absolute – where performance is subjectively and objectively impossible, courts 
will not make the order.330 
Van Huyssteen notes that after the Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society331 
judgment, courts are more inclined to award orders for specific performance.332 In 
this case, the Appeal Court was adamant that parties to an agreement were entitled 
to specific performance, save in exceptional cases.333 Another school of thought 
contends that it is accepted that courts have a general discretion to order specific 
performance.334 This point of view appears to reflect court practice and therefore 
reflects the true position, despite compelling arguments to the contrary. 
There are no hard and fast rules as to when a court will refuse to order specific 
performance, but the court will take all the circumstances in a case into account 
before making such an order.335 The following guidelines have been identified as 
instances when a court will not order specific performance: 
• When the order will encumber the debtor disproportionately to the 
advantage of the creditor.336 
• Where the court cannot ensure performance of the obligation.337 
However, where the court has jurisdiction it will be able to enforce the 
order and disputes can be resolved by the relevant court.338 
• Where the contract in question is an employment contract or other 
contract for personal services.339 Where the contractual relationship is not 
 
Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 159 n 181; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 618-619; 
Manasewitz v Oosthuizen 1914 CPD 328; SA Harness Works v SA Publishers 1915 CPD 43; 
Carpet Contracts v Grobler 1975 (2) SA 436 (T) 441. In respect of obligations to transfer property, 
deliver the merx, or other specific performance, it is clear that such performance can be enforced. 
The innocent party should be entitled to specific performance, and the court’s discretion is limited – 
Farmers Co-op Society v Berry 1912 AD 343, 350. 
330 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 155; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 370. 
331 1986 (1) SA 776 A (Benson). 
332 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 370. 
333 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 321; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 370, Benson 782-783; more 
or less in the same vein Hutchison and Du Bois write that a court will not easily interfere with the 
creditor’s right to specific performance, see Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 873. See the position in 
Singapore, Ch 5 para 5.3.2.7. 
334 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 323; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 156; Haynes v 
King Williamstown Municipality 1951 (2) 371(A) 371, 378 (Haynes). 
335 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 156; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 621-624. 
Hutchison et al Law of Contract 321 contend that these rules now virtually have ‘rule of law’ status. 
See too Haynes 381. 
336 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 156; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 323; Du Bois et 
al Wille’s Principles 873; De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217, 226; Haynes 381. 
337 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 156. 
338 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 156-157; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 875. 
339 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 156-157; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 321, 323; 
Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 624-625; Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99,107. 
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a personal one, courts will not necessarily refuse an order for specific 
performance.340 
• Where the court is of the opinion that damages will provide the creditor 
with sufficient compensation.341 
• Where the agreement does not stipulate the parties’ obligations with 
absolute clarity.342 
 
Where the court orders specific performance, related orders can also be made to 
ensure performance of the obligation(s).343 If no related order is made the creditor 
will have the normal remedies at his or her disposal, for example, execution, a 
warrant of arrest for contempt of court, or an order for damages in lieu of 
performance. In practice, it is advisable that creditors request alternative remedies 
to specific performance in their pleadings. 
3.4.3 Rescission or cancellation of the agreement 
A contracting party is only permitted to rescind the agreement in extraordinary 
circumstances,344 although there is no obligation on the innocent party to cancel an 
agreement – even if he or she has the right to do so, he or she can still elect to 
proceed in terms of the agreement.345 Such a decision will be deemed an 
abandonment of the right to cancel if he or she is shown to have been aware of this 
right. An innocent party exercises his or her right to cancel an agreement by 
communicating this intention to the defaulter. Mere communication by the innocent 
party that he or she is considering cancellation, or a threat to cancel, does not 
amount to cancellation.346 Cancellation without having gained the right thereto by 
way of notice of intention to cancel in terms of the agreement, will not be effective.347 
The consequence of rescission or cancellation is that the obligation to perform in 
terms of the agreement falls away. In the case of divisible agreements, rescission 
of one part of the agreement will not affect the remainder of the agreement. After 
rescission, both parties are entitled to the return of their respective performances. 
In certain circumstances, a party may also be entitled to damages, an aspect to 
which I now turn my attention. 
 
340 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 157; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 323. 
341 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 113. This should be regarded as a contentious 
statement, see Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 874; Benson. 
342 Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 626; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 874-875. 
343 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 158. 
344 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 215. 
345 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 216. 
346 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 218. 
347 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 115. 




In a nutshell, the purpose of damages is to place a party in the position he or she 
would have been in had the other party performed in terms of the agreement.348 
Courts apply the following general rules when calculating damages:349  
• Damages are not awarded merely because there has been a breach of 
contract. A party must prove the damages claimed.350 Mora interest is an 
exception and need not be proved.351 
• Only pecuniary loss based on breach of contract can be claimed. 
Sentimental damages or satisfaction can only be claimed in delict.352 
While the same act can lead to breach of contract and delict, this does 
not permit the court to award moral damages for a claim based on breach 
of contract.353 For contract purposes, damages are the damages affecting 
the party’s estate, irrespective of their origin.354 
• For purposes of calculation of damages the party’s financial position is 
compared to the position he or she would have been in had proper 
performance taken place.355 
• In this calculation, the true financial position is considered, and if breach 
of contract had a positive effect, this will also be taken into account.356 
• The damages must be a consequence of the breach. The nexus between 
the alleged breach and damages suffered will be considered.357 
• In the event of damages caused by breach, the plaintiff will not be able 
to claim his or her damages if: 
 
348 Kaser Roman Law 167-171; Potgieter et al Skadevergoedingsreg 1, 189-190, 198, 439; Du Bois 
et al Wille’s Principles 882-883; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 171; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 222; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 134, 415; Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 
643-647; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 230; Sharrock Business Transactions 760. 
349 See Potgieter et al Skadevergoedingsreg 82-90 and 349-378 for a general discussion of the 
principles for the calculation of damages based on breach of contract. 
350 Potgieter et al Skadevergoedingsreg 351; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 334; Sharrock 
Business Transactions 760. There is debate on exactly how to calculate the damages, depending 
on whether the plaintiff has to pay repair costs, or whether an estimate must be made using the 
market value approach. The market value approach is criticised because a loss can have 
consequences beyond market value. See Kahn v Beirowski 1933 TPD 43, 46-47; and Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 420. 
351 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 344-346; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 421-422. 
352 Potgieter et al Skadevergoedingsreg 351. 
353 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 117; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 334; Jockie v 
Meyer 1945 AD 354, 368. 
354 Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 117; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 334; Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 400. 
355 Potgieter et al Skadevergoedingsreg 184-185, 351; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 334-335. 
356 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 336; Sharrock Business Transactions 761; Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract 399-401. 
357 Potgieter et al Skadevergoedingsreg 351; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 337-340; Sharrock 
Business Transactions 762; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 398, 402-403. 
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o the damages suffered could have been, or were indeed foreseen;358 
o the damages could have been prevented had he or she acted with 
reasonable care.359 
• Damages are awarded as a monetary value and can only be claimed 
once.360 
I now turn to the termination of agreements before concluding Chapter 3. 
 
3.5 Termination 
When both parties have fulfilled their respective duties in terms of an agreement, 
the contract with all its obligations is discharged.361 This can also take place by way 
of merger, effluxion of time,362 set-off, release, notice, novation, compromise, 
impossibility of performance, prescription, insolvency, rehabilitation, an agreement 
to terminate, and, in the case of a personal obligation, by death.363 
 
3.6 Conclusion: Chapter 3 
The common-law of contract and the essentialia thereof are governed by Roman 
law principles, the texts of Roman-Dutch writers, and a wealth of South African case 
law incorporating English law principles and dating back to the 1800s. Breach of 
contract, rescission, specific performance, and damages are equally well regulated 
by principles, maxims, exceptions, and sources to promote and ensure the fair and 
reasonable treatment of parties when their agreement is breached and/or 
rescinded. These principles have developed over centuries and have been refined 
to provide fair treatment in almost every eventuality. 
Adding value to these already well-developed fairness principles, are the beneficial 
effects of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the principle of ubuntu. As shown 
in the discussion above, there are shortcomings in some areas of the common law, 
mainly in the form of contradictory judgments and the incorrect interpretation of 
statutes and the Roman and Roman-Dutch principles. But the common law remains 
 
358 This aspect is controversial as writers have criticised the courts’ approach to the stage at which 
foreseeability is judged: either at the time of entering into the agreement, or when the breach takes 
place. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 338; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 226-229; Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 413; Schatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 (2) SA 545 (A) 551. 
359 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 340; Sharrock Business Transactions 763-764; Van Huyssteen 
et al Contract 408-409; North and Son (Pty) Ltd v Albertyn 1962 (2) SA 212 (A) 215-219. 
360 Potgieter et al Skadevergoedingsreg 2-3, 23; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 175. 
361 Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 829; Hutchison et al Law of Contract 310. 
362 Also see the discussion by Mudzviti (2018) August De Rebus 18-19 on the approach of courts 
in the case of contracts with an indefinite term. 
363 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 378-390; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 829-858; De Wet & 
Van Wyk Kontraktereg 251-311; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 183. 
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a sophisticated and equitable contract-law regime that aims to protect both parties 
in equal measure, and allows the courts a discretion to develop the law within the 
bounds of the Constitution, ubuntu, and public policy. 
The main shortcomings of the common-law contract system, in general, and also in 
relation to fixed-term contracts under section 14 of the CPA, are that courts have 
delivered conflicting judgments, and there are conflicting views amongst lawyers, 
academics, and judges on various aspects, for example: 
• the parol evidence rule; 
• the principle of pacta servanda sunt; 
• freedom of contract, its extent, and whether it is still relevant; 
• penalty clauses; 
• exemption clauses; 
• errors, and when these can be classified as material; 
• inconsistent application of principles and rules by different courts and 
judges, leading to a lack of predictability and legal certainty; 
• rarely used and not well known remedies or clauses which could have 
benefitted the parties;364 
• given the basis of the common law in precedents establishing the exact 
position is time consuming while legislation lends itself to relatively easy 
determination; and finally, 
• common law has neither anticipated nor kept pace with technological 
advances – this could, of course, apply equally to legislation. 
 
The strengths of the common-law of contracts in general, including fixed-term 
contracts in terms of section 14 of the CPA are: 
• Lord Tomlin lauded the virtues of the common law in the 1934 judgment, 
Pearl Assurance Co v Union Government,365 the terms which ring true to 
today:  
‘In the first place the questions to be resolved are questions of Roman 
Dutch law. That law is a virile system of law, ever seeking, as every such 
system must, to adapt itself consistently with its inherent basic principles 
to deal effectively with the increasing complexities of modern organized 
society.’ 
• In Van Heerden and Others NNO v Queens Hotel (Pty) Ltd and Others366 
the court held that common-law rights are to be guarded jealously as they 
are less likely to be affected by changes in policy, politics, and fancies of 
the legislature. 
• In addition, and as a consequence of the above characteristic, courts 
have a discretion in each and every case to look at the facts objectively 
 
364 For instance, paras 3.2.11 and 3.2.13. 
365 1934 AD 560, 563. 
366 1973 (2) SA 14 (RA) 23. 
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and apply or develop the law in conjunction with constitutional principles 
and ubuntu, to ensure fairness. 
• The Constitutional Court holds the common law in high regard, and set 
rules for its development in Mighty Solutions367 which have resulted in 
predictability in the development of the common law. 
• The protective measures are continuous, starting during the negotiation 
stages of the agreement, continuing throughout all stages of its duration 
until termination, and on occasion continuing even thereafter – eg, in the 
case of warranties. 
• Parties have freedom of contract, so bringing both pacta servanda sunt 
and caveat scriptor into operation. This has both advantages and 
disadvantages.368 
• The protection afforded contracting parties under the common law is 
equitable and covers both parties in equal measure. 
• Finally, the checks and balances in the common-law system have 
developed and improved over centuries in different jurisdictions, and are 
tried and tested for fairness, reasonableness, and justice. In Mighty 
Solutions, Van der Westhuizen J emphasised that ‘[s]ome of the lessons 
gained from human experience over the ages are timeless and have 
passed the logical and moral tests of time’.369 
 
Having considered the relevant common-law contractual principles that also form 
the foundation for consumer agreements under the CPA, I turn in Chapter 4, to 
examine the provisions in the CPA relevant to fixed-term contracts to establish 
whether parties are better protected by these provisions than at common law, 
especially when the supplier defaults or is guilty of non-performance. 
 
 
367 See para 3.1.1 above. 
368 See the discussion in Ch 2 para 2.4. 
369 Mighty Solutions para [37]. See the discussion of this judgment and the requirements set in the 
judgment for the development of the common law in para 3.1.1 above. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  South Africa: The position of consumers under fixed-term 
agreements regulated by the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
4.1 Introduction 
South Africa entered the realm of modern consumer protection legislation on 31 
March 2011 with the newly enacted Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA).1 In 
this chapter, I provide background to put the study in perspective, briefly discuss 
the history of consumer protection legislation in South Africa, the move to implement 
effective legislation, and the aims and focus of the CPA and factors that influence 
consumer legislation. I then analyse and critique the definitions and the provisions 
of section 14, including the types of agreement affected by the section – eg, lease 
agreements, time-share, mandates, and sales of immovable property. Thereafter, I 
focus on section 2(10) of the CPA which retains the common-law rights, before 
highlighting other sections in the CPA and relevant principles and concepts that 
could have a secondary effect on fixed-term agreements. Finally, I discuss case law 
and transformative constitutionalism. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive study of the entire CPA, 
or of all agreements concluded under its provisions. Only aspects directly relevant 
to the parties’ respective positions under fixed-term contracts in terms of section 14 
of the CPA, when compared to their common-law positions are considered. A 
comparison between the common-law position and the position under the CPA is 
relevant as section 2(10) of the CPA provides that no provision in the CPA must be 
interpreted so as to preclude a consumer from exercising any right afforded in terms 
of the common law. 
4.2 Consumer protection in South Africa 
4.2.1 History and background 
In 1926 South Africa adopted its first consumer protection measures under the 
Usury Act 37 of 1926.2 In 1942 the Hire-Purchase Act was enacted to regulate hire-
purchase agreements,3 followed by the Sale of Land on Instalments Act in 1971.4 
The first legislation specifically named and intended to regulate consumer matters 
was the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 71 of 1988. This Act relied 
on consumers laying complaints concerning acts or practices they regarded as 
unfair business practices with the Consumer Affairs Committee. If the complaint was 
successful, the business practice would be declared unfair. The legislation was 
 
1 For an article investigating whether South Africa needed consumer legislation or if non-
governrnent intervention would be preferable, see Woker (2010) Obiter 217-218. 
2 The purpose of this legislation was to limit the charging of interest. This Act was replaced in 1968 
by the Limitation and Disclosure of Finance Charges Act 73 of 1968, amended and renamed in 
1980 to the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980, amended in 1986, and more recently replaced by 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter the NCA). See Otto (2010) Fundamina 257, 260-262. 
3 This Act has since been replaced by the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980, and by the NCA. 
4 Act 72 of 1971, now replaced by the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 (hereafter ALA). 
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neither effective nor frequently used, but was the direct precursor to the Consumer 
Protection Act (CPA).5 The National Credit Act,6 which regulates the consumer-
credit industry improved the position under the Usury Act and Credit Agreements 
Act, but still has serious shortcomings, mainly in the definition of key terms.7 
However, overall, the NCA should be regarded as an improvement on earlier 
legislation.8 
4.2.2 The effect of the Constitution, the Draft Green Paper and the Law 
Commission Report on the consumer policy framework9 
4.2.2.1 Introduction and background 
South Africa is a constitutional democracy—the Constitution is the supreme law as 
it specifically states that all conduct or law inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid.10 Section 7 of the Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights11 is the 
cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.12 The Constitutional Court’s decisions 
are binding on all other courts,13 and all legislation is subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
Although the Bill of Rights14 does not expressly refer to consumer rights, the 
following sections may be relevant to consumers’ rights:15 
• Section 7(1): Right to dignity, equality, and freedom. 
• Section 8(1): Bill of Rights applies to all law, it binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state. 
• Section 8(3): Courts must develop the common law to give effect to the 
Bill of Rights. 
• Section 9: Equality. 
• Section 10: Human dignity. 
• Section 18: Freedom of association. 
• Section 25(1): No one may be deprived of property. 
• Section 32(1)(b): Access to information. 
• Section 33: Just administrative action. 
 
5 Naudé (2018) JCP 413. 
6 35 of 2005 (hereafter the NCA). 
7 Otto (2010) Fundamina 257, 273. Some of the shortcomings have been addressed by the 
National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014. The National Credit Amendment Act 7 of 2019 has 
been signed into law but is not yet in operation. 
8 Otto (2010) Fundamina 273. 
9 General Notice 1957 in Government Gazette (hereafter GG) 26774 of 9 September 2004 (Green 
Paper). 
10 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
11 Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
12 Section 7(1). 
13 See Ch 3 para 3.1.1. 
14 Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
15 See Barnard & Kok (2015) THRHR 1-23 on the consumer’s right to equality. 
 South Africa: The position of consumers under fixed-term agreements regulated 
by the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
92 
 
• Section 34: Access to courts. 
• Section 36: Limitation of rights. 
• Section 39: Promotion of the values of the Bill of Rights by courts, 
Tribunals, or forums. 
Part A of Schedule 4 to the Constitution refers to functional areas over which 
national and provincial legislatures have concurrent jurisdiction, and expressly 
identifies consumer protection as one of these areas. This is the only direct 
reference to consumer protection in the Constitution.16 
As indicated below, one of the primary aims of the CPA is to transform society and 
the economy to correct the injustices of the past.17 Although neither the preamble to 
the CPA, nor its section 3, expressly mentions the Constitution, there can be little 
doubt that this objective must be realised through transformative constitutionalism.18 
4.2.2.2 The Law Commission Report 
Upon realising the importance of consumer protection and the number of consumer 
complaints against unconscionable terms or agreements, the Law Commission19 
was instructed to report on clauses and contracts that were unreasonable and 
unjust. The Commission recommended that courts rectify contracts found to be 
unconscionable and unjust.20 It recommended the Working Committee’s21 proposals 
for the identification of criteria for fairness in contracts should not be accepted, and 
that this aspect should be addressed in the proposed specific legislation. Instead of 
proposing a Bill addressing specific business practices, two Bills were proposed: 
 
16 Brits (2017) TSAR 470, 472. 
17 Preamble to the CPA, s 3(1). 
18 Transformative constitutionalism is the development of the common law in accordance with the 
principles of the Constitution. For more information see Van der Walt (2006) Fundamina 1-47; 
Moseneke (2009) Stell LR 10 12-13; Tladi (2002) De Jure 306-317; Bauling & Nagtegaal (2015) De 
Jure 149, 151; and Reddy & Rampersad (2012) Afr J Bus Manage 7412. See also para 4.4 below 
for more details. 
19 The Law Commission is now known as the South African Law Reform Commission. See 
www.justice.gov.za/salrc (date of use: 18 March 2020). The working committee is considered the 
executive committee of the Commission. 
20 South African Law Commission Report, Project 47, Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and 
the Rectification of Contracts (April 1998) (hereafter Law Commission Report). In the summary of 
findings, the Commission first raised concern with the second leg of their brief, rectification of 
contracts, as that would lead to legal uncertainty and could potentially alienate the South African 
economy from foreign investment. It proceeded, however, to conclude that legal certainty was not 
necessarily the only aim of the law, and that unjust and unconscionable contract terms should be 
addressed by specific legislation, perhaps supplemented by codes of conduct, as it felt that codes 
of conduct alone were not sufficient. The Commission recommended an ombudsman be appointed 
to deal with unreasonable, oppressive, and unconscionable contract terms in standard-form 
contracts. The Law Commission also recommended that evidence be allowed when a contract is 
interpreted (whether the contract’s wording is ambiguous or not) if such evidence assists to 
interpret the contract. Law Commission Report 3 192-207. For a discussion of parol evidence see 
Ch 3 para 3.2.9, Ch 5 para 5.3.2.9.1, and Ch 6 para 6.3.6. 
21 See www.justice.gov.za/salrc/objects.htm (date of use: 18 March 2020). 
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one on the control of unreasonable, unconscionable, or oppressive contracts or 
terms;22 and the other on unfair contractual terms.23 
4.2.2.3 The Green Paper 
Following the report by the Law Commission, the Draft Green Paper on the 
Consumer Policy Framework was published by the Department of Trade and 
Industry in 2004.24 The proposed policy had the following aim: ‘Driving 
Competitiveness: Consumer confidence and business excellence’.25 The most 
pressing problems faced by the economy and vulnerable consumers were the 
negative effects of apartheid, the fact that a high percentage of the population was 
poor and illiterate, incidences of human rights abuses, and continued socio-
economic disparity.26 
A milieu was proposed where consumers’ rights and responsibilities would flourish, 
as that would be in the best interest of business and consumers and would free the 
market of iniquitous dealers.27 This would be accomplished by providing consumers, 
especially those previously disadvantaged, with well-advised and reasonable 
procedures to effect redress by way of accessible, flexible legislation and accessible 
infrastructure to improve access to affordable legal aid when required.28 The aim 
was to provide South Africa with comprehensive consumer legislation on par with 
international legislation and in line with UN guidelines.29 The lack of an effective 
consumer movement which actively campaigned for the rights and protection of 
consumers was lamented,30 as well as the lack of customer responsiveness.31 
The Green Paper acknowledged the importance of effective competition law 
measures to ensure consumers pay fair prices in a competitive market 
environment.32 Of particular importance for this thesis, is the reference in the Green 
Paper to the inequality of bargaining power between consumers and suppliers,33 
and the reference in consumer legislation to a general provision regarding 
unconscionable contract terms, and the use of plain language to assist consumers 
 
22 Law Commission Report 208-218. 
23 Law Commission Report 219-220. For further information and criticism on the report and the 
proposed legislation, see Hefer (2000) TSAR 142-154; Jamneck (1997) TSAR 637-647; Van der 
Walt (2000) TSAR 33-51. 
24 DTI Green Paper published in General Notice 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 September 2004. A final 
version of this document was never released. 
25 Green Paper 4. 
26 Green Paper 7. 
27 Green Paper 7. 
28 Green Paper 7. 
29 See Ch 2 para 2.6. 
30 Green Paper 10. 
31 Customer responsiveness is when businesses provide good customer service, handle 
customers’ complaints efficiently, and in general provide good value for money to their customers. 
Green Paper 7. Also, see Scott LLD 7. 
32 Green Paper 18-19. 
33 Green Paper 33; also see the discussion on inequality of bargaining power in Ch 2 para 2.5. 
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with low literacy levels.34 In addition, access to redress was also emphasised.35 To 
achieve this goal a consumer commission was proposed as well as a consumer 
Tribunal to provide redress to consumers when needed.36 
4.2.2.4 Concluding remarks: The Constitution, the Law Commission Report, 
the Green Paper, and Consumer Policy Framework 
In principle, the findings and proposals in the Law Commission Report and the 
Green Paper cannot be faulted as they support both South African constitutional 
values and well-established international consumer-law principles.37 The CPA and 
its relevant sections will now be analysed to evaluate if the goals and purposes set 
in these documents were achieved in respect of the regulation of fixed-term 
contracts. 
4.2.3 The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 200838 
4.2.3.1 Introduction and background 
The turn of the century marked a new era in consumer protection and since then 
various Acts aimed at protecting consumers have been adopted.39 Before the CPA, 
there were no effective legislative consumer protection measures. The Consumer 
Affairs Act (Unfair Businesses Act)40 was inadequate as its measures were not pro-
 
34 Green Paper 34. 
35 Green Paper 40. The importance of the ‘Batho Pele Framework’ was emphasised in the 
executive summary of the Green Paper. See http://localgovernmentaction.org.dedi6.cpt3.host-
h.net/content/ batho-pele-principles (date of use: 6 February 2019). These principles relate to the 
Constitution and entitle citizens to adequate standards of consultation, service standards, access, 
courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress, and value for money. This framework 
provides consumers with effective mechanisms at local government level to handle complaints, 
and to provide assistance and recourse in cases of consumer abuse or complaints. See Green 
Paper 11. 
36 Green Paper 43-48. 
37 For example, unequal bargaining position as described by Kessler. See Ch 2 para 2.5.3; Naudé 
& Eiselen Commentary Introduction 20 para 32. 
38 The CPA. 
39 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002; the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
(NCA); the CPA in 2008 which came into effect 2011, (certain provisions of the CPA relating to 
product liability came into effect on 29 April 2010); the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 
2013 (POPI Act); Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999; Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017; 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002; and the Competition Act 89 of 1998, 
to name but a few. Future consumer protection legislation includes the envisaged Draft Housing 
Consumer Protection Bill, 2019, see Government Notice 1118 in GG 42669 of 30 August 2019. 
40 71 of 1988, the Consumer Affairs Act (Unfair Businesses Act) was adopted to regulate business 
practices and operated on a customer complaint base. Woker describes this as an enabling, rather 
than prescriptive Act as it does not prohibit conduct and, in addition, the Committee did not operate 
as envisaged because it did not have sufficient resources or the capacity necessary to operate 
effectively. In addition, Woker investigated the possibility of having industry codes to regulate the 
position of the consumer. Although regarded as successful in some instances, they were not 
officially implemented, although still recognised by the DTI as being potentially significant. See 
Woker (2010) Obiter 21. 
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active,41 or in line with constitutional aspirations. They failed to protect consumers, 
were complaint-based,42 lagged behind international trends, and contained 
ineffective powers of redress.43 Although the common law was used extensively in 
consumer cases, it was seen as inadequate in the following regards:44 
• improper consent to agreements was provided by consumers;45 
• misleading information was provided by suppliers to convince consumers 
to enter into agreements;46 
• contract terms were unfair;47 
• the quality of goods was not always adequate and goods were often 
found to be defective;48 and 
• with the developments in technology, even sophisticated and highly 
educated consumers were facing problems when confronted with 
technologically or scientifically advanced products and devices.49 
It is also submitted that the common law is not applied to a large extent in consumer 
law judgments, as litigation based on common-law principles is expensive because 
of the cost of legal representation, and cases normally take a long time to finalise. 
As a result, many consumers cannot afford legal representation and litigation based 
on the common law, especially where the disputed amounts are relatively small. 
Therefore, the country was in need of well-balanced measures to protect the 
interests of both business and consumers.50 
When the Draft Consumer Protection Bill was published, it was regarded as 
controversial by certain commentators.51 Du Preez regards the Bill as wide and far-
reaching, and she criticises the intelligibility of the Bill for consumers, as the 
language in the Bill is not user-friendly.52 The purpose of the CPA is to to provide 
 
41 In this regard see Woker (2010) Obiter 219-221; Du Preez (2009) TSAR 63-64; Naudé (2018) 
JCP 413; Tennant LLD 89-92. 
42 Naudé (2018) JCP 411-434. 
43 Du Preez (2009) TSAR 64; Woker (2010) Obiter 230-231. In addition, it was also criticised as 
being fragmented by Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 303. 
44 Woker (2010) Obiter 223. 
45 Woker (2010) Obiter 223. 
46 Woker (2010) Obiter 223. 
47 Woker (2010) Obiter 223. 
48 Woker (2010) Obiter 223 who concludes at 230 that consumer legislation was indeed a 
necessity. 
49 Woker (2010) Obiter 230. 
50 Woker (2010) Obiter 230. 
51 There were three daft versions of the Bill, the last published for commentary in May 2008. For 
comments on the Bill see Du Preez (2009) TSAR 58 and Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 302. 
52 Most of the provisions are not of direct importance for the purpose of this thesis. A few that could 
be relevant are: discriminatory marketing, cooling-off periods; return of goods; plain and 
understandable language; written consumer agreements; unfair, unreasonable, or unjust contract 
terms; warranties; and price disclosures. In her preliminary comments on the Draft Consumer 
Protection Bill, Du Preez notes the Bill is not drafted clearly and is not easy to understand. This is 
ironic as one of the aims of the resulting Act is to ensure accessibility for consumers. See Du 
Preez (2009) TSAR 82. 
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access to consumers from all income groups, regardless of socio-economic status 
and the fact that they live in remote areas, to goods and services.53 Du Preez 
observes that the CPA Bill provides for consumers’ ‘entitlements’, not for rights.54 
With the publication of the Bill in 2008, the Department of Trade and Industry said 
one of the objectives of the policy was the harmonisation of South African consumer 
protection measures with international measures.55 
4.2.3.2 Purpose and aims of the CPA 
The CPA came into effect on 31 March 2011. It is interesting that there is no 
reference to the Constitution either in the preamble to the CPA or in section 3 which 
sets out its purpose.56 The only references to the Constitution are in the definitions 
and in a few other sections.57 
The preamble to the CPA provides the general policy and sphere of application of 
the Act – that apartheid and discriminatory legislation is recognised as a burden, 
and to have caused high levels of poverty, illiteracy, and other socio-economic 
inequalities.58 Therefore, there is a need to fulfil the rights of previously 
disadvantaged people, promote their full participation in the economy as 
consumers, to protect consumers, ensure accessible transparent and efficient 
redress for exploited consumers, and to give effect to internationally recognised 
consumer rights. It recognises technological changes that bring new benefits, 
opportunities, and challenges and further acknowledges that it is desirable to 
promote a climate that supports and strengthens consumer rights and 
responsibilities, innovation, and performance. The CPA must promote the economic 
interests of consumers, promote access to information, protect consumers from 
hazards, provide effective redress, educate consumers, promote consumer activism 
and the freedom thereto, and finally, promote consumer participation in decision 
making and consumer interest-related matters.59 
It is clear, despite the lack of express reference to the Constitution, that the CPA 
embraces the values and rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. It covers consumer 
 
53 The purpose of the NCA is similar to that of the CPA. However, Du Preez (2009) TSAR 63 warns 
that despite the commendable aims of the NCA and CPA, these Acts could have the opposite 
effect if overregulated and if placing such an additional administrative burden on financiers and 
suppliers alike, that it would not be worth their while to pursue the proposed agreements or 
business. Also see the discussion on the language used in the CPA para 4.3.5. 
54 This aspect is discussed in greater detail in para 4.3.5 below. 
55 This would, of course, primarily imply the UN Guidelines. See s 2(1)(a) of the CPA. Also see Ch 
2 para 2.6. 
56 Unlike other legislation like the Companies Act 71 of 2008, where there is express reference to 
the Constitution in its preamble and in s 7 which sets out the purpose of the Act. 
57 A few examples are: s 1, s 5(2)(f), s 8(1), (2) and (4), ss 9(3) and (4)(a), section 81(2)(c), s 83(1), 
s 85 (2)(c) (ii), and ss 92(4) and 112(5). 
58 Reddy & Rampersad (2012) Afr J Bus Manage 7407. 
59 These general aims are described in more detail as part of the CPA in s 3 which I consider 
below. 
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transactions that do not fall within the scope of either the NCA or the Financial 
Sector Conduct Authority legislation.60 
Depending on the parties involved, the legal nature of the agreement, and 
applicable legislation, if any, consumer contracts are divided into three main 
categories:61 
• Consumer transactions that fall within the scope of the CPA – eg, a 24-
month agreement to purchase a cellphone coupled with a service 
agreement by a service provider.62 
• Transactions covered by the NCA – eg, personal loans and bonds. 
• Pure common-law transactions not covered by either of the above Acts 
– eg, an agreement to enter into a partnership that is covered by the 
common law. 
Even though the CPA and the NCA apply to the first two classes of consumer 
agreement, the common law still forms the basis for all these agreements, including 
those regulated by legislation.63 
Section 3 builds on the preamble to the CPA and sets out the purposes of the Act 
and how the CPA is to be implemented and interpreted.64 
 
60 Previously (before 1 April 2018) known as the Financial Services Board. The Financial Services 
Board Act 97 of 1990 as amended by the s 66 of the Financial Services Laws General Amendment 
Act 45 of 2013. The Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 has repealed the Financial Services 
Board Act. See Government Notice 853 in GG 41060 of 22 August 2017. 
61 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary Introduction 2. 
62 Certain transactions are covered by both the CPA and the NCA – eg, when a consumer 
purchases a car with a service agreement included, and obtains finance to pay the purchase price. 
The credit agreement is regulated under the NCA, while the CPA regulates the car (the goods) and 
the service agreement (the services). See paras 4.2.3.6.3 and 4.2.3.6.5 for the definitions of 
‘goods’ and ‘services’. 
63 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary Introduction 2. 
64 Section 3 provides: 
‘(1) The purposes of this Act are to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of 
consumers in South Africa by-: 
(a) establishing a legal framework for the achievement and maintenance of a consumer 
market that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable, and responsible for the benefit 
of consumers generally; 
(b) reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced in accessing any supply 
of goods or services by consumers- 
(i) who are low-income persons or persons comprising low-income communities; 
(ii) who live in remote, isolated or low density population areas or communities; 
(iii) who are minors, seniors or other similarly vulnerable consumers; or 
(iv) whose ability to read an comprehend any advertisement, agreement, mark, 
instruction, label, warning, notice or other visual representation is limited by 
reason of low literacy, vision impairment or limited fluency in the language in 
which the representation is produced, published or presented; 
(c) promoting fair business practices; 
(d) protecting consumer from - 
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4.2.3.3 The interpretation of the CPA 
Section 3 is significant in that the CPA must be interpreted to give effect to the 
purposes set out in section 3.65 As such, section 3, which consists of two parts, forms 
an integral part of the CPA and its interpretation.66 Therefore, the CPA is not 
interpreted only by making use of the normal rules of legal interpretation.67 Delport 
emphasises that when interpreting a statute, regard should not be limited to the 
literal meaning of the words, even if they are clear,68 the purpose of the statute, its 
objectives, and the Constitution must also be considered.69 Van Heerden and 
Barnard, too, emphasise the purposive interpretation the CPA70 and the importance 
of section 3 of the Act.71 This aspect was addressed in Eskom Holdings Ltd v 
Halstead-Cleak,72 and Transcend Residential Property Fund Ltd v Mati & Others73 
which emphasise the importance of interpreting the CPA having account of the 
following factors:74 
• the long title of the CPA;75 
• the Green Paper;76 
• section 2(1) of the CPA must be interpreted to give effect to the purposes 
in section 3 of the CPA;77 
 
(i) unconscionable, unfair unreasonable, unjust or otherwise improper trade 
practices; and 
(ii) deceptive, misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct; 
(e) improving consumer awareness and information and encouraging responsible and 
informed consumer choice and behavior; 
(f) promoting consumer confidence, empowerment, and the development of a culture of 
consumer responsibility, through individual and group education, vigilance, 
advocacy and activism; 
(g) providing for a consistent, accessible and efficient system of consensual resolution 
of disputes arising from consumer transactions; and 
(h) providing for an accessible, consistent, harmonised, effective and efficient system of 
redress for consumers.’  
See Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 5, 1-5. Note that section 3(2) deals with the responsibilities of 
the Consumer Commission and falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
65 Section 2(1). Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 2-2–2-3. 
66 Du Preez (2009) TSAR 65 remarks that the purpose of the CPA is significant as s 3 provides 
that the Act must be interpreted to give effect to these purposes. See too Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 
305; Delport (2014) Obiter 74. As mentioned, ss 3(2) deals with the responsibilities of the 
Consumer Commission and is not directly relevant for purposes of this thesis. 
67 Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 305. 
68 See Delport (2014) Obiter 65-69. Also see Du Preez (2009) TSAR 65; Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 
305. 
69 See the discussion in para 4.2.2.1 above. 
70 Van Heerden & Barnard (2019) THRHR 450. 
71 Van Heerden & Barnard (2019) THRHR 444, 449-450, 461; Sharrock (2010) SA Merc LJ 299. 
72 2017 (1) SA 333 (SCA) (hereafter Eskom). 
73 2018 (4) SA 515 (WCC) (hereafter Mati). 
74 The court relied on the decision in Eskom and Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) (hereafter Endumeni). 
75 Mati para [42]. 
76 Mati para [43] referring to Eskom. 
77 Mati para [44]. 
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• section 5 of the CPA;78 
• the definitions, preamble and purposes of the CPA.79 
Section 2(2) provides that when interpreting the CPA, a person, court, Tribunal or 
the Commission must consider the following matters, namely appropriate foreign 
law, appropriate international conventions, declarations, or protocols on consumer 
protection, and decisions of the consumer court, the ombud, or an arbitrator which 
have not been set aside by superior courts.80 In addition, the relevant decisions of 
the Commission and the Tribunal must also be considered.81 
Section 4(4)82 sets very strict rules for courts and Tribunals interpreting standard-
forms, other contracts, and other documents prepared by, or on behalf of, the 
supplier. Section 4(4) provides that all standard-form contracts and contracts 
prepared by or on behalf of the supplier, must be interpreted by the Tribunal or court 
to benefit the consumer.83 These rules include provisions on ambiguity,84 restrictions 
and limitations in contracts, the way in which the documents was prepared and 
presented to the consumer, and the ‘circumstances of the transaction or 
agreement’.85 Section 4(4)(b)(iii) implies that the parol evidence rule does not apply 
in the circumstances provided for in the subsection.86 
 
78 Mati para [47]. 
79 Mati para [47]. 
80 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary s 2(2), 2-6. 
81 The National Consumer Commission was established in terms of s 85 of the CPA and the 
Consumer Tribunal in terms of s 26 of the NCA. 
82 Section 4(4) provides that ‘[t]o the extent consistent with advancing the purposes and policies of 
this Act, the Tribunal or court must interpret any standard form, contract or other document 
prepared or published by or on behalf of a supplier, or required by this Act to be produced by 
a supplier, to the benefit of the consumer−  
(a)  so that any ambiguity that allows for more than one reasonable interpretation of a part of 
such a document is resolved to the benefit of the consumer; and  
(b)  so that any restriction, limitation, exclusion or deprivation of a consumer’s legal rights set 
out in such a document or notice is limited to the extent that a reasonable person would 
ordinarily contemplate or expect, having regard to−  
(i)  the content of the document; 
(ii)  the manner and form in which the document was prepared and presented; and  
(iii)  the circumstances of the transaction or agreement.’ 
83 The contra proferentem principle is now statutorily entrenched to protect the consumer who is in 
a lesser bargaining position. Also see the discussion in Ch 2 para 2.5 regarding inferior bargaining 
position. 
84 Section 4(4)(a). 
85 Section 4(4)(b). 
86 Section 4(4)(b)(iii) provides that the Tribunal or court must interpret the contract, document or 
standard form to benefit the consumer, taking into account the circumstances of the transaction or 
agreement. See the discussion in Ch 3 para 3.2.9 on the parol evidence rule, and also how the 
CPA affects the rule in para 4.3.2.7 below. 
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The second part of section 3 sets out the responsibilities of the Consumer 
Commission to ensure the effective realisation of the purposes of the CPA and the 
enjoyment of consumer rights.87  
4.2.3.4 The CPA’s field of application88 
Section 5 of the CPA provides that the Act applies to: 
• every transaction in South Africa not exempted by subsections 5(2), 5(3) 
and 5(4);89 
• the promotion of goods or services, or to the supplier of goods or 
services;90 
• goods provided or services performed in terms of a transaction covered 
by the CPA;91 
• goods provided in terms of exempted transactions to the extent provided 
for in subsection 5(5)(1)(d);92 
• unless an exemption applies;93 and 
• section 5(6) transactions are also regarded as a transaction.94 
I shall now briefly mention the fundamental consumer rights protected by the CPA 
as background to the rest of this chapter. 
 
87 This aspect will not be discussed as it falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
88 For more information on the application of the CPA relevant to the topic of this thesis, see Van 
Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 35-37; Sharrock Business Transactions 593-595; Kirby 
(2011) Without Prejudice 22; Melville & Palmer (2010) SA Merc LJ 272; Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 
301; Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distribution CC v Rattan NO 2019 (3) SA 451 (SCA); Mati; 
Vousvoukis v Queen Ace CC t/a Ace Motors 2016 (3) SA 188 (ECG). 
89 Section 5(1)(a) CPA. 
90 Section 5(1)(b) CPA. 
91 Section 5(1)(c) CPA. 
92 Section 5(1)(d) CPA. Section 5(5) provides that although these transactions are exempt from the 
operation of the CPA, the goods, the importer, distributor and supplier or retailer will be subject to 
the provisions of ss 60 and 61 of the CPA. Section 60 deals with unsafe goods and s 61 deals with 
the liability of suppliers, retailers, importers and distributors when damage is caused by goods. 
93 Section 5(2) CPA. 
94 See s 5(6) of the CPA which provides that, ‘[f]or greater certainty, the following arrangements 
must be regarded as a transaction between a supplier and consumer, within the meaning of 
this Act:  
(a) The supply of any goods or services in the ordinary course of business to any of its 
members by a club, trade union, association, society or other collectivity, whether 
corporate or unincorporated, of persons voluntarily associated and organised for a 
common purpose or purposes, whether for fair value consideration or otherwise, 
irrespective of whether there is a charge or economic contribution demanded or expected 
in order to become or remain a member of that entity; 
(b) a solicitation of offers to enter into a franchise agreement; 
(c) an offer by a potential franchisor to enter into a franchise agreement with a potential 
franchisee; 
(d) a franchise agreement or an agreement supplementary to a franchise agreement; and 
(e) the supply of any goods or services to a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement.’ 
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4.2.3.5  Consumer rights95 
Commentators regard Chapter 2 of the CPA which sets out the fundamental 
consumer rights, controversial.96 The consumer rights referred to in Chapter 2 are:  
• the right of equality;97  
• the right to privacy;98  
• the right to choose;99  
• the right to disclosure and information;100  
• the right to fair and responsible marketing;101  
• the right to fair and honest dealing;102  
• the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions;103 
• the right to fair value, good quality and safety;104 and 
• the supplier’s accountability to consumers.105 
These rights are in line with the seven rights in the UN Guidelines for consumer 
protection.106 
Only the fundamental rights relevant to fixed-term contracts are discussed where 
applicable, as a complete analysis of the fundamental rights of consumers falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
95 Naudé (2018) JCP 414 notes that these rights are those recognised by the UN Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection. For a detailed discussion of the fundamental rights of consumers see 
Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 302-406. 
96 Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 302. 
97 Chapter 2, Part A, ss 8-10. The right to equality is related to the right to human diginity as set out 
in s 1(a) of the Constitution. See Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 8-3 – 8-4 for a discussion. This 
right aims to prevent unfair discrimination. 
98 Chapter 2, Part B, ss 11 and 12. 
99 Chapter 2, Part C, ss 13-21. This right affects s 14 as the consumer has the right to choose with 
which supplier he wishes to contract. He can, eg, also choose what the duration of the agreement 
will be up to a maximum of 24 months. 
100 Chapter 2, Part D, ss 22-28. This right affects the consumer in a fixed-term agreement as all 
relevant information and financial information must be disclosed to him. This right is affected by the 
plain language requirement in s 22. 
101 Chapter 2, Part E, ss 29-39. 
102 Section 3(1)(d) and Ch 2, Part F, ss 40-47. 
103 Chapter 2, Part G, ss 48-52. See also Naudé (2009) SALJ 505-536. 
104 Chapter 2, Part H, s 53-61. For a full discussion of these rights see Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 
318-389; Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 381-398; Naudé (2011) SALJ 336-351; 
Tennant LLD on good quality and safety, especially 124-158. 
105 Chapter 2, Part I, ss 62-67. 
106 Sharrock Business Transactions 587. Also see the UN Consumer Protection Guidelines in Ch 2 
para 2.6. 
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A consumer is defined in section 1 as a person to whom the supplier markets his or 
her goods or services in the ordinary course of business; a person who enters into 
an agreement with the supplier in the ordinary course of business; unless the 
transaction is exempted in terms of sections 5(2)108 or 5(3)109 of the CPA. The 
ordinary course of business is not defined in the CPA and there are conflicting views 
on how the term should be interpreted.110 The definition of consumer further includes 
a person who uses, receives, or benefits from the particular goods described before, 
whether he or she was a party to the agreement or not, and a franchisee to the 
extent applicable in section 5(6)(b)–(e). Such a person, although not directly 
involved in a consumer transaction, and although the CPA does not expressly define 
‘indirect consumer’, is deemed a consumer by implication and will be protected 
under the CPA.111 The definition of consumer does not require the person to obtain 
the goods or services for his or her private or domestic use.112 
 
107 Section 1 defines consumer as: ‘‘‘consumer’’, in respect of any particular goods or services, 
means – 
(a) a person to whom those particular goods or services are marketed in the ordinary course 
of the supplier’s business; 
(b) a person who has entered into a transaction with a supplier in the ordinary course of the 
supplier’s business, unless the transaction is exempt from the application of this Act by 
section 5(2) or in terms of section 5(3); 
(c) if the context so requires or permits, a user of those particular goods or a recipient or 
beneficiary of those particular services, irrespective of whether that user, recipient or 
beneficiary was a party to a transaction concerning the supply of those particular goods 
or services; and 
(d) a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement, to the extent applicable in terms of 
section 5(6)(b) to (e)’. 
108 Section 5(2) provides that: ‘This Act does not apply to any transaction− 
(b) in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person whose asset value or annual turnover, 
at the time of the transaction, equals or exceeds the threshold value determined by the 
Minister in terms of section 6.’ 
In terms of s 6(1) the Minister, by notice in the Gazette, determines a monetary threshold 
applicable to the size of a juristic person for purposes of s 5(2)(b). The threshold has been 
published in Government Notice 294 in GG 34181 of 1 April 2011, that provides for a threshold of 
R2 million for jusristic persons and for the method of calculation. 
109 Section 5(3) provides that a regulatory authority may apply to the Minister for exemptions on 
specific grounds. 
110 In this regard see Sharrock (2010) SA Merc LJ 301-302; Glover Kerr’s Sale and Lease 335-336, 
Laubscher LLM 74-75; Barnard (2019) THRHR 164, 167; Stenekamp LLM 132. This aspect will be 
dealt with in more detail in para 4.2.3.8 below, where it is especially relevant for the purpose of 
lease agreements. 
111 For instance, when a person attending a promotion receives a promotional bottle of wine and 
suffers from severe food poisoning as a result, he or she will be protected by the provisions of the 
CPA. See ss 29-39 of the CPA which address such rights. See Tennant LLD 99-104; Barnard LLD 
40, 41, 43. Also see the position in Singapore Ch 5 para 5.3.2.1.1. 
112 See Sharrock (2010) SA Merc LJ 300 for a discussion of the definition. This definition differs 
from the position in the UK, see Ch 6 para 6.3.4.2.1. 
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The definition of consumer also covers juristic persons,113 but excludes juristic 
persons of which the asset value or annual turnover at the time of the transaction 
exceeds the threshold value the Minister prescribes from time to time as provided 
in section 6(1) for the purpose of section 5(2)(b).114 
The court in Mati had to decide the meaning of ‘consumer’.115 It referred to the 
decision in Eskom where ‘consumer’ was interpreted widely and inclusively.116 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Eskom set two requirements to establish if a third 
person (not a party to the agreement) is a consumer: first, whether there is a 
transaction as intended under the CPA, to which a consumer is a party; and second, 
another (third) party should use the goods after the conclusion of the transaction.117 
The court, therefore, includes a user of goods – the recipient or beneficiary of 
services or goods – whether that person is an official party to the agreement or not. 
Even somebody who received and used the goods as a gift is included in the 
definition.118 Holderness AJ, therefore, concluded that the third respondent in Mati 
was a consumer for purposes of the CPA, and was entitled to the protective 
measures in the Act even though he was not officially a party to the lease agreement 
on which the dispute was based.119 
Section 14(1) provides that section 14 does not apply to transactions between 
juristic persons, regardless of annual turnover.120 Consequently, for purposes of this 
thesis, I accept that the consumer is a natural person save where specifically 
otherwise indicated. 
4.2.3.6.2 Agreement, consumer agreement, and fixed-term agreement 
An ‘agreement’ is defined in section 1 of the CPA as an arrangement or 
understanding between or among two or more parties which purports to establish a 
relationship in law between or among them. 
A ‘consumer agreement’ is defined in section 1 as an agreement between a supplier 
and a consumer, other than a franchise agreement. 
 
113 See discussion in para 4.2.3.6.4 below. 
114 Currently R2 million rand. See Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 42-43. 
115 Mati para [48]. 
116 Eskom para [15]. 
117 Eskom para [15]. 
118 Eskom para [15]. 
119 Mati para [48]. Although he did not sign the agreement as a lessee, his name was mentioned in 
the list of occupants in the agreement. This aligns with the definition of consumer in subs (c). Also, 
see s 5(5) which provides that ss 60 and 61 which regulate product liability apply, even though the 
transaction may be excluded from the provisions of the CPA.  
120 Also see Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-5. 
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There is no definition in the CPA of a fixed-term agreement.121 The only mention of 
a fixed-term agreement is found in the CPA Regulations. Regulation 5122 provides 
that fixed-term agreements may not exceed 24 months.123 The reasonable 
deduction would therefore be that a fixed-term agreement is an agreement that 
starts on a specific date and ends on a specified or determinable date in the future.124 
Regulation 5 provides that in exceptional circumstances this 24-month period may 
be extended – eg, when specifically provided for in a regulation,125 or where the 
supplier can show a ‘demonstrable financial benefit to the consumer’.126 Although 
the term ‘demonstrable financial benefit’ is also not defined, a supplier could 
probably prove this requirement if it can show that it gave the consumer a discount 
on the basis of an extended term for the agreement.127 
There is no obvious or rational reason why the legislature thought it essential, 
necessary, or even advisable, to limit the duration of contracts in terms of section 
14 of the CPA, as the consumer can cancel the contract in terms of section 
14(2)(b)(i)(bb)128 at any time without explanation. So, section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) allows 
the consumer absolute freedom as regards the duration of contracts save for the 
provision of 20 days’ notice of cancellation. The only party bound by the duration of 
the agreement is the supplier, and even the supplier could be disadvantaged by the 
limitation of duration.129 
4.2.3.6.3 Goods130 
The definition of goods includes anything marketed for human consumption, 
tangible objects, including a medium on which anything is written or encoded. 
 
121 The Cambridge English Dictionary describes the term as ‘lasting for a fixed period of time’. See 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/English/fixed-term (date of use: 7 March 2019); Naudé & 
Eiselen Commentary 14-3. The term ‘agreement’ is defined in s 1 of the CPA as: ‘‘‘agreement’’ 
means an arrangement or understanding between or among two or more parties that purports to 
establish a relationship in law between or among them’. See Sharrock (2010) SA Merc LJ 303 for 
critique of the term agreement. 
122 Regulation 5(1)(a) of The Consumer Protection Act Regulations R293 GN R 293 in GG 34180 
of 1 April 2011, (CPA Regulations). 
123 See para 4.2.3.7.9 below for a discussion of s 14(4). 
124 Section 14. Examples of these agreements are, eg, gym membership agreements for a fixed 
period, lease contracts entered into by consumers, and cell phone contracts. Note that fixed 
deposits are exempt from the provisions of s 14 of the CPA – see GN 532 in GG 34399 of 27 June 
2011. 
125 Regulation 5(1)(b). 
126 Regulation 5(1)(a). 
127 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-3. 
128 Section 14(2): ‘If a consumer agreement is for a fixed term − (b) despite any provision of the 
consumer agreement to the contrary – (i) the consumer may cancel the agreement −(bb) at any 
other time, by giving the supplier 20 business days’notice in writing or other recorded manner and 
form, subject to subsection (3)(a) and (b);’. 
129 See para 4.2.3.7.9 below. This is especially pertinent in lease agreements. See the discussion 
below in para 4.2.3.8. 
130 Section 1 CPA. 
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Literature, music, photographs, motion pictures, games, information, data software, 
code or other intangible product written or encoded on any medium, or a licence to 
use such intangible products are also included. A legal interest in land or any other 
immovable property, other than an interest that falls within the description of a 
service in section 1, as well as gas, water, and electricity are also included.131 
For the purpose of this thesis, I use a cell phone as an example of goods. 
4.2.3.6.4 Juristic person132 
Juristic person includes close corporations, trusts as defined in the Trust Property 
Control Act,133 partnerships, and associations.134 This is a wide description as the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 defines a juristic person as ‘includ[ing] a foreign 
company; and a trust, irrespective of whether or not it was established within or 
outside the Republic’.135 
4.2.3.6.5 Service136 
The definition of ‘service’ is also very wide and covers all forms of service, advice, 
consultation, banking services, transportation, provision of food and 
accommodation, access to electronic infrastructure, access to events and facilities, 
right of occupancy other than rental, and franchise rights.137 For purposes of this 
thesis, I use a cell phone service agreement as my example. 
4.2.3.6.6 Supplier 
Any person who markets goods or services is a supplier.138 A supplier includes both 
juristic and natural persons.139 
4.2.3.6.7 Supply140 
Supply is used as a verb in relation to goods, and includes the sale, rental, 
exchange, and hire of goods in the ordinary course of business141 for 
consideration.142 In relation to services, it means the sale, performance, or causing 
 
131 Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 44-45. 
132 Definition as in s 1 of the CPA. 
133 Act 57 of 1988 (Trust Act). 
134 See Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 42-43. 
135 Section 1, Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
136 Services does not include employment, see s 5(2)(e) of the CPA. 
137 Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 45. 
138 Definition in s 1 of the CPA; Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 46. 
139 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-5. 
140 Section 1, CPA. 
141 See para 4.2.3.6.1 above. 
142 Section 1 of the CPA: ‘“Consideration” means anything of value given and accepted in 
exchange for goods or services, including− 
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services to be performed or provided, or the granting of access to premises, events, 
activities or facilities in the ordinary course of business for consideration.143 
4.2.3.6.8 Transaction144 
A transaction is when a person acting in the ordinary course of his or her business,145 
contracts with another to supply services or goods for consideration.146 For example, 
in the context of this thesis, entering into an agreement for the purchase of a cell 
phone coupled with a 24-month service agreement. 
The definitions relevant to the context of the thesis have now been provided and I 
turn to a consideration of the essence of the study – section 14 of the CPA. 
4.2.3.7 Section 14 of the CPA 
4.2.3.7.1 Introduction 
Section 14 deals with fixed-term contracts.147 The need for the section arose, initially 
and primarily in response to long-term, unreasonable gym contracts.148 However, in 
practice its ambit is far wider and includes, for example, cell phone contracts, car 
lease contracts, and service contracts.149 Importantly, and in line with section 5(4) of 
the CPA, all banks registered under the Banks Act, the Mutual Banks Act 124 of 
1993, and co-operative banks registered in terms of the Co-operative Banks Act 40 
 
(a) money, property, a cheque or other negotiable instrument, a token, a ticket, electronic 
credit, credit, debit or electronic chip or similar object; 
(b) labour, barter or other goods or services; 
(c) loyalty credit or award, coupon or other right to assert a claim; or 
(d) any other thing, undertaking, promise, agreement or assurance, irrespective of its 
apparent or intrinsic value, or whether it is transferred directly or indirectly, or involves 
only the supplier and consumer or other parties in addition to the supplier and 
consumer;’. 
143 Definition in s 1 of the CPA; Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 46. 
144 Definition in s 1 – ‘‘‘transaction’’ means− 
(a) in respect of a person acting in the ordinary course of business− 
(i) an agreement between or among that person and one or more other persons for the 
supply or potential supply of any goods or services in exchange for consideration; or 
(ii) the supply by that person of any goods to or at the direction of a consumer for 
consideration; or (iii) the performance by, or at the direction of, that person of any 
services for or at the direction of a consumer for consideration; or 
(b) an interaction contemplated in section 5(6), irrespective of whether it falls within 
paragraph (a);’. 
145 See the discussion in para 4.2.3.6.1. 
146 For purposes of this thesis, this information on the concept ‘transaction’ is adequate. For a 
discussion of the meaning of transaction see Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 36, 47-
48. 
147 Also see the discussion of the term fixed-term agreement in para 4.2.3.7.5 below. 
148 Woker (2010) Obiter 217, 224. 
149 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-5. 
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of 2007, are exempt from the provisions of section 14.150 Transactions between 
juristic persons are likewise exempt in terms of section 14(1).151 
Section 14 forms part of the fundamental right of the consumer to select suppliers, 
as it resorts under Chapter 2 Part C.152 The provisions of section 14 aim to:153 
• limit the duration of fixed-term agreements;154  
• prohibit the automatic renewal of fixed-term contracts;155  
• entitle consumers to terminate the agreement on the termination date;156  
• entitle consumers to terminate the contract on 20 business days’ notice 
at any time during the contract term;157 
• entitle suppliers to payments in terms of the contract, until date of 
cancellation, and a reasonable cancellation penalty when consumers 
give 20 days’ notice at any time during the contract term;158 
• oblige suppliers to give consumers notice of the termination date of the 
agreement;159 and 
• prohibit the unilateral amendment of the terms and conditions of the 
agreement.160 
4.2.3.7.2 The provision regulating fixed-term contracts, section 14 
To understand the significant impact of the provision on the expiry and renewal of 
fixed-term contracts I quote section 14 of the CPA at length. 
‘Section 14. Expiry and renewal of fixed-term agreements – 
(1)  This section does not apply to transactions between juristic persons 
regardless of their annual turnover or asset value. 
(2)  If a consumer agreement is for a fixed term – 
(a)  that term must not exceed the maximum period, if any, prescribed in 
terms of subsection (4) with respect to that category of consumer 
agreement; 
(b)  despite any provision of the consumer agreement to the contrary – 
(i)  the consumer may cancel the agreement –  
(aa)  upon the expiry of its term, without penalty or charge, but 
subject to subsection (3) (a); or 
 
150 GN 532 in GG 34399 of 27 June 2011. 
151 Note the wide description of juristic person – see para 4.2.3.6.4 above. 
152 Sections 13-21. 
153 See Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-3–14-4. 
154 Section 14(2)(a). 
155 Section 14(2)(d). 
156 Section 14(2)(b)(i)(aa). 
157 Section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb). 
158 Section 14(3) read with reg 5(2). Initially the cancellation penalty in the Bill was 10%, but this 
was not taken forward in the Act. 
159 Section 14(2)(c). 
160 Section 14(2)(c). 
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(bb)  at any other time, by giving the supplier 20 business days’ 
notice in writing of other recorded manner and form, 
subject to subsection (3) (a) and (b); or 
(ii)  the supplier may cancel the agreement 20 business days after 
having given written notice to the consumer of a material failure by 
the consumer to comply with the agreement, unless the consumer 
has rectified the failure within that time; 
(c)  of not more than 80, not less than 40, business days before the expiry 
date of the fixed-term consumer agreement, the supplier must notify the 
consumer in writing or any other recordable form, of the impending 
expiry date, including a notice of- 
(i)  any material changes that would apply if the agreement is to be 
renewed or may otherwise continue beyond the expiry date; and 
(ii)  the options available to the consumer in terms of paragraph (d); 
and 
(d)  on the expiry of the fixed-term of the consumer agreement, it will be 
automatically continued on a month-to month basis, subject to any 
material changes of which the supplier has given notice, as 
contemplated in paragraph (c), unless the consumer expressly – 
(i)  directs the supplier to terminate the agreement on the expiry date; 
or 
(ii)  agrees to a renewal of the agreement for a further fixed-term. 
(3) Upon cancellation of a consumer agreement as contemplated in subsection 
(1)(b) –  
(a)  the consumer remains liable to the supplier for any amounts owed to the 
supplier in terms of that agreement up to the date of cancellation; and 
(b)  the supplier – 
(i)  may impose a reasonable cancellation penalty with respect to any 
goods supplied, services provided, or discounts granted, to the 
consumer in contemplation of the agreement enduring for its 
intended fixed term, if any; and 
(ii)  must credit the consumer with any amount that remains the 
property of the consumer as of the date of cancellation, 
As prescribed in terms of subsection (4), 
(4) The Minister may, by notice in the Government Gazette, prescribe 
(a)  the maximum duration for fixed-term consumer agreements, generally, 
or for specified categories of such agreements; 
(b)  the manner and form of providing notices to the consumer in terms of 
subsection (2) (c); 
(c)  the manner, form and basis for determining the reasonableness of 
credits and charges contemplated in subsection (3); and  
(d)  other incidental matters as required to provide for the proper 
administration of this section.’ 
On first reading one immediately observes that there is an error in subsection 3 as 
it refers to the cancellation in terms of section 1(b), which should of course read 
section 2(b). It is necessary first to consider the purpose and interpretation of section 
14. 
4.2.3.7.3 The purpose of section 14 
Section 14 purports to protect consumers in an unequal bargaining position against 
exploitation by large corporations who unilaterally draft unreasonable and unfair 
 South Africa: The position of consumers under fixed-term agreements regulated 
by the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
109 
 
‘take-it-or-leave-it’ agreements for an unreasonably long term.161 Section 14 
provides for a maximum duration of these contracts to protect the consumer from 
being bound to an unreasonably long contract.162 It also provides the consumer with 
the right to cancel the agreement at any time during the fixed term without a reason, 
and, limits the amounts that can be claimed by the supplier as compensation for 
such early cancellation. Section 14 was intended to serve the purposes of sections 
3(1)(c) and 3(1)(d)163 which aim at promoting fair practices in business, and 
protecting consumers from improper trade practices and unfair conduct that 
misleads them.  
4.2.3.7.4 Interpretation of section 14 
Section 2(1) provides that the CPA must be interpreted in a way that gives effect to 
the purposes of the Act set out in section 3.164 When interpreting the Act, a person, 
court, Tribunal, or commission may also consider appropriate foreign and 
international law,165 and international conventions, declarations and protocol 
relevant to consumer protection.166 The decisions of the consumer court, ombuds, 
and arbitrators should also be considered, inasfar as they have not been set aside, 
overruled or reversed by a High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the 
Consitutional Court.167 
When a document or agreement in terms of section 14 is interpreted, section 4(4) 
provides that the court or Tribunal should advance the purposes and policies of the 
CPA and benefit the consumer, specifically when interpreting ambiguities in 
documents. Also, when interpreting restrictions, limitations, and exclusions in 
documents, the court or Tribunal should consider the content of the document, its 
manner and form of presentation, and the circumstances of the transaction or 
document, and read it so as to benefit the consumer.168 
4.2.3.7.5 Fixed-term agreements: General 
Section 14 only applies to agreements that are valid for a fixed term, such as a 
contract for the delivery of a specific service for a period of eighteen months. Section 
14(2)(a) provides that the term should not exceed the period prescribed by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry under subsection 14(4)(a) by notice in the Gazette.169 
 
161 These agreements are standard-form agreements as discussed in para 2.5. 
162 Woker (2010) Obiter 224 n 33. 
163 See para 4.2.3.7.8 below. 
164 See para 4.2.3.3 above. 
165 Section 2(2)(a). 
166 Section 2(2)(b), see Ch 2 para 2.6. 
167 Section 2(2)(c). 
168 Regard should be had to the preamble to the CPA. The preamble recognises the need to 
protect the interests of all consumers, ensure accessible, transparent and efficient redress for 
vulnerable consumers, give effect to internationally recognised consumer rights, and to promote an 
economic environment that strengthens consumer rights. Also see para 4.2.3.3 above. 
169 Regulation 5 in GN 293 GG 34180 of 1 April 2011. 
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Therefore, fixed-terms agreements may not be entered into for a period of more 
than 24 months. As such, certain types of agreement that do not have a fixed-term 
could present difficulties, for example, a life-long lease, or even registered long-
lease agreements, or time-share agreements for an indefinite period. Although 
these agreements qualify as fixed-term agreements under the CPA,170 they should 
not fall under section 14. Long-term leases are regulated by the Formalities in 
Respect of Leases of Land Act,171 and time-share agreements by the Property Time-
Sharing Control Act.172 It could, therefore, be argued that these types of agreement 
do not fall within the scope of section 14.173 There are transitional arrangements for 
pre-existing agreements, but with the CPA having come into operation in 2011, 
these are no longer relevant.174 
If the duration of a fixed-term contract exceeds 24 months, the effect of non-
adherence to section 14 read with regulation 5(1) that limits the duration of fixed-
term contracts, will probably be that the duration of the contract is reduced to 24 
months.175 
Section 14 applies, for example, to gym agreements, cell phone purchase and 
service agreements, and lease agreements. Lease agreements are discussed 
separately below.176 Other affected contracts, for instance time-share agreements, 
mandates, and sales of immovable property, are also discussed below. 
4.2.3.7.6 Section 14(1): Exclusions 
Section 14(1) provides that the provisions of the section do not apply to contracts 
between juristic persons, irrespective of their size.177 This implies that where a 
smaller juristic person contracts as a consumer178 with a supplier who is also a 
juristic person – the smaller juristic person will not be protected by the provisions of 
section 14. This is so, even if it is in a lesser barganining position than the supplier, 
and even though the smaller juristic person falls within the definition of consumer 
for the rest of the provisions of the CPA. However, when the same smaller juristic 
person contracts with an individual who is a supplier, section 14 will protect such 
 
170 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-4. 
171 18 of 1969. See para 4.2.3.8 below. 
172 75 of 1983 (Time-Share Act). See the discussion of time-share agreements in para 4.2.3.9 
below. 
173 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-4. See the discussion in paras 4.2.3.8 and 4.2.3.9 below. 
174 See Schedule 2 for transitional arrangements, specifically item 3 under this Schedule for more 
information about the application of the CPA to pre-existing agreements. 
175 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-7. Also see ss 51(1)(b)(iii), 51(3), and 52(4). Especially 
relevant to lease agreements, see para 4.2.3.8 below. 
176 There was initially a difference of opinion if the section applied to lease agreements. See para 
4.2.3.8 below; Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-4. 
177 The CPA applies to small juristic persons, with an annual turn-over or asset value lower than 
the threshold value set under of s 5(2)(b) of the CPA. See the discussion in para 4.2.3.6.1. 
178 Where the juristic person’s asset value or annual turnover is below the threshold value 
stipulated in in terms of s 6, and it is regarded as a consumer in terms of the definition in s 1 of the 
CPA. See para 4.2.3.6.1. 
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smaller juristic person. This is regarded as an unintended consequence of section 
14(1).179 It is submitted that the provisions of section 14(1) that exclude smaller 
juristic persons from the protection of the CPA, do not give effect to the aim and 
purposes of the CPA as smaller juristic persons could also need the protection 
provided in section 14, regardless of whether they contract with individuals or juristic 
persons.180 
4.2.3.7.7 Section 14(2): Cancellation181 
Section 14(2)(b)(i)(aa) provides that a consumer may cancel the agreement upon 
expiry thereof. In terms of section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) the consumer may cancel the 
agreement at any other time, by giving the supplier 20 business days’ notice.182 The 
notice in section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) must be given in writing, or other ‘recorded manner 
and form’.183 In such an event, the consumer is liable for the amount owing to date 
of cancellation, the supplier may impose a reasonable cancellation penalty, and 
‘must credit the consumer with any amount that remains the property of the 
 
179 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-4–14-5. 
180 In addition, it could perhaps be argued to be contrary to the provisions of s 8(4) of the 
Constitution. Section 8(4) of the Constitution provides that, ‘[a] juristic person is entitled to the 
rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that 
juristic person’. The right in question being equality, as provided in s 9(1) of the Constitution: 
‘Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law’. Also 
see Ch 5 para 5.4. 
181 Section 14(2) reads: ‘(2) If a consumer agreement is for a fixed term− 
(a) that term must not exceed the maximum period, if any, prescribed in terms of subsection 
(4) with respect to that category of consumer agreement;  
(b) despite any provision of the consumer agreement to the contrary− 
(i) the consumer may cancel that agreement−  
(aa) upon the expiry of its fixed term, without penalty or charge, but subject to 
subsection (3)(a); or  
(bb) at any other time, by giving the supplier 20 business days’notice in writing or 
other recorded manner and form, subject to subsection (3)(a) and (b); or  
(ii) the supplier may cancel the agreement 20 business days after giving written notice 
to the consumer of a material failure by the consumer to comply with the agreement, 
unless the consumer has rectified the failure within that time;  
(c) of not more than 80, nor less than 40, business days before the expiry date of the fixed 
term of the consumer agreement, the supplier must notify the consumer in writing or any 
other recordable form, of the impending expiry date, including a notice of− 
(i) any material changes that would apply if the agreement is to be renewed or may 
otherwise continue beyond the expiry date; and  
(ii) the options available to the consumer in terms of paragraph (d); and  
(d) on the expiry of the fixed term of the consumer agreement, it will be automatically 
continued on a month-to-month basis, subject to any material changes of which the 
supplier has given notice, as contemplated in paragraph (c), unless the consumer 
expressly− 
directs the supplier to terminate the agreement on the expiry date; or  
agrees to a renewal of the agreement for a further fixed term.’ 
182 See Clark http://www.polity.org.za/article/fixed-term-contracts-under-the-consumer-protection-
act-2011-07-15 (date of use: 23 February 2020) on the impact of this provision on the sanctity of 
agreements (pacta servanda sunt). 
183 Savahl http://www.polity.org.za/article/fixed-term-agreements-under-the-consumer-protection-
act-interesting-implications-for-landlords-2011-03-29 (date of use: 12 May 2020). 
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consumer as of the date of cancellation’.184 Section 14 does not give the supplier a 
reciprocal right to cancel a fixed-term agreement at any time. A supplier will 
therefore be bound to the full term of a fixed-term agreement under the CPA and it 
can be argued that this balances the unequal bargaining positions between the 
supplier and consumer. 
However, under section 14(2)(b)(ii) a supplier may, on material failure of the 
consumer to perform, cancel the agreement – again with 20 business days’ notice.185 
The consumer has no corresponding right to cancel the agreement.186 If the 
consumer cancels the agreement under section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) for whatever reason, 
the consumer remains liable to the supplier under section 14(3)(a), for any amount 
up to the date of cancellation. The supplier may also impose a reasonable 
cancellation penalty for the goods or services supplied or discount granted under a 
fixed-term agreement under section 14(3)(b). However, if the consumer cancels the 
agreement in terms of section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) because of a material failure by the 
supplier, the consumer will also be liable for any amounts up to cancellation, and, 
will be liable for the cancellation penalty in section 14(3)(b)(i) even if the supplier did 
not comply materially. For example, the consumer did not receive the cell phone, or 
he or she received it, but the service was never activated. It is, therefore, clear that 
the proverbial sword and shield are provided to the supplier, but the consumer (the 
primary focus of the legislature) has neither when cancelling because of material or 
other failure by the supplier. 
The consumer who cancels an agreement in the event of a material failure by the 
supplier will still be liable for any amount due up to the date of cancellation. Section 
14(2)(b), therefore, puts a consumer in a weaker position than he or she would have 
been under the common law. Under the common law the consumer could have 
based his or her cancellation of the agreement on the repudiation of the agreement, 
without any payments or penalties.187 The remedy of repudiation is still available to 
the consumer in terms of section 2(10), which retains the common law rights.188 It is 
therefore unfortunate that section 14(2)(b) effectively offers a supplier better 
protection than a consumer in the event of material failure; and that a consumer 
enjoys less protection in the event of material failure by the supplier in terms of the 
CPA than under the common law.189 It is submitted that the consumer only has 
limited cancellation rights or remedies in terms of section 14(2)(b). In fact, this 
section very obviously disadvantages the consumer and virtually works to the sole 
advantage of the supplier as the consumer is bound for another 20 business days, 
 
184 Section 14(3)(b)(ii). 
185 This provision can cause constant frustration in the case of lease agreements where the 
supplier will have to give notice every month if and when the consumer does not pay. Naudé & 
Eiselen Commentary 14-8. 
186 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-7. 
187 See Ch 3 para 3.3.3. 
188 Section 2(10) will be analysed and discussed in para 4.2.4 below. 
189 See the discussion of repudiation in Ch 3 para 3.3.3. 
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and in addition remains liable for payments up to date of cancellation,190 despite the 
material non-performance by the supplier. The aim of the Green Paper,191 the 
preamble to the CPA, and the UN Guidelines for consumer protection,192 was 
primarily to protect consumers because of their inferior bargaining position and 
potential vulnerability. The protection of suppliers was not the intention but section 
14(2)(b) has exactly that effect in practice. 
In terms of section 14(2)(c) the supplier must give the consumer notice of expiry of 
the fixed-term agreement, including notice of any material change to the agreement 
if it is extended beyond 24 months’ duration. The notice must include the options 
available to the consumer in terms of section 14(1)(d)193 and must be given not less 
than 40, and not more than 80 business days before the expiry date of the 
agreement.194 The notice must inform the consumer that he or she is entitled to 
cancel the agreement on the expiry date, or is entitled to renew the agreement for 
a further fixed period if it is not cancelled, or enter into a new agreement for a further 
fixed-period. Because the CPA is silent on when exactly the consumer must cancel 
or renew the agreement, he or she may do so until the expiry date. 
Section 14(2)(d) of the CPA provides that a fixed-term contract will continue on a 
month-to-month basis on the expiry of the fixed-term. The aim of this section is to 
prevent the automatic renewal of the contract for a further fixed term, which could 
possibly disadvantage the consumer. But, section 14(2)(d) also enables the 
consumer to extend the agreement if he or she so chooses.195 
There is no explanation or definition of a ‘material change’ in section 14(1)(d), and 
commentators regard this as unfortunate.196 Any term could potentially be material 
to the consumer, not necessarily only changes to material terms. However, when a 
supplier notifies consumers of each and every change, however insignificant, it 
could lead to an overload of notices, and could cause consumers to not pay 
 
190 Section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) of the CPA. 
191 Green Paper Ch 1 para 1.3: ‘… If these rules are enforced, consumers can be confident that the 
information provided to them is accurate, that they are given real choices and that the imbalance 
between individual consumers and businesses, especially larger businesses is addressed …’. 
192 In the objectives of the UN Guidelines for consumer protection the imbalance in bargaining 
power of consumers is recognised. See UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection Objectives, 1. See 
Ch 2 para 2.6. 
193 Section 14(1)(c). The supplier should inform the consumer that the contract will continue on a 
month-to-month basis upon expiry unless the consumer expressly terminates the agreement. The 
supplier should further explain that the consumer also has the option of renewing the contract for a 
further fixed term. 
194 There is a problem with the formulation of this section as it implies that the duration of the 
agreement must be more than 40 days and less than 80 days – these periods however, most likely 
refer to the notice period. See Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-9–14-11 for a discussion of this 
aspect and for the requirements of the notice itself. 
195 See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 381 where they explain that this was common practice 
before the CPA. 
196 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-10. 
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sufficient attention to notices.197 Suppliers now have to decide which changes are 
material in order to notify consumers. Failure to notify consumers in terms of section 
14(2)(d) is not dealt with in the CPA, but material changes of which the consumer 
was not notified may be regarded as inadequate notice to consumers, and the 
consumer could possibly not be bound by these changes. Failure to adhere to the 
notice requirements could affect the validity of the fixed-term agreement, but in 
practice, the agreement will probably continue on a month-to-month basis.198 
4.2.3.7.8 Section 14(3): Upon cancellation by the consumer199 
When a consumer cancels an agreement in terms of section 14(2), section 14(3) 
provides a remedy for the supplier. The supplier cannot only claim amounts owed 
by the consumer up to date of cancellation, it can also impose a cancellation penalty 
on the consumer in contemplation of the agreement enduring for its agreed fixed-
term, subject to the amounts prescribed in terms of subsection 4.200 
4.2.3.7.9 Section 14(4): Maximum duration of fixed-term agreements201 
Section 14(4)(a) provides that the Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, prescribe 
a maximum duration for fixed-term agreements. Regulation 5(1) of the CPA 
regulations202 provides that the duration of fixed-term agreements may not exceed 
24 months, unless a longer period is expressly agreed upon. The supplier must also 
show that such longer period holds a clear financial advantage for the consumer.203 
This, of course, is a stringent obligation to put on the supplier as it would require 
intimate and detailed knowledge of the consumer’s financial and other 
circumstances to prove this successfully. It has been argued that proving upon 
entering and accepting a contract in excess of 24 months the consumer will receive 
discounts to which he or she would otherwise not have been entitled, could qualify 
as a demonstrable financial benefit.204 The regulation does not state at what stage 
the supplier must prove the demonstrable benefit: during negotiations; when the 
contract is concluded; after conclusion; or when a dispute arises. Must the supplier 
 
197 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-10. 
198 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-10. 
199 See also the discussion of s 14(3) in para 4.2.3.7.10. 
200 Savahl https://www.polity.org.za/article/fixed-term-agreements-under-the-consumer-protection-
act-interesting-implications-for-landlords-2011-03-29 (date of use: 12 May 2020). In the Bill there 
was a prescribed percentage of 10% that was not included in the CPA. See the discussion in para 
4.2.3.7.10 below for more detail on how these penalties and fees could be calculated. For a 
discussion of recommendations and guidelines by an adjudicator see para 4.4.2 below. 
201 Also see para 4.2.3.8 for a discussion of the impact of this limitation on lease agreements. 
202 Regulation 5(1)(a) of the CPA regulations. Aspects of reg 5 directly related to the discussion of 
s 14(4) appear below. For a discussion of the rest of the provisions of reg 5 see para 4.2.3.7.10 
below. 
203 Regulation 5(1)(a) of the CPA Regulations. Delport (2014) Obiter 73, 78 and Askew 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/a-fixed-understanding-of-section-14-of-the-consumer-protection-act-
68-of-2008-2015-03-02 (date of use: 23 February 2020). Also see regs 5(1)(b) and (c) – although 
neither of these currently applies. 
204 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-6. 
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conclude an additional agreement with the consumer – with the consumer’s financial 
statements attached – to prove this; does he need to make an affidavit, or is a mere 
written or oral statement to the effect that the contract holds a demonstrable 
financial advantage for the consumer sufficient? One can hardly imagine that a 
corporation such as a cell phone service provider would have the time or capacity 
to meet this burden of proof. The demonstable financial benefit requirement in 
regulation 5, read with section 14(4) is therefore vague, highly impractical, if not 
impossible to adhere to, especially in standard-form contracts that are obviously not 
individually negotiated. 
In addition, for argument’s sake if a supplier grants certain discounts to the 
consumer, and attaches a declaration to this effect to a contract for a term in excess 
of 24 months, the consumer could still give 20 business days’ notice at any time, 
without providing a valid reason. Granting a discount would then leave the supplier 
in a position where the contract has been cancelled prematurely, and in addition, he 
has not been able to obtain the normal remuneration for the contract while it lasted 
as he provided a discounted rate in the hope of securing a longer-term contract. 
Section 14 is silent on the consequences of non-compliance with the 24-month 
maximum period, although the duration of the contract would probably be reduced 
to 24 months instead of being declared void.205 
4.2.3.7.10 Regulation 5 
Regulation 5(2) provides guidelines to determine the reasonableness of penalties 
levied by the supplier in terms of section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb).206 A discussion of the 
calculation and determination of the reasonableness or otherwise of the penalty, 
falls outside the scope of this thesis, and the factors listed in regulation 5(2) will 
merely be mentioned followed by a general overview. These factors are: 
• the amount the consumer owes the supplier up to date of cancellation; 
• the value of the transaction until cancellation; 
• the value of the goods that the consumer will retain after cancellation; 
• the value of goods the consumer will return to the supplier after 
cancellation; 
• the initially agreed duration of the agreement; 
• the losses and/or benefits the consumer accrued because of the 
agreement; 
• the nature of the services or goods reserved or booked;207 
• the period of notice of cancellation given by the consumer; 
 
205 See Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 7-14. 
206 For a discussion of an ombud decision on the interpretation of reg 5 see para 4.4.2 below. 
207 It is not clear why the words ‘reserved or booked’ are used – as a fixed-term agreement does 
not generally involve a reservation or booking, but rather involves a service agreement, goods, or 
both. For example, the purchase of a cell phone and an agreement to provide voice, data, and sms 
services to the consumer for a fixed term. 
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• the reasonable potential for a diligent service provider208 to find an 
alternative consumer between cancellation notice and the time of the 
canceled reservation; and 
• the general practice in the relevant market sector. 
In principle, all of these factors could play a role when a fixed-term agreement is 
cancelled.209 Notwithstanding these factors, regulation 5(3) provides that the penalty 
levied must not be an amount that would in effect negate the consumer’s right to 
cancellation. In practice, regulation 5(3) means that the penalty should not equal, or 
nearly equal, the total payments owed by the consumer for the remainder of the 
duration of the agreement.210 Initially the cancellation penalty in the Bill was 10 per 
cent, but this was not taken forward into the Act.211 Unfortunately, regulation 5 
provides no clear rules or a formula on how the factors in regulation 5(2) must be 
weighed or calculated.212 The effect is that considering the individual factors, the 
amount could possibly negate the consumer’s right to cancellation in any event. As 
at common law,213 section 2(1) of the Conventional Penalties Act214 provides that 
parties can agree in advance on a penalty amount for purposes of section 14(2)(b)(i) 
when entering into the agreement.215 However, when a party cancels an agreement 
lawfully,216 in other words not based on breach of contract,217 for instance, when the 
consumer exercises the right to terminate the agreement on prescribed notice218 as 
provided for in section 14(3)(b)(i), the penalty amount will not be subject to the 
provisions of the Penalties Act as penalties under the Penalties Act require breach 
of contract.219 There are differing views on this, as others contend that the penalty 
amount will be subject to the provisions of the Penalties Act.220 For the purpose of 
this thesis, this aspect is not pursued,221 and, because a cancellation in terms of 
 
208 It is submitted that ‘service provider’ should have been ‘supplier’ as fixed-term agreements can 
be entered into in respect of services, goods, or both. 
209 See the discussion in para 4.4.2 below of factors and guidelines the ombud used to establish an 
amount as penalty in the case of the cancellation of a gym contract. However, a full discussion of 
these factors falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
210 See para 4.4.2 below. 
211 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-13–14-14. 
212 In the Draft Consumer Protection Bill.  
213 See the discussion in Ch 3 para 3.2.11. 
214 Act 15 of 1962 (Penalties Act). 
215 Bearing in mind that when a penalty is provided for, damages cannot be claimed in addition to 
the penalty amount. See Sharrock Business Transactions 769. 
216 Section 1 of the Conventional Penalties Act and Sharrock Business Transactions 768-769 are 
both relevant here. See Sun Packaging (Pty) Ltd v Vreulink 1996 (4) SA 176 (SCA) (hereafter Sun 
Packaging) para [26] where the court held that ‘It affords the appellant the right to terminate’, which 
of course is exactly what is provided in s 14(2)(b)(i) of the CPA. 
217 In other words, not based on breach, but lawfully. See Da Mata v Otto NO 1972 (3) SA 858 (A) 
(hereafter Da Mata) 807-871 where the court found that a debtor’s liability should derive from a 
breach of the contract. Also see Sharrock Business Transactions 768-769. 
218 See the discussion in Sharrock Business Transactions 768-769. 
219 Sharrock Business Transactions 768-769; Sun Packaging paras [8], [18]-[26]. 
220 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-17. 
221 This debate falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
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section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) is not a breach of contract in that it is expressly authorised 
by legislation and therefore lawful, I assume for argument’s sake that the provisions 
of the Penalties Act do not apply to the reasonable penalty provided for in section 
14,222 but is governed solely by regulation 5(2). The general rule is that the consumer 
must prove that the supplier has benefited disproportionately223 as the penalty 
clause operates in favour of the supplier.224 Regulation 5, however, does not 
expressly provide who bears the onus of proof – yet another shortcoming.225 
This problem could be resolved by amending the CPA or the Regulations to provide 
a formula or sliding scale for the calculation of the penalty226 to which the consumer 
must agree in writing on conclusion of the agreement. This would ensure that the 
consumer is fully aware of the extent of his or her liability should he or she elect to 
cancel the agreement. 
4.2.3.7.11 How the common law is affected by section 14 
The supplier enjoys freedom of contract in the sense that it can draft the section 14 
agreement and so protect itself both contractually and through all or some of its 
common-law rights and remedies. Furthermore, section 51 of the CPA lists a wide 
range of prohibited transactions and clauses that could disadvantage the 
consumer.227 Therefore, the supplier is not entitled to the protection of all the 
common-law rights or remedies, and its freedom of contract is limited228 by the 
CPA’s goal of working to the benefit of the consumer.229 The limitation on the 
supplier’s freedom of contract in section 51 is intended to compensate the consumer 
for the fact that he or she is in an unequal bargaining position and a take-it-or-leave-
it position.230 Because of the limitation on the freedom of contract of the consumer, 
 
222 Sharrock Business Transactions 768-769; Sun Packaging paras [8], [18]-[26]; Da Mata 807-
871. 
223 The general rule is that the burden of proof to show that the amount is excessive rests on the 
party in breach. See Sharrock Business Transactions 770. 
224 Van Eeden & Barnard Consumer Protection 370; Steinberg v Lazard 2006 (5) SA 42 (SCA) 
paras [10]-[11]. 
225 This aspect will not be investigated as it falls outside the scope of this thesis.The only decision 
on this aspect is an ombud decision, see para 4.4.2 below. 
226 For example, a provision that the penalty will be calculated as follows: 10% of the total amount 
owed by the consumer for the remainder of the fixed-term period. If a consumer therefore cancels 
the agreement after two months into a contract for R500 per month for 24 months, the penalty 
amount will be R1 100. If he or she cancels after 22 months, the penalty will be R100. This 
calculation would also be fair to the supplier, compensating him or her for losing the protection of 
the maxim pacta servanda sunt, on a sliding scale. It would also be easy for the consumer to 
calculate so allowing him or her to know exactly what amount will be charged as a penalty. 
227 This aspect is discussed in greater detail in para 4.3.2.3.3 below. 
228 For example, a term that provides that the voetstoots clause applies to the goods sold under the 
agreement. See para 4.3.2.3.1 below. 
229 See para 4.2.4 below for a discussion of the position of the supplier in respect of his or her 
common-law rights. See Tennant & Mbele http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/17.pdf 
(date of use: 29 May 2020) and note that, unlike the common law, the CPA does not give a 
consumer the right to cancel a contract improperly induced. See Sharrock (2011) Annual Survey 
538. 
230 See Ch 2 para 2.5 for a discussion of the inferior bargaining position of the consumer. 
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the maxim caveat emptor is of no use to the consumer in these circumstances, 
especially where standard-form agreements under section 14 of the CPA are 
concerned. 
The 24-month limit on the agreement is a further limitation on the freedom of 
contract of both the supplier and the consumer.231 Section 14(4)(c) read with 
regulation 5(2), prescribes guidelines on the amounts due to the supplier, and the 
penalty, which is vague as they are of course a further limitation on the supplier’s 
right to freedom of contract as it cannot base its right to recourse purely on the 
common law. 
The principle of pacta servanda sunt in effect does not apply to the consumer in 
section 14 agreements. The consumer can cancel the agreement at any time and 
without reasons, simply by giving 20 business days’ notice.232 In this light, it is 
conceivable that the legislature intended the payments under sections 14(3)(a) and 
(b) as compensation for the supplier for its loss of the common-law right of pacta 
servanda sunt. 
Strangely, there is no provision for the consumer to give notice of cancellation 
without incurring liability for the amounts provided for under section 14(3)(b)(i) read 
with section 14(4)(c) and regulation 5(2) of the CPA, and the penalty, even if the 
supplier is in material default. On the one hand, the consumer is left without statutory 
recourse in the event of a material default by the supplier, which is a serious Achilles 
heel in the protective armour of the consumer.233 This deficiency has the effect that 
the consumer is bound to the agreement in terms of the CPA for an additional 20 
business days by pacta servanda sunt in these circumstances, and has to pay the 
penalty or cancellation charges, even when the supplier is in material default.234 
The supplier, on the other hand, cannot cancel the agreement as and when it wishes 
and is bound by pacta servanda sunt when the consumer is not in default. However, 
when the consumer is in material default the supplier can cancel the agreement with 
20 business days’ notice to the consumer. The supplier, therefore, also does not 
enjoy the protection of pacta servanda sunt in these circumstances, as it is not 
entitled to specific performance, and its right to pecuniary damages is limited by 
section 14.235 The supplier does, however, have a statutory right to cancel the 
agreement if the consumer is in default, even if its rights are limited under the CPA. 
 
231 Tennant & Mbele http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/17.pdf (date of use: 29 May 
2020). 
232 The consumer has this right in addition to the right to cancel during the cooling-off period. 
233 See para 4.2.3.7.7 above. 
234 Bear in mind that the consumer retains his or her common-law rights under s 2(10) of the CPA. 
However, he or she may not be aware of these rights, and should be protected by s 14 as the 
provision is specifically aimed at protecting vulnerable consumers against exploitation. 
235 Of course, limited by the Penalties Act in normal circumstances. 
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Although both parties’ common-law rights are adversely affected by section 14 of 
the CPA, especially the right to freedom of contract, section 2(10) of the CPA 
provides that the consumer retains his or her common-law rights.236 
4.2.3.7.12 Remedies 
The remedies provided in the CPA specifically for section 14 are set out in the 
section itself.237 The greatest disadvantage for consumers is that they cannot cancel 
immediately and without payment and potential penalty when there is material 
breach by the supplier. 
As seen above, the parties retain their common-law rights and remedies, but they 
must first exhaust the fora in section 69 before they may approach a court. In effect, 
therefore, section 69238 excludes the parties from accessing the courts for the 
application of the common law.239 The only instance in which a party (consumer or 
supplier) has direct access to court is where the supplier has allegedly contravened 
the provisions of sections 40, 41 or 48 of the CPA.240 However, the powers of courts 
to establish fairness are limited by the provisions of section 52(1)(b).241 
4.2.3.7.13 Concluding remarks: Section 14 of the CPA 
It is submitted that section 14 of the CPA does not truly empower the consumer. 
Although the Green Paper and the CPA aim to empower and protect the vulnerable 
consumer,242 without an effective remedy under section 14 when the supplier is in 
 
236 See the discussion in para 4.2.4 below. Note that s 4(4) of the CPA aims to advance the 
purposes and policies of the Act, and the benefit envisaged in the section could detract from the 
common-law principle of contra proferentem when the wording of the clause in question is vague 
or unclear.See Sharrock (2011) Annual Survey 549-550. 
237 These have been described in paras 4.2.3.7.7 and 4.2.3.7.8 above. 
238 See the discussion of s 69 in para 4.3.7.1 below. 
239 Naudé (2010) SALJ 526; Van Heerden & Barnard (2011) JICLT 137-138; Mupangavanhu 
(2012) PELJ 330-331. 
240 Section 52(1)(b) and see the discussion of this provision in para 4.3.2.6 below. Mupangavanhu 
(2012) PELJ 338-341. 
241 See the discussion in para 4.3.2.6. 
242 The distinction between consumer protection and consumer rights in the UK is emphasised by 
Andrews. She contends the main difference lies in the way rights, on the one hand, and 
protections, on the other, are enforced. A right implies the consumer has full freedom to enforce his 
or her right or claim where and when he or she chooses, the consumer is not obliged to obtain 
consent to institute the claim, and the claim is not subject to prior approval. Protection, on the other 
hand, does not inevitably imply a right, and may, for instance, imply that a regulatory body can, or 
must take action. Further, the consumer does not necessarily benefit directly, although he or she 
may, in the longer term, benefit indirectly from action taken by the regulatory body. Therefore, the 
main difference lies therein that a right effectively empowers a consumer. See 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/ documents/107435/107584/file50027.pdf especially107-108 (date of 
use: 10 August 2019). Protection normally implies a more passive role for the consumer. For a 
general discussion see Andrews Enforcement 1. Also see para 4.3.5 below on the language used 
in the CPA. 
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material breach, this aim cannot be realised because the section in fact impacts 
unfairly on the consumer. 
Having considered the essence of section 14 I move now to a discussion of other 
‘typical’ contracts covered by the section – most notably, lease, time-share, 
mandate, and sale of immovable property.  
4.2.3.8 Lease agreements 
4.2.3.8.1 Introduction and application of the CPA to lease agreements 
At common law, a lease is a reciprocal agreement in terms of which a lessor agrees 
to let property to a lessee in return for which the lessee pays rental to the lessor, 
and enjoys the temporary use and enjoyment of the property.243 Instead of the CPA 
defining the term ‘lease’, the term ‘rental’ is erroneously defined as a lease 
agreement. The correct meaning of rental is the amount paid by the lessee to the 
lessor as consideration for the use and enjoyment of the goods leased – be it a car, 
a house, or whatever, and the rental forms part of the lease agreement, and 
although it is one of the essentialia of a lease − it is not a lease agreement as such.244 
This basic and obvious misconception and serious legal mistake confusing the 
terms ‘rental’ and ‘lease agreement’, is worrying as the legislature should define the 
terms in an Act not only with legal accuracy, but also with clarity to prevent 
misconceptions and doubt. 245 The term lease will therefore be used when referring 
to a lease agreement in this thesis. 
From the outset there has been debate as to how and to what extent, if at all, lease 
agreements fall within the ambit of the CPA.246 To establish whether the CPA applies 
to leases a few aspects, definitions, and terms of the CPA must be analysed: 
• The application of the Act in section 5(1)(a). The CPA applies to every 
transaction in South Africa, unless exempted in subsections 2, 3, and 4 
of section 5. 
• ‘Agreement’ is defined as an arrangement between two or more parties 
to establish a relationship in law between them.247 
 
243 See the discussion of the common-law position on leases in Ch 3 para 3.2.16. Glover Kerr’s 
Sale & Lease 329; Sharrock Business Transactions 315; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 
488; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 355. 
244 Glover Kerr’s Sale & Lease 536; Van Jaarsveld & Oosthuizen Handelsreg 488. 
245 In Kanhym Bpk v Oudtshoorn Munisipaliteit 1990 (3) SA 252 (C) 258-259 the court decided that 
a variation from the normal meaning of a word or term would only be justifiable when the normal 
meaning of the word would not constitute the correct interpretation of the term in the context of the 
provision. This would be the case if applied to the term ‘rental’ in the CPA. Also see Botha Uitleg 
125. 
246 Glover Kerr’s Sale & Lease 335-336, 338; Delport (2014) Obiter 60, 71-79; Barnard (2019) 
THRHR 164-175; Freebody (2016) Without Prejudice 22-23; Laubscher LLM 174-176. See also 
https://www.property24.com/articles/more-cpa-clarity-for-property-sector/13518 (date of use: 15 
April 2019) and Monty (2011) Without Prejudice 46. 
247 Section 1 of the CPA. See para 4.2.3.6.2 above. 
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• ‘Consumer agreement’ is defined as an agreement between a consumer 
and a supplier, other than a franchise agreement.248 
• The definition of ‘transaction’ is an agreement between parties for the 
supply of goods or services.249 
• The ‘supplier’ means a person who markets goods or services.250 
• ‘Goods’ includes a legal interest, other than a service, in land or any other 
immovable property.251 
• When the definition of ‘supply’ is analysed it provides that supply means 
the sale, rent, exchange, and hire in the ordinary course of business for 
consideration.252  
• ‘Service’ includes the provision of access to, or use of, any premises or 
other property in terms of rental.253 
• The definition of ‘rental’,254 is an agreement for consideration in the 
ordinary course of business, in terms of which temporary possession of 
any premises or other property is delivered, at the discretion of, or to the 
consumer, or the right to use any premises or other property is granted, 
at the direction of, or to the consumer,255 but does not include a lease 
within the meaning of the National Credit Act.256 
When these concepts and the provisions of the CPA are read and interpreted 
objectively and as a whole, they create the impression that normal lease 
agreements are covered by the CPA.257 The only phrase that could possibly raise 
some doubt is ‘in the ordinary course of business’ and, of course, the term ‘fixed-
term agreement’ in section 14. Furthermore, section 14(1) of the CPA applies in that 
lessors can also be juristic persons if they let the property to a consumer as defined 
 
248 Section 1 CPA. See para 4.2.3.6.2 above. 
249 ‘Transaction means:− 
(a) in respect of a person acting in the ordinary course of business – 
(i) an agreement between or among that person and one or more other persons for the 
supply or potential supply of any goods or services in exchange for consideration; or 
(ii) the supply by that person of any goods to or at the direction of a consumer for 
consideration; or  
(iii) the performance by, or at the direction of, that person of any services for or at the 
direction of a consumer for consideration; or 
(b) an interaction contemplated in section 5(6), irrespective of whether it falls within 
paragraph (a).’ 
250 Section 1 and see the discussion in para 4.2.3.6.6 above. 
251 Section 1 and see para 4.2.3.6.3 above. 
252 Section 1 and see para 4.2.3.6.7. 
253 Section 1 and see para 4.2.3.6.5. 
254 Instead of ‘lease agreement’ as explained. 
255 Which of course should have been ‘lease agreement’ – and not ‘rental’, which is the amount 
paid monthly as remuneration for occupation of the property, as explained. 
256 Section 1 and see para 4.2.3.6.5 above. 
257 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary Contract 7; Stenekamp LLM 132; Glover Kerr’s Sale & Lease 
335-336; Savahl http://www.polity.org.za/article/fixed-term-agreements-under-the-consumer-
protection-act-interesting-implications-for-landlords-2011-03-29 (date of use: 23 February 2020). 
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in section 1 of the CPA.258 Although immovable property is included in the definition 
of goods, leases are regarded as a supply of services for purposes of the CPA.259 
‘In the ordinary course of business’ is not defined in the CPA.260 Business is defined 
as ‘the continual marketing of any goods or services’.261 To fall under the scope of 
ordinary course of business for a lease agreement, the logical deduction would be 
that the supplier should be a company or person whose full-time and continuous 
business is to lease properties, or goods like cars, or accommodation.262 The private 
person who lets a second property, or who does not lease properties or goods full-
time as his or her main business, should, when interpreting this phrase strictly, not 
be regarded as a supplier of goods or services for purposes of the CPA.263 There is, 
in any event, other legislation which deals specifically with residential leases.264 
Laubscher supports the view that a transaction where a private owner who rents out 
his or her property, not as his or her full-time business or occupation, should not fall 
under section 14 of the CPA.265 He refers to AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v 
Biddulph266 to support this view.267 Delport is critical of the rationale of applying 
section 14 to leases of immovable property.268 Barnard, too, questions whether 
section 14 should apply to residential leases and has misgivings whether section 14 
benefits consumers.269 
However, the approach of the courts, is that section 14 of the CPA covers lease 
agreements270 in that its aim is to protect vulnerable consumers. In Amalgamated 
Banks of South Africa Bpk v De Goede,271 the court held that the phrase ‘in the 
 
258 Section 14(1) provides that the section does not apply to transactions where both parties to a 
fixed-term agreement are juristic persons, irrespective of annual turnover or asset value. Also see 
Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-5 where they state that a transaction where the supplier is a 
natural person will always be covered by s 14. Also see para 4.2.3.7.6 above. 
259 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary Contract 7. 
260 See Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 5-16–5-18. Note that an ‘intermediary’, as defined in section 
1 of the CPA can represent another person in the ordinary course of business and for 
remuneration with respect to actual or potential supply of any goods or services. This could of 
course, include the lease of a property. See the discussion of mandate in para 4.2.3.10. 
261 Section 1 CPA. 
262 Stoop (2009) Annual Survey 860; Monty (2011) Without Prejudice 46; Glover Kerr’s Sale and 
Lease 336. 
263 Glover Kerr’s Sale & Lease 336; Barnard 2019 THRHR 164, 169. 
264 Sharrock (2010) SA Merc LJ 301-302; Glover Kerr’s Sale & Lease 335, Laubscher LLM 74-75; 
Barnard (2019) THRHR 164, 167. For example, the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999, the Prevention 
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998, and the Formalities in 
Respect of Lease of Land Act 18 of 1969. 
265 Laubscher LLM 128. 
266 1976 (1) SA 725 (A) 739. 
267 Laubscher LLM 128. 
268 Delport (2014) Obiter 60, 70-78, contends that this could even prejudice the consumer although 
he accepts that the current and accepted position is that s 14 covers lease agreements. 
269 Barnard (2019) THRHR 164-165, 175. 
270 Mati. See Laubscher LLM n 717. 
271 1997 (4) SA 66 (SCA) (hereafter De Goede) 75-78. 
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ordinary course of business’ does not imply that the person must conduct the type 
of business constantly and on a daily basis.272 The test is whether the transaction 
was for financial gain and reflected the terms and conditions generally used in that 
type of transaction. If this interpretation of the phrase is used, a person letting his or 
her second immovable property would be covered by the CPA. Glover supports this 
approach.273 In Gazit Properties (Pty) Ltd v Botha NO274 the court provided 
guidelines for interpreting ‘in the ordinary course of business’. It concluded that it is 
essential to establish whether the agreement is one normally entered into by solvent 
business people, with the normal conditions, and under normal circumstances.275 
Section 4(3) provides that if any provision of the CPA read in context, has more than 
one meaning, the meaning best promoting the spirit and purposes of the CPA 
benefitting the consumer must be preferred. In other words, the wide interpretation 
in De Goede and Gazit benefits the consumer. 
Leases of movable property will also resort under section 14 of the CPA. In Absa 
Technology Finance Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Michael Bid a House CC and Another276 
the court ruled that leases of movable property are indeed regulated by the CPA, 
and referred to section 5 of the CPA.277 
4.2.3.8.2 The effect of the CPA on lease agreements under section 14 
A fixed-term agreement is not defined in the CPA, but the term clearly means that 
the agreement must be concluded for a specific period.278 Regulation 5(1) of the 
CPA sets this period at a maximum of 24 months. Does this mean that in one fell 
swoop the CPA limits the duration of long-term leases agreed to by the parties and 
regulated by the law of long leases,279 and often to the benefit of the consumer?280 
Is this what the legislature intended, and if so, why? Clearly, this could disadvantage 
the lessee.281 
Another serious consequence of the application of section 14 to long-term leases is 
that it allows the consumer to cancel the agreement by notice and without offereing 
a valid reason. For example, the lessor may have spent a considerable amount on 
preparing the premises for the lessee on the assumption that the lease would be for 
24 months or longer. The lessee can now move in, give 20 business days’ notice, 
 
272 This case dealt with tax law. 
273 Glover Kerr’s Sale & Lease 337. 
274 2012 (2) SA 306 (SCA) (herafter Gazit). 
275 Gazit para [8]. 
276 2013 (3) SA 426 (SCA) (hereafter Michael Bid a House) para [28]. 
277 Michael Bid a House para [28]. 
278 See para 4.2.3.7.5 above. 
279 For instance, long term leases of immovable property registered under notarial lease 
agreements in the Deeds Registries Office in terms of s 3(1)(p) read with s 77 and s 82 of the 
Deed Registries Act 37 of 1947. 
280 Provides certainty of accommodation and savings on removal costs as discussed below. 
281 Especially in commercial leases, for example, the high costs of shop fitting and preparation of 
premises to ensure long-term stability and goodwill. 
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and cancel the agreement.282 There is no logical reason for the legislature to have 
intended this, nor does it reflect the objects of the Green Paper and the CPA. Neither 
of these documents clearly provides for such an amendment to long-term lease 
agreements or the law of lease, or that long-term leases involving consumers as 
lessees are abolished. 
There are sound reasons why consumers enter into long-term lease agreements.283 
There is also a reason for the law on long-term leases and for requiring their notarial 
execution and registration.284 For instance, the lessor can use the long-term lease 
as security to borrow money, and the lease agreement is then hypothecated by a 
mortgage bond,285 or a notarial bond,286 which in turn, provides security to the 
bondholder.287 The fact that under the CPA consumers can cancel their lease 
agreements with 20 business days’ notice obviously affects the mortgagee’s 
security. The cancellation of these leases also has consequences in that the notarial 
lease agreement, the title deed of the property, and where applicable the bond 
documentation, must be submitted to the relevant Deeds Office for cancellations 
and endorsements to be made and to rectify the official Deeds Registries’ data 
records.288 The CPA is silent on all these issues which would imply a serious 
oversight by the legislature, or that section 14 of the CPA was never intended to 
apply to lease agreements – or at least to long-term lease agreements.289 
One must, however, bear in mind that the term of a fixed-term lease agreement may 
be extended if the supplier shows it is to the lessee’s advantage.290 The effect of a 
few of the disadvantages for lessors and lessees in fixed-term agreements will be 
illustrated by practical examples, bearing in mind that section 14 does not apply to 
transactions between juristic persons.291  
As regards disadvantages to lessors: 
 
282 Section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb). See Anon https://www.property24.com/articles/landlords-ignore-cpa-at-
their-peril/13444 (date of use: 23 February 2020); Mhlanga 
https://www.property24.com/articles/the-cpa-and-property-lease-agreements/14363 (date of use: 
23 February 2020). 
283 See Delport (2014) Obiter 74 where he explains there are certain jurisdictions which prescribe 
minimum periods for commercial leases. An example is New South Wales, which has a five-year 
minimum period for retail premises as set out in s 21 of the Retail Leases Act 4 of 2003 (Victoria). 
This thesis does not include a detailed analysis of long-term leases, notarial leases, or the 
hypothecation of leases, as these aspects fall outside the scope of the thesis. Burchell (2011) 
Without Prejudice 38-39. 
284 Section 77, Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 (Deeds Act). 
285 In the case of immovable property, s 81(a) Deeds Act. 
286 In the case of movable property, s 81(b) and 82 Deeds Act. 
287 Jones Conveyancing 409. (I refer to the 3ed of Jones’s work as it is widely accepted in 
conveyancing practice to be a better edition, and better authority on conveyancing and the 
provisions of the Deeds Registries Act than the later edition/s.) 
288 Section 78, Deeds Act. 
289 However, take note that s 2(9) of the CPA could apply by implication.  
290 See the uncertainties and practical problems regarding this aspect discussed in para 4.2.3.7.9. 
291 Section 14(1) CPA, see the discussion in para 4.2.3.7.6 above. 
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• The lessor will not have a guaranteed return on his or her investment, 
and will also not have legal and financial certainty that the premises will 
be occupied for a longer term, at the most 24 months. In addition, the 
lessee can give 20 business days’ notice of vacation of the premises at 
any stage during the initial 24 months. 
• The lessor will not have the certainty that he can spend time and money 
marketing and preparing the premises for a potential lessee. 
• The penalty provided for in section 14(3)(b)(i) cannot possibly 
compensate the lessor for shortening the duration of the lease from, for 
example, fifteen years to 24 months, or even less, where the consumer 
(lessee) gives notice in terms of section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb). This is especially 
true where there have been high preparation and marketing costs 
involved in advertising the lessee’s presence in certain business 
premises. 
• When section 14 applies, the lessor will not be in a position to cancel the 
agreement during the initial 24-month period unless, of course, the 
lessee is in material breach. In that event, the lessor would have to give 
20 business days’ notice every month that the lessee is in arrears, and 
were the lessee to pay just before the expiry of the cancellation period, 
the result could be the negation of a monthly advance payment in the 
agreement292 – a form of consequence-free serial breach of contract 
surely not intended by the legislature! 
• The lessor293 could be reluctant to contract with an individual because of 
section 14 of the CPA294 which minimises the pool of suitable lessees 
from which the lessor can choose.295 
The potential negative effect of section 14 of the CPA on the consumer as a lessee 
are: 
• The lessee would lose the legal and financial certainty of remaining in 
occupation of the premises for a fixed longer period at a specified rental 
subject to specified increases. There are obvious advantages for the 
lessee in this, such as saving on removal costs, avoiding children’s 
schooling disruptions, etcetera.296  
 
292 Steyn (2014) De Rebus 25-26. 
293 Where the lessor is a juristic person. 
294 Harris http://www.polity.org.za/article/cpa-could-make-property-harder-to-rent-for-tenants-2011-
10-11 (date of use: 22 February 2020) and Hastie http://www.polity.org.za/article/the-consumer-
protection-act-and-lease-agreements-2011-11-30 (date of use: 22 February 2020). 
295 For example savings on accountants’ fees. 
296 See, eg. the amendments to the Regulations Relating to the Admission of Learners to Public 
Schools, 2001 (GenN 4138 in PG 129 of 13 July 2001) by the Amendments to Regulations 
Relating to the Admission of Learners to Public Schools, 2019 (PN 268 in PG 85 of 18 March 
2019) under the Gauteng Schools Education Act 6 of 1995. In terms of these regulations a learner 
is allowed access to a school, among others, if his or her residence falls within a school’s feeder 
zone. 
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• Section 14 could prevent individuals from entering into lease agreements 
with juristic persons especially in respect of commercial property, as 
lessors do not want to be hampered by the provisions of section 14 of 
the CPA and could insist or prefer leasing to a juristic person. At the same 
time it discourages individuals from taking part in the economy and 
prevents the potential growth and establishment of small businesses, 
starting off as individually-owned businesses, and growing, becoming 
more successful and eventually being converted into companies. This 
has financial implications, as it is expensive to incorporate and operate a 
company, for instance appointing and remunerating auditors, and paying 
annual CIPC fees. 
• When the lessee is a natural person in business, the shorter lease term 
could force him to move to another location and cause disruptions to his 
business, as well as additional costs related to for instance removal 
costs, and new marketing material to advertise his new address. 
• A lessor could be willing to extend certain discounted rates for longer-
term leases, and the lessee could save money that way.297 Due to the 
section 14 of the CPA limitations the lessor is not guaranteed a lease 
period of say, five years, or even two years, and this will result in the 
lessee losing the potential advantage of being given a discounted rate. 
• A longer-term lease could enable lessees sufficient time to recover their 
initial costs, especially for new businesses. 
• The limitation on the duration of lease agreements could also affect 
consumers’ ability to obtain credit from banks to start their businesses, 
as banks would argue that no business can start up and recover costs in 
so short period.298 Not obtaining a loan because of section 14 limitations 
would mean excluding the consumer from an economic opportunity. 
• With longer-term leases registered in the Deeds Office the lessee’s 
personal rights become real rights and can be mortgaged, thereby 
offering him improved legal protection, and in addition, the registration in 
the Deeds Office acts as security for loans on leases for immovable and 
or movable goods. Section 14 excludes this possibility. 
• The lessee can have certainty about long-term costs,299 and a guaranteed 
presence in a specific shopping complex for example, and that could be 
to his advantage in competing more effectively with competitors in the 
area. Section 14, through its limitations will render this advantage 
impossible. 
I have now analysed the position under section 14 of the CPA regarding lease 
agreements, and will conclude this topic. 
 
297 Delport (2014) Obiter 73-74. 
298 Delport (2014) Obiter 74. 
299 Steyn (2014) De Rebus 25-26. 
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4.2.3.8.3 Concluding remarks: The CPA and lease agreements 
Glover concludes that the law of lease is not affected by the CPA to the same extent 
as, for example, the law of sale.300 However, there are many instances where both 
suppliers and consumers can be detrimentally affected, and this should not be 
ignored. 
The legislature’s intention that section 14 should apply to lease agreements appears 
to have been misguided and based on incorrect legal terminology and insufficient 
legal understanding – eg, the use of the term ‘rental’ instead of ‘lease agreement’. 
The provisions in section 14 that affect leases are short-sighted and not integrated 
with other relevant legislation. These aspects need serious attention to correct 
duplication and contradictions. The application of section 14 of the CPA should be 
directed at contracts where there is an unequal bargaining position,301 to protect 
vulnerable consumers, and work to their advantage, not to disadvantage them. 
Where lease agreements are alleged to be unreasonable, unfair, or unconscionable 
the consumer will in any event be protected by the provisions of the CPA.302 
4.2.3.9 The CPA and time-share agreements303 
A time-share agreement is an agreement in terms of which the seller, generally a 
property developer, sells a specific week or weekend in a certain property to the 
purchaser. This enables a developer who sells weekly units, for instance, to sell the 
property to 52 different purchasers rather than the entire property to a single 
purchaser, which obviously improves his or her profit margin. This also enables 
purchasers, who would normally not be able to afford purchasing a holiday home or 
flat, to purchase a specific time-slot in which to use the property.304 There are many 
ways to sell time-share, including the points-based systems, normal time-share, 
share-block schemes, and a club system.305 Time-share contributes greatly to South 
Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP),306 so it is important to regulate the industry 
effectively, not only from a consumer protection point of view, but also as a matter 
of economics. 
 
300 Glover Kerr’s Sale & Lease 340. 
301 Delport (2014) Obiter 78. 
302 For instance Parts F, G and H of Ch 2 of the CPA. 
303 Regulated also by the Property Time-Sharing Control Act 75 of 1983. (Time-Sharing Act). The 
concept of time-share is defined in the Time-Sharing Act as ‘time-sharing interest’, but will be 
referred to in this thesis as time-share. 
304 Mupangavanhu & Van Huyssteen (2017) Stell LR 657-658. 
305 For a discussion see Mupangavanhu & Van Huyssteen (2017) Stell LR 658-661. 
306 http://www.thencc.gov.za/sites/default/files/news/NCC%20REPORT%20ON%20INQUIRY.pdf 
(date of use: 13 May 2020) and see the statement by Commissioner Mohamed at the release of 
the aforementioned report http://www.thencc.gov.za/sites/default/files/news/Statement%20by%20 
Commissioner.pdf (date of use: 13 May 2020); https:www. vfplus.org.za/media-
releases/investigation-into-irregularities-in-holiday-club-industry-finalised-report-to-be-made-
available-soon (date of use: 7 December 2018); https://maroelamedia.co.za/nuus/sa-nuus/verslag-
oor-vakansieklubs-bekend/ (date of use: 7 December 2018). 
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The most important question one can raise is whether the CPA – and section 14 in 
particular – applies to time-share?307 When the definitions of goods and services are 
analysed, time-share should be covered by the CPA, probably falling under the 
definition of services.308 If the contract is for a specific duration, like some of the 
holiday points-based systems, section 14 will be applicable and the consumer 
should be entitled to cancel the contract with 20 business days’ notice.309 In the 
report by the Commission,310 it recommended that all time-share contracts be 
regarded as fixed-term contracts.311 
There has been a paucity of litigation in this respect, and until there is a judgment 
on these or similar facts, or until legislation regarding time-share is amended, the 
position remains uncertain.312 
Because of numerous consumer complaints regarding time-share agreements,313 
the Commission conducted a study which revealed that most problems arose under 
the points-based systems. The most common complaints were that:314  
• points-based agreements could not be cancelled and extended in 
perpetuity, consumers consequently had to waive points, 
• the accommodation was not readily available,315 
• alternative accommodation offered was not acceptable, 
• there were misrepresentations during sales and negotiations, 
• the value of points sold to consumers was insufficient, 
• the membership fees and annual increases in fees were unpredictable, 
• points clubs’ annual meetings were inaccessible, and 
 
307 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 14-4 regard time-share contracts as problematic, as they are 
generally not subject to a specific term. See also Naudé & De Stadler (2019) PELJ 16-17. 
308 Time-share is covered by subs (f) under the definition of ‘service’ in s 1 of the CPA. Subsection 
(f) reads: ‘a right of occupancy of, or power or privilege over or in connection with, any land or 
other immovable property, other than in terms of rental.’ Mupangavanhu & Van Huyssteen (2017) 
Stell LR 666. 
309 Some time-share point agreements are for a specific period, eg, 15 years. 
310 http://www.thencc.gov.za/sites/default/files/news/NCC%20REPORT%20ON%20INQUIRY.pdf 
(date of use: 13 May 2020). 
311 http://www.thencc.gov.za/sites/default/files/news/NCC%20REPORT%20ON%20INQUIRY.pdf 
(date of use: 13 May 2020) 14. A further recommendation was that the Minister should promulgate 
Regulations in terms of section 14(4) of the CPA to regulate the purchase of points and 
membership application agreements, entered into between consumers and clubs, as fixed-term 
agreements, see page 125. 
312 However, see a dispute adjudicated by the Consumer Goods and Services Ombud (CGSO): 
Dispute Complaint No 201602-0006059 heard by Melville on 22 March 2016. 
313 De Stadler (2013) Consumer Law Review 3 points out that during 2013 the NCC asked the 
time-share industry to provide clarity on its business model. 
314 See https://maroelamedia.co.za/nuus/sa-nuus/verslag-oor-vakansieklubs-bekend/ (date of use: 
7 December 2018) and Report National Consumer Commissioner, http://www.thencc.gov.za/news-
0?qt-news=0 (date of use: 7 December 2018); 
http://www.thencc.gov.za/sites/default/files/news/NCC%20REPORT%20ON%20INQUIRY.pdf 
(date of use: 13 May 2020). 
315 Monty (2014) Without Prejudice 36. 
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• consumers were dissatisfied by the way their complaints were handled. 
The Commission’s316 proposals impacting directly on this thesis include:317 
• that sellers of time-share should make certain information available to 
consumers before conclusion of the contract,318 
• that all time-share agreements be defined and classified as fixed-term 
agreements, and 
• that the rights of consumers in terms of section 14 of the CPA 
automatically apply when consumers cancel these agreements.319 
Therefore, agreements for a fixed-period should already be covered under section 
14 of the CPA, and, once the proposals of the Commission have been accepted 
and enacted, section 14 cancellation provisions should apply to all types of time-
share agreements.320 It would definitely be to the advantage of the time-share 
industry and consumers to be regulated by section 14 of the CPA to prevent abuses 
and to protect consumers.321 
I now briefly mention a few other contracts that could be affected by section 14 of 
the CPA. 
4.2.3.10 Mandate 
A mandate agreement is an agreement where the seller/lessor of property 
authorises another person to sell or lease his or her property. The mandate 
agreement should contain a calendar date to state when the mandate will expire.322 
One of the parties must of course be an individual if section 14 of the CPA is to 
apply.323 In addition and by implication, in practice the duration of the mandate 
should be longer than 40 business days, as the supplier has to notify the consumer 
 
316 Hereafter the Commission. 
317 Report National Consumer Commissioner http://www.thencc.gov.za/news-0?qt-news=0 (date of 
use: 7 December 2018) 7; https:www.vfplus.org.za/media-releases/investigation-into-irregularities-
in-holiday-club-industry-finalised-report-to-be-made-available-soon (date of use: 7 December 
2018); https://maroelamedia.co.za/nuus/sa-nuus/verslag-oor-vakansieklubs-bekend/ (date of use: 
7 December 2018). 
318 See the discussion of this aspect in Ch 5 para 5.3.2.5 and Ch 6 para 6.4. 
319 Other proposals were also made,eg, the amendment of the Time-Share Act, industry specific 
legislation, and a new regulator for time-share. 
320 Except those for cash consideration. 
321 See Naudé & De Stadler (2019) PELJ 16-17. Also see the discussion of time-share in 
Singapore, Ch 5 para 5.3.2.5 and the UK Ch 6 para 6.4. 
322 Clause 3.3.2 of the estate agents code of conduct, which is not law and not enforceable in 
court. However, a transgression of this code could lead to disciplinary action in terms of the Estate 
Agency Affairs Act 112 of 1976.  
323 Section 14(1) of the CPA. 
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of the expiry date of the agreement 40 business days before expiry of the agreement 
in terms of section 14(2)(c) of the CPA.324 
The application of section 14 of the CPA to mandate agreements325 appears to be 
unintended according to Delport.326 However, one can also view this as an added 
protection for consumers as they will be protected by the rest of the provisions of 
the CPA, for instance, the provisions of section 54, section 61, and the fairness 
measures.327 
4.2.3.11 Sales of immovable property328 
The provisions of the CPA apply to sales of immovable property if the supplier sells 
properties in the ordinary course of his or her business.329 When the sale is an 
instalment sale, it will qualify as a credit agreement under the NCA.330 When a sale 
of immovable property is for a fixed-term, section 14 will apply – eg, when a supplier 
sells a house to a consumer and the consumer has to pay the purchase price in six 
payments, six weeks apart, and is then entitled to registration of the property against 
payment of the sixth and final payment.331 
4.2.3.12 Concluding remarks: The effect of section 14 of the CPA 
Although section 14 of the CPA is well-intentioned, one can conclude that many of 
the consequences of the section were not anticipated by the legislature, and clearly 
disadvantages the consumer.332 Some subsections, for instance section 
14(2)(b)(i)(bb), clearly benefit the consumer when the consumer cancels on his own 
accord, and not based on material failure to perform by the supplier. 
 
324 Delport (2014) Obiter 72-73. 
325 For the effect of the CPA on mandates see Naudé & Eiselen Commentary Contract 8. 
326 Delport (2014) Obiter 75-76. 
327 Section 54 deals with the consumer’s right to goods that are safe and of good quality. Section 
61 deals with liability for damage caused by goods, and strict liability applies regardless. See 
Naudé & Eiselen Commentary Contract 8 for a discussion. Note that a new Act will regulate 
property practitioners, namely, the Property Practitioners Act 22 of 2019, which was signed in 
September 2019. 
328 Consumers (purchasers) are protected in sales agreements for immovable property by the 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. In addition, the NCA covers credit agreements involving 
immovable property. 
329 There are exclusions: when the purchaser or lessee is the state, and when the purchaser or 
lessee is a juristic person above the threshold, and when the sale falls within the ambit of the NCA. 
See Delport (2014) Obiter 63-64. 
330 Section 5(2) of NCA. 
331 Bear in mind that Ch I of ALA applies to all alienations of immovable property and, depending 
on the duration of the agreement, Ch II of ALA could also apply to the contract. Also, bear in mind 
that, depending on the exact wording of the agreement and the conditions regarding payment of 
the purchase price, such an agreement could also qualify as a credit agreement under s 8 of the 
NCA. 
332 For instance, paras 4.2.3.8 and 4.2.3.9 above. 
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However, as established at the outset, section 2(10) of the CPA expressly retains 
the consumer’s common-law rights. How this affects the rights of both supplier and 
consumer in fixed-terms contracts is now considered. 
4.2.4 Retention of common-law rights: Section 2(10) 
Section 2(10) of the CPA provides that ‘[n]o provision of this Act must be interpreted 
so as to preclude a consumer from exercising any rights afforded in terms of the 
common law’. 
First, it is important to establish what the purpose of this provision is. When read in 
the context of the Constitution, the preamble to the CPA, and the purpose of the 
CPA as set out in section 3, it is clear the CPA aims to protect and empower the 
consumer who is in an unequal bargaining position and cannot insist on or negotiate 
the inclusion of all his or her common-law rights and remedies in the agreement, 
even when he or she is aware of those rights. The supplier, on the other hand, is 
generally financially strong, better informed, literate, financially literate, and has 
access to legal counsel to draft the section 14 agreement and protect him or her.333 
The legislation seeks to place the consumer in an equal bargaining position with the 
supplier and so section 2(10) is there to ensure he or she is treated fairly and has 
these common-law rights, even if not expressly included in the agreement. He or 
she will also enjoy his or her common-law rights even where they have been 
expressly renounced in the agreement.334 In principle, this intention is admirable. 
In interpreting section 2(10) Sharrock points out that the section also implies the 
consumer not only obtains and exercises common-law rights, but also has the 
associated common-law duties and obligations towards suppliers.335 The consumer 
can, therefore, not simply avoid his or her obligations to the supplier on the basis of 
the benefits, purposes, and aims of the CPA, but must also meet his or her common-
law duties and obligations under section 2(10). 
A further question is therefore whether section 2(10) implies that the supplier loses 
all its common-law rights and remedies?336 To answer this question it is first 
necessary to analyse the rules of legislative interpretation to establish if this could 
be the case. Of course, section 3 of the CPA that deals specifically with the 
interpretation of the CPA will also be considered. 
The general rules for the interpretation of legislation provide: 
 
333 The consumer might not be aware of these rights. 
334 See s 51 of the CPA which prohibits certain transactions, clauses, and terms and conditions. 
335 Sharrock Business Transactions 588. 
336 Tennant argues that he does, see Tennant LLD 187. Van Heerden & Barnard (2019) THRHR 
462 also opine that only the consumer retains his or her common-law rights. See also Naudé & 
Eiselen Commentary 2-10–2-12, 56-4–56-7. Bearing in mind ss 2 and 3 of the CPA on the 
interpretation and purpose of the Act. 
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• a presumption against the deprivation of existing rights;337 and 
• a presumption that legislation respects the common law,338 and does not 
amend it unless this appears clearly and unequivocally from the 
legislation339 – this is not clearly provided in section 2(10). 
The provision does not expressly provide that suppliers lose all their common-law 
rights and can therefore be deprived of these rights and remedies merely by mere 
implication. Of course, the fact that they too are required to fulfil their common-law 
obligations and duties, also benefits the consumer.340 
Even if it is contended that there is merit in arguing that the supplier loses these 
rights by implication, this could be countered by resort to section 9 of the 
Constitution. The reason for this being that one of his basic human rights is 
affected,341 and, there is a presumption that legislation respects the Bill of Rights, 
and that the rights extended therein have to be protected, promoted and fulfilled 
when legislation is interpreted.342 In addition, the CPA contains a provision to ensure 
justice and fair treatment,343 a benefit of doubt in favour of consumers,344 and special 
protection for those consumers mentioned in its section 3(1)(b).345 It follows that 
when suppliers have duties, they invariably also have rights. 
A further possible argument against the supplier losing its common-law rights by 
implication lies in the wording of section 2(10) itself which provides: ‘No provision of 
this Act must be interpreted so as to preclude a consumer from exercising any rights 
afforded in terms of the common law.’ In the case of a dispute falling under section 
14, it would, in general, be a clause in the agreement or the agreement itself in 
dispute and requiring interpretation – not a provision of the CPA.346 Such agreement 
or its provisions is not prescribed in the Act, the regulations, or in a schedule to the 
 
337 Botha Wetsuitleg 173. However, remember that legal interpretation and the presumptions used 
in legal interpretation are tempered by the Constitution, see Laubscher LLM 56. 
338 For guidance on the factors a court should take into account when developing the common law 
see Mighty Solutions para [39]; Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 2-11; and see the discussion of 
Mighty Solutions in Ch 3 para 3.1.1. 
339 Botha Wetsuitleg 172; Mighty Solutions para [39]. 
340 Gordon v Standard Merchant Bank 1983 (3) SA 68 (A) 87-88. Bear in mind the provisions of s 
4(3) of the CPA. 
341 Sections 9(1) and 9(2) and 36 of the Constitution. 
342 Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Limited v Gründlingh and Others 2006 (8) BCLA 883 (CC) 
paras [26]−[27] (hereafter Phumelela); Botha Wetsuitleg 173. 
343 Section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the CPA. 
344 Section 4(3) of the CPA. 
345 See Barnard & Botha (2018) SA Merc LJ 231-235, in this article the authors opine that trade 
unions are included in the definition in s 3(1)(b). 
346 In other words it would be a contractual dispute – not one based on the interpretation or wording 
of the statute itself. 
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Act, and therefore this section should not apply to disputes based on the agreement, 
as the common-law still regulates agreements.347 
The other side of the coin is that a statutory body or court must bear the aims and 
purposes of the Act in mind, constitutional principles,348 and specifically section 4(3) 
which deals with provisions that can be construed to have more than one meaning. 
In these circumstances, the protection of the consumer will have priority. However, 
even the consumer’s priority, or the fact that the CPA must be interpreted to benefit 
the consumer and not the supplier, cannot in my view, imply that the supplier loses 
all his or her common-law rights.349 It will be interesting to see what a court would 
decide in a case based on these facts. 
A factor not addressed by section 2(10) is whether only a court can adjucidate the 
dispute when deciding a case based on the common-law rights of parties, or if the 
bodies mentioned in section 69 also have jurisdiction?350 On the one hand, if only a 
court has jurisdiction, the consumer could be disadvantaged as he or she will lose 
the theoretical time and cost advantages the section 69 bodies hold.351 Court 
procedures are time consuming and costly. On the other hand, the mere fact that 
the section expressly states the consumer retains all his common-law rights can be 
seen to imply that he or she may in any event approach the court directly – 
notwithstanding the court in Joroy 4440 CC v Potgieter and Another NNO352 deciding 
the converse.353 However, one school of thought proposes that section 69 should 
be interpreted to mean that only disputes based on the CPA, and not other causes 
of action, like the common law, should be subject to the provisions of section 69.354 
Section 2(10) presents further potential problems in practice. How will a court decide 
which common-law rights to implement? Section 2(10) is widely phrased and how 
a statutory body – if statutory bodies indeed have jurisdiction to decide common-
law disputes and issues – or a court will decide which common-law right or remedy 
 
347 Some sections relate to, eg, the maximum duration, but the agreement and its specific 
provisions are not part of the CPA and are regulated by the common law. See Van Eeden & 
Barnard Consumer Protection 59-61. 
348 For example, the right to freedom of trade, occupation, and profession; property rights; and the 
principle of legality. See Mighty Solutions for a discussion of this aspect. 
349 If these arguments are not correct, the warning by Du Preez could become a reality, it could not 
be worthwhile for suppliers to enter into agreements with consumers in terms of the CPA as there 
would be no advantage for them. Du Preez (2009) TSAR 63, 66. 
350 Both these points of view are valid, and the section is not clear. Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 
2-11. 
351 In addition, these bodies are not always effective. Naudé & Barnard Enforcement 570; 
Koekemoer (2017) JCP 423-443. Also, see a similar study by Koekemoer (2014) JABR 659-669 on 
a similar study in the Motor Vehicle Service Industry; Scott LLD 51; Woker (2019) Stell LR 104-
107; Du Plessis (2018) SA Merc LJ 340-346; Naudé (2010) SALJ 525-528. Also, see the 
discussion in para 4.3.7 below. 
352 2016 (3) SA 465 (FB) (hereafter Joroy). 
353 Joroy paras [8]−[10]. 
354 Although the wording of s 69 is wide enough to cover both instances. See Naudé & Eiselen 
Commentary 2-11–2-12. 
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to implement, and how wide the body or the court’s discretion will be, remains to be 
seen. Does the statutory body or court merely read a provision into the agreement 
that would most benefit the consumer,355 and where there are two or more benefits 
available how will the body or court choose one? The body or court will probably be 
guided by the provision in the CPA which provides that the consumer should benefit, 
and select what is most beneficial for the consumer.356 
A few interesting practical implications in this scenario come to mind: 
• Can the court insert conditional clauses retrospectively into the 
agreement to protect the consumer? 
• Can the court insert suppositions into the agreement? 
• Can the court insert waivers of suppliers’ rights into the agreement? 
• Can the court insert penalty clauses that would benefit the consumer? 
• Can the court read a clause into the agreement granting the consumer 
the reciprocal right the supplier has under section 14(2)(b)(ii)? 
• Will a court decide that it cannot interfere and contract retroactively on 
behalf of a party?357 
• Will the court decide that this subsection is so wide and vague that it 
cannot be interpreted by courts with any measure of certainty and 
therefore is void or unenforceable? 
As none of these issues has served before the courts, no hard-and-fast answers 
are possible. No two judges, courts, presiding officers, or adjudicators will interpret 
and apply the common-law rights in this provision in the same way. Again, the 
inclusion of section 2(10) was clearly well intentioned, but it poses more questions 
than answers, is potentially problematic, its outcome is unpredictable, and it needs 
further clarification to establish legal certainty and be truly useful in practice. 
In addition, it will be difficult for a consumer to identify his or her common-law rights 
in practice and he or she may only access the courts to enforce these rights once 
all the other steps in terms of section 69(d) have been exhausted358 – unless he or 
she bases the claim on unfairness, in which case the courts may be approached 
directly.359 The applicable common-law rights and remedies should be clarified in 
the relevant section of the CPA, in addition to the rights and remedies available to 
 
355 Section 4(3) CPA. 
356 Section 4(3) CPA. 
357 Sharrock Business Transactions 192, contends that courts have the power to insert new 
clauses into an agreement when necessary. See too, Murray v Minister of Defence 2009 (3) SA 
130 (SCA) paras [63]−[68]. 
358 See Van Heerden & Barnard (2011) JICLT 131-136 discussing redress for consumers in terms 
of the CPA. 
359 Section 52 allows a complainant direct access to court by implication, but bear the limitations in 
s 52(1)(b) in mind. See the discussion in para 4.3.2.6. 
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the consumer under the CPA which place him or her in a better position than before 
the CPA was adopted.360 
Section 2(10) undoubtedly benefits the consumer who wishes summarily to cancel 
his or her section 14 fixed-term agreement on the basis of the supplier’s repudiation 
of the contract in that he or she may do so immediately.361 It still allows the consumer 
the option to enforce his or her common-law rights against a supplier in default, 
while section 14(2)(b)(i) of the CPA disadvantages, and even penalises, a consumer 
who seeks to cancel a fixed-term agreement as a result of the supplier’s material 
default. 
There are also secondary sections and principles which could affect the consumer’s 
position under fixed-term contracts, to which I now turn.362 
 
4.3 Consumer rights and other sections of the CPA, and relevant 
secondary principles that affect consumers under fixed-term 
agreements 
Under this heading, I highlight various relevant secondary aspects and provisions 
of the CPA that could possibly affect the position of parties in fixed-term contracts.363 
First, I deal with selected aspects of fairness. Part F of Chapter 2 of the CPA deals 
with the consumer’s right to fair and honest dealing, and Part G of Chapter 2 
regulates the consumer’s right to fair, just, and reasonable terms and conditions. I 
will outline these aspects as they could affect parties under fixed-term agreements. 
I then consider matters such as bona fides, ubuntu, and public policy that affect the 
way fairness is interpreted and applied. I also highlight the importance of the plain 
language provision in section 22 of the CPA, and comment on the powers of courts 
to establish fairness. Thereafter, I mention the formal requirements of the CPA and 
summarise the effect of section 2(9) which deals with inconsistencies between 
provisions of the CPA and other legislation. Finally, I consider enforcement and 
jurisdictional aspects of the CPA that affect fixed-term contracts. 
 
360 In addition, the consumer must be able to decide which remedies will work to his or her 
advantage – the statutory remedies or the common-law remedies or rights. 
361 See discussion in Ch 3 para 3.3.3. 
362 These aspects could be directly relevant to a fixed-term agreement under s 14 of the CPA. 
Under normal circumstances, however, they will be regarded as secondary factors for ease of 
organisation of this chapter. 
363 These sections, aspects, and principles could, in certain circumstances, be directly relevant and 
affect the consumer. However, under the standard fixed-term contract, such as a cell phone 
agreement, they would not normally be of primary interest. 
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4.3.1 Introduction to fairness 
In contract law, the fairness approach is based on collectivism,364 and arose from 
the realisation that freedom of contract had only limited application, 365 was idealistic, 
and did not take collectivist and socio-economic realities into account.366 The CPA 
applies the collectivist approach, for example, through the requirement of 
contractual fairness. In a system based on individualism, consumers must fend for 
themselves as contractual freedom and the maxims caveat emptor and pacta 
servanda sunt are applied rigorously, and it is irrelevant whether or not a contract is 
fair.367 Because of the shift to collectivism,368 Stoop argues the only way to effect 
fairness was to implement fairness as a contractual principle by way of legislation.369 
Fairness is an abstract concept which is difficult to define with certainty.370 The 
concept can be divided into many categories,371 but for the purpose of this thesis I 
focus on procedural fairness372 and on substantive or contractual fairness.373 
First, I consider Part F of Chapter 2 of the CPA – the right to fair and honest dealing 
– which deals, in the main, with the procedural aspects of fairness. I then consider 
Part G of Chapter 2 as regards contractual fairness. Various other concepts, terms, 
and sections of the CPA which could potentially affect fairness are also considered 
before the role of plain language in effecting fairness and transparency and the 
power of courts to establish fairness are examined. I return to the role of sections 
48 and 52(2) of the CPA as regards the parol evidence rule before drawing the 
discussion on fairness under the CPA to a close.374 
 
 
364 See Ch 2 para 2.4. 
365 Based on the individualist approach, see Ch 2 para 2.4. 
366 See the discussion in Ch 2 paras 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. 
367 Another example is that s 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) entitles the consumer to terminate the fixed-term 
contract at any time by giving the supplier 20 days’ notice. This negates the pacta servanda sunt 
maxim’s application to the benefit of the consumer and embodies the collectivist principle. For a 
more detailed discussion of pacta servanda sunt see Ch 2 para 2.4. 
368 Chapter 2 para 2.4. 
369 Stoop LLD 211; also see Beatson & Friedman Good Faith 15; Harland (1991) JILI 207, 216. 
370 There is no definition in the CPA of fairness. For an analysis of the fairness concept of the CPA 
see Stoop LLD 5-234. 
371 For a detailed discussion of fairness, see Stoop LLD thesis 5-166. Although fairness plays an 
important role in contracts, it is discussed only briefly as this aspect does not form the main focus 
of this thesis. 
372 Mainly dealt with in Part F Ch 2 of the CPA. 
373 The terms ‘contractual’ and ‘substantive’ fairness are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
Contractual fairness is dealt with mainly in Part G of Ch 2 of the CPA. 
374 Because of the limited scope and focus of this thesis, I do not deal with Part E of Ch 2 of the 
CPA which deals with the right to fair and responsible marketing, Part H of Ch 2 dealing with fair 
value, good quality, and safety, and Part I of Ch 2 which regulates suppliers’ accountability to 
consumers are also not addressed in detail. For an analysis of strict product liability in South Africa 
see Tennant LLD especially 89-188. 
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4.3.2 Right to fair and honest dealing375 
4.3.2.1 Introduction 
The right to fair and honest dealing is relevant to fixed-term contracts as all contracts 
under the CPA are considered for fairness, and should adhere to the provisions in 
sections 40 to 47 of the CPA. The obvious purpose of Part F of the CPA is to ensure 
fairness in CPA agreements – including fixed-term contracts – and promote the 
purpose and aims of the CPA,376 the spirit and values of the Constitution, and the 
right to fair and honest dealing. The latter links to section 3 of the CPA, specifically 
the aims in sections 3(1)(c) to promote fair business practices, and section 3(1)(d) 
to protect consumers from unfair, unreasonable, and unjust trade practices, and 
fraudulent and deceptive conduct. A consumer in a fixed-term agreement can 
therefore also enforce his or her rights based on the right to fair and honest dealing. 
4.3.2.2 Procedural fairness377 
4.3.2.2.1 Background to procedural fairness 
Procedural fairness implies fairness at the time of conclusion of the agreement. The 
circumstances relating to transparency, language requirements, and the format of 
the contract, must be fair and transparent to enable parties to protect their interests 
and to comply with the provisions of the CPA. Stoop contends that transparency 
has two components: transparency in respect of the contract terms;378 and 
transparency in the proceedings leading to the consumer entering into the 
agreement.379 When a consumer is not misled as to the quality of the goods, the 
price, and the nature of the agreement, there is transparency in respect of the 
proceedings leading to the conclusion of the agreement.380 
Factors addressed by the CPA under both the right to fair and honest dealing and 
to procedural fairness are: unconscionable conduct,381 misleading representations 
by suppliers,382 fraudulent schemes and offers,383 and pyramid and related 
schemes.384 Procedural fairness is of specific importance in South Africa as many 
 
375 Chapter 2, Part F of the CPA. The right to fair, just, and reasonable terms and conditions (known 
as contractual fairness) is discussed in the paragraph below. This heading deals with a different 
right. 
376 Sharrock (2010) SA Merc LJ 306. 
377 Sections 40-47 of the CPA are all relevant to this discussion—however, the emphasis in this 
discussion will be on s 40. For a discussion of procedural fairness see Stoop LLD 122-161. 
378 Transparency is discussed in para 4.3.2.5 below. 
379 Stoop LLD 213. 
380 Stoop LLD 213. 
381 Section 40 CPA. 
382 Section 41 CPA. 
383 Section 42 CPA. 
384 Section 43 of the CPA. See Stoop LLD 214-215 for a frame of reference to clarify and 
determine fairness. 
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consumers do not have high levels of literacy or financial literacy385 and are prone 
to be exploited by these factors. 
Procedural fairness affects fixed-term contracts when a consumer is misled about 
the quality of the product.386 For instance, the supplier tells the consumer who leases 
a tablet device that the tablet device has a 20-megapixel resolution camera, and the 
true resolution of the camera is a mere 3 megapixels. 
4.3.2.2.2 Section 40 of the CPA: Unconscionable conduct387 
‘Unconscionable’, as it relates to conduct, is defined in section 1 of the CPA as 
meaning conduct of the character described in section 40, or otherwise conduct that 
is unethical or improper to such an extent that it would shock the conscience of a 
reasonable person.388 
Glover investigated the origin of the unconscionability doctrine389 and traced it back 
to the courts of equity in England.390 He distinguishes the unconscionability in the 
CPA from that in England, Australia, and New Zealand in that the latter jurisdictions 
have both substantive and procedural requirements, while the CPA is limited to 
procedural requirements. He criticises section 40 for its apparent shotgun approach, 
instead of establishing a well-defined and specific doctrine, and warns of the danger 
in borrowing terminology or doctrine from foreign jurisdictions instead of having our 
courts examine and apply foreign law. In this instance, he argues, the legislature’s 
approach was not sufficiently nuanced.391 
Section 40 prohibits the use of physical force, coercion, undue influence, pressure, 
duress, harassment, unfair tactics, or similar unconscionable conduct by the 
 
385 Stoop LLD 214. 
386 Section 41 CPA. 
387 Section 40 regulates unconscionability and reads as follows: ‘Section 40. 
(1) A supplier or an agent of the supplier must not use physical force against a consumer, 
coercion, undue influence, pressure, duress or harassment, unfair tactics or any other 
similar conduct, in connection with any− 
(a) marketing of any goods or services; 
(b) supply of goods or services to a consumer; 
(c) negotiation, conclusion, execution or enforcement of an agreement to supply any 
goods or services to a consumer; 
(d) demand for, or collection of, payment for goods or services by a consumer; or 
(e) recovery of goods from a consumer. 
(2) In addition to any conduct contemplated in subsection (1), it is unconscionable for a 
supplier knowingly to take advantage of the fact that a consumer was substantially 
unable to protect the consumer’s own interests because of physical or mental disability, 
illiteracy, ignorance, inability to understand the language of an agreement, or any other 
similar factor. 
(3) Section 51 applies to any court proceedings concerning this section.’ 
388 Harland (1991) JILI 206-207; Glover (2013) TSAR 693-694; Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 40-
2−40-3; Du Plessis (2012) THRHR 26-42. 
389 Glover (2013) TSAR 690-693. 
390 As opposed to the common-law courts. Glover (2013) TSAR 690-691. 
391 Glover (2013) TSAR 696-697. 
 South Africa: The position of consumers under fixed-term agreements regulated 
by the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
139 
 
supplier when marketing, supplying, negotiating, concluding, executing, or enforcing 
the agreement. This also applies when the supplier demands or collects payment, 
or recovers goods from the consumer.392 
The purpose of section 40 is to promote and improve procedural fairness in respect 
of consumer agreements, and to prevent suppliers from taking advantage of the 
vulnerability of consumers.393 The unconscionability prohibition in the CPA reflects 
the common-law position on misrepresentation,394 duress,395 undue influence,396 
contracts induced by fraud,397 and the unconscionable use of influence.398 The scope 
of statutory unconscionability as defined and expanded by section 40, however, has 
a wider reach than the common-law position as it also covers the marketing, supply, 
collection of money in terms of the agreement, and the recovery of goods by the 
supplier from the consumer. It not only covers the actual negotiation and consensus, 
or lack thereof, but also the period preceding the agreement, and lasts until after 
cancellation when the supplier recovers the goods from the consumer.399 
In the paragraph below I discuss substantive fairness. 
4.3.2.3 The right to fair, just, and reasonable terms and conditions400 
4.3.2.3.1 Introduction 
Contractual fairness401 implies fairness as regards the general content of the 
agreement. This can be assessed by considering whether the interests of the parties 
are evenly balanced, what the parties reasonably expect from the agreement,402 and 
in general ensuring that the content of the agreement is fair and reasonable.403 
 
392 Section 40 (1); see Glover (2013) TSAR 692-693. 
393 Stoop LLD 156; Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 40-3; Du Plessis (2012) THRHR 26-42. Also see 
Ch 5 para 5.3.2.2 and Ch 6 6.3.4.3.1. 
394 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 51-53. See the discussion of this in Ch 3 para 3.2.14. 
395 Sharrock Business Transactions 143-145; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 111-118. 
396 Mauerberger v Mauerberger 1948 (4) SA 902 (C); Preller & Others v Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 
(A); Patel v Grobbelaar 1974 (1) SA 532 (A). For a discussion of the historical development of 
undue influence and duress see Van Huyssteen et al Contract 118-124. 
397 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 42-48. 
398 Sharrock Business Transactions 145-146. This reaffirms the underlying common-law principles 
of good faith and boni mores which are discussed below in para 4.3.2.4. 
399 Stoop LLD 156-157. 
400 Contractual fairness is dealt with in Part G of Ch 2 of the CPA. This term implies a welfarist 
approach to the interpretation of contracts as it implies an approach that aims to improve social 
justice and the financial well-being of the individual. See Hawthorne (2012) THRHR 361 for a 
detailed analysis of contractual (substantive) fairness. Also, see Stoop LLD 35-41, 92-122, 213. 
401 Substantive means ‘important, serious, or related to real facts’ see 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/substantive (date of use: 20 February 2019). 
402 Stoop LLD 213. 
403 Although ss 48-52 of the CPA are relevant, the emphasis in this discussion is on ss 48 and 51. 
For an evaluation of unfair contract terms provisions in the CPA see Sharrock (2010) SA Merc LJ 
295-325. Stoop LLD 220 recommends that the grey list be included in the text of the CPA itself, 
rather than the Regulations. 
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Contractual fairness is further divided into generalised and individualised fairness.404 
Generalised fairness implies that factors other than the contents of the agreement 
are considered, for instance, whether the price and terms of the agreement are 
market-related. This implies an objective assessment of the agreement. When 
fairness is measured in respect of the specific consumer as an individual, taking into 
account his or her welfare, individualised fairness405 is at stake, which implies a more 
subjective assessment.406 
4.3.2.3.2 Section 48 of the CPA: Unfair, unreasonable, or unjust contract 
terms407 
Section 48(1)(a)(ii) of the CPA prohibits a supplier from entering into an agreement 
on terms that are unfair, unreasonable, or unjust.408 Unfair, unreasonable, and unjust 
 
404 Stoop LLD 213. 
405 Stoop LLD 213; s 3(1)(b) is an example of individualised fairness. 
406 Matters that will be considered in such an assessment are, eg, the vulnerability of the specific 
consumer in terms of s 3(1)(b). Barnard & Botha (2018) SA Merc LJ 231-235 opine that s 3(1)(b) 
also applies to trade unions. See the discussion in para 4.2.3.3 above. 
407 Section 48(1) ‘A supplier must not – 
(a) offer to supply, supply, or enter into an agreement to supply, any goods or services− 
(i) at a price that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust; or 
(ii) on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust; 
(b) market any goods or services, or negotiate, enter into or administer a transaction or an 
agreement for the supply of any goods or services, in a manner that is unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust; or 
(c) require a consumer, or other person to whom any goods or services are supplied at the 
direction of the consumer – 
(i) to waive any rights; 
(ii) assume any obligation; or 
(iii) waive any liability of the supplier, on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust, or 
impose any such terms as a condition of entering into a transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), a transaction or agreement, a term or 
condition of a transaction or agreement, or a notice to which a term or condition is 
purportedly subject, is unfair, unreasonable or unjust if – 
(a) it is excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the consumer or other 
person to whom goods or services are to be supplied; 
(b) the terms of the transaction or agreement are so adverse to the consumer as to be 
inequitable; 
(c) the consumer relied upon a false, misleading or deceptive representation, as 
contemplated in section 41 or a statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of the 
supplier, to the detriment of the consumer; or 
(d) the transaction or agreement was subject to a term or condition, or a notice to a 
consumer contemplated in section 49 (1), and – 
(i) the term, condition or notice is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable; or 
(ii) the fact, nature and effect of that term, condition or notice was not drawn to the 
attention of the consumer in a manner that satisfied the applicable requirements of 
section 49.’ 
408 See Chadwick https://www.derebus.org.za/contracting-liability-gross-negligence/ (date of use: 5 
February 2020) for a discussion of whether it is possible to contract out of liability for gross 
negligence with reference to both the CPA and common law. 
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terms are not defined in section 1 of the CPA.409 Section 48(1)(c) further provides 
that a supplier must not require a consumer to accept terms that: waive any rights; 
assume obligations; or waive liability by the supplier, and which are unfair, 
unreasonable, or unjust, or render an agreement conditional upon these terms. 
Section 48(2) then continues to describe what would be regarded as unfair, 
unreasonable, or unjust.410 First, terms that are excessively one-sided in favour of a 
person other than the consumer.411 Second, when a term is so adverse that it is 
unfair to the consumer.412 In addition, if the consumer relies to his or her detriment 
on misleading deceptive representations as contemplated in section 41,413 or an 
opinion of the supplier (or someone acting on his or her behalf).414 Last, if the 
transaction was conditional upon a term to the effect described above, or the fact, 
or the nature of the condition or the notice was not drawn to the attention of the 
consumer in terms of section 49.415 Therefore, section 48 brings fairness into play 
at all stages of consumer negotiations and agreement, from the marketing stages 
of the transaction, through the negotiations, and even during the post-contractual 
stages of the agreement.416 
The guidelines in section 48(2) are unfortunately not clear and precise enough to 
provide real guidance on their interpretation.417 Hawthorne points out that section 48 
is similar to the German Generalklausel and the French la clause general, the 
meaning of which must be interpreted by courts and the legislature.418 She adds that 
this is another way constitutional principles can be implemented and infused into 
the private-law of contract.419 Although the approach that section 48 is a general 
clause that must be interpreted by courts and the legislature is commendable and 
cannot be faulted in theory, it is unfortunately not of great practical value as it would 
normally not be plausible for an average consumer in an ordinary section 14 
contract – eg, a dispute based on a cellphone agreement – to approach court.420 
 
409 See Sharrock (2010) SA Merc LJ 307 for a critique on the use of the terms unfair, unreasonable 
and unjust. However s 48(2) provides some guidance on when a term or condition of a transaction 
or agreement is unfair, unreasonable or unjust – unfortunately the guidance is not clear. 
410 Sharrock (2010) SA Merc LJ 308-309; Naudé (2010) SALJ 515-519; Stoop LLD 92, 109-126; 
Stoop (2015) SA Merc LJ 212-215. 
411 Section 48(2)(a). 
412 Section 48(2)(b). 
413 Section 41 forms part of the umbrella right to fair and honest dealing. It regulates false, 
misleading, or deceptive representations. For a discussion of the common law related to 
misrepresentations, and sales talk, see Ch 3 para 3.2.14. For a detailed analysis of s 41 see 
Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 41-1–41-19. 
414 Section 48(2)(c). Opinion is not qualified, and therefore one cannot assume that the opinion 
must be incorrect. Every opinion is therefore covered by this section, and it could hold detrimental 
consequences for professional people, eg, chartered accountants and attorneys. 
415 Section 48(2)(d). 
416 Hawthorne (2012) THRHR 355. This of course implies that bona fides must be present at all 
stages of the agreement. 
417 Sharrock (2010) SA Merc LJ 308; Layton-McCann LLM 20. 
418 Hawthorne (2012) THRHR 345, 361. 
419 This could be beneficial in South Africa as well. 
420 See para 4.3.2.6. 
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The timeframe to get to court, and the legal costs involved, are beyond the reach of 
the ordinary consumer and out of proportion to the duration and value of the 
agreement, and the amount in dispute. Therefore, Hawthorne’s proposal would be 
of little practical use to the ordinary consumer, despite it being sound in principle.421 
The Supreme Court of Appeal expressed itself clearly on contractual fairness in 
Napier v Barkhuizen422 and Brisley v Drotsky423 where it said that the value system 
created by the Constitution should be honoured by the courts. Although freedom of 
contract should be limited within acceptable and reasonable limits, parties should 
be allowed to conduct their own business, and there should not be unnecessary 
interference with these rights where parties have their own individual 
arrangements.424 Hawthorne criticises the legislature in this regard for including 
measures to achieve substantive fairness in the CPA, she is of opinion that this 
points to a lack of respect for this principle as illustrated by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Brisley and Napier.425 
Section 48 could also be interpreted as implying good faith,426 which is not an 
officially acknowledged legal principle although there has been an international 
trend to include and imply good faith, especially in consumer-related transactions.427 
Substantive fairness can be established by considering, inter alia, the balance of 
interests between contracting parties compared to the value reflected in the 
agreement, default rules that apply, or the prevention of certain contract terms 
aimed at unfairly prejudicing the consumer.428 
Contractual fairness can affect a consumer in a fixed-term agreement when, for 
instance, he or she must pay R15 000 for a cell phone that costs R5 000 at all other 
suppliers. 
4.3.2.3.3 Section 51 of the CPA: The ‘black-list’ 
Section 51(1) provides a list of terms and conditions prohibited by the CPA, often 
described as a so-called ‘black-list’.429 Instead of identifying specific prohibited 
 
421 In addition, s 52(1)(b) limits the powers of the court to decide on fairness disputes. 
422 2006 (9) BCLR 1011 (SCA) para [13] and the Constitutional Court judgment 2007 (5) SA 323 
(CC) (hereafter Napier). Also see the discussion of the Napier (CC) in Mohamed’s Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 314 (SCA) paras [14]−[16]. 
423 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para [95] (hereafter Brisley). 
424 This, of course, differs from agreements that fall within the scope of pure collectivism, like s 14 
CPA agreements. 
425 Hawthorne (2012) THRHR 360. 
426 See a brief discussion of good faith in para 4.3.2.4.1. 
427 For a recent Consitutional Court decision that considered good faith, its status and role in 
contract law locally and internationally, see Beadica 231 CC and Others v Trustees for the time 
being of the Oregon Trust and Others (CCT109/19) [2020] ZACC 13 (17 June 2020) [61-70] 
(hereafter Beadica). Also see the discussion in Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3.1.2. 
428 See Stoop LLD 212-215 for a discussion. 
429 For an analysis of the impact of the CPA on exemption clauses, see Richards LLM 60-95, 121-
129. 
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terms, it rather lists characteristics of prohibited terms. The supplier is prohibited 
from entering into an agreement, either a main agreement or any supplementary 
agreement, which in effect excludes the provisions of the CPA.430 The purpose of 
section 51 is to prevent unfair, unjust, and unreasonable behaviour and contract 
terms by suppliers. 
 
430 Section 51(1): ‘A supplier must not make a transaction or agreement subject to any term or 
condition if – 
(a) its general purpose or effect is to – 
(i) defeat the purposes and policy of this Act; 
(ii) mislead or deceive the consumer; or 
(iii) subject the consumer to fraudulent conduct; 
(b) it directly or indirectly purports to – 
(i) waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of this Act; 
(ii) avoid a supplier’s obligation or duty in terms of this Act; 
(iii) set aside or override the effect of any provision of this Act; or 
(iv) authorise the supplier to – 
(aa) do anything that is unlawful in terms of this Act; or 
(bb) fail to do anything that is required in terms of this Act; 
(c) it purports to – 
(i) limit or exempt a supplier of goods or services from liability for any loss directly or 
indirectly attributable to the gross negligence of the supplier or any person acting for 
or controlled by the supplier; 
(ii) constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer for a loss contemplated 
in subparagraph (i); or 
(iii) impose an obligation on a consumer to pay for damage to, or otherwise assume the 
risk of handling, any goods displayed by the supplier, except to the extent 
contemplated in section 18(1); 
(d) it results from an offer prohibited in terms of section 31; 
(e) it requires the consumer to enter into a supplementary agreement, or sign a document, 
prohibited by subsection (2)(a); 
(f) it purports to cede to any person, charge, set off against a debt, or alienate in any 
manner, a right of the consumer to any claim against the Guardian’s Fund; 
(g) it falsely expresses an acknowledgement by the consumer that – 
(i) before the agreement was made, no representations or warranties were made in 
connection with the agreement by the supplier or a person on behalf of the supplier; 
or 
(ii) the consumer has received goods or services, or a document that is required by this 
Act to be delivered to the consumer; 
(h) it requires the consumer to forfeit any money to the supplier – 
(i) if the consumer exercises any right in terms of this Act; or 
(ii) to which the supplier is not entitled in terms of this Act or any other law; 
(i) it expresses, on behalf of the consumer – 
(i) an authorisation for any person acting on behalf of the supplier to enter any 
premises for the purposes of taking possession of goods to which the agreement 
relates; 
(ii) an undertaking to sign in advance any documentation relating to enforcement of the 
agreement, irrespective of whether such documentation is complete or incomplete at 
the time it is signed; or 
(iii) a consent to a predetermined value of costs relating to enforcement of the 
agreement, except to the extent that is consistent with this Act; or 
(j) it expresses an agreement by the consumer to – 
(i) deposit with the supplier, or with any other person at the direction of the supplier, an 
identity document, credit or debit card, bank account or automatic teller machine 
access card, or any similar identifying document or device; or 
(ii) provide a personal identification code or number to be used to access an account.’ 
 South Africa: The position of consumers under fixed-term agreements regulated 
by the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
144 
 
The important provisions in section 51 for the purpose of fixed-term agreements are 
the following: 
• A contractual provision that excludes or attempts to exclude or limit the 
supplier’s liability for loss of goods or services because of the gross 
negligence of the supplier.431 This provision strips the supplier of his 
common-law right to exclude such liability.432 Sharrock contends this 
provision only prohibits the exclusion of gross negligence, and not of 
negligence in the ordinary sense of the term.433 
• The CPA also prohibits an obligation on a consumer to pay for the 
damage or assume the risk for the handling of goods displayed by the 
supplier, except as provided for in section 18(1).434 Although this also 
infringes on the supplier’s right to freedom of contract, the insertion of 
such a provision in an agreement would in any event be unreasonable 
and unfair. 
• Another prohibition often encountered in common-law commercial 
contracts is the acknowledgement by the purchaser (in this case now 
the consumer) that no representations or warranties were made, or that 
he or she received goods or a document required by legislation. The 
CPA expressly prohibits false acknowledgements in section 
51(1)(g).The supplier will, therefore, not be able to raise this protection 
which would have been unreasonable in any event in that it only affects 
false acknowledgements. 
• A consumer may not forfeit money if he or she exercises any of his or 
her rights under the CPA.435 This prohibition prevents the supplier from 
inserting penalty-type clauses and, of course, infringes the supplier’s 
common-law right to freedom of contract and the principle of pacta 
servanda sunt. 
A term which contravenes section 51 of the CPA is void to the extent that it 
contravenes the section – ie, only the ‘offending’ clause or term is excluded from 
the agreement, and the validity of the entire or the remainder of the agreement is 
not affected. 
 
431 Section 51(1)(c). See Mupangavanhu (2014) PELJ 1167-1189 on exemption clauses and Tait & 
Newman (2014) Obiter 629-643. 
432 Tennant & Mbele http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/17.pdf (date of use: 29 May 
2020). 
433 Sharrock Business Transactions 604. 
434 Section 51(1)(c). Section 18(1) provides that a consumer is only liable for damage caused by 
his or her gross negligence, reckless behaviour, or malicious or criminal conduct. 
435 Section 51(1)(h). This provision reminds one of roukoop or penalty-type common-law clauses. 
See Ch 3 para 3.2.11. 
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In addition to the list of terms and conditions absolutely prohibited by the CPA, the 
legislature has added terms and conditions that are deemed to be unfair. These 
provide further guidance as to which terms to avoid in consumer contracts. 
4.3.2.3.4 Regulation 44(3) of the CPA: The ‘grey list’ 
Another attempt at relief in these situations is found in regulation 44(3), the so-called 
‘grey list’ of terms deemed to be unfair.436 This list serves as a guide to establish 
which terms could potentially be unfair. Like the ‘black list’ above, it too lists the 
characteristics of terms deemed to be unfair – eg, a term allowing the supplier an 
unreasonably long period in which to perform.437 The list improves predictability 
regarding unfairness as it guides suppliers as to which terms to avoid in consumer 
agreements. 
4.3.2.4 Various other concepts, sections, and principles that potentially 
affect fairness438 
4.3.2.4.1 Good faith439 
A discussion of unfairness and unconscionability would not be complete without a 
brief reference to good faith, as good faith in contract forms the basis of fairness, 
justness, reasonableness, and conscionability discussed above.440 This principle 
developed from Roman law and ensures fairness in civil law.441 A precise definition 
of this concept remained elusive until the decision in Eerste Nasionale Bank van 
Suidelike-Afrika Beperk v Saayman NO.442 In Saayman Olivier JA, in his minority 
judgment, explained that the function of the bona fide rule was simply to give effect 
 
436 For an analysis of the impact of the CPA on exemption clauses, see Richards LLM 60-95, 121-
129. 
437 Reg 44(3)(p). 
438 See the Beadica judgment for a thorough, well considered and recent Constitutional Court 
judgment on the importance and role that factors such as constitutional rights, good faith, ubuntu, 
public policy and the pacta servanda sunt principle play in the application and interpretation of 
contract law. 
439 See the discussion of good faith in Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3.1.2. 
440 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 40-3; Beadica [61-70]. A full analysis, or even a discussion of 
good faith falls outside the scope of this thesis. For a discussion of good faith in the law of contract, 
see Du Plessis (2018) Stell LR 379-419; Van der Sijde LLM 1-39; Louw (2013) PELJ 45-110; 
Hoeben A et al ‘Ubuntu and the law’ available at https://www.ensafrica.com/news/Ubuntu-and-the-
law-promoting-good-faith-and-fairness (date of use: 4 October 2018); Brand (2009) SALJ 71-90; 
Nortje (2015) TSAR 571-577. 
441 For a discussion of bona fides see Van Huyssteen et al Contract 310-318; Hutchison (2011) 
SALJ 273-296; Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 737-734; Van Rensburg & Van der Merwe Law of 
Contract 9. 
442 1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA) (Saayman) Hutchison Good Faith 213; Lubbe (1990) Stell LR 1, 7; Van 
der Merwe & Lubbe (1991) Stell LR 91; Van Huyssteen & Van der Merwe (1990) Stell LR 244; 
Carey Miller (1980) SALJ 531; Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelik Afrika Beperk v Saayman NO 
1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA) (hereafter Saayman). 
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to the public’s opinion regarding respectability, reasonability, and fairness in 
contract law, in other words, the boni mores.443 
In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom444 Brand AJ ruled that although abstract maxims 
like bona fides underlie our law of contract, they are not independent rules of law, 
and therefore the court does not have a discretion to apply these abstract maxims.445 
More recently in Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Rattan NO,446 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that good faith was a basic underlying principle 
of our law which fulfils an explanatory or descriptive role in our law; a court cannot 
apply good faith as an independent rule on which to base its judgment.447 
The role of good faith in the fairness requirements under the CPA and fixed-term 
contracts, is that the supplier and consumer must to act in good faith towards each 
other in the contract. In addition, this assists in complying with the requirements of 
fairness.448 
4.3.2.4.2 Ubuntu 
Ubuntu is described by Du Plessis in her thesis449 as follows: 
‘… ubuntu does not entail a duty only on a contracting party to respect the human 
dignity of the other contracting party which duty has been linked to the principle of 
good faith, but also includes a duty on a contracting party to promote the realisation 
of the other contracting party’s human dignity through the concept of substantive 
equality as informed by the post-apartheid constitutional context.’450 
Ubuntu, therefore, plays an important role when a court applies the subjective test 
for fairness in agreements, as the court must simultaneously evaluate substantive 
 
443 Saayman 319 where the court also referred to the comparative analysis in the earlier decision of 
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Another 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 612F-H where 
the court referred to Dutch law. 
444 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) (hereafter Afrox). 
445 Afrox para [32]; Van Rensburg & Van der Merwe Law of Contract 9; Du Bois et al Wille’s 
Principles 737-738. 
446 2019 (3) SA 451 (SCA) (hereafter Four Wheel Drive). 
447 The court referred to the judgment by Brand JA in the South African Forestry Co Ltd v York 
Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) para [27], and to Potgieter & Another v Potgieter NO & Others 
2012(1) SA 637 (SCA) para [32] to support this view, Four Wheel Drive paras [27]-[28]. Also see 
Stoop LLD 63-64. 
448 See Stoop LLD 210. Du Plessis, in her LLD 391, argues that the development of the 
constitutional value of human dignity, whilst simultaneoulsy valuing freedom and the rule of law, 
could ultimately result in good faith becoming an independent substantive rule. This could, in turn, 
be used when evaluating fairness in contracts – and could lead to unfair terms, or the unfair 
enforcement of such terms, being set aside. Also see the discussion of good faith in Ch 6 para 
6.3.4.3.1.2. 
449 Du Plessis LLD 383. 
450 See Du Plessis LLD 383-384. Also see Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 para [71]; Muphangavanhu (2015) De Jure 124-125, 135; Bhana PhD 
105-106, 114, to name but a few. See Bhana PhD for a detailed study of constitutionalising 
contract law. 
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equality in contract law.451 Du Plessis observes that ubuntu is fundamental to the 
subjective test for fairness,452 and, that it is essential to consider ubuntu for the 
purposes of the CPA. She argues that ubuntu was used by implication by the 
Constitutional Court in Botha and Another v Rich NO and Others453 even if the court 
based its decision on good faith.454 This accentuates the link between ubuntu, public 
interest, and good faith necessary to establish substantive fairness in contracts.455 
One might argue that ubuntu, which is generally accepted and applied by courts, 
could perhaps in time incorporate the common-law good-faith principle,456 which is 
viewed as controversial by some, and not always implemented by courts to effect 
fairness. Perhaps the solution to the good-faith controversy is to view ubuntu as a 
collectivist good-faith principle with constitutional ideals that has replaced the 
classic good-faith principle of our traditional common law, in the move from the 
classic contract theory to a collectivist approach. 
4.3.2.4.3 Public policy and boni mores 
The concepts of public policy and boni mores play a role in establishing fairness, 
unconscionability, constitutional values, and the purpose, policy and aims of the 
CPA.457 
Public policy can be described as the guidelines, rules, or principles a specific 
government uses to establish, apply, and interpret their policies, legislation, or 
adjudication.458 It can also be argued that the Constitution is the embodiment of 
public policy.459 
The purpose of boni mores, on the other hand, is to establish the moral views of the 
community or country on a specific matter,460 and normally, depending on the pro 
rata size of the community or part of the population in question, reflects to a certain 
extent public opinion,461 public interest, and ultimately public policy.462 Boni mores 
 
451 Du Plessis LLD 295, 382-385. 
452 Du Plessis LLD 294, 383, also see Cornell & Muvangua uBuntu and the Law 24. 
453 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC) (hereafter Rich) para [46]. 
454 Du Plessis LLD 298-299, 383-384. 
455 Rich para [46]. 
456 Du Plessis LLD 383. 
457 Because this thesis does not focus on fairness these terms are dealt with very briefly. 
458 See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public%20policy (date of use: 21 February 
2019); https://www.definitions.net/definition/public+policy (date of use: 15 October 2019). 
459 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007(5) SA 323 (CC) para [28] (hereafter Barkhuizen); Stoop LLD 66. 
460 For instance on abortion, religion, corruption, and other matters of moral concern. 
461 Barkhuizen para [73]. 
462 Joubert General Principles 132 indicates that good morals do not necessarily refer to morality in 
the sexual sense. An example would be that unlawful conduct, for example duress when entering 
into an agreement, is viewed as morally wrong by the public, and therefore is viewed as contra 
bonos mores. This same action will also be against public interest as it is not desirable that these 
contracts be allowed as it will be detrimental to members of the public. At the same time, public 
policy could also reflect that this conduct is unacceptable – eg, the fairness and unconscionability 
prohibitions in the CPA that reflect the legislature’s take on the situation. 
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reflects the interests of a sector of, or the public as a whole (public interest) and 
ultimately when government reacts by way of codes or legislation to implement or 
regulate this view of the public as a whole, it becomes public policy, for instance on 
matters like good corporate governance.463 The concepts of public policy and boni 
mores have contributed to the purposes and aims of the CPA which benefit 
consumers in fixed-term agreements. I will now analyse the plain language 
provisions of the CPA. 
4.3.2.5 Plain language464 
Section 22 of the CPA, which falls under Part D of the CPA, is part of the consumer’s 
right to disclosure and information, and provides that the agreement must be in plain 
and understandable language.465 This means that an ordinary consumer within the 
target audience of a product or service, with average literacy skills,466 who does not 
have extensive experience in consumer agreements, should be able to understand 
the contents and consequences of an agreement or a notice without undue effort.467 
The purpose of section 22 is clearly that the consumer must be able to understand 
the contents and effects of the contract, in other words it contributes towards 
transparency.468 This requirement promotes substantive and procedural fairness, 
and that the parties enter into the contract in good faith.469 The burden of ensuring 
that the consumer understands the language and the financial implications of the 
transaction has now shifted from the consumer – previously known in the common 
law as the caveat emptor or caveat subscriptor maxims – to the supplier who must 
explain these aspects to the consumer.470 
 
463 For instance the King Codes on good corporate governance in company law available at 
https://www.saica.co.za/Technical/LegalandGovernance/King/tabid/2938/language/en-
ZA/Default.aspx (date of use: 6 February 2020). 
464 For a discussion of plain language in legislation and in the CPA, see Gouws (2010) SA Merc LJ 
79-94. This is especially important from a practitioner’s point of view to assist in the drafting of 
contracts, see De Stadler & Van Zyl (2017) SA Merc LJ 95-127. For a detailed discussion of plain 
language see Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 22-1–22-17 and Stoop & Churr (2013) PELJ 514-553. 
465 See Stoop & Chürr (2013) PELJ 518-547. 
466 See Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 22-5–22-6. 
467 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 22-4–22-5. 
468 Stoop LLD 129. The test to establish if a document adheres to the requirements in s 22 is 
subjective, see s 22(2) of the CPA. 
469 The duty to disclose information could be associated with the good faith principle, see Nortje 
(2015) TSAR 571-577. See Stoop LLD 206 for an analysis of the position in England and see para 
4.3.2.4.1 above for a brief discussion of good faith in consumer contracts. 
470 Section 50(2)(b)(ii) of the CPA which provides that financial obligations have to be set out 
clearly, and an itemised breakdown of the financial obligations must be provided to the consumer. 
See Tennant & Mbele http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/17.pdf (date of use: 29 May 
2020); Nortje (2015) TSAR 567-582; Otto (2014) THRHR 159-163 on the obligation on credit 
providers in terms of ss 64(1) and 64(2) of the NCA, which is similar to the principles in s 22 of the 
CPA. 
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It is uncertain what the effect on a consumer agreement will be when the 
requirements in section 22 are not followed.471 Section 22 is important, and will 
benefit consumers in fixed-term contracts as the supplier will have to explain all 
material terms of the agreement to the consumer, including the financial 
implications. Section 22 aids transparency, for instance, the monthly invoice 
amounts for fixed-term contracts like cell phone invoices, and how these are 
calculated, will have to be explained to the consumer. 
The plain language requirement assists a consumer under a fixed-term agreement 
as it is information-based consumer protection which enables a consumer to 
establish his or her rights and obligations under a specific contract. 
It is ironic that the CPA, which purports to promote intelligibility in consumer 
agreements and notices, is generally regarded as difficult to read and understand.472 
4.3.2.6 The power of the court to establish fairness: Section 52 
In all disputes in agreements under the CPA, the court is the consumer’s option of 
last resort as he or she must first exhaust all the fora in the sequence provided in 
section 69.473 However, the heading of section 52 in the CPA reads: ‘Powers of court 
to ensure fair and just conduct, terms, and conditions.’474 
Section 52 empowers courts to hear matters based on unfairness or injustice, or 
which can be regarded as unconscionable.475 The powers to adjudicate on these 
matters are only provided to courts, and not to any other body established in terms 
 
471 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 22-13–22-14. The following are possible arguments: 
• When the consumer does not understand the terms and conditions of the agreement there 
is no consensus, and therefore no valid and binding contract. See Ch 3 para 3.2.4. 
• An agreement the consumer does not understand may be regarded as unfair in terms of s 
48. 
• An agreement that does not comply with s 22 contravenes s 50(2)(b)(i) which reinforces 
the requirement in s 22. In terms of s 50(3) such an agreement, or the relevant term, could 
be void. See Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 22-13–22-14. 
• Section 51(3) provides that an agreement that contravenes s 51 is not valid to the extent 
that it does not comply with s 51. 
• Finally, the plain language requirement is listed as one of the factors in s 52 by which to 
establish fairness. As a result, the agreement will not necessarily be void because of non-
compliance with s 22. See Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 22-13–22-14. 
472 Du Preez (2009) TSAR 82; Delport (2014) Obiter 61; Van Heerden & Barnard (2019) THRHR 
465. 
473 Joroy 4440 CC t/a Ubuntu Procurement v Potgieter NO and Another 2016 (3) SA 465 (FB) 
(hereafter Joroy). See Scott LLD 49-50. 
474 Under the definitions in s 1 of the CPA the term ‘court’ does not include a consumer court. A 
‘consumer court’ is defined in s 1 as ‘a body of that name, or a consumer Tribunal, that has been 
established in terms of applicable provincial legislation’. 
475 When the consumer alleges a supplier has contravened ss 40 or 48 of the CPA. Section 
52(1)(a) CPA. See Scott LLD 98-100 and Van Heerden & Barnard (2011) JICL 136-138. 
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of the CPA.476 As the National Consumer Commission477 and the National Consumer 
Tribunal478 are statutory bodies, they have only those powers conferred on them by 
specific legislation. This creates the unique situation in which a consumer can 
approach a court directly if his or her complaint or action is based on the alleged 
lack of fair and just conduct, terms, or conditions of the agreement.479 
This creates the ideal opportunity to bypass the time-consuming procedures in 
section 69 of the CPA, as the consumer can base his or her claim on unfairness, 
injustice, or unconscionability. This will save the consumer time, although it may 
prove a more costly alternative. In addition, a consumer should not find it difficult to 
base his or her claim on unfairness, injustice, or unconscionability as provided in 
section 52. 
Section 52(1) provides that the court can consider fairness when a person (the 
consumer) alleges that: 
• the supplier contravened sections 40, 41 and 48;480 and 
• in addition, if the CPA does not provide another remedy to correct the alleged 
prohibited conduct, unfairness, injustice, or unconscionability;481 
• after the court has considered the principles purposes and provisions of the 
CPA;482 
• and the matters mentioned in section 52(2),483 
the court may make an order in terms of section 52(3). 
The restriction in section 52(1)(b) on the powers of the court to ensure fair and just 
conduct, terms, and conditions, imply that this is a remedy of last resort for the 
consumer. Therefore, the court is severely restricted in the use of these powers to 
grant an order in terms of section 52(3), and does not provide the consumer with an 
easily accessible alternative to access adjudication by a court, or a remedy to the 
fairness provisions in the CPA. Section 52(3) may even be interpreted to mean that 
a consumer must exhaust his or her remedies under section 2(10) of the CPA as 
well, before approaching the court based on fairness. This is unfortunate, for 
instance, when the supplier does not perform its duties at all, in a fixed-term 
 
476 Section 52 CPA. 
477 Commission, established in terms of s 85 of the CPA. For more information see the 
Commission’s official website http://www.thencc.gov.za/welcome (date of use: 5 February 2020). 
478 Tribunal, established in terms s 26 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA). 
479 See Hawthorne (2013) Fundamina 300, 319 where she regards the consideration of public 
policy in order to establish fairness as an English law import. 
480 Section 52(1)(a) CPA. 
481 Section 52(1)(b) CPA. 
482 Section 52(1)(b) CPA. 
483 However, s 52(2) of the CPA lists factors a court must take into account when deciding a 
dispute based on ss 40, 41 and 48. For the full list of these circumstances, see s 52(2). Also see 
the discussion in para 4.3.2.7 below regarding the effect of s 52 on the parol evidence rule. 
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agreement under section 14 of the CPA, or when the supplier defaults. The 
consumer is left without a remedy in these circumstances.484 
I now consider the effect of certain fairness provisions on the parol evidence rule. 
4.3.2.7 The effect of the fairness provisions of the CPA on the parol 
evidence rule 
The effect of section 48(1)(a)(i), 48(1)(b), 48(2)(c), and 48(2)(d)(i) and (ii), and 
section 52(2)(a)-(j) of the CPA is that extrinsic evidence may be presented to court 
in the circumstances provided for in the sections, to establish whether the terms of 
the agreement are unfair, unjust, or unreasonable.485 This, of course, affects the 
parol evidence rule.486 The parol evidence rule provides that no extrinsic evidence 
is allowed in a dispute to interpret a written agreement between parties.487 This rule 
still forms part of the South African common-law of contract.488 
The effect of the sections above on the parol evidence rule is commendable, and 
should apply to all consumer agreements, whether the dispute is based on these 
sections or not. The parol evidence rule potentially affects consumers adversely, as 
they are in a less favourable bargaining position when concluding a consumer 
agreement489 in that consumer agreements virtually always take the form of 
standard-form contracts which cannot be negotiated individually. 
A provision that expressly abolishes the parol evidence rule in respect of all 
consumer agreements under the CPA will provide welcome relief to consumers. 
Such a provision will benefit the consumer, and avoid uncertainty regarding the 
application of the parol evidence rule, as it will allow all relevant documents, facts, 
and representations as evidence to assist a consumer in proving his or her case.490 
In particular, consumers in fixed-term contracts will benefit from such a provision, 
as they invariably have to enter into standard form contracts – eg, cell phone 
contracts. 
 
484 See the discussion in para 4.2.3.7 above. 
485 See Levenstein & Barnett (2010) Without Prejudice 30-31. 
486 See the discussion of the parol evidence rule in Ch 3 para 3.2.9. Also see Tennant & Mbele 
http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/17.pdf (date of use: 29 May 2020). 
487 Also known as parol evidence. Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 807; Bradfield Christie’s Law of 
Contract 226. 
488 See the discussion of parol evidence in Ch 3 para 3.2.9. Also see KPMG para [39]; Bothma-
Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA) 
para [12]. Hutchison et al Law of Contract 263-265; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A); Delmas 
Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A). 
489 See Ch 2 para 2.5; South African courts and parliament have acknowledged inequality of 
bargaining power. Aronstam Freedom of Contract 23-24; Linstrom v Venter 1957 (1) SA 125 
(SWA) 127-128,131. 
490 See Bekker LLD 530-532. 
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4.3.2.8 Concluding remarks: Fairness 
Although the inclusion of the fairness provisions in the CPA is commendable, there 
are many provisions that still can give rise to uncertainty.491 Despite these criticisms, 
the position of the consumer has definitely improved with the inclusion of these 
provisions. The plain language provisions are commendable, as these are now 
implemented in many international jurisdictions and contribute towards fairness 
because consumers are better informed.492 It is unfortunate that the powers of the 
courts to issue an order based on fairness are limited in section 52(1)(b) of the CPA, 
as that places this remedy out of the reach of most consumer disputes because of 
the time- and cost limitations. In addition, courts and other bodies should be afforded 
the powers to consider fairness mero motu493 as that would improve access to 
justice, and simultaneously give effect to constitutional aims and purposes. The 
effect of sections 48494 and 52(2) on the parol evidence rule is commendable, and 
the limitation of the parol evidence rule should be widened to all agreements under 
the CPA to ensure effective consumer protection.  
4.3.3 Other provisions of the CPA that could potentially affect fixed-term 
agreements under section 14 of the CPA. 
4.3.3.1 Section 17 
When one reads section 17 of the CPA dealing with the consumer’s right to cancel 
advance reservations, bookings, or orders, the natural question arising is whether 
the section could affect fixed-term contracts under section 14. However, on closer 
inspection the section appears to deal exclusively with once-off bookings, orders, 
and reservations, and not with fixed-term contracts. 
4.3.3.2 Section 21 
Another section that comes to mind is section 21, which deals with unsolicited goods 
and services,495 and more specifically section 21(1)(b) which refers to the periodic 
delivery of goods during the life of an agreement. However, the section will only 
affect unsolicited goods, and not the goods or services agreed upon in the fixed-
term agreement. 
 
491 For criticism see Stoop LLD 213-214; Mupangavanhu (2015) De Jure 129-135. 
492 This is based on information-based consumer protection principles. See Ch 5 para 5.3.2.2 for 
the position in Singapore, and Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3.1.6 for the position in the UK. 
493 See the discussion of this aspect in Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3.1.1. 
494 Sections 48(1)(a)(i), 48(1)(b), 48(2)(c) and 48(d)(i) and (ii) CPA. 
495 For more information on unsolicited goods see Stoop & Taylor (2015) THRHR 296-305. 
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4.3.3.3 Section 19(6) 
Section 19(6)496 of the CPA provides that when a supplier tenders delivery of goods 
or services at a date or time other than that agreed upon, the consumer may either 
accept such delivery, or still require delivery to take place at the agreed place and 
time if the date and time have not passed, or, the consumer can cancel the 
agreement without penalty, treating the goods as unsolicited goods under section 
21. In practice the effect of section 19(6)(c) is that when the supplier does not tender 
delivery, the consumer will still have to give notice in terms of section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb), 
must pay the amounts owed up to cancellation of the agreement,497 is liable for the 
cancellation penalty,498 and will not be entitled to make use of the remedy in section 
19(6)(c). This is a serious oversight, and the section should have been worded 
similarly to section 28(6) of the CRA to effectively protect the consumer when the 
supplier does not tender delivery.499 
4.3.3.4 Sections 54, 55 and 56 of the CPA and voetstoots clauses 
Section 54 provides that services are warranted, including goods that were installed 
or maintained as part of or required for the service provided. In addition, section 
55(2) read with section 56, provides that suppliers warrant goods for six months. 
Section 57 further provides that parts, whether new or reconditioned, are 
guaranteed for at least three months. These sections could, therefore, negate the 
operation of the voetstoots clause,500 which would be to the advantage of consumers 
in fixed-term agreements and, of course, consumers in general. 
 
496 Section 19(6): ‘If the supplier tenders the delivery of goods or the performance of any services 
at a location, on a date or at a time other than as agreed with the consumer, the consumer 
may either− 
(a) accept the delivery or performance at that location, date and time; 
(b) require the delivery or performance at the agreed location, date and time, if that date and 
time have not yet passed; or 
(c) cancel the agreement without penalty, treating any delivered goods or performed services 
as unsolicited goods or services in accordance with section 21.’ 
497 Section 14(3)(a) CPA. 
498 Section 14(3)(b)(i) CPA. 
499 See the discussion of s 28(6) of the CRA in Ch 6 para 6.3.4.2.4. 
500 Stoop (2018) THRHR 650-660; Barnard (2012) De Jure 455-484; Kruger LLM 78; Tennant & 
Mbele http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/17.pdf (date of use: 29 May 2020). See 
also https://www.fin24.com/PersonalFinance/Property/No-longer-as-is-for-voetstoots-law-
20100718 (date of use: 15 April 2019). For an argument that voetstoots could still be applicable in 
certain circumstances under the CPA, see Morissey & Coetzee (2010) Without Prejudice 12-13; 
also, see Brown https://www.golegal.co.za/voetstoots-clause-cpa/ (date of use: 25 February 2020) 
for the effect of s 55 on the sale of immovable property; and Kloppers 
https://www.fin24.com/PersonalFinance/Property/No-longer-as-is-for-voetstoots-law-20100718 
(date of use: 23 February 2020); Mukheibir https://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/Intellectual-
Property/897966/The-Voetstoots-Clause (date of use: 3 March 2020); Otto (2011) THRHR 525-
545. See para 3.2.12.1. 
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4.3.3.5 Section 19(2)(c) 
Section 19(2)(c) provides that the supplier is liable for the loss of goods prior to their 
delivery to the consumer, and that the supplier must keep the goods in its care and 
at its risk until delivery to the consumer, thereby negating the effect of the common-
law passing-of-risk rule.501 
This section obviously benefits consumers in fixed-term contracts, as the consumer 
cannot be held liable when, for instance, the cell phone he or she bought is 
destroyed before delivery. 
 
4.3.4 Formalities 
The CPA prescribes formalities in the form of compulsory disclosure of certain 
information and requirements related to the way in which the information is 
disclosed.502 
These formalities serve the purpose of  
‘reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced in accessing any 
supply of goods or services by consumers whose ability to read and comprehend 
any advertisement, agreement, mark, instruction, label, warning, notice or other 
visual representation is limited by reason of low literacy, vision impairment or 
limited fluency in the language in which the representation is produced, published 
or presented’.503 
The prescription of standardised forms for notices and documents required in terms 
of legislation increases consumer protection because basic information is to be 
presented in a uniform format, making it less likely that consumers will be misled. 
For instance, when a consumer enters into a fixed-term contract for a cell phone the 
prescribed information is available to the consumer in the agreement, and in the 
further prescribed notices.504 
 
501 The common-law passing of risk rule entails that the risk of profit and loss passes from the 
seller to the purchaser when the sale is complete, in other words once the price is determined, the 
subject of the purchase is definite, and suspensive conditions have been fulfilled. In practice this 
will normally be once the agreement has been concluded (in other words before delivery of the 
res), see Du Bois et al Wille’s Principles 894; De Wet & Van Wyk Handelsreg 347-348; Sharrock 
Business Transactions 290-292; Tennant & Mbele 
http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/17.pdf (date of use: 29 May 2020). 
502 For instance, the plain language requirement, s 22 CPA, as well as the other sections in Part D 
of chapter 2 of the CPA. These requirements mainly deal with information that must be provided to 
the consumer, for instance regarding the disclosure of the price of goods or services in s 23, 
product labelling and trade descriptions in s 24, the disclosure of reconditioned and grey mark 
products in s 25, the keeping of sales records in s 26, the disclosures required by intermediaries in 
s 27, and the identification of deliverers, installers and other persons in s 28. 
503 Section 3(1)(b)(iv). Green Paper 31; also see Ch 5 para 5.3.2.2 and Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3.1. 
504 See for instance ss 26, 49 and 50 of the CPA. 
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The language used in the CPA will now be discussed to gauge its effect on the rights 
and position of consumers in fixed-term contracts. 
4.3.5 Remarks on the language in the CPA 
When the aims of the CPA in section 3(1) are read and analysed, they are similar 
in one respect, they create the impression that the legislature is patronising the 
consumer by simply attempting to protect him or her.505 The consumer has no choice 
but to play a very dependent and passive role and he or she is not effectively 
empowered by providing him or her with substantial rights and remedies that he or 
she can actively use to enforce his or her rights.506 The sophistication and financial 
literacy levels of consumers differ, and the CPA should be flexible enough to 
effectively protect, assist, and empower all levels of consumer, and not merely 
attempt to protect the most vulnerable – an approach which will ultimately result in 
no consumer having effective, active, and empowering rights he or she can pursue. 
The most helpful wording in this regard is in section 3(1)(f) which states that the 
consumer’s empowerment must be promoted. However, nowhere in section 3 does 
it state what rights the consumer actually has or exactly how this empowerment will 
be achieved. A relevant question is, therefore, how a consumer can be empowered 
without providing or stating his or her rights, and expressly stating how he or she 
can act to exercise those rights effectively? 
To truly empower a consumer he or she must be well-informed, literate, financially 
literate, able to act pro-actively, actively, and independently inasmuch as he or she 
is able to do so, to enforce his or her remedies for true knowledge, confidence and 
ultimately empowerment to succeed, otherwise he or she remains passive, 
disempowered, dependent, and a victim regardless of the legislature’s good 
intentions. 
 
505 Du Preez (2009) TSAR 63; Woker (2016) SA Merc LJ 21 n 1, where she mentions that in the 
South African regime, the consumer is the most protected in the world. See Christie & McFarlane 
Law of Contract 14-15 where there is a warning against a paternalistic approach. 
506 See Du Preez (2009) TSAR 6. The distinction between consumer protection and consumer 
rights in the UK is emphasised by Andrews. She contends the main difference lies in the way rights 
on the one hand, and protections on the other, are enforced. A right implies the consumer has full 
freedom to enforce his or her right or claim where and when he or she chooses, the consumer is 
not obliged to obtain consent to institute the claim, and the claim is not subject to prior approval. 
Protection on the other hand does not inevitably imply a right, and may, for instance, imply that a 
regulatory body can, or must take action and the consumer does not necessarily benefit directly, 
although he or she may, in the longer term, benefit indirectly from action taken by the regulatory 
body. Therefore, the main difference lies therein that a right effectively empowers a consumer. See 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107584/file50027.pdf (date of use: 10 August 
2019) especially 107-108. Protection normally implies a more passive role for the consumer. For a 
general discussion see Andrews Enforcement 1. 
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The CPA aims to educate the consumer;507 that is commendable, and the first step 
to empower the consumer.508 An idealistic Constitution and CPA alone, with 
admirable and well-intended aims and purposes, although politically correct, will not 
do this. The exploitation of vulnerable consumers is deplorable conduct and should 
not be allowed. Furthermore, the aim to protect the most vulnerable consumers in 
section 3(1)(b) is also a step in the right direction, and vulnerable consumers will 
therefore be protected. However, after protection, information and education, 
consumers should have effective rights and powers, and be independent and 
responsible consumers. That should be the ultimate goal of the CPA.509 
The CPA needs to go one step further if it is truly to empower consumers. Adequate 
literacy and financial literacy are important to allow consumers to participate in the 
economy independently. Financial literacy entails knowledge and skills to 
comprehend how the economy works, how income is earned and how to act 
responsibly with money. Pearson et al describe it as ‘the set of skills and knowledge 
that allows people to make informed and effective decisions with all of their financial 
resources’.510 It is essential and urgent that basic financial literacy be promoted in 
South Africa. A basic questionnaire that establishes whether a consumer 
understands the basic consequences of a transaction or agreement could for 
instance be a prerequisite ’qualification’ to open a bank account, apply for a loan, 
and enter into an agreement in terms of section 14. In addition, basic financial 
literacy should be taught at school level as a basic life skill.511 
Adequate literacy and financial skills will ultimately contribute to the independence 
and empowerment of consumers and benefit the community at large.512 
 
507 The preamble states that the CPA aims to ‘improve access to, and the quality of, information 
that is necessary so that consumers are able to make informed choices ...’ and also to ‘promote 
and provide consumer education,…’. 
508 However, and as this does not fall within the scope of this work and I will not discuss this in 
detail, it should be mentioned that the most important measure to effect the empowerment of 
consumers is to effect literacy by way of a sound and effective education system at grassroots 
level that delivers educated and well-informed students. Political and socio-economic ideals can 
unfortunately not be realised by a Constitution and idealistic, though well-intended, legislation 
alone. This fact is acknowledged by the legislature by implication in the preamble to the CPA. 
509 See Du Preez (2009) TSAR 65 who contends that the CPA focuses strongly on entitlements for 
consumers. 
510 Pearson et al (2017) PELJ 2-3; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_literacy (date of use: 15 
February 2019). 
511 Pearson et al (2017) PELJ 3. It could also be promoted by way of television programs/clips, radio 
promotions, competitions, cellphone apps/promotions, billboards, etc. Until higher standards of 
literacy and financial literacy are achieved, it is recommended that suppliers make use of automated 
recordings in booths that can be operated by consumers independently, to listen to recordings of 
explanations, consumer literacy, and financial literacy information, and education. The consumer 
should then after having listened, confirm his or her understanding on the recording and/or answer 
a few basic questions to evaluate his or her understanding of the agreement/procedure. This enables 
suppliers to inform consumers and to keep record of compliance in the event of disputes. 
512 See the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA), previously the Financial Services Board 
(FSB) survey and investigation into financial literacy in South Africa available at 
https://www.fscaconsumered.co.za/Resources/Research%20Documents/FSB%20Financial%20Lit
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Responsibilisation, literacy, and financial literacy are not attained overnight and will 
be a continuous and long-term project, but ultimately, it is the only way to attain 
informed, independent, responsible and empowered consumers. Along with the 
protection and effective empowerment of consumers, this should be a priority.513 
The lack of true empowerment in the CPA, and in section 14, by merely protecting 
the consumer, and not providing the consumer with effective rights, could therefore 
be a factor that contributes to the lack of effective remedies to assist the consumer 
when the supplier materially malperforms. 
4.3.6 Section 2(9)  
Section 2(9) provides that if a section of the CPA and another Act or Acts apply and 
these provisions are inconsistent, the section that best protects the consumer will 
prevail. This is in line with the aims and purpose of the CPA, and the purpose of 
section 2(9) clearly is to protect the consumer.514 
I have now dealt with a number of seconday factors that might affect a consumer 
under a fixed-term contract. I will now briefly highlight a few relevant aspects of the 
enforcement of the CPA.515 
4.3.7 Enforcement 
4.3.7.1 Enforcement other than by a court 
A consumer must follow the sequence of prescribed enforcement agencies in 
section 69 of the CPA.516 To enforce a right or resolve a dispute the consumer starts 
by approaching the Tribunal if permitted in the particular dispute.517 Alternatively, he 
or she must refer the dispute to the ombud with jurisdiction,518 or the provincial 
consumer court which has jurisdiction – if there is one.519 Failing this the consumer 
can refer the matter to an alternative dispute resolution agent under section 70.520 
After this, he or she can file a complaint with the Commission in terms of section 
 
eracy%20Report%202015.pdf (date of use: 15 February 2019) and also their consumer website 
https://www.fscaconsumered.co.za/ (date of use: 15 February 2019). 
513 Financial literacy depends on the disclosure of information. See Pearson et al (2017) PELJ 2-55 
on this aspect as a full discussion of information, financial literacy, etc, falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. See also, Zokaityte (2016) Capital Markets Law Journal 405-413. 
514 See para 4.2.3.3 above. Also see Stoop (2014) THRHR 136-144. For a similar provision in 
Singapore on ambiguity, see Ch 5 pars 5.3.2.9.2 (s 18 of the CPFTA), and in the UK see Ch 6 para 
6.3.4.3.1.1 (s 69 of the CRA). 
515 This aspect falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
516 For a discussion of the dispute settlement mechanism under the CPA and proposals for its 
amendment, see Mupangavanhu (2012) PELJ 320-341. For a discussion of s 69 of the CPA see 
Scott LLD 45-50; Naudé & Eiselen Commentary 69-3, 69-19; Koekemoer (2017) JCP 423. Also, 
see Van Heerden & Barnard (2011) JICL 131-138. 
517 Section 69(a). 
518 Section 69(b), or an ombud envisaged in section 69(c)(i). 
519 Section 69(c)(ii). 
520 Section 69(c)(iii). 
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71.521 Only at this stage – once all other available statutory remedies have been 
exhausted – may the consumer approach a court with the necessary jurisdiction.522 
The Commission is established in terms of section 85 of the CPA.523 Section 85(1) 
provides that the Commission must exercise the functions assigned to it under the 
CPA, mainly in section 92(1) thereof, or any other law, in accordance with the values 
and principles in section 195 of the Constitution.524 The Commission has statutory 
powers only.525  
The National Consumer Tribunal (Tribunal) was established in terms of section 26 
of the NCA. The CPA provides that the Tribunal’s responsibility regarding the 
realisation of consumer rights in section 4 of the CPA, amongst others, is the 
development of the common law to improve the realisation and enjoyment of 
consumer rights – in particular as regards vulnerable consumers provided for in 
section 3(1)(b) of the CPA. 
Woker remarks that the intention of the legislature could never have been for the 
Commission and Tribunal to be solely responsible for the application and 
adjudication of consumer law under the CPA.526 It appears that consumers are 
unaware of the complaint procedures and forums available.527 Lack of capacity has 
also been reported at the Commission. Particularly in its early stages, the 
Commission did not always follow compliance requirements for the issuing of 
compliance notices, and it has been criticised for not enforcing the provisions of the 
CPA vigorously.528 Several factors influence the effectiveness of these forums, for 
instance, the cost and the time required to lodge a complaint, how effectively the 
forum operates, the transparency of the operations, whether they are readily 
accessible and easy to use, and the kind of relief a forum could offer the 
consumer.529 
Naudé reiterates the most important aspect of consumer redress:530 ‘The path of a 
consumer complaint should be clear and easy to understand.’ In addition, the 
 
521 Section 69(c)(iv). 
522 Section 69(d). See Sharrock Business Transactions 637; Joroy 4440 CC v Potgieter and 
Another NNO 2016 (3) SA 465 (FB) para [8]. 
523 One of the purposes of the CPA is to establish the Commission. 
524 Section 195 of the Constitution deals with the basic values and principles governing public 
administration, inter alia, that the service must be provided fairly, equitably, and without bias. 
525 See ss 92-98 of the CPA. 
526 See Woker (2016) SA Merc LJ 21-48 for a discussion of dispute resolution, its challenges, and 
recommendations. 
527 Koekemoer 2017 JCP 419-455. 
528Naudé & Barnard Enforcement 570. 
529 Koekemoer (2017) JCP 423-443. Also, see Koekemoer (2014) JABR 659-669 on a similar study 
in the Motor Vehicle Service Industry. 
530 Naudé (2010) SALJ 547. 
 South Africa: The position of consumers under fixed-term agreements regulated 
by the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
159 
 
complaint should be handled and finalised rapidly, efficiently, correctly, and with no 
serious cost implications for the consumer.531 
Section 69(c)(iii) of the CPA provides that a matter can be referred to a different 
alternative dispute resolution agent. The result of this provision is that there will be 
no formal record of the decision, which could lead to a situation where there is a 
lack of guidance for future decisions, and no uniformity in the enforcement of the 
CPA. 
It is clear that much work is needed to inform the consumer of the process of 
enforcement under the CPA, to make the enforcement process transparent to the 
consumer, to simplify the process, and to make the process as time and cost 
effective as possible.532 This will ensure efficient enforcement of the CPA and 
ultimately contribute to consumer empowerment. 
4.3.7.2 Normal court with jurisdiction533 
Under normal circumstances, the court appears to be the last resort for consumers 
as the consumer must, on an initial reading of section 69, first exhaust all other 
options in section 69 of the CPA,534 save as provided for in section 52. As the 
Commission and the Tribunal are creatures of statute and do not have inherent 
jurisdiction on matters other than those specifically provided for in the CPA, one can 
argue that when a consumer bases his or her case on the common law alone, rather 
than as an alternative, then only a court has jurisdiction. The same argument can 
be used when a consumer bases his or her complaint or dispute solely on the 
agreement itself and not a provision of the CPA.535 
In addition, courts and the Tribunal must in terms of section 4(2)(a), develop the 
common law to improve the realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights 
generally.536 Courts (and other bodies) must promote the spirit and the purposes as 
set out in section 4(2)(b)(i) and further should advance consumers’ rights in practice 
to ensure the realisation of these rights to redress.537 The court and these bodies 
should further also be innovative in their orders to give effect to the aims of the 
CPA.538 The Commission and Tribunal are not expressly authorised or empowered 
by the CPA to deal with common-law matters. They are creatures of statute and can 
 
531 Also see Woker (2016) SA Merc LJ 21, 48. 
532 Scott LLD 51. 
533 For a discussion of the powers of court see Van Heerden & Barnard (2011) JICL 136-138. Also 
see, Barnard & Mišćenić (2019) Journal for Juridical Science 111-136. 
534 This was confirmed in Joroy. 
535 Naudé 2009 (SALJ) 526. See Naudé & Barnard Enforcement 575-576 on the jurisdiction of 
courts. Also see Mupangavanhu (2012) PELJ 340 on the jurisdiction of ordinary courts and s 34 of 
the Constitution. 
536 Sharrock Business Transactions 587. 
537 Section 4(2)(b)(ii); Sharrock Business Transactions 587. 
538 For more information see Naudé & De Stadler (2019) PELJ 1-27. 
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only hear statutory matters. However if they are granted the power and authority to 
adjudicate on common-law matters, access to justice will improve. 
I now return to the hierarchy principle in section 69 of the CPA. 
Possible exceptions or arguments against the hierarchy principle in section 69 
are:539 
• That disputes based on section 14 agreements should, as common-law 
agreements, be heard by a court directly without first exhausting all other 
measures in section 69. 
• That disputes based on breaches of contract should be heard by courts 
as these disputes are not based on a provision in the CPA (I support this 
argument in theory).The wording of section 69 unfortunately appears to 
contradict this approach and, to my mind, closes this so-called 
loophole.540 
• There are arguments that all disputes based on common-law contract 
disputes can be heard by courts directly541 as the bodies in section 69 are 
creatures of statute and so lack jurisdiction. In addition, section 4(2) of 
the CPA provides that courts and the Tribunal must develop the common 
law, which also counters this argument. 
• Disputes based on unfairness are the only disputes that must be heard 
by courts, and the CPA expressly excludes them from the procedure and 
sequence of steps in section 69. When a dispute is based on unfairness 
the consumer can and must go directly to court as other bodies cannot 
adjudicate the dispute.542 Further, in light of the presumption that the 
legislature does not intend inserting purposeless and invalid provisions 
in legislation,543 it is submitted that there is no other valid interpretation of 
this section.544 
• Another possible point of view is based on the argument that legislation 
respects the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.545 Section 34 of the 
Bill of Rights provides that everyone has the right to have any dispute 
decided before either a court, or, in the second part of the sentence, 
provides as an alternative that anyone can have a fair and public hearing 
before another independent and impartial Tribunal or forum.546 The 
 
539 See Scott LLD 45-51. 
540 See s 69. See also Joroy. The only way to change this is to amend the CPA, or to find it 
unconstitutional, which is unlikely – see Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC). 
Also see Du Plessis (2016) SA Merc LJ 156. 
541 Naudé (2009) SALJ 525-528. 
542 Section 52. 
543 Botha Wetsuitleg 173. 
544 However, s 52(1)(b) limits the powers of the court to matters where the CPA does not provide a 
remedy. 
545 Botha Wetsuitleg 172. 
546 Scott LLD 47-48. Scott is of the view that s 69 could be interpreted to give effect to the 
consumer’s s 34 consitutional right. 
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assumption that the legislature respects the rights in the Bill of Rights 
could therefore preclude the interpretation in Joroy,547 which deprives the 
party of the right to a court hearing for an extended period in that he or 
she must first approach other ineffective bodies which could waste both 
time and money.548 A party wishing to contest the judgment in Joroy could 
base his or her case on section 36 of the Constitution, or perhaps even 
on ubuntu. It would be interesting to see how a court would decide such 
an argument. 
The Constitutional Court’s approach to jurisdiction is important. In Chirwa v Transnet 
Ltd and Others549 the Constitutional Court decided that where a specialised 
framework for dispute resolution exists, parties should use this framework, and that 
the jurisdiction of the High Court is excluded.550 In the Chirwa case however, a 
statutory provision provided that the Labour Court had exclusive jurisdiction over 
the specific matter.551 The scenario in section 69 of the CPA differs from this, as the 
jurisdiction of the court is not totally excluded by section 69. However, an argument 
could be made that the jurisdiction of the court is suspended, and therefore initially 
excluded, until such time as the complainant has exhausted all the other options in 
section 69. 
These arguments are relevant as the procedure for approaching an ombud, the 
Commission, and the Tribunal have unfortunately proven very inefficient and time-
consuming.552 This deprives consumers and suppliers of effective, cost-effective, 
and timely redress – an aim of the CPA. On the other hand, although access to court 
would be ideal, it also involves a financial burden for the consumer, as well as not 
always being time-efficient. The solution is clearly to ensure that the bodies listed in 
section 69 become more efficient. 
As the statutory body or court must exercise its discretion for the benefit of the 
consumer in cases of doubt or ambiguity,553 another potential problem posed by the 
interpretation of the provisions of the CPA is the possibility of widely differing 
judgments based on the same set of facts. This is because the discretion is based 
not on the law or the analysis of the facts and the law, but rather on the benefit of 
the individual consumer. The stare decisis554 rule could be detrimentally affected by 
this. 
 
547 See the discussion in para 4.2.4. 
548 This argument was not used in the pleadings. 
549 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) (hereafter Chirwa). 
550 Chirwa paras [59] [67]-[68]. 
551 See Scott LLD 49-50. 
552 See para 4.3.7.1 above. 
553 As intended in s 4(3) of the CPA. 
554 Stare decisis is the rule to abide by decided cases, see Hiemstra & Gonin Drietalige 
Regswoordeboek 292. 
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The procedure and hierarchy provided in section 69 should be reviewed by the 
legislature555 and clarified to ensure much-needed accessible, effective, time-
efficient, and affordable redress for consumers.556 
I now briefly consider case law, and highlight how courts should interpret and apply 
the CPA and transformative constitutionalism to effect the purposes and aims of the 
CPA. 
 
4.4 Case law and transformative constitutionalism 
4.4.1 Introduction 
To date no judgment based on and dealing specifically with section 14 of the CPA 
has been reported. Du Plessis argues that the paucity of consumer-law judgments 
in general is because consumers first have to explore and exhaust other forms of 
adjudication before approaching a court.557 This aspect of the CPA is criticised by 
Du Plessis and Naudé both of whom argue, correctly in my view, that consumers 
should be entitled to approach court directly, especially where damages are 
involved.558 There also appears to be problems related to the administration and 
efficiency of the Commission and the Tribunal.559 This notwithstanding, a limited 
number of complaints have been heard by the Tribunal.560 
The courts’ important task of developing the law when deciding disputes before 
them is, to an extent, sidelined by the CPA requiring consumers first to exhaust, in 
the set order, the steps and formalities in section 69 before approaching a court.561 
This restricts the development of consumer law by largely excluding the courts.562 
The only clear exception in terms of which a party may approach court directly is 
when, as party to a fixed-term agreement, he or she bases the claim on unfairness 
in section 52.563 
 
555 Naudé (2010) SALJ 547; Scott LLD 205-206. 
556 Scott LLD 195-196. 
557 Section 69 CPA; Du Plessis (2016) SA Merc LJ 147. 
558 Du Plessis (2016) SA Merc LJ 148; Naudé (2010) SALJ 527. 
559 See the discussion in para 4.3.7.1. 
560 For example, NCT/14719/2012/101(P) CPA, in which the Tribunal decided that s 14(2)(a) and 
(b) do not apply as it (the contract) expired before the second anniversary of the Act. The most 
relevant complaint was heard by adjudicator Melville, see para 4.4.2 below. In another complaint, 
Complaint 201602-0005932 7 March 2016, also before adjudicator Melville, the facts were similar. 
This time the membership was for 1 year and the consumer gave notice to cancel after 2 months. 
The gym demanded an 80% cancellation fee. In deciding if the 80% was a reasonable cancellation 
fee, the adjudicator decided that R699 constituted a reasonable cancellation fee, which amounted 
to approximately 30% of the outstanding fees. 
561 For a discussion of this see Scott LLD 32-115; Naudé (2010) SALJ 515-547; Du Plessis (2016) 
SA Merc LJ 147-157. 
562 Scott LLD 45-51. 
563 See para 4.3.2.6. Also bear in mind the limitation in s 52(1)(b). 
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4.4.2 Ombud decision 
Regulation 5(2) regulates the calculation of the reasonable credit, or charge a 
supplier may give or impose on a consumer who cancels an agreement.564 
Regulation 5(3) provides that a supplier may not charge an amount that has the 
effect of negating the consumer‘s right to cancel the fixed-term contract – eg, charge 
an amount equal to the payments due for the remainder of the fixed-term contract 
period – which would clearly disadvantage the consumer.565 
The reasonable credit or charge contemplated in regulation 5(3) as well as the 
provisions of section 14(4) were adjudicated in Complaint 201506-000377566 by the 
Consumer Goods and Services Ombud.567 The complainant entered into a gym 
agreement for a three-year period. The complainant stopped his monthly payments 
and sought to cancel the agreement before the expiry of the three-year period. The 
consumer was informed that his contract superseded the CPA, and that he was 
liable for three years of monthly subscription fees – ie, R4 329, which included arrear 
monthly subscription fees, annual levies for three years, and 50 per cent of the 
remaining monthly payments for the three years. The adjudicator decided on three 
issues: 
• Was the supplier entitled to a three-year contract as he did not show a 
demonstrable financial benefit to the consumer? The adjudicator decided 
in the negative, and in addition, pointed out that the five-day cooling off 
period was not sufficiently conspicuous in the contract and the supplier 
should have brought this to the attention of the consumer.568 
• The supplier did not expressly provide in which way the contract had to 
be cancelled, and insisted on cancellation in writing, which led to a longer 
time to cancel, and in turn to more months’ unpaid fees.569 
• Whether the cancellation fee charged was reasonable. The ombud 
decided that section 14 did not allow for the future loss of profit – ie, 
payment of future monthly fees. The ombud fixed the amount owed by 
the complainant at R1 100 being the arrear membership fees, the annual 
 
564 This aspect of reg 5 will be discussed here for purposes of fluency of the discussion. The 
remainder of reg 5 is discussed in para 4.2.3.7.10 above. 
565 Also see the discussion of penalty clauses in Ch 3 para 3.2.11 and the judgment discussed in 
Ch 6 para 6.6.4. 
566 Dated 25 January 2016 before Melville (Gym-complaint example). Also see Complaint No 
201602-0005932 7 March 2016 again before Melville. 
567 The Consumer Goods and Services Ombud (CGSO) is a scheme of alternative dispute 
resolution for the Consumer Goods and Services Industry as described in s 82(6) of the CPA. 
568 Section 16 regulates cooling-off periods. Section 16(3) provides for the 5-day cooling-off period, 
and provides that when a contract is concluded as a result of direct marketing, the consumer is 
entitled to cancel the agreement without penalty, within 5 days after conclusion of the agreement or 
delivery of the goods. The cooling-off period provides the consumer with an additional right, and he 
or she retains all his or her other rights in terms of the CPA and the common law. See s 16(2). 
569 Section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) provides that the 20 days’ notice in terms of s 14 should be given in 
writing or other recorded form. See the discussion in para 4.2.3.7.7 above. 
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levy, and an estimate for costs involved in the cancellation of the 
agreement. 
The guidelines used for calculating the cancellation penalty are:570 
• ‘the value of the transaction up to cancellation; 
• the value of the goods which will remain in the possession of the consumer after 
cancellation; 
• the value of the goods that are returned to the supplier; 
• the duration of the consumer agreement as initially agreed.’571 
Where a consumer does not retain goods, services, or discounts, for instance on 
termination of a lease agreement, there will be no penalty or fee due to the supplier 
in respect of these.572 
I will now proceed to study important case law to analyse and criticise how 
agreements in terms of section 14, and the CPA could be interpreted and applied 
to effect the envisaged aims and purposes of the CPA and the Consitution. 
4.4.3 Transformative constitutionalism 
The interpretation of statutes, the common law, and agreements form an important 
part of the application and development of law and legal culture. Courts play a vital 
role in this process in that it is they that are called upon to develop the law by the 
way in which they promote the constitutional goals through their application of the 
precepts of interpretation, these statutes, the common law, and agreements. 
At the same time, courts, commissions, and Tribunals must give effect to the aims, 
objects, and purposes of the specific legislation they are dealing with, whilst being 
fair and just and taking common-law principles and public policy into account. This 
is a delicate balancing act, and the philosophy and school of thought behind the 
approach to the interpretation of legislation is paramount in the development of legal 
culture. 
Another interesting aspect that comes into play when interpreting agreements is the 
effect of legislation – eg, consumer protection legislation – on the development, 
policies, and principles of the common-law of contract. This aspect has the potential 
to disrupt the logical and ordered development of the common-law of contract 
principles as it affects the way courts interpret agreements to fit the purpose or 
purposes of the legislation involved.573 
 
570 See Gym-complaint example Annexure A 11 and 13 for more details and a discussion. Although 
reg 5(2) lists other guidelines as well—the adjudicator specifically ruled that these four factors 
should be taken into consideration when the supplier calculates the penalty. 
571 See reg 5(2) of the CPA Regulations for all the guidelines.  
572 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 381. 
573 Bant (2017) MLR 895; Van Heerden & Barnard (2019) THRHR 449-450. 
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Transformative constitutionalism is important in the interpretation of fixed-term 
contracts as the court must interpret the CPA purposively. In addition, when the 
common-law of contract is involved, its specific retention in section 2(10) of the CPA 
means that the common law must be developed and interpreted by applying 
transformative constitutionalism. 
4.4.4 The interpretation of legislation to effect transformative 
constitutionalism 
Transformative constitutionalism involves that when courts decide a dispute, the 
Constitution must be interpreted liberally to promote political and socio-economic 
change and reform.574 Van der Walt regards human dignity, equality, and freedom 
in section 7(1) of the Constitution as the framework for constitutional 
transformation.575 It is a given that the purpose of law is not solely to ensure and 
effect justice; it is also a tool for political and socio-economic change and 
transformation in a constitutional democracy based on collectivism.576 In his article 
on the influence of legal culture on transformative constitutionalism, Klare highlights 
the importance of the judiciary in ‘a site of law-making activity’.577 This involves a 
wide approach to legal interpretation, as one knows that the common law, case law, 
and statutes are the main sources of the law. Therefore, one sometimes loses 
perspective of the important role and function that the interpretation of the sources 
– common law, case law, and legislation – plays in the development of the law and 
in the way transformation and justice are brought about. To implement this, Klare 
proposes judges should find a balance between judicial method and how the law is 
interpreted in terms of the sphere and objectives of the Constitution.578 Hale argues 
that the grounds for economic policies should be less conservative than the 
principles of freedom of contract and private property, as these principles can both 
cause and perpetuate existing imbalances and inequalities.579 
There is an inherent risk in interpreting the law to effect political change as the 
individual political views and inclinations of judges and adjudicators play a major 
role. Perhaps that is why courts and judges tend to interpret somewhat objectively 
and conservatively in order not to give too much weight to the personal political 
 
574 For general background on this topic see Moseneke (2009) Stell LR 3013; Tladi (2002) De Jure 
306-317; Langa (2006) Stell LR 351-360; Van der Walt (2005) TSAR 655-689; Van der Walt (2006) 
TSAR 1-31. Klare (1998) SAJHR 150-151, stresses that this interpretation should try to give effect 
to the hopes and ideals of the Constitution. See also Bhana PhD 36-38, 241-242. The CPA is 
legislation that aims to effect political and socio-economic change – see Imperial Group (Pty) Ltd 
t/a Cargo Motors Klerksdorp v Dipico and Others (4260/2015) [2016] ZANCHC 1 (1 April 2016) 
where the court referred to the CPA as ‘a social justice piece of legislation’ that has as purpose, 
inter alia, to protect consumers by ensuring that they have clear and unobstructed access to 
redress. 
575 Van der Walt (2006) Fundamina 1, 4. 
576 Bauling & Nagtegaal (2015) De Jure 149, 151. 
577 Klare (1998) SAJHR 146-147. 
578 Klare (1998) SAJHR 188. 
579 Hale (1943) Colum L Rev 627-629. 
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aspect of interpretation, and to ensure objectivity and predictability. A further risk is 
that when the ruling political party changes, all legislation and judgments must also 
shift gear to reflect the latest government’s policies which, of course, threatens legal 
certainty.580 However, when the Constitution is used as a compass and the primary 
source for transformation, this risk diminishes somewhat in the face of the gravitas 
of the Constitution. 
It is common cause that the judiciary must apply the Constitution to all judgments. 
However, Davis observes that court judgments in key cases unfortunately indicate 
the opposite approach.581 He criticises the general view and definition of freedom of 
contract, and notes that these definitions do not, as a rule, include sufficient 
reference to constitutional aspects, although there usually is some reference to 
public policy and good faith.582 He remarks that courts normally provide a general 
constitutional background in their decisions on the common-law of contract, and 
then proceed to base their judgments on ‘real’ contract law. He argues these 
judgments do not truly reflect the law as it should be interpreted in a constitutional 
democracy. In many instances courts pay lip service to the Constitution, but lack 
the true courage and conviction to implement transformative constitutionalism in 
their judgments.583 As a purposive approach and constitutional values will play an 
important role in the interpretation and application of disputes under the CPA and 
section 14 more specifically, a few judgments will be analysed to see what guidance 
can be found. 
4.4.5 Case Law  
4.4.5.1 Afrox Health Care Bpk v Strydom584 
In his critique of case law in which there has been a failure to develop constitutional 
principles, Davis first refers to Afrox which well illustrates his argument. Strydom, a 
patient at a private hospital, was required to sign the hospital’s standard admission 
form in which he absolved the hospital of liability for damages caused by injuries or 
death resulting from default by hospital staff, unless the default was wilful. After his 
operation, Strydom suffered complications which appeared to arise from the 
negligent conduct of nursing staff. He consequently sued the hospital which, of 
course, relied on the indemnity clause in the standard admission form. Strydom 
claimed that the indemnity clause was against public policy or, in the alternative, 
 
580 For example, France and Italy. See https://www.euronews.com/2016/12/13/why-do-italian-
governments-change-so-often (date of use: 5 February 2020). 
581 Davis (2011) Stell LR 845-863. 
582 Davis (2011) Stell LR 847. Davis also observes there are exceptions and refers to Bhana 2008 
SAJHR 300, 303. 
583 Davis (2011) Stell LR 847. 
584 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) (hereafter Afrox). 
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that it was not in line with good faith, equity, and fairness set out in section 27(1)(a) 
of the Constitution.585  
The court paid attention to the pacta servanda sunt maxim, made mention of the 
fact that these types of clauses were in line with the contra proferentem maxim, to 
be interpreted against Afrox, and proceeded to regard a strict version of the freedom 
of contract principle as an essential constitutional value. This is, of course, the 
classic example of unequal bargaining positions as theorised by Kessler.586 Brand 
JA, curiously, found that the plaintiff was not in a weaker bargaining position than 
the hospital.587 Davis appropriately criticises this view as he argues that a patient 
who urgently needs an operation from a hospital, can surely not be in an equal 
bargaining position.588 The court also dismissed ‘abstract notions’ such as good 
faith, reasonableness and fairness as a foundation to set aside or restrict contractual 
provisions.589 The critical error on the side of the court here was not to weigh the 
importance of the constitutional right to healthcare against the principles of contract 
law, especially when interpreted in the context of a contract entered into in a 
situation of obvious unequal bargaining position.590 It must be noted that the 
outcome of this case probably would have been different had the CPA been 
applicable at the time. 
4.4.5.2 Barkhuizen v Napier591 
The applicant Barkhuizen was insured by a company represented by the 
respondent. The applicant suffered a loss because of a motor vehicle accident and 
notified the respondent. The claim was repudiated. Two years later the applicant 
instituted action against the respondent, the respondent raised a special plea as the 
applicant was obliged to institute action in terms of the policy within 90 days of 
repudiation.592 
The essence of the matter before the Constitutional Court was whether a time 
limitation clause in a contract was against public policy,593 as the limitation restricts 
a party’s right to approach the court. A time limitation can be unreasonable and 
contrary to public policy, but public policy relies on ubuntu, which means that a 
person should have had sufficient opportunity to approach court.594 When a person 
 
585 This section provides that everyone has the right to access to health care. 
586 See the discussion of the unequal bargaining position in Ch 2 para 2.5. 
587 Afrox para [12]. 
588 Davis (2011) Stell LR 851. 
589 Afrox para [32]. 
590 Davis (2011) Stell LR 852. 
591 2007 (5) SA 323 CC (hereafter Barkhuizen). 
592 The case was first heard by the provincial court, and then the appeal court. See the note by 
Bhana on the appeal judgment, Bhana (2007) SALJ 269-280, and Woolman’s response to Bhana 
in (2008) SALJ 10-24. 
593 The court held that the effect of a time limitation is the same, whether it is in a contract or in 
legislation. See Barkhuizen para [46]. 
594 Barkhuizen paras [51]−[52]. 
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has a reasonable, adequate and fair opportunity to approach the court for legal 
redress such a limitation is not against public policy. The court confirmed that the 
Constitution is the source or foundation of public policy.595 
A decision based on fairness hinges on two factors; the first is whether the clause 
itself is unreasonable, secondly, the court should decide whether it has to be 
enforced, taking into account the factors that caused non-compliance to the time 
limitation in the relevant clause.596 To decide if a clause is unreasonable, public 
policy on the one hand, and the right to seek legal redress on the other, must be 
considered and balanced. The court held that the careful balance between the 
unreasonableness of the clause in question, and the right to seek legal redress, 
reflects constitutional values.597 The second factor – why compliance could not take 
place within the time limitation – will focus on the circumstances preventing such 
compliance, implying there must have been good and valid reasons for non-
compliance.598 
The court will also evaluate the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the 
agreement, such as a lack of bargaining power, a lack of understanding regarding 
the contents of the agreement, and if the contract was entered into freely, to 
establish whether the time limitation is contrary to public policy.599 
After consideration of these factors, the court decided the applicant had sufficient 
time to issue summons after repudiation of his claim by the insurer in that he had all 
the information he needed to issue summons. The court found that 90 days was 
sufficient in the circumstances, and that the enforcement of the time limitation clause 
was reasonable.600 
4.4.5.3 Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 601  
The essence of the dispute in Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 
was whether a lessor could terminate a lease and evict lessees with the sole 
purpose of obtaining higher rental, whether this termination constituted an unfair 
practice, and if the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 should be taken into account 
when determining the issue. The court also had to establish the extent of protection 
the Constitution provides to either or both parties. This case is interesting for 
purposes of this thesis as it affected poor and destitute individuals and investigated 
the extent to which the Constitution could, or should, be interpreted and applied to 
transform in order to protect such individuals. 
 
595 Barkhuizen paras [7], [28], and [104]. Also, see Sutherland (2008) Stell LR 406-408. 
596 Barkhuizen para [56]. 
597 Barkhuizen para [57]. 
598 Barkhuizen para [58]. 
599 Barkhuizen paras [63]-[67]. 
600 Barkhuizen para [67]; Sutherland 2008 Stell LR 412-413. 
601 2012 (3) SA 531 CC) (hereafter Maphango). 
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The lessor bought the property in which the applicant occupied a flat, upgraded the 
building, and then sought to increase the rent. The lessor sent cancellation notices 
to lessees and at the same time offered to enter into new agreements with exactly 
the same stipulations, save that the lessor was asking significantly higher rental per 
month.602 When the lessees rejected these new agreements the lessor approached 
the court for their eviction. Both the South Gauteng High Court and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal found in favour of the lessor.603 
The majority ruling in the Constitutional Court found that the Rental Housing Act 
applied. The court further found that legislation had to be interpreted not only to 
apply to contractual provisions, but to extend beyond that and to subject lease 
agreements – in effect common-law agreements – and the exercise of the rights in 
terms of these agreements, to allow courts to analyse these contracts to establish 
if there was unfairness when the parties’ respective rights and interests were 
considered.604 Cameron J held that the common law should be developed to limit 
the lessor’s contractual right to cancel the agreement.605 He also concluded that the 
Constitution allows legislation to be interpreted considerably more widely, especially 
as the Rental Housing Act was post-Constitution legislation.606 
This interpretation is wider in two ways. First, it aims not to impede or impair access 
to housing (public bodies and private parties),607 and second, when legislation 
affects the private parties’ obligation to provide housing, it will impact negatively on 
the lessor’s right to adequate or reasonable return on investment.608 
Davis calls upon the courts to broaden the scope of the Constitution and to interpret 
and develop legislation and common law to bring about change. However, if they 
are denied a decent return on their investment, judgments such as Maphango could 
in practice discourage private property developers from purchasing, improving, and 
restoring derelict properties.609 This would achieve exactly the opposite result 
envisaged by Hale and Davis and leave the poor and destitute in worse living 
conditions, as the state lacks both the resources and the capacity to keep up with 
the demand for suitable accommodation. 
The relevance of the decision for this thesis is that the CPA also provides for the 
benefit of consumers to enjoy priority610 and stresses the unfairness and 
unconscionability611 of certain contracts. It contains a specific subsection dealing 
 
602 The lease agreements made provision for either party to terminate the agreement by giving 
written notice. 
603 Maphango paras [19] and [21]. 
604 Maphango para [53]. 
605 Maphango para [55]. 
606 Maphango para [57]. 
607 Maphango paras [34]−[36]. 
608 Maphango para [34]. 
609 Also, see Stoop (2013) Int J Private Law 336-338. 
610 For example, in s 2(9), s 3, ss 4(3) and 4(4) of the CPA. 
611 Sections 40-52 of the CPA. 
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with vulnerable consumers.612 Of course, a similar situation could develop in 
consumer-protection law, and the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Maphango 
would be binding in similar circumstances. This would dissuade suppliers from 
dealing with consumers if there was no, or not sufficient, return on their investment, 
and this would disadvantage consumers in the long term. 
Courts must be careful when walking the tightrope of transformative 
constitutionalism which might well prove to be a double-edged sword which harms 
the economy and prejudices the very people it aims to protect. 
4.4.5.4 Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel 
Interests (Pty) Ltd613 
In a case based on a material breach of the payment clause on the due date in a 
contract of lease, Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel 
Interests (Pty) Ltd involved an appeal against an order of the Gauteng Local Division 
declining to evict the respondent from the leased premises. The High Court had 
ameliorated the effects of the pacta servanda sunt maxim by applying the principles 
of ubuntu, fairness, and public policy.614 The respondent’s failure to make timely 
payment was due solely to the failure of the respondent’s bank to effect payment on 
the due date and could not be ascribed to its conduct or omission. The respondent 
had based its case on the principle that parties who enter into an agreement do so 
in good faith, and that good faith lends flexibility to circumstances where a party 
cannot perform due to events it cannot control. Furthermore, the respondent alleged 
that the implementation of the cancellation clause was decidedly unreasonable, 
unfair, and against public policy. It further averred that the clause itself was not 
reasonable, as it demanded compliance without regard to the reasons for non-
compliance. The respondent based this contention on the fact that the good faith of 
contracting parties, ubuntu, reasonableness, and simple justice were the 
foundations of public policy, and, that the contract should be construed in the spirit 
and context of the Bill of Rights.  
The respondent based this argument on the Barkhuizen judgment.615 The 
respondent also relied on the judgment by Jacoob J in Everfresh Market Virginia 
(Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd.616 The respondent’s final contention was 
that the cancellation would affect the respondent, its employees, contractors, and 
 
612 Section 3(1)(b). 
613 2018 (2) SA 314 (SCA) (Mohamed’s Leisure). 
614 Mohamed’s Leisure [1]. 
615 Barkhuizen para [58] which found that a court could look at the circumstances and reasons for 
non-performance to establish if a clause in an agreement was, both objectively and subjectively, 
sufficiently reasonable to be enforceable. 
616 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) (hereafter Everfresh). In the judgment, Moseneke DCJ said that contract 
law should take cognisance of constitutional values, public policy, good faith, and ubuntu – it 
should further not be too restrictive, and should take into account the approach of the majority of 
the population and not be confined to classic and colonial legal tradition para [71]. 
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secondary staff severely, and when evaluated in this light, pacta servanda sunt 
should be relaxed. 
The court therefore had to decide, judging objectively, whether canceling the 
agreement in terms of the cancellation clause would be against public policy on 
grounds of unreasonableness and unfairness – in short, should the maxim pacta 
servanda sunt be preferred over constitutional values and public policy. The court 
relied on Sasfin v Beukes617 and emphasised the sanctity of contracts as an integral 
part of contractual freedom.618 It then considered the clause itself, which it found to 
be objectively reasonable. It decided that the contract had been entered into freely, 
and that both parties had enjoyed equal bargaining power. The respondent had 
been aware of the effect of the clause, the failure was caused by its own bank, and, 
in addition, the appellant had waited an additional twelve days before canceling the 
agreement. The appeal was successful. The court stated that had it found that pacta 
servanda sunt should be ameliorated by principles of ubuntu and public policy, it 
would have meant that the court stepped in on behalf of the parties, entered into an 
agreement, and invalidated a normal, standard and objectively reasonable clause 
contained in lease agreements.619 
Although one generally has sympathy for the respondent and all parties affected, 
the judgment is based on sound and objective legal argument and reasoning. 
Neither the contract, nor the cancellation clause was objectively unreasonable, 
against public policy, or against constitutional values. Furthermore, the respondent 
was an experienced and well-known company in the hotel industry which was aware 
that a failure to pay could have dire consequences. Finally, the failure to make timely 
payment was caused by the respondent’s agent.620 
Courts should exercise caution when developing contract law to infuse 
constitutional values as the decision to assist a litigant should be used 
circumspectly,621 and only when it is quite clear that the clause or agreement in 
question is objectively unreasonable and goes against the grain and general gist of 
the Constitution, ubuntu, good faith, and public policy. The following passage from 
Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes622 aptly explains how a court should judge public policy: 
 
617 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) where the court decided that its power to declare contracts contrary to public 
policy should be limited to ensure legal certainty, and that the personal sense of fairness should 
not interfere lightly with contractual obligations. 
618 Para [23]. The court also referred to Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69. 
See further Bhana PhD on freedom of contract. 
619 Mohamed’s Leisure para [32]. In Beadica the Constitutional Court reaffirmed the important role 
that the pacta servanda sunt principle plays in contracts, and as a result thereof, also in our 
economy and the country’s economic development. The court however, put the importance of the 
principle in perspective and explained that the rule did not have preference over constitutional 
rights and values, see Beadica [83-87]. 
620 As an aside, one could also mention that the parties were in equal bargaining positions at the 
time they entered into the agreement. 
621 The Constitutional Court confirmed this approach in Beadica [71-78]. 
622 1989 (1) SA 1(A) (hereafter Sasfin). 
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‘The power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should, however be 
exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the 
validity of contracts result from an arbitrary and indiscriminate use of power. One 
must be careful not to conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely 
because its terms (or some of them) offend one’s individual sense of propriety and 
fairness.’623 
4.4.6 Concluding remarks: The interpretation of the CPA and transformative 
constitutionalism 
When interpreting a statute or an agreement, one should not only consider the literal 
meaning of the words, even if they are clear.624 The purpose of the statute, its 
objectives, and the Constitution should also be examined.625 
A judgment following the line of thought and argument as Mohamed’s Leisure will, 
in the long-term, most benefit the economy, lessees, and consumers. The judgment 
balances the common-law principles, public policy, and constitutional aspirations, 
while still providing legal certainty. In so doing it can be seen to encourage 
investment by private property developers or suppliers for the long-term benefit of 
consumers. 
It remains to be seen how courts will interpret difficult cases that involve balancing 
constitutional rights, the purpose and aims of the CPA, fixed-term agreements under 
section 14 of the CPA, the application of section 2(10), and the long-term benefit of 
consumers – especially those mentioned in section 3 of the CPA. 
I have briefly discussed the history of consumer legislation in South Africa, the 
importance of the Constitution, and various policy documents addressing the CPA. 
I have also analysed section 14 of the CPA and the relevant sections that affect 
fixed-term contracts. Thereafter, I dealt with the paucity of case law and the 
interpretation of legislation by implementing transformative constitutionalism to 
indicate a possible way section 14 could be interpreted and applied. 
4.5 Conclusion: Chapter 4 
The supplier can draft the section 14 standard-form agreement on his own terms. 
He is well-protected by section 14 and is entitled to payments to date of cancellation. 
In addition, he can, in his discretion, impose a penalty by using the guidelines 
provided in section 14(4) and regulation 5, which are neither overly prescriptive nor 
models of clarity. 
The consumer, who is in an unequal bargaining position, is compelled to accept the 
terms of this agreement. This is why section 14 was drafted, specifically to protect 
the consumer. But, unfortunately, section 14 of the CPA does not expressly provide 
 
623 Sasfin per Smalberger JA 9. 
624 Delport (2014) Obiter 66-69.  
625 See para 4.2.3.3; Delport (2014) Obiter 74; Botha Wetsuitleg 105-111. 
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the consumer with remedies by which to enforce his or her rights. The section also 
lacks sufficient protective measures for the consumer in the section – save for the 
right to cancel at any time by giving 20 business days’ notice. Because of his or her 
unequal bargaining position, the consumer will not be able to include the common-
law protection measures available to purchasers and lessees to the fixed-term 
agreement.626 
When a dispute between the supplier and consumer arises, the matter will have to 
follow the hierarchy set out in section 69. Only after having exhausted these 
measures – in all likelihood a drawn-out process taking an inordinate time – will the 
consumer be in a position to access the courts to attempt to enforce his or her 
common-law rights. It is moot whether a court is able to ‘insert’ all the common-law 
protective measures available to the consumer into the standard-form agreement – 
ie, to disregard the contents of the contract so as to find in favour of the consumer. 
The disadvantages of section 14, and other relevant and secondary provisions of 
the CPA are:  
• The limitation of duration of fixed-term contracts is superfluous and 
serves no purpose in protecting consumers who may terminate the 
agreement at any time under section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb).627 
• Consumers are not protected at all in the event of default by the supplier 
as they cannot summarily terminate the agreement in these 
circumstances.628 
• The fact that a consumer is required to give notice in the event of non-
performance or default by the supplier as provided in section 
14(2)(b)(i)(bb), means that the consumer remains liable for payments 
until cancellation, even if the supplier has not performed. He or she is 
also liable to a penalty, even though the contract has to be cancelled 
through no fault of his or her own.629 
• The interpretation and application of section 2(10) needs urgent 
clarification if it is to be of assistance to the consumer.630 In addition, the 
position regarding the common-law rights of suppliers must also be 
established with certainty. 
• The effect on the stare decisis rule of the implementation by courts or 
bodies of the section 2(10) rule, can be unpredictable as courts will 
interpret and apply the section differently.631 
 
626 Although he or she retains his or her common-law rights in terms of s 2(10), he or she may not 
be aware of this fact, or exactly what these comprise. 
627 See para 4.2.3.7.7 above. 
628 See para4. 2.3.7.7 above. 
629 Paras 4.2.3.7.7, 4.2.3.7.9 and 4.2.3.7.10 above. 
630 Para 4.2.4 above. 
631 Para 4.2.4 above. 
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• The problems relating to the hierarchy of bodies and courts need to be 
addressed and the position clarified to be in line with Constitutional 
values, and to ensure that it is transparent, affordable, and accessible.632 
• The fact that in many cases there are no formal records of the decisions 
of, for example, alternative dispute resolution hearings, could lead to a 
lack of uniformity in the application of the CPA, and a lack of precedent-
setting for future decisions.633 
• The fact that only disputes based on unfairness can be referred to court 
could work to the disadvantage of consumers not able to afford 
litigation.634 
• It is a disadvantage that section 14(4) contains no clear provisions on 
how the supplier must prove discounts or advantages accorded the 
consumer on contracts in excess of 24 months.635 
• The fact that statutory bodies do not assist consumers efficiently.636 
• The general trend that the consumer is merely afforded protection but not 
effectively empowered which results from the CPA being more reactive 
than proactive.637 
• The fact that most courts do not implement effective constitutional 
transformation in suitable circumstances.638 
• The fact that the CPA is not written in plain language which the average 
consumer can understand and interpret with ease.639 
• In general, the fact that there is a lack of education and efficient 
educational programs to advance financial literacy and ensure that 
consumers achieve an acceptable level of financial literacy is 
lamentable.640 
• The vagueness of the calculation of the penalty the supplier can claim 
from the consumer in terms of section 14(3) is a disadvantage. The 
legislature could rather include a formula or sliding scale in section 14 or 
the Regulations by which this amount could be calculated. Alternatively, 
the amount, or the formula to calculate the amount payable in terms of 
section 14(3), should be provided in writing to the consumer when the 
contract is concluded.641 
 
632 Section 69 and see para 4.3.7 above. 
633 Section 69(c)(iii) and see para 4.3.7.1 above. 
634 Paras 4.3.2.6 and 4.3.7 above. 
635 Para 4.2.3.7.9 above. 
636 Para 4.3.7 above. 
637 Para 4.3.5 above. 
638 Para 4.4 above. 
639 Para 4.3.2.5. 
640 Paras 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.5. 
641 Para 4.2.3.7.10, and subject to the provisions of the Conventional Penalties Act. 
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• The negative and unpredictable effect of random decisions by bodies or 
courts when implementing the advantage to consumers as intended in 
sections 2(9) and 4(3) on the stare decisis rule.642 
• The fact that the parol evidence rule is not expressly excluded in 
consumer contracts and for purposes of the CPA, is a further 
disadvantage. Given their inferior bargaining power, it would have 
benefited consumers had the parol evidence rule been expressly 
excluded. This would enable them to provide all relevant evidence 
regarding the facts and circumstances in a dispute.643 
• The potential disadvantage the limitation of the duration of fixed-term 
contracts in section 14 has on both lessees and lessors.644 
• It is also regrettable that shortcomings in the CPA are not addressed 
timeously by the legislature. Many of the disadvantages have been 
pointed out by writers but no action has been taken to remedy the 
position.645 
• The fact that fairness can only be considered by courts as a remedy of 
last resort due to the limitations in section 52(1)(b), is a lost opportunity.646 
• From the perspective of suppliers, the CPA negatively affects their 
common-law rights to freedom of contract, pacta servanda sunt, the 
application of the parol evidence rule in certain circumstances, caveat 
subscriptor, voetstoots, and the passing of risk.647 
• Small business enterprises should ideally also be protected by the 
provisions of section 14 of the CPA – particularly in light of the wide 
meaning attributed to the term in the CPA. 
• The CPA should provide that adjudicating bodies and courts can take 
notice of fairness mero motu at any stage in consumer proceedings, as 
that would improve access to justice.648 
On the other hand, there are clear advantages to section 14 (and other relevant 
provisions) of the CPA: 
• The CPA aims to comply with international standards of consumer 
protection.649 
• The limitation of the duration of contracts in certain types of agreement is 
definitely to the advantage of consumers – notably cell phone agreements 
and gym contracts – as this ensures that consumers are not bound for 
unreasonably long periods. It should however be remembered that the 
 
642 Paras 4.2.3.3 and 4.3.7.2. 
643 Para 4.3.2.7. 
644 Para 4.2.3.8. 
645 See, eg, Stoop (2014) THRHR 139, 144; Delport (2014) Obiter 60-80. 
646 Para 4.3.2.6. 
647 Paras 4.2.3.7.10 and 4.2.3.7.11. 
648 See, eg, the discussion in Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3.1.1 on the position in the UK. 
649 Para 4.2.2.3. 
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consumer remains free to cancel the contract at any time in terms of section 
14(2)(b)(i)(bb).650 
• The position of the consumer has, in general terms, improved after 
implementation of the CPA, especially with the effect of the CPA on common-
law principles such as freedom to contract, pacta servanda sunt, parol 
evidence, voetstoots, passing of risk, and caveat subscriptor. This may be 
attributed to the legislature’s acknowledgment of the consumer’s inferior 
bargaining position and the legislature’s resolve to protect the consumer 
against the harsh effects of these principles by way of relevant provisions in 
the CPA.651 
• The CPA supports and promotes constitutional values and ideals.652 
• The efforts to use plain language in agreements is a move in the right 
direction, although section 22 can be criticised for not being entirely clear.653 
• The efforts to prohibit unfairness and unconscionable provisions in 
agreements represent a positive move to protect consumers and apply 
generally to all consumer agreements.654 
• The intention of the legislature to establish alternative bodies that are 
intended to be easily accessible and affordable for consumers to resolve 
disputes, is also a move in the right direction – even if currently ineffective.655 
• Section 2(10) which preserves common-law rights is commendable, although 
the intention of the legislature to make the common law available to suppliers 
is not entirely clear.656 
• Section 52 enables a consumer to access the courts directly, but this could 
be a double edged sword as court proceedings can be time consuming and 
costly, and access to court in terms of section 52 is a remedy of last resort.657 
I have now analysed and indicated points of criticism regarding section 14 of the 
CPA. This has highlighted both the advantages and disadvantages section 14 holds 
for parties to a fixed-term contract. Now that the fixed-term regime under the CPA 
has been evaluated, I may proceed to a comparative study of the Consumer 
Protection Fair Trading Act in Singapore in Chapter 5 in which I shall assess the 
position of consumers in Singapore in contracts similar to fixed-term contracts 
intended under section 14 of the CPA. In Chapter 6, the same process will be 
adopted with regard to the United Kingdom. 
 
 
650 See the discussion in paras 4.2.3.7.7 and 4.2.3.7.9. 
651 Para 4.2.3.7.1. 
652 Paras 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.1, 4.2.3.2 and 4.2.3.3. 
653 Para 4.3.2.5. 
654 Para 4.3.2.3. 
655 Para 4.3.7. 
656 Para 4.2.4. 
657 Para 4.3.2.6. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  The Law of Singapore: Consumer protection and fixed-term 
agreements 
5.1 Introduction 
Singapore is an international commercial centre.1 It shares a common heritage with 
South Africa and, as former British colonies, both are members of the 
Commonwealth of Nations,2 and both have common-law systems.3 The South 
African judiciary4 and other quasi-legal and administrative authorities5 regard 
Singapore’s consumer policies highly. The legislature in Singapore regularly 
updates its consumer protection legislation and recently expanded the mandate of 
the Competition and Consumer Commission6 to act proactively.7 In addition, the 
Consumer Protection Association in Singapore (CASE) provides effective and 
accessible consumer information and assistance on its website.8 A comparison with 
equivalent Singapore legislation may prove useful in addressing the shortcomings 
identified in section 14 of the CPA.9 
I first provide background to the consumer protection regime in Singapore, and then 
analyse, discuss and evaluate the relevant provisions in the Consumer Protection 
(Fair Trading) Act.10 I then highlight sections of the Unfair Contract Terms Act11 
relevant to the scope of this thesis. Aspects of consumer-related judgments that are 
 
1 Chua (1998) Urban Consumption 981-1000. 
2 See http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/country/africa/ (date of use: 13 November 2019) and 
http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/country/asia/ (date of use: 13 November 2019). 
3 The common law in Singapore is based on the common law of England, see 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-008-9647?transitionType=Default&contextData= 
(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 (date of use: 13 November 2019) and 
https://www.singaporelawwatch.sg/About-Singapore-Law/Overview (date of use: 13 November 
2019). The common law in South Africa is based mainly on Roman-Dutch law, although also 
influenced to an extent by British law. See the discussion in Ch 3 paras 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. The two 
countries have a good diplomatic relationship and aim to improve mutual tourism and trade. See 
http://www.thediplomaticsociety.co.za/archive/archive/746-south-africa-and-singapore-partnership-
continues-to-grow-stronger (date of use: 13 November 2019). 
4 Binns-Ward (2017) JCCLP 2. 
5 See Complaint 201703-0012601 (14 March 2017) where the ombud Melville referred to the case 
of Chwee Kin Keong and others v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR (R) 502 (Chwee). The 
Chwee judgment is discussed in para 5.5.3 below. 
6 Commission. The Commission was established in terms of s 3 of the Competition Act (Cap 50B). 
The powers of the Commission are provided for in ss 12G-12J of the Consumer Protection (Fair 
Trading) Act (Cap 52A) (CPFTA). 
7 Sections 12G-12V of the CPFTA, amended in 2016. 
8 See https://www.case.org.sg/ (date of use: 13 November 2019). The CASE is a non-profit, non-
governmental association registered as such with the Registry of Societies in Singapore. It aims to 
protect consumer interests by providing information and education and by ensuring fair and ethical 
trade practices in business. For the history of the CASE see https://www.case.org.sg/history.aspx 
(date of use: 13 November 2019). 
9 See Ch 4 para 4.5 where these shortcomings are listed. 
10 Hereafter the CPFTA. This Act came into force on 1 March 2004. 
11 (Cap 396) (Original Enactment UK 1977 c 50). Applicable from 12 November 1993 (hereafter the 
UCTA). 
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of importance to this study are also analysed to identify any pitfalls or lessons to be 
learnt from the Singaporean experience. 
This chapter is not a comprehensive study of the history, background, and 
development of consumer law and legislation in Singapore. It does not include an 
analysis of Singapore’s common-law of contract, although common-law principles 
are touched on if and where relevant. 
I conclude the chapter by highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of 
consumer protection legislation in Singapore in an attempt to find solutions to the 
shortcomings identified in the CPA.12 
5.2 Background and history 
Singapore was a British colony from 1819 to 1963 before it became part of 
Malaysia13 until its independence on 9 August 1965.14 Because of its long 
association with England, it shares a legislative history and common-law heritage.15 
The automatic application of English law in Singapore only ended with the 
Application of the English Law Act (Cap 7A) in 1993.16 
The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore is not a single document but a 
rearrangement of the 1963 State Constitution, the Republic of Singapore 
Independence Act, and the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.17 
 
12 See Ch 4 para 4.5. 
13 See https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/History/Singapore-history.htm (date of use: 15 May 
2019); https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Singapore (date of use: 15 May 2019). 
14 See https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15971013 (date of use: 24 April 2019). 
15 South Africa does not share the same legal history, see Ch 3 para 3.1. Yu 
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/sec/library/1011in11-e.pdf 10 (date of use: 24 April 
2019). For an early article on consumer protection and the need for better protection in Singapore, 
see Sinnadurai (1969) Sing L Rev 107-126. 
16 See https://www.singaporelawwatch.sg/About-Singapore-Law/Overview (date of use: 20 May 
2019) and http://www.singaporelegalhistory.org/index.php?title=The_Reception_of_English_Law 
(date of use: 20 May 2019). 
17 See https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/news/events/magna/our-constitution#start (date of use: 
30 July 2019). This is officially known as an authorised reprint. The current Constitution is the 1999 
reprint, see https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CONS1963 (date of use: 31 July 2019). For a short history 
of the Constitution of Singapore see https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/news/events/magna/our-
constitution#start (date of use: 30 July 2019). For a discussion and critique of the Singapore 
Constitution see Tushnet 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4654&context=clr (date of use: 31 
July 2019); Silverstein http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2015/10/Silversteinfinal.pdf (date of use: 31 
July 2019). The Constitution of Singapore is regarded as a ‘secular constitution’, as it 
accommodates the different religions in Singapore. For further discussion see Neo (2016) Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion 431-456. 
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Legislation that could potentially affect consumers in Singapore includes the 
Misrepresentation Act,18 the Unfair Contract Terms Act,19 and the CPFTA. The most 
important of these, which is also the focus of this chapter, is the CPFTA,20 enacted 
in 2003 as a result of successful and sustained campaigns by the Consumer 
Association of Singapore to curb the exploitation of consumers. The primary aim of 
the UCTA is to protect consumers against exemption clauses in contracts in cases 
of negligence. In other instances it nullifies exemption clauses, or limits them by 
demanding that they be reasonable.21 The UCTA is mentioned briefly where 
relevant, but is not analysed in any depth as it is not directly relevant to fixed-term 
contracts.22 The Small Claims Tribunal Act23 is referred to if and where necessary in 
considering jurisdiction.24 
The stated purpose of the CPFTA25 is to protect consumers against unfair practices. 
Two important considerations played a role in its drafting: the consumer’s obligation 
to answer for his or her own acts and decisions when entering into an agreement; 
and the balancing of this responsibility with the interests of traders who need legal 
and financial certainty when entering into agreements.26 This emphasises the 
 
18 Cap 390 1994 Rev Ed Sing, (MA). The purpose of the MA in the preamble thereof is ‘to amend 
the law relating to innocent misrepresentations’. Booysen notes that courts in Singapore do not 
insist on plaintiffs formally pleading the MA, and emphasises that this is the correct approach in 
consumer matters as consumers are not legal experts and do not necessarily have legal 
representation. She also remarks that there are relatively few cases on the UCTA and the MA. 
Booysen (2016) SJLS 219, 231, 236, 246-248. 
19 Cap 396 1994 Rev Ed Sing (UCTA) which is similar to the United Kingdom’s Unfair Contract 
Terms Act. 
20 This Act came into force on 1 March 2004, Singapore: Public Consultation on the Consumer 
Protection (Fair Trading) Act (2008) available at https://doi.org/10.1080/03050710801942704 (date 
of use: 26 May 2019) 149-211. 
21 See ss 3, 4 and 11 of the UCTA. 
22 Except, perhaps, by analogy to s 10(2) of the CPFTA, and where applicable and relevant in case 
law. 
23 (Cap 308) Act 27 of 1984 available at https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/SCTA1984 (date of use: 26 May 
2019). The Small Claims Tribunal is hereafter referred to as the SCT. 
24 Note the extended jurisdiction in the SCT under s 7 of the CPFTA. 
25 This purpose is stated in the preamble to the CPFTA, although it is not expressly referred to as a 
preamble, it is directly under the heading. 
26 Parliamentary debate of 10 November 2003 on the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Bill, 
Session 1 Vol 76 Sitting 23 available at https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic?reportid=-
25_20031110_s0004_T0002 (date of use: 15 May 2019) (hereafter Parliamentary Debate 10 
November 2003). It is interesting to observe the important role parliamentary debates on the 
CPFTA and its amendments played in the courts’ interpretation of the Act. Courts consult 
parliamentary debates when adjudicating a specific Act to establish the exact purpose and aims of 
the legislature with specific legislation, for instance, Freely Pte Ltd v Ong Kaili and others [2010] 2 
SLR 1065 (Freely v Ong) see the discussion in para 5.5.1. Booysen (2016) SJLS 219, 223, also 
see the parliamentary statement by Minister at the time of the introduction of the CPFTA on 11 
November 2003, available at https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/report?sittingdate=11-11-2003 (date of 
use: 29 May 2020); Chandran (2004) SJLS 192. Also see the publication by Gupta (2008) Law 
Gazette (all 3 pages), regarding balancing the rights of consumers and healthy competition law 
principles and legislation, available at https://www-lawnet-
sg.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/lawnet/group/lawnet/page-
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delicate balance between these interests, and it is instructive, when evaluating case 
law, to observe how the courts in Singapore achieve this.27 The legislature made it 
clear that consumers are expected to act responsibly when entering into consumer 
transactions, and that the Singaporean legislature did not intend unnecessary 
market regulation by way of prescriptive legislation.28 The legislature also chose not 
to impose criminal sanctions on perpetrators.29  
The CPFTA ushered in significant changes to the consumer-law regime. It provided 
civil remedies for wronged consumers30 and introduced cooling-off periods in certain 







0(Gupta)  (date of use: 27 May 2019). 
27 See para 5.5 below. 
28 This is in stark contrast to the CPA where consumers are only protected, and not provided with 
effective rights and obligations. See Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.7 and 4.5. 
29 Chandran Business Law 173. The criminalisation of transgressions of the CPFTA was discussed 
in Parliament but never introduced in the CPFTA, Parliamentary Debate 10 November 2003 
available at https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic?reportid=-25_20031110_s0004_T0002 (date of 
use: 27 May 2019). This is one of the highly criticised aspects of the CPFTA and is discussed 
below. See Chandran Business Law 174; Chandran (2004) SJLS 222; and para 5.3.2.10. 
Chandran mentions that a possible reason for this could be that the introduction of criminal 
sanctions would further increase the expense of running a business in Singapore. He also argues 
that the additional remedies that provide that perpetrators can enter into a voluntary agreement of 
future compliance (s 8(1) of CPFTA) thus preventing further legal action, could perhaps 
compensate to an extent for the lack of criminal sanctions. Chandran (2004) SJLS 222. 
30 Chandran (2004) SJLS 217-220, 222-223. 
31 See s 11 of the CPFTA on the right to cancel certain contracts within a cancellation period. The 
term ‘cooling-off’ is not used in the CPFTA. It is a general term used when referring to the right to 
cancel in certain prescribed circumstances. See Chandran (2004) SJLS 220-222. 
32 See https://www.rba.gov.au/education/resources/explainers/the-global-financial-crisis.html (date 
of use: 24 April 2019). 
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was extended in 2009 to include financial products and services.33 In addition, the 
amended Act regulates unconscionable conduct not previously covered.34 
The CASE is committed to ‘protecting consumers (sic) interest through information 
and education, and promoting an environment of fair and ethical trade practices’.35 
It does this mainly by educating consumers, working with retailers, and lobbying for 
effective legislation or legislative amendments when needed – a three-pronged 
approach which considers all parties involved in consumer transactions.36 The 
CASE has an interesting and informative website with general advice for consumers 
and includes consumer alerts, statistics, and case studies. The CASE website also 
offers guidance and industry-specific tips for consumers; for instance on electronic 
equipment, electricians, and insurance.37 It even has an alphabetical ‘company alert 
list’ that lists businesses that have had numerous complaints laid against them in 
order to caution consumers when doing business with these traders.38 
 
33 These were previously excluded. See Singapore: Pubic Consultation on the Consumer 
Protection (Fair Trading) Act (2008) Commonw L Bulletin 34:1 149-211 https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
03050710801942704 (date of use: 26 May 2019); Singapore: Public consultation on the Consumer 
Protection (Fair Trading) Act (2008) 34 Commw L Bull 149-150 https://heinonline-
org.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/commwlb34&id=15







0(Tan%20A%20Legal%20update) (date of use: 27 May 2019); Yu available at 
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/sec/library/1011in11-e.pdf (date of use: 24 April 2019) 






0(The%20legal%20implications) (date of use: 27 May 2019). 
34 Yu available at https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-11/english/sec/library/1011in11-e.pdf (date of use: 
24 April 2019). The CASE and the Singapore Tourism Board were appointed as the bodies 
responsible for supervising unfair trade practices. Since 1 April 2018 the Competition and 
Consumer Commission of Singapore is responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions 






Fair%20trading%20Act%20Singapore)%20AND%20(Caveat%20Emptor) (date of use: 27 May 
2019). 
35 See https://www.case.org.sg/aboutus.aspx (date of use: 24 April 2019). 
36 See https://www.case.org.sg/aboutus.aspx (date of use: 24 April 2019). 
37 See https://www.case.org.sg/consumer_guides.aspx (date of use: 24 April 2019). 
38 See https://www.case.org.sg/consumeralertlist.aspx (date of use: 24 April 2019). 
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The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore39 has been responsible 
for the application, administration, and enforcement of the CPFTA since 1 April 
2018.40 
 
5.3 Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The CPFTA is a short, well-constructed Act consisting of four parts, comprising 21 
sections and four schedules.41 The purpose of the CPFTA is stated as: ‘to protect 
consumers against unfair practices and to give consumers additional rights in 
respect of goods that do not conform to contract, and for matters connected 
therewith’.42 
In practice, the effect of the CPFTA is that suppliers must provide consumers with 
information that could potentially affect consumers’ decisions on whether or not to 
enter into an agreement.43 This principle is known as ‘information-based consumer 
 
39 See para 5.1 above. 






Fair%20trading%20Act%20Singapore)%20AND%20(Caveat%20Emptor) (date of use: 27 May 
2019). For an explanation of their powers see the discussion in para 5.1. 
41 The Act is divided into Part I which explains terminology; Part II dealing with unfair practices; and 
Part III which provides additional rights to consumers in respect of goods that do not conform to 
contract (Lemon Law). Part IIIA sets out the investigative powers of the Commission and the court; 
Part IIIB explains the offences; and finally, Part IV contains general provisions. The first Schedule 
excludes certain transactions and Schedule 2 lists specific unfair practices. The third Schedule has 
been repealed. Schedule 4 explains how certain terms in the Act should be interpreted, and the 
fifth and final Schedule lists events of which the Commission should be notified. There appears to 
be a difference of opinion as to the origin of the CPFTA with some writers of the opinion that it is of 
Canadian origin – the Saskatchewan Consumer Protection Act Cap C 30.11996 Statutes of 
Saskatchewan. However, it also shows similarities to the Australian Trade Practices Act 51 of 
1974, Commonwealth Consolidated Acts; the Alberta Fair Trading Act (Cap F2, 2000 Revised 
Statutes of Alberta); the British Columbia Trade Practices Act (Cap 457, 1996, Consolidated 
Statutes of British Columbia); and New Zealand consumer legislation (New Zealand Fair Trading 
Act, Act 121 of 1986, New Zealand Statutes). See Chandran (2004) SJLS 192, 202; the Freely v 
Ong case 1069 1090-1091; and Paterson & Wong (2016) SAcLJ 1179 1081-1082.  Others contend 
that certain parts of the CPFTA- eg, ‘unfair advantage-taking’ – resemble the equitable doctrine of 
unconscionable dealing, which is of English origin, and used in Australia. See Paterson & Wong 
(2016) SAcLJ 1079, 1093.  
42 Preamble to the CPFTA stating the purpose of the Act. 
43 Sections 4 and 5(3)(b) of the CPFTA. Also see the Second Schedule to the CPFTA which lists 
specific unfair practices, many of which relate to information, misleading information, or omissions 
in information – eg, Part 1 items 2 and 20. The information referred to in s 4 will probably be a 
‘material fact’ which is defined in s 2(1) of the CPFTA as: ‘“material fact” means any information 
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protection’, and is aimed at ensuring the fair treatment of consumers.44 Suppliers 
are held liable for the information provided, or for the lack thereof.45 The CPFTA 
encourages consumers to settle conflicts and disputes with suppliers,46 and the 
failure to attempt to resolve conflicts could negatively affect the judgments of courts 
or referees.47 The Act also provides contravening suppliers with the opportunity to 
take remedial action by providing undertakings to correct unlawful practices to 
prevent legal action.48 One view of this effect on consumers is that it is a move away 
from the adage ‘buyers beware’ to one of ‘sellers be fair’.49 
Although the CPFTA does not contain a counterpart for section 14 of the CPA, the 
purpose of this comparison is to consider if there are better practices in Singapore 
regarding the matters covered by section 14 of the CPA, and whether section 14 is 
indeed essential to the South African consumer protection regime. 
So, the CPFTA has a completely different approach to consumer protection and a 
direct comparison between it and the CPA is not possible. However, to understand 
the conceptual basis on which the Singaporean legislation seeks to protect 
consumers, a discussion of the definitions in the CPFTA, and those sections which 
are pertinent to fixed-term contracts under the CPA, is necessary. 
 
that a supplier knows or ought reasonably to know would affect the decision of a consumer to enter 
into a consumer transaction’. An example of a material fact would, eg, be representing that goods 
are new and have not been used, while the goods have been altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, or 
have deteriorated. See the list of specific unfair practices in Part 1 of Schedule 2. 
44 The CPA also protects the consumer’s right to information and disclosure. The plain language 
provision in s 22 of the CPA is an example, and this right to disclosure and information promotes 
fairness. See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.3.2.5. Other sections in the CPA that could also be 
regarded as information-based are subs 14(2)(c) and (d). 
45 This may pose risks for professionals, eg, lawyers, when they advise clients and omit 
information. It is also difficult to establish beforehand what constitutes material information in given 
circumstances. Sometimes an omission can also be ascribed to lack of information provided by 
clients. See Loke (2004) Law Gazette 1-2; Paterson & Wong (2016) SAcLJ 1089-1092. 
Information-based consumer protection can also be criticised as it may provide so much 
information that a consumer is discouraged from paying attention to or reading all that is provided. 
In addition, illiterate consumers will not be able to access the information and disclosures, although 
the CPA in s 3(1)(b), and the CPFTA in s 4(c), both have provisions aimed at protecting vulnerable 
persons. Courts have the jurisdiction and powers provided for in s 7(4) of the CPFTA, which are 
discussed in para 5.3.2.10, but which may briefly be summarised as: an order for restitution of 
money or property; the award of damages, an order of specific performance, the repair of goods, or 
the provision of parts; and an order varying the contract terms and conditions. 
46 This aspect is discussed in greater detail in para 5.3.2.9.5. 
47 Chandran Business Law 172. This aspect is more fully discussed in para 5.3.2.9.5. 
48 Loke et al A Consumer’s Guide 3. 
49 For a discussion of caveat emptor and freedom of contract see Ch 2 paras 2.3.1 and 2.4.2. Loke 
et al A Consumer’s Guide 4; this is in apparent contrast to the statement made by the Minister of 
Trade in Parliament, when he expressly stated that buyers should answer for their own acts and 
decisions, available at https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/report?sittingdate=10-11-2003 (date of use: 
29 May 2020). 
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5.3.2 Relevant sections and Schedules 
5.3.2.1 Definitions 
I first analyse relevant definitions in the CPFTA before discussing provisions in the 
CPFTA relevant to fixed-term contracts. 
5.3.2.1.1 Consumer50 
‘“Consumer” means an individual who,51 otherwise than exclusively in the course of 
business  
(a) receives or has the right to receive goods or services from a supplier; or 
(b) has a legal obligation to pay a supplier for goods or services that have 
been or are to be supplied to another individual;’ 
This definition excludes juristic persons as it aims to protect the individual consumer 
who enters into an agreement in his private capacity, and not exclusively for or as 
the representative of a business.52 In terms of this definition a ‘consumer’ includes 
both A and B as ‘consumers’ in the situation where A buys a cell phone for or on 
behalf of B, from C.53 
The exclusion of small businesses from the application of the CPFTA has been 
criticised, and the court has acknowledged that small businesses could benefit from 
protection similar to that available to individuals when they are in a weaker 
bargaining position.54 The position in South Africa regarding juristic persons, is that 
these entities can be protected by the provisions in the CPA. There is a threshold 
value at which a juristic person with an annual turnover within the threshold values 
determined by the Minister from time to time, is regarded as a consumer for 
 
50 Section 2(1) of the CPFTA. 
51 The term ‘individual’ is not defined in the CPFTA. Chandran Business Law 167 contends that the 
term probably excludes businesses, except when a sole proprietor or member of a partnership 
deals purely in his or her personal capacity. 
52 Chandran Business Law 167 contends that ‘consumer’ probably does not include companies, 
statutory bodies, or other incorporated bodies. See too Booysen (2016) SJLS 226. 
53 An example is where someone receives goods as a gift, the receiver of the gift (B in this 
instance) will also be regarded as a consumer as he or she received or had the right to receive the 
goods in question. This also applies when a consumer rents a car – he or she will be regarded as a 
consumer as regards the car. See Chandran Business Law 168. 
54 Jurong Port Pte Ltd v Huationg Inland Transport Service Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR (R) 53 (hereafter 
Jurong) , although this decision was based on contract law and the court referred to the UCTA in 
this specific paragraph and its definition of consumer, this principle also applies to the CPFTA. 
Booysen refers to the situation in Australia where under the Australian Consumer Law certain 
businesses, other than public listed companies, are protected against unconscionable conduct in 
prescribed circumstances. She also refers to the application of the UCTA. Booysen (2016) SJLS 
219, 226. Note that in the Lemon Law the definition of consumer is wider – see para 5.3.2.7. Also 
compare this to the definition in the UCTA in para 5.4 below. 
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purposes of the CPA.55 However, section 14(1) of the CPA expressly excludes 
contracts between juristic persons from the application of section 14 as a whole.56 
5.3.2.1.2 Consumer transaction57 
‘“Consumer transaction” means — 
(a) the supply of goods or services by a supplier to a consumer as a result of 
a purchase, lease, gift, contest or other arrangement; or 
(b) an agreement between a supplier and a consumer, as a result of a 
purchase, lease, gift, contest or other arrangement, in which the supplier 
is to supply goods or services to the consumer or to another consumer 
specified in the agreement,  
but does not include any transaction specified in the First Schedule;’ 
Subsection (a) of this definition implies that no agreement is necessary.58 
Subsection (b) caters for those circumstances where there is an agreement. As 
discussed under the definition of consumer, a transaction will also cover the 
circumstances where consumer A buys goods or services for use by consumer B, 
as a gift or otherwise. 
There is no time limit on the duration of agreements or transactions in Singapore, 
and therefore no equivalent to section 14 of the CPA.59 This does not appear to be 
a problem in practice in Singapore, as no judgments could be found dealing with 
the duration of fixed-term agreements. There has been concern in Singapore 
regarding prepaid deals, specifically prepaid gym contracts,60 and the opinion was 
expressed that protection was needed for consumers when the businesses of such 
suppliers were liquidated.61 Nevertheless, it was emphasised that business should 
 
55 Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 316. 
56 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.6. 
57 Section 2(1) CPFTA. Although the term ‘consumer transaction’ is defined in the CPFTA, the 
terms contract and agreement are also used in the CPFTA, although not defined, and therefore 
these terms will be used interchangeably in this discussion. 
58 The exceptions in Schedule 1 relate to the acquisition of an estate or an interest in immovable 
property, see Chandran Business Law 166. These exceptions do not include leases and time-
share of immovable property. Employment contracts are excluded in the qualification of the 
definition of ‘consumer transaction’ in s 1(b) of Schedule 1 to the CPFTA. 
59 The only reference to a time limit, express or implied, is in Schedule 3 Part 2 item 3(1)(b) where 
it is states that ‘applicable agreement’ must be interpreted to mean that the price of goods is to be 
paid by two or more instalments. 
60 Apparently s 14 of the CPA was specifically aimed at protecting consumers entering into long-
term gym contracts. See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.1. 
61 Ng available at https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/mps-lawyers-call-more-safeguards-
consumers-buying-prepaid-deals (date of use: 20 June 2019) 1. 
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not be stifled by safety measures, and insurance was proposed as an alternative 
solution to protect consumers.62 
The provisions of the CPFTA cover all transactions not expressly excluded in 
Schedule 1, which implies that contracts for a fixed term are included in the CPFTA, 
as fixed-term contracts are not excluded in the schedule.63 There is no limitation in 
the CPFTA on the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts,64 which, of course, 
differs from the position under the CPA in South Africa. 
5.3.2.1.3 Goods65 
‘“Goods” means − 
(a) any personal property, whether tangible or intangible, and includes − 
(i) chattels that are attached or intended to be attached to real property 
on or after delivery; and 
(ii) financial products and credit, including credit extended solely on the 
security of land; 
(b) any residential property; or 
(c) a voucher;’ 
The definition of ‘goods’ is comprehensive. No goods, other than those defined in 
the section will be regarded as goods.66 The reference to residential property in the 
CPFTA relates to the lease or rental of that property and not its sale as the latter is 
excluded from the provisions of the CPFTA.67 
 
62 This view reflects the Minister’s view that business should not be repressed. See Parliamentary 






protection%20Fair%20trading%20Act%20Singapore) (date of use: 27 May 2019). 
63 These types of contract (cell phone purchase with airtime package, for example) could also for 
argument’s sake be covered by credit legislation or hire purchase legislation when finance for a 
loan is involved. 
64 Except for the minimum duration for time-share contracts, which should be longer than three 
years. See para 5.3.2.5. 
65 Section 2(1) CPFTA. 
66 Also see the discussion in Chandran Business Law 165. 
67 Excluded by the qualification of ‘consumer transactions’ in s 1(a) of Schedule 1 to the CPFTA 
which reads: ‘The term “consumer transaction” does not include any of the following transactions: 
(a) acquisition of an estate or interest in any immovable property (but not including any lease of 
residential property granted in consideration of rent or any time share contract).’ 
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There is also a financial limit to claims detailed in section 6(6) 68 of the CPFTA.69 The 
limit is relatively low, according to critics, which restricts the use of the CPFTA and 
its potential benefit for consumers. The practical effect is that the CPFTA is not 
sufficiently used and so does not have optimal impact.70 
5.3.2.1.4 Services71 
‘“Services” includes − 
(a) a service offered or provided that involves the addition to or maintenance, 
repair or alteration of goods or any residential property; 
(b) a membership in any club or organisation if the club or organisation is a 
business formed to make a profit for its owners; 
(c) the right to use time share accommodation under a time share contract; 
and 
(d) financial services;’ 
This is not an exhaustive definition and Chandran argues that professional services 




means a person who, in the course of the person’s business − 
(a) provides goods or services to consumers; 
(b) manufactures, assembles or produces goods; 
 
68 Currently S$ 30 000. This was the equivalent of approximately R 370 000 on 18 June 2020. 
69 Section 6(2) of the CPFTA. 
70 Chandran Business Law 174. 
71 Section 2(1) CPFTA. 
72 Chandran (2004) SJLS 194. 
73 In item 1b of Schedule I to the CPFTA. Previously certain financial services were also excluded, 
probably because they were already covered by other legislation. Chandran criticises this reason 
for the exclusion and also argues that some unfair practices were not covered by these other Acts, 
(CPFTA and UCTA), eg, using small print to obscure essential and material facts, or the use of 
oppressive terms that were not necessarily regulated by these Acts. See Chandran (2004) SJLS 
195. The legislature deleted the exclusion on 4 August 2016, and these transactions are now 
covered by the CPFTA, see item 20 of Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the CPFTA regarding small print. 
The position regarding contracts of employment is similar to the position in South Africa under the 
CPA, see Ch 4 para 4.2.3.6.5. 
74 Section 2(1) CPFTA. Note that the term supplier is not used in the Lemon Law – see para 
5.3.2.7 below. 
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(c) promotes the use or purchase of goods or services; or 
(d) receives or is entitled to receive money or other consideration as a result 
of the provision of goods or services to consumers, 
and includes any employee or agent of the person, and the word “supply”, with its 
grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall have corresponding 
meanings;’ 
It is clear, from this definition, that if a supplier concludes a private sale, for example 
of his or her personal second-hand cell phone or car, that sale will not be covered 
by the CPFTA as the transaction was entered in his or her personal capacity.75 
The consumer can hold an employee or agent liable, because both are included in 
this definition of supplier.76 It is not clear under what circumstances a consumer will 
choose to hold the employee or agent liable as it will generally be to his or her 
advantage to act against the supplier who should be in a stronger financial position77 
or be covered by insurance against liability. The supplier is also vicariously liable for 
the acts of its employee or agent.78 This is similar to section 113 of the CPA. 
Manufacturers, assemblers, producers, and promotion businesses are further 
included in the definition of supplier. It is unclear whether the consumer can hold 
such a business liable for unfair practices if he or she had no direct contact with the 
business.79 Chandran contends that direct contact is not required for the following 
reasons:80 
• If direct contact had been required, the legislature would not have 
included subsections (b) to (d) in the definition. 
• Section 16 provides that a bona fide person who advertises, prints, 
distributes or supplies an advertisement in his ordinary course of 
business is not liable under the CPFTA for a representation or omission 
in that advertisement. This points to the fact that if the operation of the 
section was intended to be restricted to persons who had direct contact 
or agreements with the supplier, section 16 would not have been 
necessary. 
• Agents and employees are expressly included in the definition, although 
they are not likely to have agreements with the consumer. 
• When consumers receive gifts from suppliers, the consumer can hold the 
supplier liable despite there being no agreement in respect of the gift.81 
 
75 Chandran Business Law 196. 
76 Chandran Business Law 167. 
77 Chandran (2004) SJLS 196. 
78 Section 5(3)(b) CPFTA; Chandran Business Law 167. 
79 Chandran Business Law 196. 
80 Chandran (2004) SJLS 196. 
81 Chandran (2004) SJLS 197. 
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• When a person receives goods paid for by another, the recipient can act 
against the supplier82 even though he or she has no agreement with the 
supplier.83 
A consumer can hold a manufacturer liable, despite the absence of a direct 
agreement between the parties, in the event of an unfair practice84 which stems from 
statements, omissions, representations, or misrepresentations in the information or 
warranty document provided by the manufacturer together with the relevant goods. 
Because a promotions company can make misrepresentations or provide incorrect 
information during the promotion of a product, that company should ensure that the 
information conveyed in a promotion is accurate. The unfair practice must relate to 
a consumer transaction and must, therefore, be aimed at the consumer and not the 
supplier.85 For instance, when an unfair practice occurs when manufacturers 
promote goods to suppliers to stock a certain product or range, and the promotional 
material is not directed at consumers, the manufacturers will not be guilty of an 
unfair practice under this section. 
It is clear that when a consumer bases his or her action on unfair practice,86 he or 
she can choose from a range of parties to hold liable: the manufacturer, assembler, 
promotions company, supplier, employee, or agent. However, a bona fide printer, 
distributor, or broadcaster cannot be held liable for an unfair practice.87 
Section 7(3)88 of the CPFTA might be relevant here, as it provides that actions in 
terms of the Act shall be deemed to be based on contract. However, section 7(3) 
only deals with jurisdictional matters89 and cannot be taken to imply that an 
agreement is not a sine qua non. Section 7(3) merely provides that it is not 
necessary to prove the existence of an agreement. One could also argue that a 
claim does not have to be based on an agreement between the parties because 
section 5(1) provides that an unfair practice can take place before, during, and after 
the transaction.90 Clearly, before the transaction no agreement exists. 
From the above, it can be concluded that the CPFTA creates new statutory rights 
for consumers, which are not necessarily based on the existence of an agreement 
between the consumer and the party who may be held liable.91 Therefore, a 
 
82 Chandran (2004) SJLS 197. 
83 This is similar to the position in South Africa, see the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.6.1. 
84 See the discussion of unfair practice in par 5.3.2.1.6 below. 
85 Chandran (2004) SJLS 199. 
86 The consumer can only do this in the case of unfair practice, see para 5.3.2.1.6 below. 
87 Section 16 CPFTA. 
88 Section 7(3) reads: ‘(3) For the purposes of determining whether an action under section 6(1) 
exceeds the District Court limit or the Magistrate’s Court limit within the meaning of the State 
Courts Act (Cap. 321), such an action shall be deemed to be a claim founded on contract.’ 
89 Chandran 2004 SJLS 197 n 42. 
90 See the example provided by Chandran (2004) SJLS 197 n 42 and see Ch 4 para 4.3.2.2. 
91 Chandran (2004) SJLS 197. 
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consumer in Singapore has a wide choice of defendants whom he or she can hold 
liable when his or her action is based on an unfair practice under section 4.92 
Similarly, in South Africa a consumer under section 56(1) read with section 61(1) of 
the CPA, can hold every person in the supply chain liable for harm provided for in 
section 61(5) of the CPA. However, the harm in section 61(5) of the CPA relates to 
death, injury, illness, and loss, and is not based on unfair practice as in section 4 of 
the CPFTA. 
5.3.2.1.6 Unfair practice 
‘Unfair practice’ is defined in section 2 of the CPFTA as an unfair practice within 
the meaning of section 4 of the CPFTA. 
The definition of ‘unfair practice’ is very brief. Sections 493 and 594 deal with the 
concept more fully. 
5.3.2.2 Section 495 
Section 4 aims to protect consumers against misleading or deceptive statements 
or omissions by the supplier. Section 4 also protects consumers against false 
claims by suppliers, or from being taken advantage of by suppliers. An unfair 
practice by a supplier includes an act or omission resulting in the reasonable 
deception and misleading of a consumer, the making of a false claim, the taking 
advantage of vulnerable consumers, and finally, the commission of an unfair 
practice as described in Part 1 of the Second Schedule.96 
 
92 Sections 56(1) and 61(1) of the CPA contain similar provisions regarding product liability (as 
opposed to s 4 of the CPFTA which deals with unfair practice in Singapore). Sections 56(1) and 
61(1) provide that the consumer can hold the whole supply chain liable in the circumstances 
provided for in these sections. Supply chain is defined in s 1 of the CPA as all the suppliers who 
contribute in turn to supply the goods or services to the consumer, whether it is a supplier, the 
producer, an importer, a retail merchant, or a service provider. See para 5.3.2.1.6. 
93 Section 4 of the CPFTA deals with the meaning of unfair practice. 
94 The definition of unfair practice in s 2 does not refer to s 5. Section 5 only provides for the 
circumstances surrounding an unfair practice. 
95 4. ‘It is an unfair practice for a supplier, in relation to a consumer transaction − 
(a) to do or say anything, or omit to do or say anything, if as a result a consumer might 
reasonably be deceived or misled; 
(b) to make a false claim; 
(c) to take advantage of a consumer if the supplier knows or ought reasonably to know that 
the consumer − 
(i) is not in a position to protect his own interests; or 
(ii) is not reasonably able to understand the character, nature, language or effect of the 
transaction or any matter related to the transaction; or 
(d) without limiting the generality of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), to do anything specified in 
the Second Schedule.’ 
96 Part 1 of Schedule 2 deals with specific unfair practices. 
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Section 4 has the same tenor as the unfairness and unconscionability provisions in 
Part F of the CPA.97 
5.3.2.3 Section 598 
Section 5 deals with circumstances surrounding unfair practices and provides that 
an unfair practice can be committed before, during, or after a consumer transaction99 
and can be a single act or omission.100 Section 5 also provides that the 
reasonableness101 of the actions of the person102 must be considered, and extends 
liability for the act or omission103 to acts or omissions performed by an agent or 
employee. ‘Act or omission’ implies that the provisions of section 5(2) of the CPFTA 
are pro-active and sanction omissions. Therefore, the supplier must act pro-actively 
to prevent liability in terms of section 5(2) of the CPFTA. Section 5(3)(b) also 
provides for the vicarious liability of the employer or principal of an employee or 
agent.104 
5.3.2.4 Remedies in respect of unfair practice 
Section 7(4) of the CPFTA provides that ‘without prejudice to any other powers of 
the court to grant relief, a court105 (other than a Small Claims Tribunal)106 may in any 
 
97 Also see s 40(2) of the CPA discussed in Ch 4 para 4.3.2.2.1. 
98 ‘Section 5 − 
(1) An unfair practice may occur before, during or after a consumer transaction. 
(2) An unfair practice may consist of a single act or omission. 
(3) In determining whether or not a person has engaged in an unfair practice − 
(a) the reasonableness of the actions of that person in those circumstances is to be 
considered; and 
(b) an act or omission by an employee or agent of a person is deemed also to be an act 
or omission of the person if the act or omission occurred in the course of – 
(i) the employee’s employment with the person; or 
(ii) the agent exercising the powers or performing the duties on behalf of the 
person within the scope of the agent’s actual or apparent authority.’ 
99 Section 5(1) of the CPFTA. This implies that the section obliges the supplier to behave 
proactively. 
100 Section 5(2) of the CPFTA. 
101 Section 5(3)(a) of the CPFTA. The term ‘reasonableness’ is not defined in the CPFTA. 
Chandran Business Law 171 argues that reasonableness could serve as a defence for the 
supplier. 
102 The term ‘person’ refers to the supplier, his or her employee (s 5(3)(b)(i)of the CPFTA) or agent 
(s 5(3)(b)(ii) of the CPFTA). 
103 Section 5(1) CPFTA. 
104 The provisions of s 5(3)(b) of the CPFTA is similar to the position in South Africa in s 113 of the 
CPA. 
105 ‘Court’ is not defined in the CPFTA. 
106 The Small Claims Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over matters based on hire-purchase 
agreements, time-share contracts, or the rental or sale of immovable property. However, s 7(1) 
provides that the Small Claims Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters 
provided for in s 7(1)(a)-(e) of the CPFTA. Also see s 7(2)-(5) of the CPFTA; Loke et al A 
Consumer’s Guide 36. The Small Claims Tribunal is restricted in jurisdiction based on the 
monetary value of the claim, currently S$ 20 000 (R 247 000), which can be raised to S$ 30 000 
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proceedings where the court finds that a supplier has engaged in an unfair practice’, 
make the following orders:107 
• order restitution of money, property, or other consideration provided by 
the consumer; 
• award damages for any loss the consumer suffered as a result of the 
unfair practice; 
• make an order for specific performance against the supplier; 
• direct the supplier to repair goods, or provide parts for goods; or 
• make an order to vary the contract terms. 
In addition, the court may require a supplier who has not complied with the 
provisions of the CPFTA, to publish the fact that there is an injunction against it – a 
so-called ‘name-and-shame’ tactic – to ensure that suppliers adhere to the 
requirements of the CPFTA.108 The errant supplier must inform the Commission of 
certain prescribed matters to keep the Commission updated and to allow it to ensure 
compliance with the relevant order.109 This measure ensures the continued 
supervision over errant suppliers, and continued protection of consumers.110 The 
Commission, in these circumstances, provides a supervisory compliance function, 
in addition to, and as a consequence of, the court order. This strengthens and 
ensures continued enforcement of both consumer redress and enforcement 
measures to effect better implementation of the protective measures in the CPFTA. 
In addition, the consumer has the right to cancel the agreement in terms of certain 
sections of the CPFTA when the ‘cooling-off’ period applies – eg, in time-share 
 
(approximately R 370 000 on 18 June 2020) if both parties agree. See 
https://www.statecourts.gov.sg/cws/SmallClaims/Pages/GeneralInformation.aspx#:~:text=Jurisdicti
on%20of%20the%20Tribunals,it%20within%20the%20Tribunals'%20jurisdiction. (date of use 15 
June 2020). 
107 Chandran Business Law 172; Loke et al A Consumer’s Guide 35-36. 
108 Section 9(5)(b) CPFTA. 
109 Amended by Act 25 of 2016 Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Amendment) Act 2016. See s 













of use: 27 May 2019). 
110 Since the publication of this legal bulletin the Competition and Consumer Commission (the 
Commission) has been appointed as administering agent. See para 5.1 above. 
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contracts.111 Section 12F of the CPFTA provides powers for courts in connection 
with the Lemon Law.112 
The CPFTA also regulates time-share. 
5.3.2.5 Time-share113 
The definitions of time-share accommodation, time-share contract, time-share 
related contract, and time-share rights in section 2(1) of the CPFTA are not unusual, 
and refer to rights in terms of agreements in respect of living accommodation 
intended to be used for leisure purposes by parties who have the right or rights to 
use that accommodation.114 This right is conditional on the period for which the rights 
can be exercised being not less than three years.115 A right to accommodation in 
terms of a contract of employment does not qualify as a time-share right or rights.116 
The CPFTA was amended in 2008 to provide adequate protection for time-share 
buyers.117 The definitions of the abovementioned terms were inserted in the CPFTA 
 
111 Chandran Business Law 172-173. These contracts where the so-called ‘cooling-off’ period 
applies are regulated by s 11 of the CPFTA. The types of contract to which this right applies are 
not listed in s 11 of the CPFTA, but are prescribed by regulation – eg, time-share contracts, see 
para 5.3.2.5 below. The CPA also has cooling-off periods in certain instances, see Ch 4 para 4.4.2. 
112 See para 5.3.2.7 below for an explanation of the term ‘Lemon Law’. Part II of the CPFTA is 
referred to as the Lemon Law for ease of reference. 
113 Section 2(1) of the CPFTA provides the following definitions relevant to time-share:  
‘“time share accommodation” means any living accommodation, in Singapore or elsewhere, 
used or intended to be used (wholly or partly) for leisure purposes by a class of persons all of 
whom have rights to use, or participate in arrangements under which they may use, that 
accommodation or accommodation within a pool of accommodation to which that 
accommodation belongs. 
“time share contract” means a contract which confers or purports to confer on an individual 
time share rights that are exercisable during a period of not less than 3 years; 
“time share related contract” means a contract to assist a consumer to dispose of his time 
share rights conferred under a time share contract; 
“time share rights” mean rights to use time share accommodation for a specified or 
ascertainable period, but do not include rights under a contract of employment or an 
insurance policy.’ 
114 All of these will be collectively referred to as time-share. 
115 See the definitions of ‘time share accommodation’, ‘time share contract’, ‘time share related 
contract’ and ‘time share rights’ in s 2(1) of the CPFTA. Also see Chandran Business Rights 164 n 
33. 
116 See definition of ‘time share rights’ in s 2(1) CPFTA. 
117 Section 2 (g) of the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Amendment Act 15 of 2008. For further 
reading see a bulletin on the public consultation process on the proposed amendments before 
these amendments came into operation. The CPFTA is evaluated and measured against 
international legislation on a regular basis, and it was decided to amend the CPFTA to widen its 
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to include time-share purchasers under the protection offered to consumers by the 
CPFTA. 
This amendment was implemented by way of the CPFTA (Cancellation of 
Contracts) Regulations 2009.118 These regulations contain definitions of cancellation 
periods, notices to consumers, long-term holiday products, cancellation notices, and 
other relevant terms.119 The most important definition is that of a ‘regulated contract’, 
which means ‘a direct sales contract, a long-term holiday product contract, a time 
share contract or a time share related contract’.120  
Regulation 4(2) provides that a consumer may give notice of cancellation of the 
time-share agreement at any time within the cancellation period, or the extended 
cancellation period, where applicable. The cancellation period in terms of the 
regulations for time-share products is a period of five days (excluding weekends 
and public holidays) after the contract is entered into,121 or five days after the 
consumer information notice has been brought to the attention of the consumer.122 
The supplier is not entitled to claim payments or other consideration before the 
expiry of the cancellation period.123 In other words, the cancellation period is 
essentially a ‘cooling-off’ period.124 
Notice of cancellation may be given in a prescribed form,125 or by any other notice 
in writing.126 Should the consumer not cancel the contract within five days, he or she 










FileUri=/Commentaries/50333-M/resource/LGUPD_[2006]_ALGL_21_v1.0.pdf (date of use: 27 
May 2019). 
118 Hereafter the CC Regulations which came into operation on 15 April 2009. 
119 See https://www.mti.gov.sg/Legislation/Legislation/Consumer-Protection (date of use: 14 
November 2019). 
120 See the definitions in reg 2(1) for more information. The regulations also provide for the 
exercise of the powers in s 11 which deals with the cooling-off periods and s 18A which provides 
that the burden of proof in consumer disputes rests on the supplier.  
121 Reg 4(2) of the CC Regulations. 
122 Reg 4(1) of the CC Regulations. 
123 Reg 3A CC Regulations. 
124 Cooling-off in Singaporean law is discussed by Loke et al A Consumer’s Guide 21-22. 
125 Reg 4(7) CC Regulations. 
126 The consumer can give notice of cancellation by using the form prescribed in the CC 
Regulations and by delivering it personally, sending it by pre-paid post, or sending it via facsimile. 
For more information see https://www.mti.gov.sg/Legislation/Legislation/Consumer-Protection 
(date of use: 14 November 2019) and Loke et al A Consumer’s Guide 22-23. 
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cancellation, the consumer can lodge a complaint with the CASE.127 All monies paid 
by the consumer must be refunded within 60 days of cancellation.128 
Although the legislature’s policy to uphold the maxim caveat emptor129 is tempered 
when it comes to time-share, after the cooling-off period the consumer is bound by 
the agreement. This position is similar to the position in South Africa,130 but differs 
from the position in the UK which is more beneficial to the consumer.131 
5.3.2.6 Other consumer protection provisions 
Section 13 prohibits the contractual exclusion of provisions of the CPFTA, except in 
settlement of a dispute. This prohibition is similar to section 51 of the CPA.132 
Section 15 provides that despite any provision in the CPFTA, consumers retain all 
rights and remedies in terms of other legislation or common-law rights, subject to 
the provisions in section 11 – which provides for regulations regarding cancellation 
rights – and section 20 – which provides that the Minister may from time to time 
make regulations necessary or expedient for the purposes of the CPFTA. At first 
glance, section 15 appears similar to section 2(10) of the CPA. However, section 
2(10) is more restrictive in that it applies only to provisions of the CPA,133 not to 
agreements entered into, which, unless specifically otherwise provided by 
legislation, are entered into and regulated by the common law.134 
5.3.2.7 The ‘Lemon Law’135 
In 2012, the so-called ‘Lemon Law’ was added to the Act as Part III.136 The Lemon 
Law provides the consumer with remedies to replace products, or be refunded the 
 
127 For a discussion of the powers and authority of the CASE, see para 5.1 above. 
128 For a discussion of the consumer’s right to cancel see https://singaporelegaladvice.com/law-
articles/unfair-sale-practices-cooling-periods-right-cancel-contracts-consumer-protection-fair-
trading-act/ (date of use: 14 November 2019). 
129 Parliamentary Debate on 10 November 2003 available at 
https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/report?sittingdate=10-11-2003 (date of use: 29 May 2020). 
130 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.9. 
131 See the discussion of this aspect in Ch 6 para 6.4. 
132 See Ch 4 para 4.3.2.3.3. 
133 See Ch 4 para 4.2.4. 
134 See Ch 4 para 4.2.4. 
135 See para 5.3.1 above. See the discussion of the term ‘Lemon Law’ in Loke (2014) SJLS 285-
286. See also Lau http://learn.asialawnetwork.com/2017/12/05/a-guide-to-singapores-lemon-law-
the-law-protecting-consumers-in-singapore/ (date of use: 25 April 2019). The provisions in Part III 
of the CPFTA are referred to as the ‘Lemon Law’ for ease of reference. As consumer rights in 
respect of non-conforming goods do not form part of the focus of this thesis, I will only highlight a 
few pertinent aspects. 
136 See Part III of the CPFTA. 
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purchase price (or part thereof), in the event of defective goods, when replacement 
or repair of the goods has been unsuccessful.137 
Under the Lemon Law, if at the time of delivery the goods delivered (but not services 
as the Lemon Law only applies to goods)138 do not correspond to what is described 
in the relevant contract, or as regards the quality thereof, the consumer is entitled139 
to require the transferor (not the supplier)140 to repair or replace the goods.141 
Alternatively, the consumer can require the transferor to reduce the purchase price 
by an appropriate amount142 or to rescind the agreement.143 If the transferor 
discloses a defect, or if the defect was or would have been easy to see during a 
proper inspection by the consumer, the consumer will not be able to base his or her 
claim on the Lemon Law. 
The scope of certain definitions in the CPFTA is widened in section 12A for 
purposes of the Lemon Law, and do not correspond fully to the definitions in the rest 
of the CPFTA. For instance, the definition of transferee is not exactly the same as 
the definition of consumer in the rest of the CPFTA. This aspect can be criticised as 
 
137 There are different views on the origin of the term Lemon Law. Some writers view it as British 
slang for substandard goods, while others allege it is an American term used in connection with the 
sale of second-hand motor vehicles. Loke (2014) SJLS 285 n 3 and 286 n 4. See the Parliament 
Report Parliament No 12 Session No 1 Volume 88 Sitting no 23 date 9 March 2012 Second 





ContentPage&contentDocID=/SPRS/0070_88_23_bill-5.xml&queryStr=(Lemon%20Law) (date of 
use: 26 May 2019); https://www.gov.sg/factually/content /what-is-the-lemon-law (date of use: 26 
May 2019); Booysen (2016) SJLS 223; Chin & Yusoff (2017) International Business Management 
1328, 1332. 
138 Similar to s 56(2) of the CPA. 
139 Section 12C of the CPA. 
140 The definitions in section 12A of the CPFTA do not use the term supplier, but rather transferor 
which is defined as:  
‘(a) in relation to a contract of sale of goods, means the seller within the meaning of the Sale 
of Goods Act; 
(b) in relation to a contract for the transfer of goods, has the same meaning as in the Supply 
of Goods Act; and 
(c) in relation to a hire-purchase agreement, means the owner within the meaning of the 
Hire-Purchase Act.’ 
141 Loke (2014) SJLS 301-303. 
142 Loke (2014) SJLS 305 
143 Loke (2014) SJLS 304-305. The Lemon Law differs from s 20 of the CPA as s 20 only entitles 
the consumer to return goods within 10 days of delivery of the goods, cooling-off in certain 
prescribed circumstances. Also see Tan https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/majority-
of-lemon-law-car-disputes-resolved (date of use: 25 April 2019); Poh 
https://blog.moneysmart.sg/shopping/lemon-law-singapore/ (date of use: 25 April 2019); Loke 
(2014) SJLS 285-306. 
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it could lead to differing interpretations to these two terms which could lead to 
confusion.144 
The right to repair, replacement, reduction of the purchase price, or rescission of 
the contract is qualified by a time limit of six months after delivery of the goods.145 
However, the six months’ time limit does not apply if it is established that the goods 
complied with the agreement on the date of delivery. The six months’ time limit also 
does not apply146 if the nature of the goods is such that they cannot last for six 
months – eg, perishables like vegetables and meat, or other products with an expiry 
date. 
The Lemon Law has been criticised for being ‘bolted on’ to existing legislation and 
for being unclear for unsophisticated consumers.147 The inclusion of the Lemon Law 
in the CPFTA also creates a more difficult dispute resolution procedure. It is 
submitted that the subtle differences in definitions, and the general overlap of the 
CPFTA and the Lemon Law can cause confusion and problems in practice. 
The provisions of the Lemon Law are relevant to consumers under fixed-term 
contracts, for example, in terms of an agreement for the purchase (and service 
delivery) of a cell phone.148 
Section 12A provides for the interpretation of the Lemon Law, and defines key 
terms. Section 12B149 deals with the general application of the Lemon law. Section 
 
144 Loke (2014) SJLS 28-290, 306. 
145 Section 12B(3) CPFTA. This is similar to s 56 of the CPA. See Ch 4 para 4.3.3.4. 
146 Section 12B(4) CPFTA. 
147 Loke (2014) SJLS 289-290, 306. 
148 A cell phone contract normally covers both the purchase and service delivery of the phone – but 
bear in mind the Lemon Law as it appears in the CPFTA will not apply to the service delivery part 
of the agreement. 
149 ‘12B. –  (1) This Part applies if − 
(a) the transferee deals as consumer; 
(b) the goods do not conform to the applicable contract at the time of delivery; and 
(c) the contract was made on or after the date of commencement of section 6 of 
the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Amendment) Act 2012. 
(2) If this section applies, the transferee has the right − 
(a) under and in accordance with section 12C, to require the transferor to repair or 
replace the goods; or 
(b) under and in accordance with section 12D − 
(i) to require the transferor to reduce the amount to be paid for the transfer by 
the transferee by an appropriate amount; or 
(ii) to rescind the contract with regard to the goods in question. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), goods which do not conform to the applicable 
contract at any time within the period of 6 months starting after the date on which 
the goods were delivered to the transferee must be taken not to have so conformed 
at that date. 
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if − 
(a) it is established that the goods did so conform at that date; or 
(b) its application is incompatible with the nature of the goods or the nature of the 
lack of conformity.’ 
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12B provides that the consumer (transferee150 in the Lemon Law) has the right to 
repair or replacement, or a price reduction or rescission of the contract, when the 
goods do not conform to the contract at date of delivery, and that the time frame for 
repair or replacement is six months. In the alternative, the consumer can claim a 
price reduction or rescind the agreement.151  
Section 12C152 qualifies the repair or replacement of goods and provides that the 
transferor must repair or replace the goods within a reasonable time, without 
causing significant inconvenience to the consumer. It also requires the supplier to 
bear the costs of repairing or replacing the goods. If replacement is impossible or 
disproportionate in comparison to other remedies or a suitable reduction or 
rescission, the consumer will not be entitled to such repair or replacement. To 
establish this disproportionality the section provides for the consideration of the 
value of the goods, the lack of conformity, and the degree of inconvenience to the 
 
150 The definition of transferee in s 12A of the CPFTA reads: 
‘“transferee”  − 
(a) in relation to a contract of sale of goods, means the buyer within the meaning of the Sale 
of Goods Act; 
(b) in relation to a contract for the transfer of goods, has the same meaning as in the Supply 
of Goods Act; and 
(c) in relation to a hire-purchase agreement, means the hirer within the meaning of the Hire-
Purchase Act.’ 
151 The price reduction or rescission provisions are found in s 12D. For a detailed discussion of s 
12B see Loke (2014) SJLS 285-306. 
152 ‘12C.− (1)  If section 12B applies, the transferee may require the transferor to − 
(a) repair the goods; or 
(b) replace the goods. 
(2) If the transferee requires the transferor to repair or replace the goods, the transferor 
must − 
(a) repair or, as the case may be, replace the goods within a reasonable time and 
without causing significant inconvenience to the transferee; and 
(b) bear any necessary costs incurred in doing so (including in particular the cost 
of any labour, materials or postage). 
(3) The transferee must not require the transferor to repair or, as the case may be, 
replace the goods if that remedy is − 
(a) impossible; 
(b) disproportionate in comparison to the other of those remedies; or 
(c) disproportionate in comparison to an appropriate reduction in the amount to be 
paid for the transfer under paragraph (a), or rescission under paragraph (b), of 
section 12D(1). 
(4) One remedy is disproportionate in comparison to the other if the one imposes costs 
on the transferor which, in comparison to those imposed on him by the other, are 
unreasonable, taking into account − 
(a) the value which the goods would have if they conformed to the applicable 
contract; 
(b) the significance of the lack of conformity with the applicable contract; and 
(c) whether the other remedy could be effected without causing significant 
inconvenience to the transferee. 
(5) Any question as to what is a reasonable time or significant inconvenience is to be 
determined by reference to − 
(a) the nature of the goods; and 
(b) the purpose for which the goods were acquired.’ 
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consumer. The nature and purpose of the goods must also be considered when 
establishing a reasonable time or significant inconvenience. 
Section 12D153 provides that the consumer can claim a reduction in price by a 
proportionate amount or rescind the contract. Loke emphasises that the legislature 
specifically provided that replacement and repair are to be preferred over price 
reduction and rescission. He cautions that courts should not undermine or erode 
the consumer’s statutory right to repair or replacement of a product by too readily 
ordering a reduction in price or rescission of the agreement.154 This, of course, 
confirms the application of the principle pacta servanda sunt.155 
Before rejecting and terminating the agreement, or requiring the replacement of the 
goods, the consumer must give the transferor a reasonable time to repair or replace 
the goods in terms of section12E.156 
Despite being criticised as an add-on measure causing confusion,157 overall the 
Lemon Law benefits consumers in Singapore. Detailed measures, as contained in 
the Lemon Law, could benefit consumers in South Africa as the current measures 
in sections 56 to 61 of the CPA are neither as detailed, nor as sophisticated as those 
in the Lemon Law.158 
The Lemon Law is similar to the provisions of sections 56 and 61 of the CPA,159 in 
that both aim to regulate the return of goods that do not comply with the description 
and or standard of goods in the agreement, or the warranty as to their quality. These 
latter sections deal with replacement, repair, or refund in respect of the goods to the 
 
153 ‘12D.− (1)  If section 12B applies, the transferee may − 
(a) require the transferor to reduce the amount to be paid for the transfer of the 
goods in question to the transferee by an appropriate amount; or 
(b) rescind the contract with regard to those goods, 
if the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied. 
(2) The condition is that − 
(a) by virtue of section 12C(3) the transferee may require neither repair nor 
replacement of the goods; or 
(b) the transferee has required the transferor to repair or replace the goods, but the 
transferor is in breach of the requirement of section 12C(2)(a) to do so within a 
reasonable time and without causing significant inconvenience to the 
transferee. 
(3)  For the purposes of this Part, if the transferee rescinds the contract, any 
reimbursement to the transferee may be reduced to take account of the use he has 
had of the goods since they were delivered to him.’ 
154 See Loke (2014) SJLS 305. 
155 Also, see the discussion of this aspect in Ch 2 para 2.4; Ch 3 para 3.2.2; and Ch 4 para 
4.2.3.7.11. 
156 Section 12E of Part III of the CPFTA. 
157 Loke (2014) SJLS 306 
158 See ss 56-61 of the CPA, and the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.3.3.4. 
159 For a detailed critical discussion of s 61 of the CPA see Tennant LLD. 
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consumer.160 While the CPA contains a similar provision in section 56(2), the extent 
of detailed protection offered by the CPFTA is superior to that of the CPA.161  
The remedies, powers, and orders in Singapore as regards ‘Lemon Law’ matters, 
are more explicitly described, wider, and more effective than those available to the 
consumer under section 14 of the CPA which details no specific remedies or orders 
in section 14 itself, or in sections of the CPA relevant to section 14, to protect the 
consumer in circumstances such as non-delivery or material default by the supplier 
of the goods under a fixed-term agreement.162 
5.3.2.8 Time limit for institution of action 
The consumer must institute action within the period prescribed in section 12(1) of 
the CPFTA, which in general is two years after the occurrence date of the event on 
which the claim is based.163 
I briefly consider procedural matters next, before highlighting a few pertinent 
aspects of jurisdiction, the powers of courts, and the enforcement of the CPFTA by 
the Commission. 
5.3.2.9 Procedural matters 
The Singapore legal system is based on English law and many of the procedures 
are similar to those in South Africa. What follows is a brief analysis of the procedural 
issues that affect the functioning of the CPFTA. 
5.3.2.9.1 Parol evidence 
Section 17164 of the CPFTA deals with the parol evidence rule.165 It expressly allows 
evidence regarding express warranties in consumer law actions, even though they 
 
160 Note that s 56 of the CPA deals with goods only, and not services. Note that the CPA also has 
provisions dealing with product liability, see the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.3.3.4. 
161 The section in the CPA could disadvantage the supplier or the consumer unreasonably as 
unlike its counterpart in the CPFTA, the section does not provide for disproportionality or 
inconvenience to be taken into account. 
162 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7. 
163 For exceptions see s 12. 
164 ‘Section 17.− (1) Notwithstanding sections 93 and 94 of the Evidence Act (Cap. 97), parol 
or extrinsic evidence establishing the existence of an express warranty is 
admissible in any action relating to a consumer transaction between a 
consumer and a supplier even though it adds to, varies or contradicts a 
written contract. 
(2)  Subsection (1) shall not be applicable to establish the existence of any 
express warranty in respect of goods or services intended for business 
use.’ 
165 For a discussion of parol evidence see Ch 3 para 3.2.9; Ch 4 para 4.3.2.7, and Ch 6 para 6.3.6. 
The rule is abolished in certain sections of the CPFTA despite the provisions of ss 93 and 94 of the 
Evidence Act (Cap 97) of Singapore. 
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may vary or contradict any written agreement between the parties.166 This is an 
advantage of the CPFTA, not only because it provides clarity on the contentious 
issue of parol evidence,167 but it also assists the court when interpreting express 
warranties in an agreement, in particular in instances of unequal bargaining 
positions, unfairness, and unconscionability, and when vulnerable consumers are 
concerned.168 
Section 17 appears to abolish the parol evidence rule in respect of express 
warranties only. However, when section 5(3)(a)169 of the CPFTA is interpreted, the 
parol evidence rule is, by implication, abolished in most if not all consumer 
complaints. Section 5(3)(a) of the CPFTA aims to determine the reasonableness of 
a person’s actions to establish whether an unfair practice occurred before, during, 
or after a consumer transaction.170 When case law is studied, it is clear that all 
extrinsic evidence, including parol evidence, is taken into account by courts when 
adjudicating consumer law issues.171 
In South Africa, similar but less extensive exclusions of the parol evidence rule exist. 
The parol evidence rule is excluded in the circumstances provided for in section 
4(4)(b)(iii) of the CPA where a court or tribunal must interpret a standard form, a 
contract, or other document prepared by, or on behalf of the supplier to advance the 
purposes and policies of the CPA.172 In addition, sections 48 and 52(2) of the CPA 
provide that extrinsic evidence may be led to establish whether terms are unfair, 
unjust, or unreasonable.173 The exclusion of the parol evidence rule is to be preferred 
as this greatly assists consumers who are in a weaker bargaining position. 
 
166 Note that s 17(2) specifically excludes express warranties for goods or services used for 
business purposes. Some writers contend that the parol evidence rule has been abolished for 






M.xml&queryStr=(Consumer%20protection%20fair%20trading%20act%20Singapore) (date of use: 
27 May 2019). However, the CPFTA does not abolish the parol evidence rule, it is only excluded 
expressly or by implication in certain provisions or circumstances. 
167 See Ch 3 para 3.2.9 for a general discussion of the parol evidence rule. 
168 Section 4(c) CPFTA, s 3(1)(b) CPA. Also, see the case of Chwee Kin Keong and Others v 
Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR (R) 594. Although this is the reference to the High Court 
case, this case illustrates the extent to which the court used parol evidence. The order of the High 
Court was appealed, but the High Court decision was confirmed on appeal. 
169 The heading of s 5 is ‘Circumstances surrounding unfair practice’. Section 5(3) reads:  
‘In determining whether or not a person has engaged in an unfair practice (a)  the reasonableness 
of the actions of that person in those circumstances is to be considered;’. 
170 On the interaction between the sanctity of contract, and the consideration of fairness see Kwek 
(2005) SAcLJ 411-425. 
171 See, eg, the Chwee judgment para 5.5.3 below. 
172 See Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.3 and 4.3.2.7. 
173 See Ch 4 para 4.3.2.7. 
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5.3.2.9.2 Presumption against the supplier 
Section 18 of the CPFTA provides that all written consumer agreements in which 
there is an ambiguous provision must be interpreted against the supplier.174 Both 
sections 17 – which abolishes the parol evidence rule in respect of express 
warranties – and section 18 of the CPFTA ease the role of the court when 
interpreting and investigating consumer agreements, as will be illustrated when 
discussing case law in Singapore.175 
Section 18 creates a presumption against a supplier in Singapore when a document 
is ambiguous. In its effect, therefore, it is similar to sections 4(3) and 2(9) of the CPA 
which also deal with ambiguity and advantage to the consumer.176 Section 4(3) of 
the CPA is wider than section 18 of the CPFTA as it applies to the interpretation of 
any provision of the CPA, and not only to the interpretation of consumer 
agreements. Section 4(3) of the CPA also expressly includes the promotion of the 
spirit and purposes of the CPA when interpreting the CPA, and not merely the 
benefit of the consumer as in the CPFTA, which should also considerably widen the 
scope of interpretation compared to the CPFTA in Singapore. 
5.3.2.9.3 Defences 
The reasonableness of a supplier’s conduct will be evaluated to determine if he or 
she has engaged in an unfair practice in terms of section 5(3) of the CPFTA. If the 
conduct was based on a reasonable belief, for instance on a representation made 
by the manufacturer, this belief could serve as a valid defence.177 A similar provision 
in the CPA is found in section 52(2)(d) which provides that both the supplier and the 
consumer’s conduct must be considered by the court when deciding on fair and just 
conduct and terms and conditions. 
5.3.2.9.4 Burden of proof  
When a consumer lodges a complaint, section 18A provides the burden of proof 
rests with the supplier to show that he or she has complied with all relevant 
provisions of the CPFTA and its regulations.178 This benefits consumers in 
Singapore, who are not necessarily sufficiently informed about all the provisions of 
the CPFTA, and perhaps overawed by legal representatives of suppliers during 
 
174 Similar to s 4(4) of the CPA. This is the contra proferentem rule, see Ch 2 para 2.5.4; Ch 4 para 
4.2.3.3; and Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3. 
175 See, eg, the Chwee judgment para 5.5.3 and Freely v Ong para 5.5.1 below for examples of 
good investigative adjudication. Although the court did not find against the supplier in the Chwee 
judgment, an in-depth investigation was held and the court came to the correct decision. 
176 See Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.3 and 4.3.6. 
177 Section 5(3) CPFTA; Chandran Business Law 171. 
178 See s 18A of the CPFTA. Note that the Minister is authorised to specify requirements for the 
CPFTA or the regulations. See also reg 9 of the CC Regulations concerning time-share products 
which contain a similar provision. 
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redress procedures. In addition, it ensures that the process is informal and 
consumer friendly. 
These provisions dealing with the burden of proof in Singapore are progressive. The 
National Consumer Tribunal in South Africa, for example, has very strict formal 
procedures that could intimidate consumers.179 A general provision in the CPA 
shifting the burden of proof to the supplier would greatly benefit the consumer in 
general, including consumers under fixed-term agreements. 
5.3.2.9.5 Procedure for settlement of a dispute 
The normal procedure when a consumer feels he or she has a claim against a 
supplier is to:180 
• try and settle the dispute with the supplier informally; 
• when the dispute is not settled informally or when the consumer is not 
satisfied with the outcome, he or she may lodge a complaint with the 
CASE – the consumer must then follow the advice and procedure 
proposed by CASE;181 
• the consumer must use a dispute-resolution scheme for disputes that fall 
in a class of disputes for which a prescribed resolution scheme exists;182 
• the consumer can also choose to use ADR; 
• if the consumer is not satisfied with the outcome of the procedures above, 
he or she can institute action in a court having jurisdiction;183 and 
• if the consumer is not satisfied with the decision of the court, he or she 
can appeal this decision to a further court that has jurisdiction. 
These steps correspond to the position under the CPA as the consumer must follow 
a set procedure before going to court. However, the procedures and enforcement 
of the CPFTA, and the efficiency of these measures in Singapore, appear more 
effective and better organised than in South Africa184 – which, of course, greatly 
assists the consumer. 
5.3.2.10 Jurisdiction, powers and enforcement 
Section 7 provides for the jurisdiction of the small claims tribunals185 and for specific 
orders that courts can make when a consumer bases his or her claim on an unfair 
 
179 Woker (2019) Stell LR 108-109. 
180 Loke et al A Consumer’s Guide 36-37. 
181 This is regarded as non-legal advice. 
182 See the definition of ‘specified dispute resolution scheme’ in s 2(1) of the CPFTA. 
183 Either the Small Claims Tribunal, Magistrates Court, High Court, or Appeal Court. 
184 See Ch 4 para 4.3.7. 
185 The jurisdiction of the Small Claims Tribunals is limited and set out in s 7 of the CPFTA. 
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practice by the supplier.186 Section 7(6) excludes relief where contracts were entered 
into for goods or services intended for business use.  
The monetary value of claims in terms of the CPFTA are limited by its section 6(6), 
which is regrettable as a higher amount could have ensured wider application and 
use of the provisions of the Act.187 
Courts may require a supplier who has not complied with the provisions of the 
CPFTA, to publish the fact that there is an injunction against it – a so-called ‘name- 
and-shame’ tactic – to ensure that suppliers comply with the requirements of the 
CPFTA.188 An errant supplier must inform the Commission of certain prescribed 
matters to keep the Commission updated and to allow it to ensure compliance with 
the relevant order.189 This measure ensures continued supervision over errant 
suppliers, and continued protection of consumers. In these circumstances, the 
Commission fulfils a supervisory, compliance function, in addition to and as a 
consequence of the court order. This strengthens and ensures continued 
enforcement of both consumer redress and enforcement measures to effect better 
implementation of the protective measures under the CPFTA. 
As mentioned in the introduction,190 the Commission is responsible for the 
administration and enforcement of the CPFTA.191 An important recent development 
 
186 Section 7(4) of the CPFTA.  
187 See para 5.3.2.1.3 above. 
188 Section 9(5)(b) CPFTA. 
189 Amended by Act 25 of 2016 Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Amendment) Act 2016. See s 












7.pdf&pdfFileUri=/Commentaries/96037/resource/96037.pdf (date of use: 27 May 2019). (Since the 
publication of this legal bulletin the Competition and Consumer Commission (the Commission) has 
been appointed as administering agent.) 
190 See para 5.1 above. 






Fair%20trading%20Act)%20AND%20(Caveat%20Emptor) (date of use: 27 May 2019). Prior to that 
the CPFTA was administered by SPRING, see 
https://www.case.org.sg/consumer_guides_cpfta.aspx (date of use: 7 May 2019); Meng see n 189. 
(However, the Standards Productivity and Innovation Board Act was repealed in 2018.) 
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is that the Commission now has extensive powers to initiate an investigation if it has 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that a supplier is engaged in an unfair practice.192 
This is commendable, as it ensures that the Commission can act proactively, 
thereby preventing potential consumer abuses before they take place, and before 
complaints have been made. Previously, the CPFTA only allowed complaint-based 
investigations which was a problem, particularly in the absence of criminal sanctions 
for offenders.193 The advantages of proactive consumer-protection legislative 
measures are well documented, the most important of which is to prevent consumer 
disadvantage before it happens, and to curtail suppliers from imposing unfair 
practices and contract terms.194 An additional advantage is that consumers no 
longer need to seek redress in that this proactive measure eliminates the problems 
before they arise. This, in turn, relieves pressure on enforcement agencies and 
courts and saves consumers time and money in unnecessary complaint procedures 
and litigation.195 
Although the South African Commission has similar proactive powers – for instance 
sections 99(d)–(h) of the CPA – these powers are seldom used, presumably owing 
to a lack of resources.196 
The absence of criminal sanctions in the CPFTA has been criticised.197 While this 
criticism is valid, there is merit in the legislature’s argument that criminal sanctions 
would escalate the costs of administering and applying the legislation. The contrary 
view is that if perpetrators are effectively deterred from transgressing the provisions 
of the CPFTA by criminal sanction, no significant costs should arise as there will be 
no, or limited criminal prosecutions. 
The process of consumer redress and the enforcement of consumer protection 
measures in Singapore appear better organised and more efficient, time-wise, than 
 
192 See ss 12G–12V CPFTA. 
193 Section 12G–12V of the CPFTA extended the powers of the Commission to include 






Fair%20trading%20Act)%20AND%20(Caveat%20Emptor) (date of use: 27 May 2019). This 
position was previously criticised by Booysen (2016) SJLS 227. 
194 Naudé (2007) SALJ 515-547; Naudé (2006) Stell LR 361. 
195 Naudé (2017) TSAR 141, 148; Naudé (2007) SALJ 521, 527; Naudé (2006) Stell LR 361-385; 
Jacobs et al (2010) PELJ 362. 
196 Naudé (2018) JCP 413; Woker (2019) Stell LR 107-109. 
197 Loo & Ong (2017) University of Tasmania Law Review 15. This aspect has not been amended 
since the CPFTA came into operation, and Loo and Ong regard the failure to address it as a 
‘missed opportunity’. The Minister expressly stated during the parliamentary debate that the 
legislature did not intend to criminalise offences as it would lead to an increase in costs that would 
ultimately be passed on to the consumer. Parliamentary Debate Parliament on 10 November 2003 
available at https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/report?sittingdate=10-11-2003 (date of use: 29 May 
2020). 
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in South Africa.198 A similar redress and enforcement structure, and effective 
statutory bodies ensuring continued adherence to the provisions of the CPA and 
court orders, could greatly assist consumers in general, and in fixed-term contracts 
in particular.199 
5.3.3 Concluding remarks: The CPFTA 
The CPFTA is principle based and has a deceptively simple aim. There is no 
provision in the CPFTA comparable to section 14 of the CPA which regulates fixed-
term contracts. However, an examination of academic writings and court judgments 
revealed no disputes based on this aspect. This can only lead to the conclusion that 
such a provision is not regarded as necessary in Singapore in that the CPFTA and 
contracts concluded under its auspices are adequately regulated. 
The common-law maxims caveat emptor200 and pacta servanda sunt 201 also appear 
to be more widely applied in Singapore than in South Africa.202 Fairness measures 
in the CPFTA are effective, especially with the inclusion of the Lemon Law which 
contributes towards this well-balanced consumer protection law regime.203 
Before considering selected judgments to illustrate the application of the consumer- 
law regime in Singapore, brief mention of relevant aspects of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act is necessary. 
 
5.4 The Unfair Contract Terms Act 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act204 has as its purpose, ‘to impose further limits on the 
extent to which civil liability for breach of contract, or for negligence or other breach 
of duty, can be avoided by means of contract terms or otherwise’.205 The UCTA 
therefore aims to negate the detrimental effect of exemption clauses in consumer 
agreements,206 although its application is not strictly limited to the field of consumer 
 
198 For an analysis and critique of the consumer protection enforcement regime in South Africa, see 
Scott LLD 184-204. Also see Ch 4 para 4.3.7. 
199 For criticism of the South African CPA enforcement and redress procedures, see Naudé (2009) 
SALJ 515-547; Mupangavanho (2012) PELJ 320-341; Koekemoer (2017) JCP 419-443; Woker 
(2017) SA Merc LJ 1-16; Naudé (2010) SALJ 515-547; Van Heerden & Barnard (2011) JICLT 131-
144; Naudé & Barnard Enforcement 565-590. Also see Ch 4 para 4.3.7 and for the position in the 
UK see Ch 6 para 6.5.5. 
200 See para 5.3.1 above. 
201 See para 5.3.2.7 above. 
202 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7. 
203 See paras 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.2.3 above. 
204 Hereafter the UCTA, came into effect on 12 November 1993 by the Application of English Law 
Act (Cap 7A). 
205 Preamble to the Act. 
206 Kian & Chim Your Rights as a Consumer 56. 
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law.207 Only the provisions of the UCTA relevant to fixed-term agreements are 
highlighted. 
The UCTA aims to protect consumers who have entered an agreement with a 
supplier or business, against the exclusion of certain rights when the consumer is 
in a weaker bargaining position.208 A disadvantage of the UCTA is that it is not 
always possible to identify clauses that exclude or restrict the liability of suppliers, 
and some authors argue for reform of the UCTA to enable courts to consider freely 
the allocation of the risks involved in agreements.209 
At first glance, the protection of the UCTA only applies to individual consumers and 
does not extend to businesses or companies as neither of these terms is clearly 
defined in the Act.210 When section 12(1)(a) of the Act is read, it appears that a 
business cannot deal as a consumer if it enters into the agreement in the course of 
business.211 Loke contends that a business can be regarded as a consumer for 
purposes of the UCTA,212 but he bases this argument on foreign case law. However, 
Kay Lim Construction & Trading Pte Ltd v Soon Douglas (Pte) Ltd and Another213 
had already been decided when Loke’s article was published. In Kay Lim, the court 
ruled that section 3(1) of the UCTA indeed protects businesses.214 Latimer supports 
 
207 As certain aspects of the UCTA apply whether it is a consumer sales agreement or not. This is 
not an express provision, but is implied in s 12 of the Sale of Goods Act. Kian & Chim Your Rights 
as a Consumer 56; Booysen (2016) SJLS 219, 228. Section 2 covers all contracts. Section 3(1) 
uses the words, ‘deals as consumer or on the other’s written standard terms of businesses’. In 
addition, s 6(3) provides that the Act can be applied if reasonable against persons other than 
consumers as well. Section 7(3) further extends the scope of the UCTA to other parties than 
consumers, also as far as it is reasonable. 
208 It should be noted that despite the effect and scope of the UCTA − s 15 of the CPFTA provides 
similar protection to consumers as s 2(10) of the CPA. See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.4. For 
case law dealing with the scope of the UCTA, see Koh Lin Yee v Terrestrial Pte Ltd and another 
[2015] 2 SLR 497. This case dealt, amongst others, with whether the exclusion of a set-off of 
payments made by the purchaser of goods, on behalf of the seller, was covered by the UCTA, and 
the reasonableness of such a clause. Also, see the discussion of unequal bargaining position in Ch 
2 para 2.5. See Press Automation Technology Pte Ltd v Trans-Link Exhibition Forwarding Pte Ltd 
[2003] 1 SLR (R) 712 for a decision where the reasonableness of limiting liability, as well as an 
allegation of weak bargaining position were discussed. In this case, the court found that limiting 
liability to S$100 000 was reasonable and that the plaintiff had sufficient bargaining power and 
freedom of choice of a contractor, not to be regarded as being in a weak bargaining position. 
209 Booysen (2016) SJLS 222. 
210 Business is defined in s 14 as: ‘“business” includes a profession and the activities of any 
Government department or local or public authority;” this does not provide guidance whether a 
business can rely on the protective measures afforded to consumers, and does not specifically 
include or exclude for instance smaller companies or businesses’. 
211 ‘Section 12(1) A party to a contract “deals as consumer” in relation to another party if − 
he neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself out as doing so;’ 
This is in contrast to the CPA where juristic persons are protected if their annual turnover falls 
within the threshold amount provided for in terms of s 6 of the CPA. 
212 Loke (2014) SJLS 288-289. He, however, bases this view on a UK case. See Booysen (2016) 
SJLS 226 for a contrasting view. 
213 [2013] 1 SLR 1 (hereafter Kay Lim). 
214 Kay Lim 36-38. 
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the view in the Kay Lim judgment and argues that the term consumer in the UCTA 
includes commercial entities.215 
Booysen argues that businesses can be in an inferior bargaining position in certain 
circumstances, but cannot rely on the UCTA for protection; they must resort to the 
protection afforded by the MA.216 An interesting provision in item (a) of the Second 
Schedule to the UCTA provides that the strength of bargaining positions of the 
parties should be considered for purposes of sections 6(3), 7(3) and (4),217 which 
could imply that businesses can be considered if they are in a weaker bargaining 
position. In addition, when section 3(1) of the UCTA is analysed one can argue that 
businesses are included in the protection of the UCTA based on the second part of 
section 3(1), namely, ‘or on the other’s written standard terms of business’, as this 
implies inequality in bargaining position. The court confirmed Booysen’s contention 
that a business can sometimes be in a weaker bargaining position and should be 
protected in suitable circumstances in Jurong Port Pte Ltd v Huationg Inland 
Transport Service Pte Ltd.218 However, there is neither clarity nor unanimity on this 
point. 
In South Africa, juristic persons with an annual turnover under the threshold value 
are included in the protection of the CPA.219 But, section 14(1) of the CPA excludes 
transactions between juristic persons from the protection of section 14 of the CPA.220 
The UCTA is compliance-based legislation,221 and a further point of criticism is that 
there are no criminal sanctions for contraventions of section 2(1) of the UCTA.222 






03405201005002807101412712500207610001910105 (date of use: 15 May 2020) 23. Latimer 
does not provide a specific page or paragraph in the case to substantiate this argument, but the 
relevant part is 36-38 of the case. 
216 Booysen (2016) SJLS 226. The CPFTA does not assist businesses as they are expressly 
excluded, and this can be regarded as a disadvantage as smaller businesses could also be in 
need of protection in certain circumstances. 
217 In the main, these sections deal with transactions where a party deals ‘otherwise than as a 
consumer’. 
218 Although this was an obiter dictum [2009] 4 SLR (R) 53 (hereafter Jurong). 
219 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.6.1. 
220 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.6. This is open to criticism as smaller businesses can in certain 
circumstances be in a weaker bargaining position, or perhaps even be regarded as vulnerable. 
221 Booysen (2016) SJLS 232 criticises the fact that there was no body to monitor and apply the 
UCTA. After this, there were proposals for the Standards Productivity and Innovation Board Act 
(SPRING) to monitor and apply the UCTA, see Booysen n 46. However, the Standards Productivity 
and Innovation Board Act was repealed in 2018. 
222 Booysen (2016) SJLS 227. 
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5.5 Case law 
As a first step in the enforcement of their rights, consumers must report their claims 
to the CASE. This is done either by phoning the CASE for advice, going to the CASE 
offices for counter service,223 or by submitting an online complaint form.224 The CASE 
then provides assistance in the form of advice,225 or attempts to resolve the dispute 
by correspondence.226 If a dispute is not settled by the CASE to the satisfaction of 
the consumer, he or she can appeal the decision, and only then does the matter go 
to court and is reported. Similar to the South African scenario,227 the amounts 
involved are not necessarily large enough to justify legal costs and the institution of 
court proceedings.228 
The CASE has a relatively high success rate.229 Most disputes are settled 
successfully during alternative dispute resolution procedures or are heard by the 
Small Claims Tribunal. Consequently, they are not officially reported.230 The result 
is that there is no full record of these decisions to assist with uniformity in the 
analysis of the CPFTA, the setting of precedents as guidance for future decisions, 
and the development of consumer protection law.231 
There are a few important court decisions which illustrate how courts in Singapore 
interpret and apply consumer law and, more specifically, the provisions of the 
CPFTA. In some of the decisions the common law is discussed, which is relevant 
to section 14 of the CPA, as section 2(10) of the CPA provides common-law rights 
are retained. Unfortunately, no judgment on fixed-term contracts could be found. 
 
223 See https://www.case.org.sg/complaint.aspx (date of use: 13 November 2019).  
224 See https://www.case.org.sg/complaint_onlinecomplaint.aspx (date of use: 28 April 2019). Note 
that fees are payable to the CASE, although it is a non-profit consumer association, not a statutory 
organisation. For more information on the procedure and the fees payable see, https:// 
www.case.org.sg/complaint_lodgeacomplaint.aspx (date of use: 13 November 2019). 
225 These opinions and advice appear to be non-binding as they are not strictly regarded as legal 
advice. See https://singaporelegaladvice.com/law-articles/consumer-rights-in-singapore/ (date of 
use: 15 November 2019); https://www.cccs.gov.sg/approach-cccs/making-complaints (date of use: 
15 November 2019) and 
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4501&context=sol_research (date of use: 
15 November 2019). 
226 Paterson & Wong (2016) SAcLJ 1083, this is an informal procedure, in contrast to the 
procedures in the CPA where the CC steps in. 
227 Note that in South Africa the small claims court can be used subject, however, to s 7 which 
allows only natural persons to institute action in the small claims court. Small Claims Court Act 61 
of 1984. The jurisdictional limit of the small claims court in South Africa is currently R20 000. 
Because the disputed claims are not necessarily based on or arising out of a liquid document most 
claims cannot be adjudicated by small claims courts. 
228 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.1. 
229 See https://www.case.org.sg/consumer_guides_statistics.aspx (date of use: 7 May 2019). 
230 Paterson & Wong (2016) SAcLJ 1079 1083. Also see the statistics available on the CASE 
website https://www.case.org.sg/consumer_guides_statistics.aspx (date of use: 29 April 2019). 
231 This is similar to the South African situation where there are limited records available of the 
adjudication of consumer disputes. See Ch 4 para 4.3.7.1. 
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5.5.1 Freely Pte Ltd v Ong Kaili and Others232 
One of Singapore’s consumer-law cases most often cited is Freely v Ong. This case 
deals with misrepresentation in section 4 of the CPFTA. The appellant (Freely), 
advertised a course in the Straits Times in which he represented himself as holding 
a PhD from a prominent university. He also advertised software at a special price 
on the day of the course. During the presentation of the course Freely digressed to 
irrelevant matters and was abusive towards the attendees. When the respondents 
sought a refund of the fees paid, Freely refused and denied all the allegations. The 
respondents instituted a claim against Freely. The Small Claims Tribunal examined 
the parliamentary debates surrounding the adoption of the CPFTA to establish its 
aims and purposes, the origin of the legislation, the intention of the legislature, and 
how the CPFTA should be interpreted. 
The referee decided that Freely was liable under section 4(a) of the CPFTA as he 
had misled the course attendees. Freely was ordered to refund a part of the course 
fees – ie, the difference between actual course fees paid and the amount the 
curriculum was estimated to be worth in the market.233 Freely also had to refund the 
full price of the software to attendees and contribute S$10 to each claimant for 
disbursements.234 This order was confirmed in an appeal to the High Court.  
This decision illustrates how fairness provisions in consumer protection legislation 
can assist consumers who have been misled. 
Another important case is Speedo Motoring Pte Ltd v Ong Gek Sing235 which 
addresses the Lemon Law and refers to the principle of unequal bargaining 
positions. This aspect could be relevant to the South African position, specifically to 
cell phone, timeshare, and gym contracts.236 
5.5.2 Speedo Motoring Pte Ltd v Ong Gek Sing237 
In Speedo v Sing the respondent, Sing, bought a three year old second-hand hybrid 
motor vehicle without purchasing the extended warranty. Speedo, the appellant 
supplier, sent the vehicle for an independent evaluation test at their own cost and 
the car was rated a B vehicle. The supplier represented that the vehicle had been 
serviced regularly and was in very good condition. Soon after purchase, numerous 
defects emerged and it became clear that the car had not been serviced regularly. 
The brakes and tyres needed to be replaced. Shortly thereafter, the hybrid system 
 
232 [2010] 2 SLR 1065 (hereafter Freely v Ong). 
233 This relates to the application of s 6 of the CPFTA regarding damages suffered by the 
claimants. The referee also discussed ss 28 and 30 of the Small Claims Tribunal Act 27 of 1984, 
which is not directly relevant for purposes of this study. 
234 See s 74(3) read with s 115(2) of the CPA which provides for damages. 
235 [2014] 2 SLR 1398 (hereafter Speedo v Sing). 
236 Although this specific judgment dealt with second-hand goods, the basic principle remains the 
same. 
237 Speedo v Sing. 
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gave problems and then the hybrid battery required replacement. Sing contacted 
Speedo but they failed to respond to his requests for a refund. 
Sing approached the Small Claims Tribunal. He initially claimed the cost of the 
brakes, the tyres and the replacement of the hybrid battery. He was awarded a 
percentage of the costs for the battery only, as the referee found that the tyres and 
brakes were subject to normal wear and tear. The referee also decided he should 
not be refunded the full purchase price of the new battery as it was a used car. The 
court held that the evaluator’s report would not protect the seller as the hybrid 
battery did not form part of that evaluation. As the CPFTA provides for the weaker 
bargaining position of the consumer, the purpose of the CPFTA is to provide 
protection and recourse for consumers in these circumstances.238 It further found 
that parties could not opt to exclude the application of the CPFTA, as stated in 
section 13(1) of the CPFTA.239 The court decided that the hybrid battery was an 
integral part of the hybrid vehicle. As the whole purpose of buying such a vehicle 
was to save on fuel costs, the battery could not be seen as a minor component like 
wiper blades or a faulty cabin light, and Sing was therefore entitled to a partial 
refund. Speedo appealed, the decision of the Small Claims Tribunal was confirmed 
on appeal.240 
The following aspects of relevance for this thesis were considered in this decision: 
• the unequal bargaining position of the purchaser; 
• whether the CPFTA applied as Sing had not bought the extended 
warranty; 
• whether the Lemon Law applied as the vehicle did not conform to the 
contract at the time of delivery;241 and 
 
238 Speedo v Sing para [28]. 
239 Speedo v Sing paras [30]-[34]; Chandran Business Law 174. 
240 For a discussion of the application of the Lemon Law to the purchase of second-hand vehicles 















eUri=/Commentaries/86559-M/resource/LGUPD_[2014]_RJTN_33 _v1.0.pdf (date of use: 27 May 
2019). 
241 Section 12B(1) of the CPFTA. 
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• what an appropriate remedy would be under the relevant section of the 
CPFTA? 
This is a thorough and fair decision. The court considered the weaker bargaining 
position of the consumer and held that this is why the CPFTA specifically provides 
that provisions of the Act cannot be excluded by contract. Therefore, the provisions 
of the CPFTA applied even when a purchaser does not purchase the extended 
warranty. The court did not award the full repair and replacement costs, as the 
vehicle was second-hand and normal wear and tear could be expected. This 
judgment provides guidance to suppliers of second-hand vehicles, especially the 
importance of the duty of the supplier to disclose potential defects and allow an 
opportunity for a purchaser to inspect the vehicle thoroughly. 
5.5.3 Chwee Kin Keong and Others v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd242  
In Chwee Kin Keong and Others v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd an employee of the 
seller (Digiland) made a bona fide mistake by pricing laser printers on the internet 
at S$66.00 instead of S$3 854.243 The plaintiffs and 778 other purchasers bought 
printers at the incorrect price before Digiland realised the mistake. The plaintiffs 
(Chwee and his 6 friends) had communicated with each other regarding the low 
price, and the news spread fast.244 From the cellular phone short message system 
record and e-mails, it was clear that, as purchasers, they were aware that there had 
been a mistake and they aimed to make a huge profit based on this mistake.245 
When Digiland became aware of the mistake it immediately removed the faulty 
advertisement.246 It then informed the purchasers (despite the automated system’s 
confirmation of their orders) that the price was a mistake and that it would not honour 
the orders.247 When Digiland informed the plaintiffs that it would not deliver the 
printers, as a mistake had been made, the plaintiffs went to the press.248 
The plaintiffs claimed that a concluded contract must be honoured otherwise there 
would be no legal certainty, especially regarding internet transactions.249 (They had 
ordered multiple printers – between 50 and 100 each – because of the error and 
clearly did not intend them for personal use.) The defendant, of course, argued that 
 
242 [2004] 2 SLR (R) 594 (hereafter Chwee Kin Keong High Court). This decision was taken on 
appeal in Chwee Kin Keong and others v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005]1 SLR (R) 502 (hereafter 
Chwee Kin Keong Appeal Court) and the appeal was dismissed, except as to the cost factor. The 
High Court decision will be analysed, not the appeal decision, as the facts, circumstances, and 
merits of the case were discussed in greater detail in the High Court judgment. 
243 Para [7] Chwee Kin Keong High Court. Also see s 23(9) of the CPA relating to inadvertent and 
obvious errors in pricing. 
244 Chwee Kin Keong High Court para [10] 
245 Chwee Kin Keong High Court paras [12]−[71]. 
246 Chwee Kin Keong High Court para [76]. 
247 See s 23(9) of the CPA in this regard. 
248 The court drew a negative conclusion from this – Chwee Kin Keong High Court para [77]. 
249 Pacta servanda sunt. See the discussion in Ch 3 para 3.2.2 and Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.7 and 4.4.5.4 
for the position in South Africa. 
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the law should not punish a party for making a genuine mistake of which the 
purchasers should have known. The defendant pointed out that Digiland would in 
effect lose more than S$6 000 000 if the transactions were to be honoured.250 
The court considered the following issues: 
• Should the principle of pacta servanda sunt prevail in these 
circumstances? 
• Is there a need to give effect and execute electronic transactions in 
commerce?251 
• What is the role of consensus ad idem and honest mistake when 
concluding an agreement? 
• How to balance the interests of the consumer and supplier. 
• The need to apply common sense to solve problems, while at the same 
time having the necessary regard for legal principles and ensuring legal 
certainty. 
The crux of the matter for the court, was that a reasonable man looking objectively 
at the offer would realise or suspect that something was amiss. It was also 
‘improper’ for someone who realised there was an error to try to benefit 
commercially from this error.252 The court investigated the qualifications, 
backgrounds, and professional and personality traits of each plaintiff, as well as the 
messages and e-mail communications of each. It decided that the contract was void 
ab initio as there was no consensus ad idem, because of the error in pricing of the 
item. It added that a party who is in fact labouring under a mistake, may not take 
advantage of such clearly improper circumstances.253 The court described the 
plaintiffs’ conduct as ‘audacious, opportunistic and contrived’, and compared it to 
‘predatory pack-hunting’.254 Chwee appealed but the decision was upheld.255 
This judgment is an illustration of a court bold enough to use honesty, fairness, 
equity, and the common-law principle of consensus ad idem, carefully balanced 
against the strict application of pacta servanda sunt, the principle of giving effect to 
internet transactions, and a general presumption in favour of consumers, to find in 
favour of the trader. This was so despite the presumption in section 18 of 
 
250 Approximately 74 million South African Rand, calculated on 18 June 2020. 
251 Chwee Kin Keong High Court para [103]. 
252 Paras [140], [147]-[149] Chwee Kin Keong High Court. In South Africa such an incident is 
covered by s 23(9) of the CPA. 
253 Para [149] Chwee Kin Keong High Court. 
254 Chwee Kin Keong High Court para [151]. Chwee Kin Keong Appeal Court para [107]. For 
further discussions on this case see Kwek (2005) SAcLJ 411-425 for the link between fairness and 
commerce; and Koh (2005) LawLines 24-27 for a discussion of the impact of the decision on 
internet transactions. See also Yeo (2004) SJLS 227-240. 
255 Chwee Kin Keong Appeal Court para [107]. 
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Singapore’s CPFTA that an ambiguous provision in a consumer contract must be 
interpreted in favour of the consumer.256 
Lessons to be learnt from the way the court decided this case: 
• The need for courts thoroughly to investigate the facts, the litigating 
parties, and their circumstances in making a value judgement for 
purposes of consumer-law cases. This emphasises the need to abolish 
the parol evidence rule in consumer-law cases so that courts are able to 
consider all relevant circumstances – including e-mails and documents 
in reaching a fair decision. 
• The need to apply fairness and equity judicially and sparingly in suitable 
circumstances despite rigid rules like pacta servanda sunt. 
• The courage of the court in finding against consumers as there is a 
general tendency to decide in favour of consumers, presumably as a 
result of consumer-protection legislation normally containing provisions 
specifically providing for the presumption of benefit for consumers in 
cases of ambiguity.257 
• The need for common-law principles based on fairness to be retained 
and to prevail over strict maxims in suitable circumstances. 
• The practical and common-sense approach the court used to consider 
the facts and balance the interests of the parties, common-law legal 
principles, strict legal maxims, and legislation to reach a fair judgment. 
The effect of this judgment in practice is that a high premium should be placed on 
honesty and integrity in commercial transactions. The judgment emphasises the 
essential role of courts in ensuring justice and fairness.258 
5.5.4 Examples of continued consumer abuses in Singapore259 
Unfortunately, a prudent judgment such as Chwee Kin Keong that sets high 
standards of integrity and honesty for contracting parties, has not changed 
unscrupulous behaviour by merchants in Singapore. In 2014, an incident was 
reported in the press in which a Vietnamese tourist signed an agreement for a cell 
phone for his girlfriend costing S$950. He was not fluent in English and was not 
informed, or did not understand, that the warranty included in the agreement cost 
an additional S$1500. He could not pay for the warranty and begged for 
 
256 Similar to ss 2(9) and 4(3) of the CPA. 
257 In Singapore s 18 of the CPFTA has this effect, although this case was not decided in terms of 
the CPFTA. 
258 See Ch 2 para 2.4.2; Pound (1908) YLJ 482-483, 487. 
259 See Paterson & Wong (2016) SAcLJ 1079-1110 for a detailed discussion of this incident and 
the Singapore consumer protection law. 
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reimbursement, but the supplier only offered to return part of the money, which offer 
was refused. The CASE intervened and the tourist received a refund of S$400.260 
In another incident in 2014, also involving a mobile phone, a student bought a 
mobile phone and after signing the agreement, was told to pay an additional S$1000 
for a warranty. She was told that the warranty was S$39.90 but did not realise that 
figure was not the total amount in respect of the warranty, but the amount per month. 
She claimed that the salesperson had misled her by placing his finger over the 
words that indicated that the S$39.90 was per month, and told her to sign. She 
ended up having to pay S$551 despite the fact that she could not afford the 
amount.261 
These and similar incidents led to an amendment to the CPFTA in 2016, which gave 
the Commission investigative (as opposed to reactive) powers262 to ensure proactive 
consumer protection. Prior to this, the Commission could only act after a complaint 
had been lodged by a consumer. Proactive consumer protection, when effectively 
utilised by the Commission, could potentially assist in curtailing these abuses by 
suppliers.263 A similar proactive measure in the CPA would greatly benefit consumer 
protection in South Africa which is essentially reactive.264 
These incidents demonstrate that, despite the Singapore legislature’s best efforts 
to provide effective consumer protection measures, and excellent judgments by 
courts and consumer protection institutions and administrative bodies, consumers 
should still value, and apply, the adage caveat subscriptor to protect themselves.265 
Even when legislation exists aimed specifically at preventing these unfortunate 
incidents, exploitation of vulnerable consumers continues. Some writers, therefore, 
advocate criminal sanctions to penalise perpetrators.266 
 
 
260 See Chew https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/vietnamese-tourist-kneels-and-begs-for-
refund-of-iphone-6-at-sim-lim-square-0 (date of use: 24 April 2019); Loo & Ong (2017) University of 
Tasmania Law Review 15-48. 
261 See Baker https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/another-sim-lim-incident-student-reduced-to-
tears-after-being-charged-1000-for-warranty-0 (date of use: 25 April 2019). 
262 See the discussion of the powers of the Commission in para 5.1 above. 
263 Although there has been fierce criticism of abuses by cellular phone traders, most of these are 
aimed against unfair trade practices, and the proposal to curb these abuses does not mention the 
regulation of these contracts by a provision similar to s 14 of the CPA. Leck & Jun (2015) 
Intellectual Property 1. 
264 Although measures such as the black and grey lists of prohibited terms could be regarded as a 
proactive measure. See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.3.7. 
265 Parliamentary Debate on 10 November 2003 available at 
https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/report?sittingdate=10-11-2003 (date of use: 29 May 2020). 
266 See para 5.3.2.10 above. 
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5.6 Conclusion: Chapter 5 
The purpose of the CPFTA is neither ideological nor socio-political. An analysis of 
the deceptively simple purpose of the CPFTA and its effect, interpretation, and 
implementation shows that the Act, together with the UCTA when appropriate, the 
improved investigative powers of the Commission, the CASE, and decisive court 
decisions, has resulted in the empowerment of and protection for consumers without 
political or socio-economic aims. The CPFTA provides consumers with assistance 
and information, ensures fair trading circumstances for traders, is just and equitable, 
and is probably more effective in reaching socio-economic goals than politically 
motivated legislation would be.267 This is because it empowers consumers with 
effective rights, education, and information and stays true to purpose.268 When this 
is done effectively, the secondary goals follow ipso facto. 
The advantages of the consumer law regime, the way legislation is interpreted by 
courts, and the important role of the CASE and the Commission in the Singaporean 
consumer-law regime relevant to section 14 of the CPA, and to the CPA in general, 
are: 
• There is no specific provision for fixed-term contracts – all consumer 
contracts are covered by the CPFTA so eliminating many of the 
disadvantages mentioned in Chapter 4.269 This is especially true when 
dealing with lease agreements.270 The only exception is time-share, 
which must be for a period in excess of three years. 
• Provisions in the CPFTA are wide enough to protect consumers against 
most forms of foreseeable unfair and unconscionable conduct by 
suppliers. 
• The wide investigative powers granted to the authorities have resulted in 
excellent and detailed decisions by the courts, consumer protection 
institutions, and administrative bodies. 
• Parliamentary debates are considered important in establishing the true 
intention of the legislature and the true purpose of legislation. The courts 
consult these debates when considering judgments to achieve these 
goals.271 
• An effective Consumer Association is essential which can: 
 
267 Especially in countries where the government changes regularly, and these regimes potentially 
could have vastly differing or contrasting policies. Examples of regular changes in governments are 
found in France and Italy. See Harris https://www.euronews.com/2016/12/13/why-do-italian-
governments-change-so-often (date of use: 24 September 2019). Another example of this is the 
Brexit situation in the United Kingdom – where UK legislation was amended to align UK legislation 
with similar legislation in the European Union. After this, of course, the UK voted to exit the EU. 
Since 31 January 2020 the UK is no longer part of the EU see https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
politics-32810887 (date of use: 27 March 2020). See further Ch 6 para 6.3.1. 
268 Through the CPFTA, the CASE, and good court decisions. 
269 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.5. 
270 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.8. 
271 Freely v Ong para [22], for instance. 
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o provide information on its website; 
o provide a forum where claims can be initiated; 
o assist consumers when reporting a claim; and 
o deliver a high success rate in resolving consumer disputes. 
• Effective Small Claims Tribunals and alternative dispute resolution 
measures and institutions are necessary.272 
• Consumers require effective empowerment through the provision of 
effective rights and remedies that they can use actively – eg, section 6 
and the detailed remedies provided in the Lemon Law. 
• The fact that effective and accessible information and the education of 
consumers by the CASE on its website contributes to inform consumers, 
and makes relevant information easily accessible.273 
• The express exclusion of the parol evidence rule for warranties in the 
CPFTA, and its implied exclusion in section 5(3)(a) contributes to 
fairness and justice in court decisions and compensates the consumer in 
an unequal bargaining position to some extent. 274 
• The express inclusion of lease agreements for immovable property in the 
protection of the CPFTA leads to greater certainty that leases of 
immovable property indeed fall within the ambit of the Act.275 
• There is no limitation on the duration of contracts. Therefore, there is no 
fixed term that could negatively affect consumers, suppliers, or other 
legislation or registered agreements.276 
• The fact that the Commission can now act proactively to initiate 
investigations in terms of section 12G, and it is no longer complaint-
based. 
• The fact that when there is a need for amendments, either by way of 
criticism of writers or when a need is established in practice, the 
legislature reacts and amends the position –  eg, the insertion of sections 
12G to 12V of the CPFTA, the amendment of time-share provisions in 
2009, and the extended and proactive powers of the Commission. 
• The balanced approach the legislature and the courts follow as 
consumers still have the responsibility to value the maxim caveat emptor, 
despite the effective protection and empowerment provided in the 
CPFTA.277 
• The preference of specific performance over rescission, so upholding the 
application of the principle pacta servanda sunt.278 
 
272 Although South Africa has similar commendable measures in the CPA, these have 
unfortunately been found to be time-consuming and ineffective in practice. For a discussion see Ch 
4 para 4.3.7. 
273 See, eg, https://www.case.org.sg/consumer_guides.aspx (date of use: 13 November 2019). 
274 See the discussions in para 5.3.2.9.1 above; Ch 4 para 4.3.2.7; and Ch 6 para 6.3.6. 
275 See para 5.3.2.1.2 above and contrast the position in South Africa in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.8. 
276 See the discussion of this aspect in Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.7 and 4.2.3.8. 
277 See paras 5.3.2.5 and 5.3.2.10 above. 
278 See para 5.3.2.7 above. 
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• The CPFTA is principle-based legislation and as a result courts retain a 
discretion to base their decisions on the particular facts of a case. 
• As a leading commercial centre, Singapore has proved that empowered, 
educated, and confident consumers can negotiate with suppliers and 
compare products. This ensures healthy competition and stimulates a 
vibrant economy so ensuring improved socio-economic circumstances. 
• The name-and-shame policy in sections 9(5)(b) and 9(7)(b) of the 
CPFTA is transparent, and ensures that consumers are aware of the 
identity of transgressors and the extent of their transgressions. In 
addition, this should encourage non-compliant suppliers to meet the 
provisions of the CPFTA. 
• The continued supervision of errant suppliers by the Commission in 
terms of section 9 of the CPFTA, ensures adherence to the provisions of 
the Act. 
• Section 18A of the CPFTA provides that the burden of proof rests on 
suppliers which eases the burden for the consumer, who is not 
necessarily informed or familiar with procedure or the extent of the 
burden of proof and its requirements in complaint procedures. 
The following pitfalls remain in Singapore’s consumer-law regime: 
• The CPFTA, does not expressly include protection for small businesses 
that could have benefited from these measures and arguably are also in 
need of protection because they could also be in an unequal bargaining 
position.279 
• The fact that claims in terms of the CPFTA are financially limited could 
possibly be detrimental to its advantage for consumers as it is not 
available for all consumer-law cases.280 
• Theoretically, employees and agents could be held personally liable for 
misrepresentation,281 despite a provision for vicarious liability. This 
measure could be regarded as superfluous, or perhaps, was intended as 
an additional preventative measure. 
• The CPFTA only contains civil remedies and so is not necessarily an 
effective deterrent for unscrupulous behaviour by merchants.282 
• Because the Small Claims Tribunal and ADR decisions are not reported, 
there is no full record of all consumer law decisions.283 This holds serious 
consequences as there are no formal records to set precedents or 
 
279 Jurong Port Pte Ltd v Huationg Inland Transport Service Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR (R) 53 para [19]. 
However, there are writers who argue that small business can be covered, see para 5.3.2.1.1 
above. 
280 Chandran Business Law 174. 
281 See discussion of the definition of supplier in para 5.3.2.1.5 above. 
282 Two incidents reported in Straits Times. Although now that the Commission has been granted 
investigative powers, we shall have to see whether this proves effective against unscrupulous 
traders in practice. See Chandran Business Law 174. 
283 However, this problem is shared by most jurisdictions. 
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guidelines for future decisions to ensure legal certainty and 
consistency.284 
• The Small Claims Tribunal as a court of first instance can also be 
criticised because of its limited jurisdiction.285 
• Concerns have been expressed about insufficient protection for 
consumers in prepaid agreements – eg, gym contracts. However, 
compulsory insurance cover has been proposed to protect consumers in 
these agreements when suppliers are liquidated or run into financial 
trouble.286 
• There is an alleged overlap between the CPFTA and the Lemon Law 
provisions. Subtle differences in definitions between these two pieces of 
legislation could complicate, rather than simplify, the position in practice. 
The Lemon Law was inserted with good intentions, and perhaps the 
overall protection afforded consumers compensates for the slight overlap 
and possible confusion.287 
• Finally, a directive or section in the CPFTA explaining the exact status of 
the CASE and its opinions and advice would be helpful, as there appears 
to be no official information available on this issue. 
Overall, the CPFTA can be regarded as a success in that it balances the rights of 
all interested parties fairly, it is proactive, and it contains effective redress and 
enforcement measures. 
South Africa can clearly learn from the provisions of the CPFTA relevant to fixed-
term contracts under the CPA. In Chapter 6, I analyse and discuss the relevant 
provisions of the United Kingdom’s consumer legislation, in particular the Consumer 
Rights Act, to determine whether this too can offer guidance in improving the 
position of consumers under fixed-term agreements in terms of the CPA. 
 
 
284 See para 5.5 above. 
285 The jurisdiction of the Small Claims Tribunal is set out in the Small Claims Tribunals Act (Cap 
308), and there is uncertainty in Singapore whether the Tribunal can order specific performance. 
See Chandran Business Law 172 n 37; Chandran (2004) SJLS 219. 
286 Ng available at https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/mps-lawyers-call-more-safeguards-
consumers-buying-prepaid-deals (date of use: 20 June 2019) 1. 
287 See para 5.3.2.7. 
 The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection and fixed-term agreements 
222 
 
CHAPTER SIX The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection 
and fixed-term agreements 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 225 
6.2 Background and history .......................................................................... 226 
6.3 Legislation .............................................................................................. 227 
6.3.1 The effect of Brexit on consumer protection legislation in the UK ...... 229 
6.3.2 Consumer legislation in the UK .......................................................... 229 
6.3.3 EU Directives ..................................................................................... 230 
6.3.3.1 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU ........................................ 231 
6.3.3.2 Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC .................................. 232 
6.3.3.3 EU Sales and Guarantees Directive 1999/44/EC .......................... 232 
6.3.4 Consumer Rights Act (CRA) .............................................................. 233 
6.3.4.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 233 
6.3.4.2 Part 1 of the CRA........................................................................... 234 
6.3.4.2.1 Consumer .................................................................................. 235 
6.3.4.2.2 Trader ........................................................................................ 239 
6.3.4.2.3 Goods ........................................................................................ 240 
6.3.4.2.4 Delivery of goods ....................................................................... 241 
6.3.4.2.5 Services ..................................................................................... 242 
6.3.4.2.6 Digital content ............................................................................ 242 
6.3.4.2.7 Mixed contracts ......................................................................... 243 
6.3.4.2.8 Hire agreements in respect of tangible movable goods ............. 244 
 The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection and fixed-term agreements 
223 
 
6.3.4.3 Part 2 of the CRA........................................................................... 244 
6.3.4.3.1 Unfairness ................................................................................. 245 
6.3.4.3.1.1 Application of the fairness test .............................................. 245 
6.3.4.3.1.2 The role of good faith ............................................................ 248 
6.3.4.3.1.3 Black list ................................................................................ 249 
6.3.4.3.1.4 Grey list ................................................................................. 249 
6.3.4.3.1.5 Exemptions from the fairness test ......................................... 250 
6.3.4.3.1.6 Transparency, prominence, and the average consumer ....... 251 
6.3.4.3.1.7 Concluding remarks: Unfairness, Part 2 of the CRA ............. 253 
6.3.4.4 Part 3 of the CRA........................................................................... 253 
6.3.5 Common-law rights ............................................................................ 253 
6.3.6 Parol evidence ................................................................................... 255 
6.3.7 Lease agreements of immovable property ......................................... 257 
6.3.8 The duration of contracts ................................................................... 259 
6.3.8.1 Automatic renewals ....................................................................... 260 
6.3.8.2 Indefinite contracts ......................................................................... 260 
6.3.8.3 The right to terminate ..................................................................... 261 
6.3.8.4 Tie-in periods ................................................................................. 261 
6.3.8.5 Concluding remarks: Duration of fixed-term contracts in the UK ... 262 
6.3.9 Concluding remarks: The CRA .......................................................... 262 
6.4 Timeshare agreements .......................................................................... 263 
6.5 Procedures and remedies for consumers when dissatisfied .................. 266 
6.5.1 Goods ................................................................................................ 267 
 The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection and fixed-term agreements 
224 
 
6.5.2 Digital content .................................................................................... 267 
6.5.3 Services ............................................................................................. 268 
6.5.4 Concluding remarks: Remedies, dissatisfied consumers ................... 268 
6.5.5 Jurisdiction and enforcement ............................................................. 268 
6.6 Case law ................................................................................................ 270 
6.6.1 The Office of Fair Trading v Ashbourne Management Services & 
Others ................................................................................................ 270 
6.6.2 Du Plessis v Fontgary Leisure Parks Ltd ........................................... 272 
6.6.3 Rochdale Borough Council v Dixon ................................................... 273 
6.6.4 ParkingEye Limited v Beavis .............................................................. 274 
6.6.5 Concluding remarks: UK case law ..................................................... 275 
6.7 Conclusion: Chapter 6 ............................................................................ 276 
 
  
 The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection and fixed-term agreements 
225 
 
CHAPTER SIX:  The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection and 
fixed-term agreements 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I consider consumer legislation and case law in the United Kingdom 
(UK) relevant to fixed-term contracts. The UK has incorporated European Union1 
Directives and case law into its consumer law, and these will be addressed where 
applicable.2 Although the focus does not fall on UK’s common-law of contract, 
applicable areas of the common law will be considered where they play an important 
role in statutory consumer law.3 The discussion centres round the definitions and 
various relevant aspects of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA), the duration of 
contracts, and the protection afforded to consumers by UK time-share legislation. 
The fairness provisions in contracts are considered before briefly examining the 
procedures consumers are required to follow to enforce their rights under the CRA. 
The analysis of relevant UK case law to establish if we can learn from UK 
experience, closes the chapter. 
Electronic and cross-border international transactions are not considered and a 
detailed discussion of all remedies at the disposal of consumers in terms of the CRA 
falls outside the scope of this thesis.4 
The UK has left the EU (Brexit) without a negotiated deal,5 and this could have a 
significant impact on the UK’s consumer protection law regime, given the UK’s 
decision to include EU Directives, Guidance on the Directives, and EU case law in 
 
1 The European Union (EU) is a European political and economic union established in 1993 when 
the Maastricht Treaty came into force. The EU has developed an internal EU market with 
standardised legislation. See https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union (date of use: 16 
January 2020).The EU was preceded by the EEC established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. See 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union/Creation-of-the-European-Economic-Community 
(date of use: 16 January 2020). 
2 The EU Directives have grown in importance since the 1980s and were formally implemented in 
2008 in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/1277). See Beale 
Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-003–38-005, 38-013–38-015. EU case law will not be discussed under 
the case law heading in this chapter but where relevant to the discussion – only UK case law will 
be discussed under the case law heading. The EU case law is important to assist with the 
interpretation of the same or similar concepts in the UK. Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-003, 
38-017–38-024. See Barnard (2017) SA Merc LJ 353-389 on the importance of comparative law, 
especially the law of the EU. 
3 Courts in the UK have not intentionally developed the common-law of contract to regulate 
consumer-law contracts between traders and consumers, although some of the developments in 
judgments may have had this effect. See Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-001. 
4 For an overview of the history and development of consumer law in the UK see Andrews 
Enforcement 1129-1160. 
5 The UK left the EU at 23h00 on 31 January 2020. See https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-
32810887 (date of use: 27 March 2020); https://www.government.nl/topics/brexit/brexit-where-do-
we-stand (date of use: 27 March 2020). There will be a transition period until 31 December 2020 
and during this time all EU rules and regulations will apply in the UK. See 
https://www.government.nl/topics/brexit/brexit-where-do-we-stand (date of use: 27 March 2020). 
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UK consumer law. It must, however, be borne in mind that the long-term future of 
these instruments and their continued role in UK consumer law is uncertain.6 
I conclude the chapter by highlighting the advantages, disadvantages, and lessons 
to be learnt from the UK consumer-law regime.  
 
6.2 Background and history 
The UK does not have a formal constitution but constitutional principles are found 
in legislation, case law, and in the customs and values of parliament.7 While the 
purposes and aims of consumer law have always been straightforward – to protect 
consumers from potential harm, to provide for a fair trading environment, and to 
provide redress for harmed parties – in practice the means for achieving these aims 
have always been problematic.8 Reports on the need to improve the UK consumer- 
 
6 The UK’s decision to leave the EU will be referred to as Brexit see 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/europe/what-is-brexit.html (date of use: 21 June 
2019); https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brexit (date of use: 21 June 2019); for a general discussion of 
the effects of Brexit see Bruton https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/brexit-european-union-
britain-united-kingdom-theresa-may-uk-election-result-latest-europe-news-today-97421/ (date of 
use: 21 June 2019). For an analysis of the legal implications of Brexit see Gee et al 
https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-artslaw/law/iel/leaving-EU-legal-impact-brexit-
gee-rubini-trybus.pdf (date of use: 21 June 2019) especially 47-51; for more detail on the inclusion 
of EU consumer rights in the CRA see Giliker (2017) LS 78 -102. For guidance on how consumer 
protection law is enforced after a ‘no deal’ exit from the EU see 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
786749/EU_Exit_Guidance_Document_for_No_Deal_final.pdf (date of use: 20 May 2020) 24-27. 
7 See Smith & Bull England and Wales 294. See also https://www.bl.uk/magna-
carta/articles/britains-unwritten-constitution (date of use: 31 July 2019); 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/what-uk-constitution/what-uk-constitution (date of use: 31 
July 2019). Parliament has investigated a written Constitution – for a summary of this investigation 
see https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/political-and-constitutional-
reform/The-UK-Constitution.pdf (date of use: 31 July 2019). 
8 Cartwright (2016) CLJ 271-272 who argues that enforcing consumer law offences, through 
prosecution or compliance measures, was a lengthy procedure and the remedies obtainable were 
restricted. The Hampton Report made recommendations to improve the situation. See Hampton 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file22988.pdf (date of use: 16 May 2019) (hereafter Hampton Report). 
This was followed by the Macrory Review available at 
https://restorativejustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/resources/files/Regulatory%20Justice%20Sanctio
ning%20in%20a%20post-Hampton%20World%201.pdf (date of use: 16 May 2019). The English 
and Scottish Law Commissions both recommended that consumer law be simplified and 
consolidated in a single piece of legislation. See Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-195. The 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (now the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy) requested a report on the simplification and the consolidation of consumer-
related law in 2010 and this report also proposed that a single piece of legislation should be 
enacted to regulate consumer law, goods, and remedies. Howells & Twig-Flessner 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/3
1838/10-1255-consolidation-simplification-uk-consumer-law.pdf (date of use: 4 July 2019). 
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law regime identified the two main problems with UK consumer law: the law was not 
applied and enforced equally and it was unnecessarily complicated.9 
In 2012, it was decided to follow the EU’s Consumer Rights Directive10 as closely as 
possible in the new Consumer Rights Act 2015.11 Proposals for the reform and 
simplification of consumer law were investigated12 and the Draft Consumer Rights 
Bill was proposed in 2013.13 This was followed by the enactment of the CRA in 
2015.14 
I now consider the CRA, relevant UK Regulations, and EU Directives, together with 
legislation governing time-share, so as to compare the situation in the UK and the 




The CRA is a consolidation of legislation designed to provide clarity15 for both the 
business community and consumers16 whilst taking account of technological 
advances.17 Earlier UK consumer legislation was complex and fragmented,18 and 
 
9 For the full report see http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107584/file50027.pdf 
(date of use: 10 August 2019) especially 21; Explanatory notes para 15, available at 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/notes (date of use: 15 June 2020). Also see Beale 
Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-195–38-196, 38-347. 
10 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights 
(known as the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD)) available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/ EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32011L0083 (date of use: 13 November 2019). Part of the CRD 
was introduced in 2012 as the Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations 2012, and the 
rest came into effect during 2014 as the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and 
Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. 
11 The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA) came into force on different dates, but the majority of its 
provisions were operative from 1 October 2015. The CRA can be accessed at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/contents/enacted (date of use: 13 November 2019). 
For a background discussion see http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/notes/contents (date 
of use: 13 November 2019). 
12 Devenney (2018) JBL 485-511. 
13 URN: BIS/13/925. See 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmpublic/consumer/memo/consumerevidence.pdf 
(date of use: 7 September 2019) for evidence on the Bill by interested parties. 
14 The CRA came into force on 1 October 2015, see also n 11 above. 
15 Devenney (2018) JBL 489-490. 
16 For the Explanatory Notes on the CRA see 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/pdfs/ukpgaen_20150015_en.pdf (date of use: 15 May 
2019) (hereafter Explanatory Notes); Emery (2015) Credit Management 34. 
17 Conway https:// researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06759/SN06759.pdf (date of 
use: 16 May 2019).  
18 Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Rights Act para 5 available at 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/notes/division/2 (date of use: 16 May 2019) 
(hereafter Explanatory Notes). Also see Devenney (2018) JBL 486-488. 
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consisted of some ten Acts, and various regulations and directives.19 Ironically, the 
CRA aimed to bring UK consumer legislation in line with EU legislation,20 and 
incorporates EU Directives.21 
The different approaches when naming consumer legislation are interesting as 
certain countries – eg, South Africa and Singapore – use the term ‘protection’, while 
the UK chose the term ‘rights’.22 
 
19 Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973; Sale of Goods Act 1979; Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982; Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994; Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers 
Regulations 2002; Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA); Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 (UTCCR); Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2001; 
Competition Act 1998; Enterprise Act 2002. See the Explanatory Notes para 8. 
20 See Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-003-38-004 for a discussion of the emergence of EU law 
in UK law, and the early approaches to EU law. The importance of EU law in the UK is ironic in 
light of the UK’s decision to leave the EU. See Gee et al 
https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-artslaw/law/iel/leaving-EU-legal-impact-brexit-
gee-rubini-trybus.pdf (date of use: 21 June 2019) for a general discussion of the effects of Brexit. 
21 The Directives are: Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:31999L0044 (date of use: 13 November 2019); 
Directive 93/13/EEC of the Council on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31993L0013&from=EN (date of use: 15 
January 2020); Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer 
Rights available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011L0083&from=EN (date of use: 15 January 2020); 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Cooperation 
between National Authorities responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws 
available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004R2006&from=EN (date of use: 15 January 2020); 
Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council setting out the 
requirements for Accreditation and Market Surveillance relating to the Marketing of Products 
available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:218:0030:0047:EN:PDF (date of use: 15 
January 2020); Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on General 
Product Safety available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001L0095&from=EN (date of use: 15 January 2020); 
Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Injunctions for the protection 
of Consumers’ Interests available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX :31998L0027&from=EN (date of use: 15 January 2020). 
Explanatory Notes paras 9 and 10. Also see Giliker (2017) LS 78-102. 
22 The difference in terminology used to name legislation is interesting, as the CPA and Singapore 
consumer legislation (CPFTA) are termed consumer protection legislation, and the UK Act is the 
Consumer Rights Act. The distinction between consumer protection and consumer rights is 
emphasised by Andrews. She contends the main difference lies in the way rights on the one hand, 
and protections on the other, are enforced. A right implies the consumer has full freedom to 
enforce his or her right or claim where and when he or she chooses, the consumer is not obliged to 
obtain consent to institute the claim, and the claim is not subject to prior approval. Protection, on 
the other hand, does not inevitably imply a right and may, for instance, imply that a regulatory body 
can or must take action and the consumer does not necessarily benefit directly. He or she may, 
however, benefit indirectly in the long term from action taken by the regulatory body. Therefore, the 
main difference lies therein that a right effectively empowers a consumer. See in this regard, 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107584/file50027.pdf (date of use: 10 August 
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6.3.1 The effect of Brexit on consumer protection legislation in the UK23 
The UK voted to leave the EU on 23 June 2016,24 just one year after approval and 
commencement of the CRA. In preparation for the event, special draft legislation 
has been drafted.25 
Relevant guidance and EU Directives, as well as case law decided by European 
courts before the official Brexit date are discussed as they form part of UK consumer 
law until the UK amends the current consumer regime to limit or exclude EU law.26  
6.3.2 Consumer legislation in the UK 
The aim of the CRA as reflected in the preamble to the Act is, 
 ‘to amend the law relating to the rights of consumers and protection of their 
interests; to make provision about investigatory powers for enforcing the regulation 
of traders; to make provision about private actions in competition law and the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal; and for connected purposes’.27  
 
2019) especially 107-108. Protection normally implies a more passive role for the consumer. For a 
general discussion see Andrews Enforcement 1. Also see the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.3.5. 
23 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/203/pdfs/uksi_20190203_en.pdf (date of use: 3 July 
2019). For the EU’s perspective of the legal implications of Brexit on the UK, see Gee et al 
‘Leaving the EU?’ available at https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-
artslaw/law/iel/leaving-EU-legal-impact-brexit-gee-rubini-trybus.pdf (date of use: 12 July 2019). 
24 See Mueller https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/europe/what-is-brexit.html (date of 
use: 21 June 2019). For more information and a few discussions or briefings on the unknowns of 
Brexit see https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8408 (date of 
use: 30 July 2019); and https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-
8451 (date of use: 30 July 2019). For a discussion of the possible implications of Brexit on 
consumer law in the UK see Willett (2018) CLJ 179-210. 
25 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2019/9780111180785/pdfs/ukdsi9780111180785_en.pdf 
(date of use: 6 August 2019). These regulations deal with practical measures to address the 
shortcomings of EU law that will set in when the UK leaves the EU. See https://www.gov.uk/eu-
withdrawal-act-2018-statutory-instruments/consumer-protection-amendment-etc-eu-exit-
regulations-2018 (date of use: 4 July 2019) for links to the regulations and explanatory 
memorandum, that aim to deal with amendments necessitated by Brexit to provide legislation for 
the effective operation of such legislation upon Brexit. See 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/479/pdfs/uksi_20190479_en.pdf (date of use: 6 August 
2019), these regulations were made to provide for the effective application of retained EU law after 
Brexit; http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/203/pdfs/uksi_20190203_en.pdf (date of use: 6 
August 2019) to provide for transitional provisions regarding consumer protection on Brexit. For an 
indication of the vast number of uncertainties regarding Brexit see 
https://beta.parliament.uk/search?q=Brexit (date of use: 30 July 2019). 
26 Willett (2018) CLJ 179-210, 210 argues that the effects of Brexit could probably cause UK 
consumer law evolving to become more self-interested and self-reliant. For the guidance on 
practical measures and the Guidance on the functions of the Competitions and Markets Authority 
after a ‘no deal’ exit from the EU see 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
786749/EU_Exit_Guidance_Document_for_No_Deal_final.pdf (date of use: 20 May 2020) 24-27. 
27 Preamble to the Consumer Rights Act 2015. Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-341 highlights 
four strategies in the CRA: implementation of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
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The role of the CRA is to bring about reform in the field of consumer law in the UK 
– to clarify and modernise consumer law,28 and, as stated above, to reconcile UK 
consumer law with that of the EU.29 
Before discussing the applicable provisions of the CRA, and UK Regulations, I 
highlight a few relevant EU Directives.30 
6.3.3 EU Directives 
EU Directives and EU court rulings are important and form part of UK law.31 The UK 
courts are required to interpret and apply EU Directives, and to carry out the terms 
and purposes of EU Directives and EU rulings in the UK.32 However, when UK law 
and the EU Directives and rulings differ or conflict, the courts must apply UK 
legislation.33 
Guidance on EU Directives is available on the official website34 and provides 
direction on the purposes, aims, and application of the relevant EU Directives which 
include:35 
 
Regulations; amendment of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; the wide application of Part 1 of 
the CRA; and, the extension of enforcement measures. Also see Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 
38-348-350; see too Ch 4 para 4.2.2.3 and Ch 5 paras 5.3.2.10 and 5.6. 
28 Devenney (2018) JBL 485, 490. 
29 Note that from the date of withdrawal of the UK from the EU, EU law will still form part of UK law, 
and the law derived from EU law will be maintained in the UK, see 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
786749/EU_Exit_Guidance_Document_for_No_Deal_final.pdf (date of use: 20 May 2020) for more 
information. For a summary and suggestions of how the EU law could be applied and interpreted 
by UK courts, see Andrews Enforcement 90-91; Giliker (2017) LS 78-102. 
30 For a discussion of all sources of consumer law in the UK, see Andrews Enforcement 66-74. 
These include other and delegated legislation, byelaws, statutory codes of practice, and case law. 
31 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-013. 
32 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-013, 38-344. 
33 See Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-013, 38-346. For an example where the court had to do 
this see Robertson v Swift [2014] WLR 3438, specifically paras [30]−[33] for the factors the 
Appellate Division considered in reaching its decision; Andrews Enforcement 90-91. 
34 For example, the Guidance on the Consumer Rights Directive is available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/consumers/consumer-contract-law/consumer-rights-
directive_en (date of use: 22 January 2020). 
35 The purpose of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (UCPD) of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, 11 May 20015 is to regulate unfair commercial practices in member 
states. See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005L0029&from=EN (date of use: 17 July 2019). Unfair 
commercial practices can include, but are not limited to, misleading, unfair and aggressive 
advertising and marketing practices as set out in articles 1-8 of the Directive. The Directive aims to 
ensure consumers are protected from these practices, indirectly also to protect the economy by 
preserving interests of legitimate competitors, and to promote cross-border activities between 
member states. The EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive will not be discussed as it relates 
more to the public competition sphere of the law with limited effect on the specific consumer 
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6.3.3.1 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU36 
The Consumer Rights Directive regulates aspects of consumer contracts37 on pre-
contractual information the trader must provide the consumer.38 This is known as 
information-based consumer protection as it empowers the consumer by providing 
him or her with information. Consumer contracts are divided into off-premises 
contracts,39 distance contracts,40 and on-premises contracts, each having its own 
requirements. The main purpose of the CRD is to ensure high levels of consumer 
protection.41 
 
contracts that form the subject of this study. The E-Commerce Directive (2003/31/EC) https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000L0031&from=EN (date of use: 18 July 
2019), aims to ensure and regulate the free movement of goods and services, to develop 
information society services, and to eliminate barriers of division between European nations (art 1). 
It further aims to stimulate electronic commerce, economic growth and investment, and improve 
competition (art 2). It is therefore not of direct relevance to this topic, although it applies to 
consumer law in general in the UK. Directive 1999/44/EC deals with certain aspects of the sale of 
consumer goods and associated guarantees to ensure a minimum set of rules within the EU, to 
ensure uniform rules wherever the goods are purchased, and to strengthen consumer confidence. 
See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31999L0044&from=EN 
(date of use: 10 September 2019). The EU Services Directive 20016/123/EC available at 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006L0123&from=EN (date of 
use: 18 July 2019), aims to improve and erase barriers to the free movement of services and 
employment, and the development of service activities, social protection, equality, and to ensure 
improved employment levels. The EU Services Directive will not be discussed as it addresses the 
movement of services and employment within the EU, and not with the services provided and 
contracted for in consumer contracts. The EU Directive 2013/11/EU (hereafter EU Directive on 
Consumer ADR) deals with ensuring fast and cost-effective dispute resolution of consumer 
contract disputes within the EU and in the member states’ domestic markets. 
36 Hereafter the CRD available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011L0083&from=EN (date of use: 17 July 2019). Also see 
the European Commission, DG Justice Guidance Document available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/crd_guidance_en_0.pdf (date of use: 17 July 2019) for 
further information and guidance on the Directive, its purpose, application, and interpretation. 
37 It is interesting to note that the CRA does not define the term ‘consumer contract’ but the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) Unfair Contract Terms Guidance uses the term – eg, at 
3 and the heading at 8 of the Guidance where consumer contracts are addressed – and states that 
the CRA defines the term. See 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf (date of use: 22 January 2020). Also see n 59. 
However, the term ‘contract’ is defined in s 3 of Part 1 of the CRA and, therefore, the term contract 
will be used for the discussion of Part 1 of the CRA. The term consumer contract, which is defined 
in s 61(3) of Part 2, will be used when discussing Parts 2 and 3 of the CRA. In the rest of the 
discussion the terms consumer contract and contract are used interchangeably. 
38 Articles 5 and 6; Links to the Consumer Rights Directive, Guidance on the Application of the 
Directive, and various other related documents can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-
topic/consumers/consumer-contract-law/consumer-rights-directive_en (date of use: 16 August 
2019). 
39 Article 21. 
40 Article 20. 
41 Article 3. 
 The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection and fixed-term agreements 
232 
 
This Directive is important from the perspective of the consumer in the UK as it was 
imported into the UK consumer law by way of the Consumer Contracts (Information, 
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations (CCRs) in 2013.42 These 
provisions entitle a consumer to cancel or withdraw from a consumer contract in 
prescribed circumstances.43 
6.3.3.2 Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC44 
The purpose of the EU’s UCTD is to regulate the provisions on unfair terms in 
contracts between traders and consumers.45 These provisions were inserted in Part 
2 of the CRA and will be discussed or referred to where relevant in this thesis as 
the directive entitles consumers to cancel or withdraw from consumer contracts in 
prescribed circumstances.46 
6.3.3.3 EU Sales and Guarantees Directive 1999/44/EC 
The Sales and Guarantees Directive47 aims to provide a uniform high level of 
consumer protection by ensuring that goods sold conform to contractual 
specifications, and entitles consumers to make use of a rebuttable presumption, 
which simply put implies that without restricting freedom of contract, the goods 
conform to the contract in the ‘most common situations’.48 In addition, the directive 
proposes certain minimum protective measures in consumer contracts to ensure 
that goods conform to contract, and to provide that the seller is directly liable to the 
consumer when goods do not conform to contract.49 The SGD is of interest to this 
study as it protects consumers against contractual exploitation. The provisions of 
this directive were implemented in Chapter 1 of Part 1 of the CRA. 
 
42 SI 2013/3134, (CCR’s) available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/3134/introduction/made (date of use: 21 August 2019); 
Practice Note Overview 2. 
43 See Part 3 of the Regulations. 
44 Hereafter the UCTD available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31993L0013&from=EN (date of use: 17 July 2019). For 
guidance on the Directive see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019XC0927(01)&from=EN (date of use: 20 March 2020). 
45 Article 1 of the UCTD. Note that art 1.2 excludes mandatory legislative provisions from the 
operation of the Directive. 
46 See para 6.3.4.3 below. 
47 Hereafter the SGD available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31999L0044&from=EN (date of use: 18 July 2019). Note that 
this Directive will be replaced in January 2022 by Directive (EU) 2019/771. See 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/consumers/consumer-contract-law/consumer-sales-and-
guarantees-directive_en (date of use: 20 March 2020). 
48 The presumption does not limit or restrict freedom of contract but is used to establish whether 
there is a lack of conformity considering, cumulatively and inter alia, the reasonable expectations of 
the consumer and whether the goods are new or second-hand. See art 8 of the EU Sales and 
Guarantees Directive available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31999L0044&from=EN (date of use: 18 July 2019). 
49 See arts 1-9 which are particularly useful for protecting consumers. These provisions would 
benefit consumers in s 14 agreements under CPA. 
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Having identified the most relevant EU Directives applicable in UK consumer law, I 
can now turn to a discussion of the relevant sections of the CRA. 
6.3.4 Consumer Rights Act (CRA) 
6.3.4.1 Introduction 
The CRA consists of three parts. Part 1 regulates consumer contracts for goods, 
services, and digital content.50 Part 2 deals with unfair contract terms,51 and Part 3 
regulates general aspects and how the CRA is enforced.52 Because section 1(3) of 
the CRA distinguishes between three types of contract – goods contracts; service 
contracts; and digital content contracts – any of Chapters 2, 3 or 4 of the CRA may 
apply.53 
The Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills54 in the UK has prepared 
Explanatory Notes to the CRA55 which are useful when read in conjunction with the 
CRA to assist in interpreting and understanding the Act. The explanatory notes do 
not form part of the CRA and were not drafted or endorsed by Parliament. They are 
intended merely to assist and guide the interpretation and application of the CRA.56 
The guidance on the CRA and applicable regulations is available on the 
government’s website,57 and consumers and traders can visit the website, enter the 
name of the Act or regulations they need guidance on, and a list of guides appears.58 
These guides are in simple language and provide guidance to traders and 
consumers alike on aspects of the CRA and applicable regulations. The guidance 
 
50 Andrews Enforcement 174; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 160-161; Explanatory Notes 
2. 
51 Andrews Enforcement 176, 223-225; Explanatory Notes 2. 
52 Andrews Enforcement 176-177; Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-336; Explanatory Notes 2. 
53 Section 1(3) of the CRA provides:  
‘(3)  Any of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 may apply to a contract − 
(a)  if it is a contract for the trader to supply goods, see Chapter 2; 
(b) if it is a contract for the trader to supply digital content, see Chapter 3 (also, 
subsection(6)); 
(c) if it is a contract for the trader to supply a service, see Chapter 4 (also, subsection 
(6)).’ 
54 Now known as the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 
55 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/notes (date of use: 21 August 2019). 
56 Introduction to the Explanatory Notes available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/pdfs/ukpgaen_20150015_en.pdf (date of use: 12 July 
2019). 
57 The official government website is http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/contents/enacted 
(date of use: 20 January 2020). The explanatory notes on the CRA can also be accessed on this 
site. 
58 A site for businesses (and consumers) to access information is 
https://www.businesscompanion.info/ (date of use: 12 July 2019). The site aimed at consumers is 
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/Global/Public/Campaigns/cra/ConsumerRightsSummary-
GoodsOL.pdf (date of use: 20 January 2020). 
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is not law, but reflects the views of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)59 
on the intention of the legislature. 
Before discussing the CRA, I mention the relevant UK regulations as they are 
referred to in the discussion of the sections of the CRA: 
• Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) 
Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3134);60 
• Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations 2012 (SI 
2012/3110);61 
• Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (SI 
2008/1277);62 
• Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2013);63 
• Provision of Services Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2999);64 and 
• Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes (Competent 
Authorities and Information) Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/542).65 
6.3.4.2 Part 1 of the CRA 
Part 1 of the CRA deals with the concepts and terms used in the Act, as well as 
providing for the clarification of consumer rights relating to goods, services, and 
digital content.66 
Section 1 provides that Part 1 of the CRA will apply when a trader and consumer 
enter into an agreement for the trader to supply goods, digital content, or services, 
if the agreement is a contract.67 The contract can be in writing, oral, or implied, or a 
combination of these, depending on circumstances.68 The section further provides 
 
59 CMA Unfair Contract Terms Guidance for Business available at 
https://www.businesscompanion.info/sites/default/files/CRA-Goods-Guidance-for-Business-Sep-
2015.pdf (date of use: 20 March 2020). The aim of the CMA is to promote competition for the 
benefit of consumers. For more information on the CMA see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority/about (date of 
use: 20 March 2020). See n 37. 
60 Hereafter the CCRs available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/3134/contents/made 
(date of use: 13 November 2019). 
61 Hereafter PSR available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/3110/contents/made (date of 
use: 15 January 2020). 
62 Hereafter CPUT available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/1277/contents (date of use: 
15 January 2020). 
63 Hereafter E-Commerce Regulations available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/2013/made (date of use: 15 January 2020). 
64 Hereafter PSRs available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/2999/pdfs/uksi_20092999_en.pdf (date of use: 15 January 
2020). 
65 Hereafter ADR Regulations available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/542/contents/made (date of use: 15 January 2020). 
66 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-446; Explanatory Notes para 22. 
67 For an explanation of the term ‘contract’, see Explanatory Notes para 31. 
68 Explanatory Notes para 30. 
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that Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the CRA applies to contracts for the supply of goods. 
Chapter 3 of Part 1 provides for the supply of digital content, and Chapter 4 of Part 
1 applies in respect of the supply of services. One, two or all three of these chapters 
may be applicable depending on the nature of the agreement.69 Certain mixed 
contracts are dealt with separately, for instance, section 15 deals with goods and 
installation, and section 16 provides for the supply of goods and digital content. 
Section 2 deals with the definitions of key words in the CRA, and a few important 
terms relevant to this discussion and contracts, specifically fixed-term agreements 
in terms of section 14 of the CPA, will now be highlighted. After this, the provisions 
and relevant aspects of Part 1 are discussed, before moving on to analyse the 
pertinent aspects of Part 2 of the CRA. 
6.3.4.2.1 Consumer 
Consumer70 ‘means an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly 
outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or profession’. 
The word ‘individual’ implies a natural person,71 and therefore companies and limited 
liability partnerships72 are excluded from the definition.73 When a sole trader or a 
partner in a partnership contracts in his or her personal capacity as consumer, he 
or she can be regarded as a consumer, depending on the purpose of the transaction 
in question.74 In addition, a trader in the ordinary sense of the word, can on occasion 
be regarded as a consumer when, in other transactions he or she is in a ‘weaker’ 
position compared to the trader he or she is dealing with.75 When a group of 
consumers contract together, every member of the group can enforce his or her 
rights, or the person who acted on behalf of the group can enforce the rights on 
 
69 Explanatory Notes para 32. 
70 Section 2(3). However, when a legal person enters into an arbitration agreement for consumer 
purposes it can make use of the unfair terms provisions in the CRA. Sections 89-91 of the 
Arbitration Act 1996. See Heifer International Inc v Helge Christiansen and Others [2007] EWHC 
3015 (TCC) (hereafter Heifer), accessed on Westlaw 2007 WL 4610568. This exception is also 
subject to the sum in dispute being above a certain minimum amount as specified in the relevant 
legislation. Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-038. 
71 See Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-031. 
72 A limited liability partnership is a partnership that is officially registered under the Limited Liability 
Partnerships Act of 2000, and has separate legal personality and limited liability for the partners. 
The partners in a limited liability partnership are taxed individually. See https://www.pearse-
trust.ie/blog/bid/67579/uk-limited-liability-partnerships-key-features-benefits-explained (date of use: 
20 March 2020). Also see the government website which provides guidance and explains the 
concept including how to set up and run such a partnership – https://www.gov.uk/guidance/set-up-
and-run-a-limited-liability-partnership-llp (date of use: 20 March 2020). 
73 Note that the definition of consumer in the CRA is wider than that in EU law. See Giliker (2017) 
LS 78, 82-83; Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-031, 38-038-38-040. 
74 Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl (Case C-269/95) EU:C:1997:337. Also see Andrews Enforcement 18-
20; Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-034. 
75 Beale Chitty on Contracts 32 ed, 2nd cumulative supplement 38-032; Costea v Volksbank 
România SA (C -110/14) 23 April 2015 paras [20]-[32]. 
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behalf of the group.76 When a transaction is mainly for consumer use, for instance, 
a sole trader buys a microwave oven for use in his or her apartment, and uses it 
once a week when working from home to warm food, he or she will still be regarded 
as a consumer in respect of the transaction.77 
The principles that have emerged to establish whether a person acts outside of the 
scope of his or her trade, business, craft, or profession are:78 
• If the consumer bought the item for the purpose of his or her private 
consumption and use, he or she will be regarded as a consumer for the 
specific transaction.79 
• A person who bought a house and renovated it for his or her family to live 
in, was found not be acting for his or her trade, business, craft, or 
profession,80 although the house increased in value and, as such, there 
was financial benefit involved.81 If the house had been bought as part of 
an investment portfolio, however, the purchaser would not have been 
regarded as a consumer.82 The courts will establish the intention of the 
person when entering into the transaction.83 
• The intended use of a product can change, and a product a consumer 
originally purchased for individual use, can in future be used for business 
purposes.84 
• The mere fact that an individual is an expert, or well established in a 
specific field does not imply he or she cannot be or remain a consumer.85 
• When a consumer purchases an item for mixed purposes, the court will 
try to establish whether the private use of the item is predominant.86 
 
76 For instance, when a group of friends buy theatre tickets together. Explanatory Notes para 36. 
77 See the examples in Explanatory Notes para 36. It further appears that the UK definition of 
consumer is wider than that in EU law, see Practice Note Overview 6. For a discussion of the EU 
law see the Practice Note Overview 7; EU law looks at the predominant purpose of the transaction, 
see Costea v SC Volksbank România SA (Case C-110/14) EU:C:2015:538. Also, see Andrews 
Enforcement 20-23. 
78 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-038-38-039; Devenney (2018) JBL 494-495. 
79 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-036-38-037; Standard Bank London Ltd v Apostolakis [2000] 
IL Pr 766 para [15]; Overy v Paypal (Europe) Ltd [2012] EWHC 2659 (QB) para [180]. 
80 These activities will be referred to as ‘business purposes’ for ease of reference and brevity. 
81 Heifer 35. 
82 Heifer 35. 
83 Practice Note Overview 11. 
84 Practice Note Overview 14. 
85 Schrems v Facebook Ireland Ltd (Case C-498/16) EU:C:2018:37 paras [25]−[41]. This case is 
also important because it emphasised the value of a uniform definition of consumer in the EU 
jurisdiction. For a table of cases decided on whether a purchaser’s purpose fell outside of his 
business, see Practice Note Overview 11-13. 
86 However, the position before enactment of the CRA was not clear as others required the 
secondary use to be negligible, see Andrews Enforcement 20-21. Also see Gruber v Bay Wa AG 
C-464/01 [2005] ECR I-439; Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-033. The test is now set at ‘wholly 
or mainly’ as in the definition of consumer in s 2 of the CRA. 
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Further enquiry into the concept of the consumer is necessary when establishing 
who qualifies as the ‘average consumer’. This is pertinent when deciding on the 
prominence87 of a term in an agreement when the consumer agreement is tested 
for fairness.88 The benchmark is whether the average consumer would have been 
aware of the meaning and implications of this term when entering into the 
agreement in question.89 Section 64(5) of the CRA defines an average consumer as 
‘a reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect’ person. The test used to 
establish who the average consumer is, is an objective one. In The Office of Fair 
Trading v Ashbourne Management Services Ltd90 the court described the average 
consumer as ‘a member of the public interested in using a gym which is not a high 
end facility and who may be attracted by the relatively low monthly subscriptions’.91 
This definition is not particularly helpful, because it only indicates that the consumer 
is interested in joining a gym, and is neither rich nor poor.92 Further guidance on the 
term is provided in the CMA Unfair Terms Guidance.93 
Vulnerable consumers are dealt with in regulation 2(5) of CPUT. Criteria include, for 
example, physical and mental disabilities and age.94 The concept of vulnerable 
consumers is still a work in progress in both the UK and the EU.95 
When an individual purchases a second-hand item at an auction he or she attends 
personally, he or she will not be a consumer in terms of section 2(5) of the CRA.96 
However, because the CCRs still apply, and because the consumer will be 
protected by the CRD provisions in the CRA, he or she will be able to make use of 
these additional protective measures.97 Further protection is also provided in Part 2 
of the CRA which deals with unfairness.98 
 
87 The ‘prominence’-requirement is new to the CRA, and the purpose of deciding whether a term or 
condition is prominent or not, is to establish whether the term was brought to the consumer’s 
attention in a way that would enable the ‘average consumer’ to be aware of it, see Practice Note 
Overview 88. 
88 See para 6.3.4.3. This is used for purposes of Part 2 of the CRA. 
89 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-041-38-043. 
90 [2011] EWHC 1237 (Ch) (hereafter Ashbourne). For a discussion of this judgment see para 6.6.1 
below. 
91 Ashbourne 8. 
92 Also see Andrews Enforcement 29-30; The Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc [2010] 1 
AC 696 para [113]; Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-041. 
93 See Practice Note Overview 88-90 for more information. Guidance 2.63-2.65. The CMA 
guidance is not the law, but merely provides guidance in the form of the CMA’s views on the 
intention of the legislature. 
94 See https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2009/EN/2-2009-1666-EN-F-0.Pdf (date of 
use: 15 August 2019) 28-30; Andrews Enforcement 27-29. 
95 Practice Note Overview 80; Andrews Enforcement 29. This differs significantly from the position 
in South Africa where this term is well-defined and important – see the discussion in Ch 4 paras 
4.2.3.2, 4.2.3.7 and 4.3.5, and the position in Singapore, Ch 5 paras 5.3.2.2, 5.3.2.9. 
96 See s 45 of the CPA regarding auctions. 
97 For instance, the goods must comply with information provided prior to entering into the 
agreement, and the passing of risk in respect of the goods. 
98 See the discussion in para 6.3.4.3. 
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A consumer who purported to act as a trader was denied consumer protection in 
terms of the UCTA. In Gruber v Bay Wa99 the European Court of Justice100 decided 
where a consumer creates the impression that he or she is acting for business 
purposes, he or she will not be regarded as a consumer, even if he or she would 
have been regarded as a consumer in normal circumstances.101 
The definition of consumer, and its interpretation are relevant when a business or 
sole trader wants to make use of the additional protective measures that apply to 
individual consumers. It could also be important to an individual who bought an item 
for use both in his or her business and for personal use. The other side of the coin 
is when a trader wants to rely on the lack of protective measures for businesses 
when he or she is of the view that the consumer was not an individual but acting for 
business purposes. The burden of proof that a person was not acting as a consumer 
rests with the trader who wishes to rely thereon.102 
There are different types of contract: contracts for goods; contracts for services; and 
contracts for digital content. These contracts are further divided into on-premises 
contracts,103 distance contracts,104 and off-premises105 contracts.106 It is important to 
distinguish between these different agreements as the trader is obliged to provide 
pre-contractual information to the consumer, and the requirements of the type of 
information and the way it is provided differs depending on where the contract was 
concluded.107 If the required pre-contractual information is not provided, or not 
provided correctly, the consumer may have a right to cancel or withdraw from the 
agreement.108 Courts in the UK have to consider whether information requirements 
 
99 AG C-464/01 [2005] ECR I-439 [51] (hereafter Gruber). 
100 The role of the European Court of Justice is to ensure EU law is interpreted and applied 
consistently in every EU country so ensuring countries and EU institutions abide by EU law. For 
further information see https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-
bodies/courtjustice_en (date of use: 13 November 2019). 
101 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-034; Gruber para [51]; and the obiter remarks in Overy para 
[180]. The CPA contains no similar provision. This could be regarded as a lacuna in the CPA, as it 
is part of the responsibilisation of the consumer. Although estoppel as a defense can be raised 
against such a consumer in South Africa – the CPA should preferably have addressed this issue. 
Training, information, and education of consumers in consumer-related matters can be regarded 
as consumer responsibilisation. See Evans et al available at 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0308518X17694030 (date of use: 28 March 2020); 
Morrison available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/65ab/b923bd84a841d876c50b049386b5c95c163d.pdf (date of 
use: 28 March 2020). 
102 Section 2(4) of the CRA; Practice Note Overview 8; Macdonald & Atkins Law of Contract 219; 
Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-045. 
103 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-085. 
104 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-081. 
105 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-076-38-080. 
106 Regulation 5 CCRs; see the definitions. 
107 This aspect is relevant for the fairness test in Part 2 of CRA. 
108 For a full discussion of the information, requirements for the different types of contract, and the 
consequences of non-adherence, see Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-055-38-144; Practice 
Note Overview 3. 
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have been met, and if not, what the consequences of such non-compliance are for 
the consumer.109 
6.3.4.2.2 Trader 
Trader ‘means a person acting for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft 
or profession, whether acting personally or through another person acting in the trader’s 
name or on the trader’s behalf.’110 
The term ‘business’ is used in the definition and relevant in the discussion of 
trader,111 and includes activities of a government department or a local or public 
authority.112 Even not-for-profit organisations can be regarded as traders when they 
conduct trade or run a charity shop to collect funds.113 
The European Court of Justice, when deciding on the definition of trader in the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (UCPD), has held that the 
definition of trader should be determined in relation to the ‘related but diametrically 
opposed concept of “consumer”’.114 This description does not provide much clarity 
or practical guidance. What the court apparently intended was that if the purpose of 
the transaction is not outside of that individual’s business, it must be a purpose 
within the scope of his business.115 
It is also relevant to establish when an individual trading online with other individuals 
will become a trader. In all probability, he or she would become a trader when a 
substantial part of his or her income is derived from such activity.116 The European 
Court of Justice confirmed this in Komisia za Zashtita na Potrebitelite v 
Kamenova.117 The definition of trader in the CRA does not require the business 
activity to be regular.118 
 
109 This is by analogy to the EU decision of Radlinger v Finway a.s. C-377/14 21 April 2016 paras 
[63]−[67] (hereafter Radlinger); Beale Chitty on Contracts 2nd cumulative supplement 38-063A. 
110 Definition in s 2 of the CRA. 
111 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-047. 
112 Definition in s 2 of the CRA. 
113 Explanatory Notes para 35. This is similar to the position in South Africa in s 5(6) of the CPA. 
Although the definition of transaction in the CPA requires consideration, s 5(6) of the CPA provides 
that it is not always a requirement. See Barnard & Botha (2018) SA Merc LJ 235-250. 
114 BKK Mobil Oil Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlatuteren 
Wettbewerbs eV (Case C-59/12) EU:C:2013:634 (hereafter Mobil Oil) para [33]. 
115 Practice Note Overview 9. 
116 Commission UCPD Guidance available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016SC0163&from=EN (date of use: 16 August 2019) para 
2.1. 
117 (Case C-105/17) EU:C:2018:808 paras [36]−[45] (hereafter Kamenova). 
118 Case law under earlier legislation suggests that this was previously the case. See Davies v 
Sumner [1984] 1 WLR 1301, 1305. See Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.6.1 for a discussion of this aspect in 
South Africa. 
 The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection and fixed-term agreements 
240 
 
When a trader acts through an intermediary or makes use of subcontractors, he or 
she remains liable for the due and proper performance of the contract.119 Online 
platforms can also be regarded as traders (for purposes of unfair commercial 
practices) when they act for purposes related to their business and charge 
commissions on transactions between traders and users or purchasers.120 
Examples of these platforms are eBay, Amazon, Uber, Airbnb, and Booking.com.121 
These traders have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and the test is whether 
the platforms charge a commission or derive income from targeted advertising.122 In 
addition, it should be established whether the services provide a platform for 
business-to-consumer transactions.123 
A trader acting for an individual who sells or supplies goods on behalf of individuals, 
for instance when he or she sells consignment goods124 on behalf of an individual, 
has been regarded as the seller by the European Court of Justice, when the trader 
did not disclose this fact to the purchaser.125 An analogy could be drawn to reach 
the same conclusion in connection with a trader in terms of the CRA when not 
disclosing the full facts to a consumer.126 Therefore, traders should be careful to 
disclose all relevant facts to consumers or risk being held liable by the consumer.127 
Most of the UK case law relating to the definition of trader, was decided under 
previous legislation; it however remains relevant as courts still consult those 
decisions for guidance.128 
6.3.4.2.3 Goods 
Goods129 ‘means any tangible movable items, but that includes water, gas and 
electricity if and only if they are put up for supply in a limited volume or set quantity.’ 
Land is not included in this definition.130 Certain specified contracts, for instance, for 
the supply of cash, goods sold in execution, pledges, mortgages, charges, and other 
 
119 Explanatory Notes para 35. 
120 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016SC0163&from=EN 
(date of use: 5 July 2019) the UCPD Guidance 109-111. 
121 UCPD Guidance 110. 
122 UCPD Guidance 110. 
123 UCPD Guidance 111. 
124 Consignment goods are goods that do not belong to the trader who sells or holds them, but the 
trader generally earns a commission or fee for the sale. See 
https://www.accountingtools.com/articles/2017/5/5/consigned-goods (date of use: 12 July 2019). 
125 Wathelet v Garage Bietheres & Fils SPRL (Case C-149/15) EU:C:2016:840 paras [28]−[30], 
[45]. 
126 Beale Chitty on Contracts 2nd cumulative supplement 38-052A; Practice Note Overview 10; 
UCPD Guidance 114. 
127 This is similar to s 27(1)(a)(ii) of the CPA where the intermediary (trader) must disclose the 
prescribed information to any person to whom he offers to supply services, or goods performed or 
supplied by a third person. 
128 For further information on when a person/business will be regarded as a trader see the table of 
case law in Practice Note Overview 11-13. 
129 Section 2(8) CRA. 
130 Only movable items are included in the definition in s 2 of the CRA. Practice Note Overview 15. 
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forms of security are excluded from the definition of goods for the purpose of 
Chapter 2 of the CRA.131  
Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the CRA does not apply to these excluded contracts,132 but 
does to all other goods, digital content, and services.133 The goods in question can 
be sold, hired, or transferred, and can be the object of hire purchase agreements or 
conditional sales agreements.134 
Although ‘delivery’ is not defined in section 2 of the CRA, it will be briefly discussed 
as it is relevant to the discussion of goods. 
6.3.4.2.4 Delivery of goods 
Goods must be delivered within 30 days after conclusion of the contract when there 
is no specific agreement as to the time or period of delivery.135 Parties are, however, 
free to negotiate and contract for a date or time for delivery which could be within, 
or after the prescribed 30 day period.136 
Section 28 regulates the delivery of goods. Section 28(6)137 is relevant to this 
discussion as it provides that the consumer may terminate the agreement when the 
trader has refused to deliver the goods, or delivery has not taken place in 
circumstances where time was of the essence. There is no identical provision in the 
CPA, and such a provision would greatly benefit the consumer in South Africa under 
 
131 Section 3(3) CRA; Practice Note Overview 15. 
132 Practice Note Overview 15. For instance, the lease of immovable property will be excluded, but 
the hire of tangible movables will be covered by Part 1 of the CRA. 
133 However, Part 2 of the CRA which relates to fairness, applies to all contracts concluded 
between traders and consumers save for contracts of employment or apprenticeship. See ss 61(1) 
and 61(2) CRA. 
134 Practice Note Overview 15. 
135 Section 28(3) and (4) of the CRA. Traders should not leave delivery until the end of the 
prescribed period if it can take place before this as this could cause an unnecessary delay to the 
consumer. 
136 Section 28(7) of the CRA provides that the consumer may specify a period for delivery that is 
appropriate in the given circumstances. See Practice Note Overview 24. Also, see Commission 
Guidance on CRD for more information. For more information on delivery by instalments, see s 
26(1) of the CRA; CMA Unfair Terms Guidance 5.36.3; reg 30(4) of the CCRs for the consumer’s 
cancellation rights for instalments. See the Department for Business Energy and Industrial 
Strategy’s Guidance for principles and charges regarding deliveries available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
337754/bis-14-973-Statement-of-principles-for-parcel-deliveries.pdf (date of use: 6 August 2019) 
and https://www.businesscompanion.info/printpdf/en/quick-guides/goods/delivery-charges (date of 
use: 6 August 2019). 
137 Section 28(6), ‘If the circumstances are that – 
(a) the trader has refused to deliver the goods, 
(b) delivery of the goods at the agreed time or within the agreed period is essential taking 
into account all the relevant circumstances at the time the contract was entered into, or 
(c) the consumer told the trader before the contract was entered into that delivery in 
accordance with subsection (3), or at the agreed time or within the agreed period, was 
essential, then the consumer may treat the contract as at an end.’ 
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the circumstances in section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb).138 The consumer would then be able to 
cancel the agreement without notice, without being liable for any amounts owed up 
to date of cancellation and would also not be liable for a cancellation penalty. 
There are a variety of remedies available to the consumer for late delivery, and the 
trader may not exclude these remedies as the practice of excluding remedies for 
late delivery is blacklisted, and therefore, prohibited.139 
6.3.4.2.5 Services 
Chapter 4 of Part 1 (on contracts for goods, digital content, and services) of the CRA 
applies to services. Although services are not defined in the CRA, section 48 states 
which contracts are covered by Chapter 4 of Part 1. Section 48(4) provides that a 
contract to which Chapter 4 applies is referred to as a contract to supply a service. 
Section 48(1) sets out a general catch-all clause providing that Chapter 4 applies to 
‘a contract for a trader to supply a service to a consumer’. Section 48(2) contains 
certain exclusions, for instance, Chapter 4 does not apply to a contract of 
employment or apprenticeship. In terms of section 48(3) Chapter 4 also does not 
apply to a gratuitous contract subject to Scots law. 
6.3.4.2.6 Digital content 
Digital content140 means ‘data which are produced and supplied in digital form’. Part 
1 of the CRA will only apply to digital content for payment by consumers.141 This 
includes digital content such as a gift voucher, a token, or virtual currency, and is 
not limited to traditional forms of data like cellphone data, airtime or internet data 
from an internet service provider.142 This is subject to the condition that where the 
digital content is provided free of charge with goods or services, the consumer is 
liable for payment in respect of the goods or services part of the contract.143 
 
138 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.7. There is also no express provision to this effect in the 
CPFTA in Singapore. 
139 Practice Note Overview 25. South Africa has similar provisions regarding delivery in section 
18(3) of the CPA which provides that the goods delivered must correspond to the description or 
sample provided by the supplier. Section 19 of the CPA regulates the consumer’s rights regarding 
delivery of goods, but does not contain a provision identical to s 28(6) of the CRA. Section 19(6) 
provides a remedy when the supplier tenders delivery of the goods, but when the supplier does not 
tender delivery, or does not perform at all, the consumer is at a disadvantage. See the discussion 
in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.7. 
140 Section 2(9) of the CRA. 
141 Section 33(1) of the CRA. 
142 Practice Note Overview 15. It should be noted that software is regarded as a sale of goods for 
purposes of the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 (SI 1993/3053), although 
software is not regarded as goods for purposes of the CRA. Beale Chitty on Contracts 2nd 
cumulative supplement 38-452. This differs from the position in South Africa where the definition of 
goods also covers digital content, see Ch 4 para 4.2.3.6.3. 
143 Section 33(2). 
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6.3.4.2.7 Mixed contracts 
Where a contract provides for a mixture of the sale of goods, services, and digital 
content, the goods provisions will apply to the parts of the agreement dealing with 
goods. The services provisions will apply to the part of the agreement dealing with 
services, and the digital content part of the CRA will apply to the part of the 
agreement dealing with digital content.144 An example of a mixed contract is the 
agreement to purchase a mobile phone where there is also a service agreement, 
and digital content in the form of broadband services.145 
Mixed-content contracts are subject to the following rules:146 
• When the consumer purchases goods that require installation,147 the 
goods will not conform to the contract when: 
o ‘the installation forms part of the agreement; and 
o the goods must be installed by the trader, or under his responsibility; and 
o the goods are installed incorrectly.’148 
• When the consumer purchases digital content and the digital content 
does not conform to the contract specifications, for instance, where there 
are statutory requirements for adequate quality,149 the consumer will have 
the statutory remedies in section 16 at his or her disposal.150 
• Where the consumer purchases goods that must be manufactured or 
produced, the contract is regarded as a sales contract, and the provisions 
pertaining to sales contracts will apply.151 
• Where the consumer purchases goods and the trader must deliver the 
goods, the agreement is only regarded as a contract for the purchase of 
goods, and not as two contracts – one for the purchase of goods, and 
another separate contract for their delivery.152 However, there are 
separate provisions that govern the delivery of goods, and remedies for 
late delivery of goods that will apply.153 
• When the consumer purchases digital content and the trader has to 
provide related services, for example he or she must transmit the content 
 
144 Section 1(4)-1(6) of the CRA, as well as ss 15 and 16 of the CRA. 
145 For an interesting discussion and comparison of mobile contracts see 127- 131 of the report 
available at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107584/file50027.pdf (date of use: 13 
August 2019). 
146 Mixed contracts are provided for in s 3(7) of the CRA. Practice Note Overview 15-16. Also see 
ss 1(4)–1(6) and 15 and 16 of the CRA. 
147 Similar to s 54(1)(a)-(c), s 58(4), and s 61(2) of the CPA all dealing with the consumer’s right to 
fair value, good quality, safety, and the liability of the installer. 
148 Section 15 of the CRA. 
149 Section 16 of the CRA. In particular, the statutory requirements as to quality, fitness for 
purpose, and description that matches the goods. Practice Note Overview 16. 
150 Section 16(2) read with s 19 CRA. 
151 Section 5(2)(a) CRA; Practice Note Overview 16.; Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-454. 
152 Practice Note Overview 16. 
153 Practice Note Overview 16. 
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to the consumer, the agreement is regarded as one for digital content 
and not as a sale of digital content and a separate service agreement.154 
Mixed contracts are relevant for fixed-term agreements under the CPA as the 
ordinary cell phone agreement coupled with a service agreement is an example of 
a mixed contract. 
I turn now to the regulation of lease agreements under consumer legislation in the 
UK to establish differences and similarities to the regulation of lease agreements 
under consumer law in South Africa and Singapore. 
6.3.4.2.8 Hire agreements in respect of tangible movable goods 
Hire and lease agreements of movable, tangible goods are contracts for the 
purposes of Part 1 of the CRA,155 and will be covered by Parts 2 and 3 of the CRA. 
However, as the lease of immovable property is excluded from the operation of Part 
1 on the basis of the definition of goods in section 2, these agreements are not 
covered by Part 1 of the CRA and will be discussed under a separate heading.156 
Lease agreements of movables entered into between traders and consumers are 
also covered by Part 2 of the CRA,157 and are therefore subject to the fairness test 
which promotes protection of the consumer. The fairness test applies to consumer 
contracts, and the court must consider fairness mero motu, even when it is not in 
dispute.158 This will have the effect in practice that lessors will consider the terms 
and conditions in their agreements carefully, which, in turn, will result in a greater 
balance between the rights and obligations of the parties.159 
Unlike the limitation in section 14 of the CPA, the CRA sets no maximum duration 
for lease agreements. This is an advantage over the CPA as the supplier and 
consumer can agree on a duration that suits both parties.160 
6.3.4.3 Part 2 of the CRA 
Part 2 of the CRA contains provisions for unfair terms in agreements and in other 
notices – eg, information boards in car parks in which the trader notifies the public 
that he or she will not be liable for losses or publishes certain conditions.161 Part 2 
of the CRA has a wider application than Part 1 in that it covers all consumer 
 
154 Sections 39(1)-(2) of the CRA. 
155 Sections 2 and 3(2) of the CRA. 
156 See para 6.3.7 below. 
157 Section 61(3) of the CRA. 
158 Section 71(2) of the CRA; Andrews Enforcement 191; Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-361. 
159 See https://www.housingrights.org.uk/news/new-consumer-rights-legislation-will-impact-tenants-
landlords-and-agents (date of use: 10 August 2019). 
160 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.9. 
161 See, eg, the ParkingEye Limited v Beavis judgment discussed in para 6.6.4 below. Part 2 of the 
CRA is derived from the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Contract 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999; Andrews Enforcement 176. 
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contracts, although the term ‘consumer contracts’ is not defined in the CRA and is 
only used from Part 2 onwards. 
6.3.4.3.1 Unfairness 
Section 62(4) of the CRA provides a contract term will be unfair if it is contrary to 
good faith,162 or when it causes a significant imbalance – to the detriment of the 
consumer – in the respective parties’ rights and obligations under the agreement.163 
Section 62(5) provides further guidance and determines which factors should be 
taken into account when establishing fairness.164 Schedule 2 contains a list of terms 
that may be deemed unfair – the so-called ‘grey list’165 – while Schedule 3 contains 
terms that are unfair, the ‘black list’.166 
6.3.4.3.1.1 Application of the fairness test 
Part 2 of the CRA, which regulates unfair terms, applies to all consumer contracts.167 
The majority of the terms and conditions in contracts and notices are subject to the 
fairness test in both standard-form or individually-negotiated contracts. When 
evaluating the fairness of a term in an agreement, the type of contract and the 
subject matter of the contract, as well as the circumstances at the time of its 
conclusion must be considered.168 All these aspects play a role in the interpretation 
of the term in question, and a term that seemed unfair at first glance could be found 
 
162 See the discussion of good faith in para 6.3.4.3.1.2 below. 
163 See para 6.6 below for a discussion of judgments that dealt with this aspect. Courts must 
decide on the unfairness or otherwise of a term – and even though the section does not mention a 
significant imbalance to the detriment of the trader – one can assume that courts will also intervene 
where such an imbalance is detrimental for the trader. 
164 For a discussion of unfair terms, see MacDonald & Atkins Law of Contract 226-230. In South 
Africa, s 48(2) of the CPA sets out factors that are regarded as unfair, unreasonable, or unjust. 
Also see s 52(2) of the CPA for factors the court must consider in ensuring that conduct is fair and 
just. See discussion in Ch 4 paras 4.3.2.6 and 4.3.2.7. 
165 This is similar to reg 44 of the CPA Regulations. 
166 See Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 223-225 for a general discussion. This is similar to s 
51 of the CPA. 
167 Part 2 of the CRA has a broader scope than Part 1. See the discussion in para 6.3.4.2. Also see 
Explanatory Notes 13 on the application of Part 1, and 69 on the application of Part 2. Explanatory 
Notes 15-16 and 74-75. 
168 Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 223. This is similar to the position in South Africa, 
however, s 52(2) of the CPA lists more factors that must be considered. Although the CRA does 
not expressly deal with reasonableness in Part 2 but only with fairness, s 11 of the UCTA provides 
that terms in consumer contracts should be reasonable and fair when taking into account all the 
circumstances known, or which should reasonably have been known or foreseen, by the parties at 
the time of conclusion of the agreement. The test is contextual. For instance, when determining 
whether a penalty clause in a consumer contract is reasonable, the court will consider the effect of 
multiple penalties charged under a single contract and assess the aggregate of the charges to 
establish whether the charge or charges are excessive. The provision, therefore, assists 
consumers involved in unfair or unreasonable contracts. See the discussion in Andrews 
Enforcement 180-181. For further information on historic considerations by courts, see Andrews 
Enforcement 181. Also see Beale Chitty on Contracts 2nd cumulative supplement 38-281; 
Radlinger paras [92]-[95]. 
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fair when interpreted as prescribed by considering the factors in section 62(5).169 
Certain terms are exempt from the assessment for fairness – these are known as 
the ‘core exemptions’.170 These are terms that reflect statutory provisions,171 terms 
that specify what the main subject matter of the agreement is,172 and terms that 
‘relate to the adequacy of price against goods and services’.173 
Part 2 of the CRA applies to: 
• any contract between a trader and consumer where some form of 
consideration changes hands; 
• contracts for services or digital content;174 
• notices given by traders; 
• terms in collateral, related, or ancillary contracts. 
Section 61 of the CRA sets out the applicability and exceptions to the applicability 
of Part 2 of the CRA. For example, Part 2 does not apply to contracts of employment 
or apprenticeship, or to notices regarding the rights, obligations, or liabilities 
between an employer and employee.175 
The CMA Unfair Terms Guidance176 provides that if a contract is entered into for a 
minimum or defined period, the contract terms and provisions are deemed to be 
valid for that period. If corollary services or goods that are not directly related to the 
goods or services contracted for are worked into the terms of the agreement, these 
terms will be viewed with suspicion for possible unfairness.177 
 
169 Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 223. 
170 This is dealt with in para 6.3.4.3.1.5. For further information see Practice Note Overview 86-88; 
MacDonald & Atkins Law of Contract 219-226. 
171 Section 73 of the CRA. 
172 Section 53(1)(a) of the CRA. 
173 Section 64(1)(b) of the CRA. 
174 For example, licences for intellectual property rights, personal guarantees for loans, contracts 
under which the consumer supplies something to the trade. See Practice Note Overview 74. 
175 Sections 61(2) and 61(5) CRA. This is similar to the position in South Africa under the CPA. See 
Ch 4 para 4.2.3.6.5. 
176 See 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf (date of use: 19 July 2019). There are also historic 
examples of fair and unfair terms. See Annex B. New elements of unfair terms law, unfair contract 
terms explained, and various other guides and information at the following website: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unfair-contract-terms-cma37 (date of use: 19 July 
2019). 
177 Practice Note 40. Also see CMA Unfair Terms Guidance 97-98; Historic Examples Annex A A53 
and A92. This corresponds to s 13(1)(b) of the CPA which regulates the consumer’s right to elect 
suppliers. Also see s 51(2)(a) of the CPA which deals with prohibited transactions, agreements, 
terms and conditions. 
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Courts must consider mero motu whether terms in an agreement are fair when the 
court has satisfactory evidence at its disposal.178 The court can even consider 
fairness during the enforcement stage of the proceedings.179 This, of course, greatly 
assists a party with no legal representation.180 Once the court has decided on the 
fairness of a term or condition, it will not consider fairness during subsequent 
proceedings or when enforcing a court judgment.181 The only exceptions to this rule 
are when legislation allows fairness to be reconsidered based on public policy,182 
and when other terms in the contract, not previously considered, should be 
considered for fairness.183 
Section 69 of the CRA provides that when interpreting an ambiguous term in a 
contract (whether allegedly unfair or not), the court should interpret the term so as 
to benefit of the consumer.184 The court has also remarked obiter that there is no 
real difference between the English common-law contra proferentem rule and the 
statutory obligation to interpret a term or condition for the benefit of the consumer.185 
In addition, the statutory interpretation in terms of section 69 should only be used 
as a last resort to determine the meaning of a clause or term;186 in all other 
circumstances, courts should use the normal rules of interpretation to establish the 
meaning of a term or condition.187  
Unfair terms or notices are significant for purposes of this thesis as these will not 
bind a consumer.188 The remainder of the contract will, however, continue if 
practicable.189 
 
178 Section 71(2) CRA. Also see Practice Note 81. When the court considers fairness of its own 
accord, the judge must implement the audi alteram partem rule. See Banif Plus Bank Zrt v Csaba 
Csipai (Case C-472/11) EU:C:2013:88 paras [17], [19]−[22] for example, where the court applied 
this. See Pannon GSM Zrt v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi (Case C-243/08) EU:C:2009:350 paras 
[22]−[28], [31]−[35] (hereafter Pannon). 
179 This is in line with EU position. See Pannon and Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín 
Calderón Camino (Case C-618/10) EU:C:2012 349 para [57]. 
180 This improves access to justice, and a similar provision in the CPA would improve access to 
justice as envisaged in s 33 and 34 of the Constitution. See Ch 4 para 4.3.2.8. 
181 Practice Note Overview 81. 
182 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Rodriguez Nogueira (Case C-40/08) EU:C:2009:615 paras 
[55], [59]. 
183 Banco Primus SA v Gutierrez Garcia (Case C-421/14) EU:C:2017:60 paras [52], [54]. 
184 Section 69 of the CRA. This similar to s 4(4) of the CPA, see Ch 4 para 4.2.3.3. It is also similar 
to s 18 of the CPFTA, see Ch 5 para 5.3.2.9.2. An exception to this interpretation in favour of the 
consumer is ‘where an enforcement body applies for an injunction in relation to the use of a 
blacklisted or unfair term’. See Practice Note 81. Also see obiter remarks in AJ Building and 
Plastering Ltd v Turner and Others [2013] EWHC 484 (QB) (hereafter AJ Building) para [50]. 
185 AJ Building para [53]. 
186 AJ Building para [53]. Note that the court’s remarks on the interpretation of ambiguous clauses 
was made obiter, and that this case was decided in terms of earlier legislation (UTCCRs). 
187 Practice Note 82. 
188 Practice Note 80-81. 
189 Section 67 CRA. See the following EU cases in this regard for more information, Pohotovost’ v 
Korčkovská (Case C-76/10) EU:C:2010:685 [61] and Pereničová and Another v SOS financ spol s 
r o (Case C-453/10) EU:C:2012:144 paras [29]-[31]. 
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6.3.4.3.1.2 The role of good faith 
The concept good faith is used in section 62 of the CRA. Section 62(4) expressly 
provides that ‘a term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes 
a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to 
the detriment of the consumer’.190 Unfortunately, the CRA provides no definition to 
explain exactly what meaning should be attached to the term when interpreting or 
applying the section.191 Good faith is not an official contract-law principle in UK law.192 
Apparently, the term was derived from an EU Directive and is gradually being 
accepted in English law,193 although not yet formally defined. 194 The requirement of 
good faith has the effect that parties must negotiate openly and fairly, and terms 
and conditions in the contract must reflect this attitude195 – especially as this concept 
was expressly and intentionally included in section 62 of the CRA.196 
In the case of Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank197 the court held 
that good faith involves ‘fair and open dealing’.198 In Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de 
Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa199 the European Court of Justice decided, when 
considering the good faith of the trader, that regard should be had to whether a 
 
190 This is comparable to the position in South Africa as set out in s 48(2)(a). Also see Stoop LLD 
114 n 195. 
191 El-Gendi (2017) QMLJ 95. 
192 Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 22-23, 228-230; Smith v Hughes (1871) 6 LR (QB) 597. 
See also Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 where Ackner L said: ‘A duty to negotiate in good faith is 
as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party.’ 
and Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-243, 38-244, 38-246. 
193 From the UCTD recital 16 it was incorporated in reg 5(1) of the UTCCRs. See 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1999/2083/pdfs/uksi_19992083_en.pdf (date of use: 7 
September 2019); DG of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52; El-Gendi (2017) 
QMLJ 89. 
194 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31993L0013&from=EN 
(date of use: 7 September 2019). Guidance regarding the consideration of good faith is provided in 
recital 16 of the preamble to the EU Directive where it states that the bargaining position of the 
parties, whether the consumer was induced to accept the term, and whether the goods were 
supplied because of a special order by the consumer, are factors that must be taken into account. 
In the case of Marleasing SA v La Commercial (Case C−106/89) [1992] 1 CMLR 305, the court 
permitted reference to the EU Directive, and by implication it is likely that reference to the preamble 
and the recitals will also be allowed. See Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 228; El-Gendi 
(2017) QMLJ 88, 95. Also note that the decision to leave the EU could potentially influence the 
effect of this development in future. 
195 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank 2001 WL 1171932 (hereafter First 
National Bank) para [36]; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 228; El-Gendi (2017) QMLJ 88-
89. See Practice Note 77-78 for a discussion of the CMA Unfair Terms Guidance on good faith 
pointers on openness and fair dealing. Also, see Stoop LLD 197-202 for more detail on good faith 
and its role in unfairness. 
196 See El-Gendi (2017) QMLJ 97 for his conclusion on this aspect. 
197 Also see MacDonald & Atkins Law of Contract 230-232. 
198 First National Bank para [36]. For further guidance on good faith see the CMA Unfair Terms 
Guidance regarding openness and fair dealing 23 available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf (date of use: 9 September 2019). 
199 C-415/11(March 14 2013) [2013] 3 CMLR 5 (hereafter Aziz). 
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consumer would have consented to the term in question had the contract been 
negotiated individually.200 The court in Aziz set out considerations a trader should 
bear in mind when deciding whether a consumer would have agreed to terms or 
conditions in a contract.201  
Whittaker contends that good faith was imported into section 62 to assist in the test 
for significant imbalance in the sense that a court should consider all the interests 
involved holistically, and not apply the test too rigidly and impersonally.202 
There are, however, certain terms that are regarded as prohibited or suspect when 
determining fairness, which I now consider. 
6.3.4.3.1.3 Black list203 
The purpose of the black list is to provide for terms and conditions that are 
prohibited. When a blacklisted term appears in a contract, the consequences are:204 
• the term is not binding on the consumer and therefore, there is no need 
to apply the fairness test to consider the fairness of a blacklisted term; 
• terms that have the same effect as blacklisted terms will also be 
blacklisted and will not be binding; 
• when such a blacklisted term is used and its use is misleading, it could 
be an unfair commercial practice in terms of CPUT and the trader may 
therefore be potentially liable to criminal prosecution;205 and 
• the addition of words to a blacklisted term with the effect that a 
consumer’s rights are not affected by such blacklisted term, will not 
negate the blacklisted term or make it acceptable. 
6.3.4.3.1.4 Grey list 
The grey list contains terms and conditions that are deemed to be unfair. There is 
no provision in the CRA that provides for the burden of proof regarding these listed 
terms, other than the duty of the court to consider fairness mero motu.206 This is in 
 
200 Aziz para [69]. This decision was followed in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] 3 WLR 1373 
(hereafter Beavis). For a discussion of this case see para 6.6.4 below; Macdonald & Atkins Law of 
Contract 230; Beale Chitty on Contracts 2nd cumulative supplement 38-251A. 
201 These were whether the term was commonly used in the specific type of contract, if there was 
an objective reason for the term or condition, and if the term or condition resulted in the consumer 
being left without protection. See Practice Note Overview 78; Beavis para [105]. 
202 Whittaker in Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-245. Also see Practice Note Overview 77 where 
it is stated that good faith is a broad concept. 
203 Section 31 of the CRA. 
204 Practice Note Overview 83. For a discussion of the blacklisted terms see Practice Note 
Overview 83-85. For a discussion of s 51 of the CPA see Ch4 para 4.3.2.3.3. 
205 See Part 2 - Part 4A of CPUT and the Explanatory Memorandum to CPUT, both available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/1277/contents (date of use: 15 June 2020); Practice Note 
Overview 83. 
206 Section 71 of the CRA. 
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accordance with EU law.207 The grey-listed terms are not unfair as such, but may be 
regarded as unfair.208 However, a term listed in Schedule 2 to the CRA could be fair 
when considered in a particular contract.209 Terms that have a similar effect in 
practice to those listed in Schedule 2 will also be regarded as suspect. The list is 
not exhaustive, and any term can potentially be found to be unfair if and when the 
test for fairness is applied.210 
6.3.4.3.1.5 Exemptions from the fairness test 
Certain terms are exempt from the fairness test. These are terms included in 
mandatory legislation, terms that relate to the main or core subject matter of the 
contract,211 and terms that make provision for the adequacy or appropriateness of 
the price in relation to the goods, digital content, or services that form the subject of 
the agreement.212 This is known as the core exemption.213 The purpose of this 
exemption is to allow and retain a certain measure of freedom of contract regarding 
 
207 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-362. 
208 Practice Note Overview 85. In South Africa the CPA contains a similar provision in s 48, and a 
‘grey list’ in reg 44. Regulation 44 of the regulations under the CPA contains a non-exhaustive list 
of contract terms presumed to be unfair and unreasonable. Regulation 44(2)(a) provides that the 
list is only indicative, so in certain circumstances a listed term may be fair. 
209 For instance, the penalty in Beavis was considered fair. See the discussion in para 6.6.4 below. 
210 Terms that have the following effects are grey listed:  
• Terms that provide consumers will not be entitled to full redress in cases of breach. 
• Terms that bind consumers to a contract beyond their expectation. 
• Terms that entitle a trader to non-performance of his or her obligations in terms of the 
contract. 
• Terms that preclude consumers from recovering advance payments on cancellation or 
termination of the agreement. 
• Terms that entitle the trader forthwith and unilaterally to amend or vary the terms of an 
agreement. For instance to supply a different brand of phone than that agreed upon in a 
cell phone agreement. 
• Terms that entitle the trader to amend the price or subject of the agreement after 
conclusion. 
• Terms that provide that a consumer is subject to unreasonable financial sanctions. 
Part 2 of the grey list provides for terms listed in Part 1 that are not grey listed when used in certain 
and specific types of contract, and are therefore regarded as exceptions to the grey list. See 
Practice Note Overview 85-86. This differs from the position in South Africa where the listed terms 
are presumed to be unfair. See Ch 4 para 4.3.2.3.4. 
211 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-363 38-367. 
212 Section 64 CRA; Practice Note Overview 86-88. Also see the CMA Unfair Terms Guidance for 
pointers on the core exemption. Note that the core exemption will not apply unless the term is 
transparent and prominently displayed. See Practice Note Overview 88; UCTD and s 64(5) of the 
CRA; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 225. In South Africa, the position is different as price 
is not excluded/exempt. See s 52(2)(a) and (i) of the CPA.  
213 These are terms that reflect statutory provisions (s 73), terms that specify what the main subject 
matter of the agreement is, and terms that ‘relate to the adequacy of price against goods and 
services’. For further information on these aspects see Practice Note Overview 86-88; MacDonald 
& Atkins Law of Contract 219-226; Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-367. 
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the core matter of the contract, thereby allowing the free market to function despite 
the statutory restrictions in the CRA.214 
The CMA Unfair Terms Guidance contains useful rules on the core exemption, 
these include pointers on when a term is a core term, and guidance on price setting 
terms.215 
6.3.4.3.1.6 Transparency, prominence, and the average consumer 
Transparency plays an important role in the CRA in that a term in a written consumer 
contract must be transparent.216 This emphasises the importance of information-
based consumer protection, and means that the core exemption will only apply 
when a term in a consumer contract is transparent and prominent.217 Transparency 
in the CRA means that a term or condition must be expressed in plain and 
understandable language.218 In addition, when the term or agreement is in writing it 
must be legible.219 To qualify as prominent for the purpose of section 64, a term in a 
consumer contract must be brought to the attention of the consumer.220 
Transparency and prominence are relevant to section 14 of the CPA because 
information must be provided to consumers in a way that enables them to 
comprehend the scope of their rights, obligations, and duties under the consumer 
contract.221 
The CMA Unfair Terms Guidance provides the following guidance on 
transparency.222 
 
214 Paragraph 3.5 of the CMA Unfair Contract Terms Guidance 31 July 2015 available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf (date of use: 5 September 2019); Beatson et al 
Anson’s Law of Contract 225. 
215 See 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/4
50440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf (date of use: 7 September 2019) 37-41. 
216 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-382-38-385. 
217 Section 64(2) CRA. 
218 UCTD; MacDonald & Atkins Law of Contract 238-239. Similar to s 49(3) CPA. 
219 Section 64(3) CRA; also see s 68 CRA; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 231. 
220 Section 64(4) CRA. This is similar to s 49(1), (2) and (4) of the CPA.  
221 See the discussion of s 22 of the CPA, Ch 4 para 4.3.2.5. 
222 See 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf (date of use: 9 September 2019) 30-32. Also see 
Zokaityte 2016 Capital Markets Law Journal 405 where the writer discusses similar problems 
related to consumers’ financial literacy and numeracy and contends that despite high requirements 
regarding disclosures and information to consumers, consumers appear to remain resistant to 
spending sufficient time and effort to do research into products and information concerning the 
products and effect on finances. This section is similar to s 22 of the CPA which deals with the 
consumer’s right to information in plain and understandable language. 
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• The term should make grammatical sense to the average consumer223 
and enable the consumer to understand the economic consequences of 
the term.224 For purposes of section 64(4) of the CRA, the average 
consumer is a consumer who is ‘reasonably well-informed, observant, 
and circumspect’.225 
• The consumer should be able to understand the legal consequences of 
the term when concluding the agreement so that he or she can determine 
his or her future rights and obligations. 
• When the agreement involves technical or complex issues,226 the trader 
should provide the consumer with sufficient information – eg, brochures 
or additional literature – to enable the consumer to understand the 
terminology used in the agreement. The trader should ensure that the 
consumer is able to understand the practical implications of the terms 
and how these relate to his or her rights and obligations. 
The mere fact that a term in a consumer agreement is not transparent, when 
evaluated separately from the fairness test, does not necessarily make it 
unenforceable against a consumer.227 When a term is ambiguous it should be 
interpreted in a way that favours the consumer.228 
The CMA229 is responsible for adherence to contracts or terms that are unfair, or not 
transparent.230 This is similar to the position in Singapore where the Competition and 
Consumer Commission of Singapore must also apply, enforce, and administer the 
provisions of the CPFTA.231 This emphasises the relationship and continued 
importance attached to the interaction between consumer protection and 
competition law in foreign jurisdictions.232 
 
223 See s 64(5) for the description of average consumer for purposes of s 64(4) of the CRA. See 
the discussion of average consumer in para 6.3.4.2.1. 
224 CMA Guidance 30-32; and Kásler and Another v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt (Case C-26/13) [2014] 
WLR (D) 180 para [73]. 
225 Section 64(5) of the CRA. 
226 For instance, contracts for advanced and complex electronic goods like a computer network 
router. 
227 Practice Note Overview 76; Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-385. 
228 Section 69 CRA. This is similar to the provisions in Singapore, see Ch 5 para 5.3.2.9.2, and 
South Africa Ch 4 para 4.2.3.3. 
229 Unfortunately, there is no comparable organisation in South Africa, and as a result the 
regulation of unfairness under the CPA is in the main reactive. 
230 This role was previously fulfilled by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT); the role of the CMA is to 
interpret the agreement in the same way as a court. But, where the court looks at a contract mostly 
retrospectively – the CMA must establish what the term or condition’s future impact will be and act 
accordingly. See Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 231-232. 
231 See Ch 5 para 5.1. 
232 See Ch 2 para 2.7 and Ch 5 paras 5.1 and 5.2. Also see Gupta regarding the balance between 
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6.3.4.3.1.7 Concluding remarks: Unfairness, Part 2 of the CRA 
The fairness, transparency, and prominence requirements benefit consumers in the 
UK, as they prevent traders from exploiting consumers, and vulnerable consumers 
in particular. However, a concept such as good faith could have been defined in the 
CRA to provide additional guidance as to its exact meaning, application, and 
interpretation under the CRA. 
6.3.4.4 Part 3 of the CRA 
Part 3 of the CRA deals with general consumer-law issues,233 including the 
enforcement of the CRA. It brings about change mainly in three areas:234 it requires 
letting agents to publish their fees;235 it provides for student complaint schemes;236 
and finally, it regulates secondary ticketing.237  
This brings me to the role of the common law in the CRA which will be compared 
with section 2(10) of the CPA. 
6.3.5 Common-law rights 
Consumers retain their common-law rights and remedies in addition to the rights 







0(Gupta) (date of use: 27 May 2019). For a detailed discussion of the link between consumer law 
and competition law – and a proposal that there should be a unified theory on competition and 
consumer-protection law, see Lande & Averitt (1997) Antitrust LJ 713-756; Albors-Llorens (2014) 
European Union Yearbook of European Law 163-193. 
233 Enforcement, competition, letting agents’ fees, student complaint schemes, and secondary 
ticketing, none of which is of paramount importance for purposes of this study. 
234 Other areas as well, eg, competition law s 81 and Schedule 8; the codification of enforcement 
powers by investigating officers s 77 and Schedule 5. These are not discussed in detail as they are 
not relevant to this study. 
235 Sections 83-88 of the CRA and Schedule 9. 
236 Section 89 of the CRA. 
237 Section 90 CRA. Secondary ticketing is the resale of tickets for an event, eg, a sporting or 
music event. See https://www.theguardian.com/money/2018/may/25/secondary-ticketing-how-it-
works-law-pitfalls-and-future-concert-football (date of use: 16 January 2020). 
238 Herbert Smith Freehills available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/97201ec2-4738-4cfe-8be2-171592bd5d0c.pdf 
(date of use: 21 August 2019). Note that there are certain advantages for consumers in using the 
common-law remedies for rejection and damages. For a discussion and the interaction of remedies 
see Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-422-38-423. 
239 Sections 19(9) to 19(11) of the CRA provide that the CRA does not prevent a consumer from 
seeking other remedies in the circumstances provided in s 19(9), eg, when there is a breach of a 
requirement in the contract. In s 19(10) it provides what these other remedies may be, and in s 
19(11) it describes the remedies, eg, for claiming damages. 
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preserve the consumer’s common-law rights and remedies.240 A term in a contract 
which prohibits or prevents a consumer from using his or her common-law rights 
and remedies, or which in any way dissuades or restricts the consumer from using 
these rights or remedies, will be void under sections 31(2),241 47(2),242 and 57(4)243 
of the CRA. Sections 42,244 43,245 and 44246 entitle the consumer to other remedies, 
including, of course, common-law remedies.247 
From the sections above it is clear that the consumer retains his or her common-
law right or remedy to terminate the agreement.248 The common law requires that all 
the terms and conditions in a contract must be brought to the attention of a 
consumer.249 It is the consumer’s choice, when exercising his or her rights under a 
guarantee or warranty, to decide whether to rely on his or her statutory or common-
law rights against the trader, or his or her rights under the manufacturer’s guarantee 
or warranty.250 The CMA Unfair Contract Terms Guidance provides that terms in a 
contract which exclude or restrict the consumer’s right to assignment251 can be 
scrutinised for fairness.252 
Section 58 deals with the powers of courts. The section indicates that courts are 
required to deviate from the normal requirement for specific performance – ie, that 
specific performance must be refused, unless damages are insufficient 
 
240 Explanatory Notes paras 94–95, 102–103. This right is, however, subject to limitations in s 
19(12) of the CRA which provides when the consumer may not end (terminate) a contract. This is, 
eg, where goods do not conform to the contract as provided in ss 15 and 16 of the CRA, except as 
provided in subss 19(3)-(6). For a discussion of this aspect see Beatson et al Anson’s Law of 
Contract 539. 
241 Section 31 relates to liability that cannot be excluded or restricted under a contract for the 
supply of goods. 
242 Section 47 relates to liability that cannot be excluded or restricted under a contract for the 
supply of digital content. 
243 Section 57 relates to liability that cannot be excluded or restricted under a contract for the 
supply of services. 
244 Section 42 sets out the consumer’s right to enforce the terms of a contract in respect of digital 
content. 
245 Section 43 sets out the consumer’s right to repair or replacement of digital content. 
246 Section 44 sets out the consumer’s right to a reduction in price in respect of digital content. 
247 See Explanatory Notes paras 207-208; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 539-540. 
248 Section 54(7)(f); Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 540 n 46. 
249 Practice Note Overview 20. 
250 Only goods are at stake in this instance as the definitions of consumer guarantee in s 30 of the 
CRA, and of commercial guarantee in the CCR, reg 5 cover only goods. Practice Note Overview 
31-32. Other references to the consumer’s common-law rights include, eg, s 53. See Explanatory 
Notes para 260 and for more examples paras 262–265, 271–272, 373. 
251 A common-law contractual right. Assignment is a transfer of rights in property to another which 
entitles the transferee to the rights the transferor had prior to the transfer. See https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/assignment (date of use: 21 January 2020). 
252 See 5.33 Unfair Terms Main Guidance available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf (date of use: 9 September 2019). 
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‘punishment’253 – and to this extent section 58 can be seen to affect consumers’ 
common-law rights. 
A trader retains his or her common-law rights by implication, for example in 
Schedule 2 to the CRA where the trader retains his common-law right to terminate 
a contract, but the trader may not reserve the right to terminate a contract in 
circumstances not permitted at common law as this could be regarded as unfair.254 
A trader would probably be entitled to protection under the common-law ‘unilateral 
mistake’ doctrine where he or she inadvertently makes a pricing mistake.255 
There is no express and general provision in the CRA which retains parties’ 
common-law rights, and one assumes the applicability of the common law will have 
to be established separately on a case-by-case basis. By implication, however, 
when not expressly excluded, it is assumed that parties retain their common-law 
rights and remedies256 
In South Africa, the common law has been expressly retained in section 2(10) of the 
CPA.257 
Because it is essential to establish the role, importance, and admissibility of external 
evidence regarding contract terms and circumstances surrounding the conclusion 
of agreements, the application of the parol evidence rule in UK consumer law must 
also be considered. 
6.3.6 Parol evidence 
In general, the parol evidence rule258 applies in the UK.259 There are exceptions to 
its application, principally when it is clear that the parties did not intend the written 
contract to record their entire agreement.260 Therefore, the ambit of the rule is limited 
until it is proven that the written contract was intended to form the only and whole 
 
253 See Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 610-611 for more information and a discussion. 
254 Practice Note Overview 46; paras 7 and 8 Schedule 2 to the CRA. 
255 Practice Note Overview 36-37. 
256 See in this regard Whittaker LQR 71 where he concludes that English consumer law ‘…remains 
a patchwork, with the general law set by the common law…’. 
257 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.4. 
258 For a general discussion of parol evidence see Ch 3 para 3.2.9. 
259 Jacobs v Batavia and General Plantations Trust [1924] 2 Ch 329; Adams v British Airways plc 
[1995] IRLR 574 [21]; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 146-148; Beale Chitty on Contracts 
vol I 13-99-13-102. 
260 Gillespie Bros & Co v Cheney, Eggar & Co [1896] 2 QB 59, 62. 
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agreement between the parties.261 The UK Law Commission stated this point of view 
in its 1986 Report on the rule.262 This has also been confirmed by courts.263 
The only exception to this rule is that parol evidence is allowed where documents 
must be linked to each other, or where there is an implied or express reference to 
another document or documents in the contract.264 The inclusion of an ‘entire 
agreement’ clause265 will not necessarily exclude parol evidence.266 
There is no express reference in the CRA to the parol evidence rule or its 
application, or even its exclusion in contracts. However, when sections 11 and 12 
in respect of goods, section 36 in respect of digital content, and sections 37 and 50 
in respect of service contracts, are analysed, it is clear that these sections provide 
that contracts include the pre-contractual information267 the trader provided to the 
consumer as a term or terms in the contract.268 Therefore, the parol evidence rule 
does not apply in these circumstances. 
This is welcomed, as the consumer will generally benefit from a provision allowing 
pre-contractual information. It is an improvement on the position in the CPA 
especially as contracts are not individually negotiated where standard-form 
contracts are used and, in addition, the consumer is often in an inferior bargaining 
position as he or she cannot negotiate individual contract terms with the supplier. 
The next important aspect of the CRA is to establish whether lease agreements of 
immovable property are regulated by the CRA. 
 
261 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol I 13-103; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 147. 
262 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol I 13-102; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 147-148; The 
Law Commission Report 1986 Parol Evidence 27. 
263 See Yani Haryanto v ED & F Man (Sugar) Ltd [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 44; Rosseel NV v Oriental 
Commercial Shipping Co (UK) Ltd [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 625, 628. 
264 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol I 13-105 – 13-106. 
265 These clauses are normally found in standard-term contracts, eg, standard consumer 
agreements. The purpose of these clauses is to exclude all statements or representations not 
included in the written agreement. 
266 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol 1 13-107. The most likely reason is that the whole purpose of 
such a clause is to exclude statements or representations other than those in the written 
agreement, which could of course seriously disadvantage the other party. For a general discussion 
of the parol evidence rule and its application in the UK, see Beale Chitty on Contracts vol I 13-108-
13-136. 
267 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No 3134) this includes most written and oral 
representations, notices, and advertisements; Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 144-145. 
268 For instance, on a notice board, in advertisements, or notices. Also, see Beatson et al Anson’s 
Law of Contract 144-145. 
 The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection and fixed-term agreements 
257 
 
6.3.7 Lease agreements of immovable property269 
In the UK lease agreements in respect of immovable property entered into between 
traders and consumers are covered only by Parts 2 and 3 of the CRA,270 and are 
therefore subject to the fairness test.271 This, of course, leads to better protection for 
consumers. The definition of goods in section 2 of the CRA excludes immovable 
property as goods are limited, inter alia, to ‘tangible movable items’, and lease 
agreements in respect of immovable property are therefore excluded from the 
operation of Part 1 of the CRA.272  
Lease agreements are consumer contracts273 in terms of section 61 of the CRA, 
which means that notices in terms of leases must comply with requirements set for 
consumer contracts and notices, and are subject to the normal review applicable to 
consumer notices.274 
 
269 Lease agreements of movables will fall under Part 1 of the CRA, and depending on whether 
they relate to goods, or are mixed contracts the relevant chapters of Part 1 will apply. 
270 See s 61 in Part 2 of the CRA and s 83 of Part 3 of the CRA, as well as Schedule 9. Lease 
agreements were previously regulated by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999. These provisions are now included, virtually verbatim, in the CRA. See Curbison & Webb 
https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/legal-updates/when-property-law-and-consumer-legislation-
collide/5068335.article (date of use: 10 August 2019). Although these regulations are virtually 
identical to the provisions in the CRA the Guidance on unfair terms in tenancy contracts has been 
withdrawn by the Office of Fair Trading. See 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
616956/oft356.pdf (date of use: 10 August 2019). Also note that letting agents are now required to 
publish their fees in terms of s 83 of the CRA. 
271 See the definition of goods in s 2 of the CRA and the discussion in para 6.3.4.2.3. As an aside, 
as it is technical and involves the interaction between the Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban 
Development Act 1993 and the UCTA now replaced by the CRA, this aspect is not directly relevant 
to this study. It, however, remains interesting to see what is regarded as unfair, see the recent 
judgment in Jones v Roundlistic Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 2284 paras [33]-[37], [40], [47]-[48] (the 
parties have indicated that they will ask for leave to appeal this decision), and the discussion of this 
judgment at https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/legal-updates/when-property-law-and-consumer-
legislation-collide/5068335.article (date of use: 10 August 2019); Grant & Grace 
https://www.outertemple.com/2018/10/court-of-appeal-gives-guidance-on-unfair-terms-consumer-
credit-regulations-1999/ (date of use: 10 August 2019); and 
https://www.alep.org.uk/article/795/when-property-law-and-consumer-legislation-collide-jones-v-
roundlistic-limited-2018-ewca-civ-2284 (date of use: 10 August 2019). 
272 See the definition of goods discussed in para 6.3.4.2.3. 
273 The CRA uses the term ‘consumer contract’ in the text of the CRA for the first time in s 61, apart 
from the reference to the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) 
Regulations 2013 in s 50 and, of course, on the cover page of the CRA, and the headnote 
reference to ‘consumer contracts’ on each page of the CRA. This term is used consistently in ss 
61-76 of Part 2 of the CRA. Reference to the term is also found in the Schedules for instance in 
Schedule 1 item 35. 
274 In addition, the CRA requires letting agents to disclose their fees. See 
https://www.housingrights.org.uk/news/new-consumer-rights-legislation-will-impact-tenants-
landlords-and agents (date of use: 10 August 2019). The provisions in Part 2 of the CRA could 
have a significant impact on the property sector in the UK, see Stevens-Hoare 
https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/blog/built-environment /could-the-consumer-rights-act-2015-affect-the-
property-sector (date of use: 10 August 2019). 
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The fairness test applies to standard contract terms and the court must consider 
fairness mero motu, even when fairness is not in dispute.275 This will have the effect 
in practice that lessors will consider the terms and conditions in their agreements 
carefully, and this in turn results in a better balance between the rights and 
obligations of the parties.276 
Where furniture and household equipment are included in a lease agreement for 
immovable property – eg, the lease of a furnished apartment – the agreement could 
in addition, qualify as a contract for the hire of goods, and in that respect falls under 
Part 1 of the CRA.277 When services such as cleaning are included in the lease 
agreement the provisions of Part 1 of the CRA relating to services will also apply.278 
In the event that internet services and provision form part of the lease agreement, 
the provisions relevant to digital content in Part 1 of the CRA will apply to that 
specific part of the lease agreement.279 
There is no maximum duration set by the CRA for lease agreements, which 
distinguishes the CRA from the limitation in section 14 of South African CPA. This 
is an advantage over the CPA as the supplier and consumer can agree on a duration 
that suits both parties.280 The terms and conditions of leases in the UK are subject 
to the fairness test in the CRA. Further protection for lessees is that letting agents 
are now required to publicise their fees.281 This disclosure is another instance of a 
tool in the CRA to effect information-based consumer protection. 
The advantages of the regulation of leases of immovable property in the UK are: 
• There is no statutorily prescribed maximum duration for these contracts. 
This enables parties to agree on a mutually beneficial duration. 
• The contracts are subject to the fairness test. 
• Letting agents must publicise their fees which results in better informed 
consumers and contributes to improved consumer protection. 
These advantages could benefit both consumers and suppliers in lease agreements 
in terms of section 14 of the CPA.282 
Under the following heading I analyse the CRA to establish whether there are 
guidelines to establish fairness of the duration of fixed-term contracts under the 
CRA. 
 
275 Section 71(2) of the CRA; Andrews Enforcement 191; Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-361. 
276 See https://www.housingrights.org.uk/news/new-consumer-rights-legislation-will-impact-tenants-
landlords-and-agents (date of use: 10 August 2019). 
277 Sections 9-14 of the CRA. 
278 Sections 50-57 of the CRA. 
279 Section 1(1). Practice Note Overview 15. 
280 See the discussion of this aspect in Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.7.9 and 4.2.3.8. 
281 See ss 83-88 of the CRA in Ch 3 of Part 3 of the CRA, and see Schedule 9. 
282 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.8. 
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6.3.8 The duration of contracts 
As indicated above, under the CRA the parties are free to determine the duration of 
their contracts.283 For example, cell phone contracts generally run for between 12 
and 36 months.284 When the duration of an agreement is inordinately long, this could 
be viewed as unfair – particularly as regards so-called ‘tie-in’ periods.285 
The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) 
Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3134), however, require traders to provide details on the 
duration of a contract, whether it can be extended automatically, or if its term is 
indefinite.286 The trader must also provide information regarding the termination of 
the agreement, including conditions and charges that may be applicable on 
termination, the notice period required, and how such notice should be given to the 
other party.287 
When a consumer enters into an online transaction, information regarding the 
duration of the agreement must be provided to the consumer before he or she 
agrees to purchase the goods or services. In practice, this means the information 
must be provided clearly on the trader’s order page where it will stand out more 
clearly, rather than in the link to or in the terms and conditions page or information 
linked to the transaction.288 Adhering to this practice will assist the trader in proving 
the information was provided clearly to the consumer before the order was placed 
should a consumer subsequently allege unfairness or non-disclosure. 
There are a few instances when the duration of a contract will be regarded with 
suspicion, and these instances and how UK consumer law deals with these are now 
considered. 
 
283 The Timeshare Regulations discussed in para 6.4 below do, however, limit the minimum 
duration of time-share contracts to the extent that a consumer can only give notice to cancel the 
agreement after the second instalment. 
284 See https://www.o2.co.uk/shop/phones#sort=content.sorting.featured&page=1 (date of use: 3 
July 2019); https://www.mobiles.co.uk/samsung-galaxy-s10-512gb-prism-
black?tariffcode=HGCYMFEB19&giftcode=NA16 (date of use: 3 July 2019); 
https://www.androidauthority.com/best-uk-mobile-network-835186/ (date of use: 3 July 2019). 
285 See para 6.3.8.4 below for a discussion of tie-in periods. 
286 The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 
(SI 2013/3134) Schedule 1 (i) 22. 
287 Practice Note Overview 23-24. 
288See reg 14(2) CCRs available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/3134/pdfs/uksi_20133134_en.pdf (date of use: 8 
September 2019). See Guidance on the CRD for more information on this available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/crd_guidance_en_0_updated_0.pdf (date of use: 8 
September 2019) 28. 
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6.3.8.1 Automatic renewals 
The CMA Unfair Contract Terms Guidance provides guidelines on the automatic 
renewal of contracts.289 The Guidance provides that the automatic renewal of 
contracts has the same effect on consumers as an involuntary extension of the 
obligation to make payments in terms of the agreement.290 Automatic renewal terms 
may be deemed unfair if the terms aim to automatically extend a contract of fixed 
duration beyond such fixed duration; when the consumer has not indicated 
otherwise; or where the date by which the consumer must opt for the extension is 
unreasonably early in the contract term.291 
Transparency in the terms and negotiations is important, and if the auto-renewal of 
an agreement is made clear before the purchase, the auto-renewal will in all 
likelihood be deemed fair.292 A trader must also send the consumer a reminder of a 
reasonable period before the renewal takes place, which should clearly explain to 
the consumer what the terms of the renewal are, and what steps the consumer 
should take to prevent auto-renewal.293 
The consumer can cancel the agreement during the renewal period without incurring 
any charge or penalty,294 subject to the condition that the procedures for such a 
cancellation do not unfairly bind the consumer to the agreement.295 The consumer’s 
right to cancel post-renewal of the agreement is not restricted to agreements where 
the consumer has such right in terms of the CCRs.296 
6.3.8.2 Indefinite contracts 
There are specific provisions in the UK relating to contracts that continue indefinitely 
thereby obliging the trader to give reasonable notice to the consumer of the 
 
289 See CMA Unfair Terms Guidance 95-96, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf (date of use: 28 March 2020). 
290 See historic Annex A group 8 A51 available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
450467/Unfair_terms_guidance_Annex_A.pdf (date of use: 3 July 2019).  
291 Historic Annex A A51. Further, see A51-A52 for examples of terms and the proposed term to be 
used instead of such unreasonable term. 
292 Practice Note Overview 23. 
293 CMA Unfair Terms Guidance 95-96; Practice Note Overview 23. 
294 Par 9 Part 1 Schedule 2 to the CRA – in contrast with s 14 of the CPA. 
295 CMA Unfair Terms Guidance 95-96; Practice Note Overview 23-24. 
296 See in this regard https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/letter-from-the-cma-to-cloud-
storage-providers-on-consumer-law/checklist-for-cloud-storage-providers-terms-to-look-out-for 
(date of use: 3 July 2019); 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
510338/UCT_09_Subscriptions.pdf (date of use: 3 July 2019). 
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termination of such agreement where there are valid grounds for the termination.297 
The consumer must be accorded a reciprocal right.298 
A contract can only be terminated with immediate effect if there are valid reasons 
for doing so and if those reasons are set out in the contract.299 
6.3.8.3 The right to terminate300 
A contract can also contain provisions allowing the trader to terminate the 
agreement, as contractual termination may, in certain instances, be easier for the 
trader to enforce than a termination in terms of the common law.301 These 
circumstances are, for example, in contracts for the long-term delivery of services, 
supply, or delivery of goods. After the initial period the consumer’s right to cancel 
terminates, and the trader may wish to reserve the contractual right to terminate the 
agreement as a result of non-payment by the consumer. Another example is when 
the trader wants to discontinue a product or service and the contract is of 
indeterminate duration subject, of course, to providing the consumer with a 
reciprocal right to terminate the agreement.302 An immediate termination will only be 
possible in exceptional circumstances.303 
6.3.8.4 Tie-in periods 
Tie-in periods are fixed periods, normally with a minimum duration, during which the 
consumer is obliged to continue paying for the trader’s goods or services, 
sometimes even if he or she has given notice of termination of the agreement.304 
The CMA provides guidance on unfair contract terms.305 The CMA guidance is not 
 
297 Schedule 2 to the CRA para 8, eg, contracts for the delivery of milk or a newspaper. 
298 Practice Note Overview 46. 
299 CMA Unfair Terms Guidance 94-95. 
300 See Beatson et al Anson’s Law of Contract 552 for a general discussion of termination clauses 
and the interaction between the common-law right to terminate and a contractual term to terminate. 
301 Practice Note Overview 46. 
302 Practice Note Overview 46. 
303 Unfair Terms Guidance para 5.18. 
304 See the Unfair Terms Main Guidance 86 n 97, paras 5.15.4, 5.15.7, 91 n 102; and Ashbourne 
para [169]. Unfortunately, neither the CRA nor the Explanatory Notes, provides us with a definition 
of a tie-in period. See Practice Note Overview 45. The term is normally used in the UK in estate 
agent agreements which mandates estate agents to sell an immovable property. In England the 
minimum period for such a tie seems to be six weeks. See 
https://www.which.co.uk/money/mortgages-and-property/home-movers/selling-a-house/estate-
agent-fees-and-contracts-an2n90t09n2g (date of use: 3 July 2019). In South Africa these 
agreements are normally referred to as sole-agent agreements and the essence of the agreement 
is that the seller is obliged to pay the estate agent commission during the period of the ‘tie’ – even 
if the sale was effected by another estate agent or by the seller himself. The essence and 
importance of the tie-in period appears to be that there is an obvious imbalance of rights loaded 
against the consumer during the tie-in period, and the consumer must pay for goods or services 
whether or not he or she uses them.  
305 See CMA Guidance 95-96 available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
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law, but reflects the CMA’s views on the intention of the legislature. Courts have the 
final say on the interpretation, operation, and application of the CRA.306 
Tie-in periods are viewed with suspicion when they prohibit termination during the 
tie-in period, especially when the consumer remains liable for all, or largely all 
payments during the tie-in period.307 When the clause provides that a charge or 
penalty must be paid to terminate the agreement, and that amount is equal to, or 
amounts in practice, to all of the payments for the tie-in period, or when the tie-in 
period is very long, the clause will also be viewed with suspicion.308 Tie-in clauses 
that do not evenly balance the rights and contractual relationship between the 
parties could be regarded as unfair.309 
6.3.8.5 Concluding remarks: Duration of fixed-term contracts in the UK 
The above classification, principles, and provisions dealing with terms and 
conditions relating to the duration of contracts, and the way they are dealt with in 
UK consumer law, are instructive for the purpose of this study – in particular the fact 
that there is no maximum duration for consumer contracts in the UK. The 
shortcomings and limitations of fixed-term contracts under section 14 of the CPA310 
would greatly benefit from similar flexible provisions. 
6.3.9 Concluding remarks: The CRA 
From the analysis in this chapter, it is clear that UK consumer law is not consolidated 
as a whole in the CRA as recommended.311 Applicable regulations, the EU 
Directives, as well as EU case law must be consulted in addition to the CRA. This 
makes it difficult to establish the correct and complete legal position on any given 
set of facts at a single glance. As such, the CRA must be regarded as an opportunity 
lost effectively to simplify the UK’s statutory consumer law. 
Despite these criticisms, the CRA and UK consumer-law regime are an 
improvement on the previous position in the UK and provide better protection for 
 
450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf (date of use: 8 September 2019). Also see Historic 
Annex A Group 8 A51-A52 available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
450467/Unfair_terms_guidance_Annex_A.pdf (date of use: 8 September 2019). 
306 CMA Guidance 7. 
307 Practice Note Overview 45. 
308 CMA Unfair Terms Guidance 95-96 available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf (date of use: 28 March 2020) and see Ashbourne in 
para 6.6.1 below. 
309 Practice Note Overview 45. See the discussion of Ashbourne in para 6.6.1 below for 
suggestions by the court as to what a trader should do to prevent the tie-in period from being found 
unfair. 
310 See Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.7.7 and 4.2.3.8. 
311 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-195-38-196; Devenney (2018) JBL 510-511 identifies the 
main shortcomings in the reform process. 
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consumers in fixed-term agreements than section 14 of the CPA, for example, by 
not limiting the duration of contracts and by granting the consumer the right to 
terminate the agreement upon non-delivery by the trader.312 
Having discussed the overall system, I turn now to its application through an 
examination of the UK’s approach to time-share. 
6.4 Timeshare agreements 
The Timeshare, Holiday Products, Resale and Exchange Contracts Regulations 
2010313 introduced the EU Timeshare Directive 2009314 to the UK. In essence, the 
Timeshare Regulations protect consumers by providing pre-contractual duties the 
trader must perform315 and allowing the consumer fourteen days within which to 
withdraw from the agreement.316 
The Timeshare Regulations prescribe formalities for time-share agreements. For 
instance, the contract must be in writing and contain certain prescribed 
information.317 
A time-share contract is defined in regulation 7 as: 
‘7 (1)A  “timeshare contract” means a contract between a trader and a 
consumer318− 
 
312 Section 28(6) of the CRA para 6.3.4.2.4 above. 
313 SI 2010/2960, hereafter the Timeshare Regulations. The Timeshare Regulations regulate 
‘timeshare contracts’ and ‘long-term holiday product contracts’. Exchange agreements and resale 
agreements of these agreements are also covered by the regulations. For ease of reference, the 
agreements will be collectively referred to as time-share contracts or agreements in this study. 
314 See Directive 2008/122/EC https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008L0122&from=EN (date of use: 15 January 2020). 
315 The trader must provide information that is clear, correct, and easy to understand on a 
prescribed form. In addition, and based on the information provided, the consumer must be able to 
make an informed decision whether to enter into the agreement or not, and the language used for 
the agreement must be one of the official languages of the state in which the consumer has 
citizenship or resides. Regulations 12 and 13. Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-138. 
316 Regulations 20 and 21 of the Timeshare Regulations. Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-136. 
Also note the 14-day period is extended in certain circumstances, see regs 12-18, and 20-24 of the 
Timeshare Regulations. 
317 See Parts 1 and 3 of Schedules 1, 2, 3 and 4 to the Timeshare Regulations for information on 
all the requirements. 
318 Regulation 11(1) of the Timeshare Regulations provides the definitions of consumer and trader: 
‘11.− (1)  In these Regulations − “consumer” means an individual who is not acting for the 
purposes of a trade, business, craft or profession; “trader” means –  
(a)  a person acting for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft or 
profession, or  
(b)  anyone acting in the name of, or on behalf of, a person falling within paragraph 
(a).  
(2)  Any reference in these Regulations to a consumer or trader in relation to a regulated 
contract, means –  
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(a)  under which the consumer, for consideration, acquires the right to 
use overnight accommodation for more than one period of 
occupation, and  
(b)  which has a duration of more than one year, or contains provision 
allowing for the contract to be renewed or extended so that it has a 
duration of more than one year. 
(2)  The reference to “accommodation” in paragraph (1) includes a reference 
to accommodation within a pool of accommodation.’ 
 
The Regulations also deal with long-term holiday product contracts which are 
defined in regulation 8 as: 
‘8.  A “long-term holiday product contract” means a contract between a trader and 
a consumer—  
(a) the main effect of which is that the consumer, for consideration, acquires 
the right to obtain discounts or other benefits in respect of 
accommodation, and  
(b)  which has a duration of more than one year, or contains provision allowing 
for the contract to be renewed or extended so that it has a duration of 
more than one year, irrespective of whether the contract makes provision 
for the consumer to acquire other services.’ 
These definitions correspond to the general concept of time-share internationally. 
A consumer can withdraw from the time-share agreement within fourteen days of 
conclusion of the agreement without providing reasons for the withdrawal.319 This 
withdrawal terminates the time-share and all ancillary agreements.320 
The time-share contract and long-term holiday product contract are both interesting 
from a South African perspective in that both have a minimum duration, in contrast 
to the position in South Africa. Regulation 24 provides that a consumer can 
terminate a time-share contract without penalty321 by giving notice to the trader no 
later than fourteen days after the request for an instalment322 is due.323 In other 
 
(a)  in the case of a contract which has been entered into, the consumer or trader 
who is party to the contract, or  
(b)  in the case of a proposed contract, the consumer and trader who will be parties 
to the contract, once it is entered into.’  
These are in essence the same as those dealt with in the CRA. For purposes of this study this 
aspect will not be discussed in detail. 
319 Regulations 20 and 21 of the Timeshare Regulations. 
320 Regulation 22(2)(b)Timeshare Regulations, for example, exchanges. See Beale Chitty on 
Contracts vol II 38-140. 
321 Regulation 24(1). 
322 Not including the first instalment, reg 24(4). 
323 Regulation 24(2-4). 
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words, after the first year of the agreement. This restriction is for the benefit of the 
consumer who may terminate any long-term holiday product that is a ‘regulated 
contract’,324 provided it is the second or later instalments as set out in the instalments 
schedule.325 The Timeshare Regulations expressly provide that all payments must 
be of equal value, and the situation therefore differs from many agreements in South 
Africa where a deposit is usually payable under time-share agreements, depending 
on the type of agreement entered into.326 
The Timeshare Regulations have the following protective mechanisms for 
consumers. 
• The requirement to provide prescribed information in regulation 12 of the 
Timeshare Regulations.327 
 
324 A regulated contract is a time-share contract to which the Timeshare Regulations apply and is 
not excluded within the meaning of reg 6. These are, eg, multiple reservations, normal lease 
agreements, hotel loyalty schemes, and certain insurance agreements as specified in reg 6(5). 
Therefore, all agreements normally viewed as time-share should be covered by the term ‘regulated 
contract’. For more information and a discussion, see Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-137 and 
vol II 990 n 825. 
325 Regulation 24 – also see reg 26 for the schedule that sets out the payment schedule. Beale 
Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-140. 
326 Depending on whether it is point-based, shares are bought with payment of an annual levy, or it 
could even be a share-block transaction. 
327 12.− (1) ‘Before entering into a regulated contract, the trader must – 
(a) give the consumer the key information in relation to the contract, and 
(b) ensure that the information meets the requirements of this regulation. 
(2) The trader must comply with paragraph(1) in good time before entering into the 
contract. 
(3) The “key information” in relation to a contract means – 
(a) the information required by Part 1 of the standard information form (see 
regulation 13(2)), 
(b) the information set out in Part 2 of that form, and 
(c) any additional information required by Part 3 of that form. 
(4) The information must be – 
(a) clear, comprehensible and accurate, and 
(b) sufficient to enable the consumer to make an informed decision about whether 
or not to enter into the contract. 
(5) The information must be provided – 
(a) in the standard information form, completed in accordance with regulation 
13(1), 
(b) in writing, 
(c) free of charge, and 
(d) in a manner which is easily accessible to the consumer. 
(6) If the consumer is resident in, or a national of, an EEA State, the information must 
be provided in a language which is an official language of an EEA State and which 
is – 
(a) the language, or one of the languages, of the EEA State in which the consumer 
is resident, or 
(b) the language, or one of the languages, of the EEA State of which the consumer 
is a national. 
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• A cooling-off period. 
• The right to withdraw from the agreement from the second instalment 
(year) onwards. 
Failure to comply with the Timeshare Regulations is a criminal offence and is 
punishable by a fine.328 
South African consumers trapped in long-term time-share agreements could benefit 
from such a provision.329 The only significant difference is that in South Africa in 
many instances, there is a deposit or purchase price payable, and if it is a sizable 
amount, cancellation could be to the detriment of the consumer as he or she could 
risk losing all or most of this payment. However, to be fair, the trader cannot be 
expected immediately to repay this amount as it could cause cash flow and liquidity 
problems for developers of time-share schemes. The long-term solution is to amend 
South African time-share legislation to provide for equal payments and a 
cancellation right. In addition to the rest of the well-regulated aspects of time-share 
contracts in the UK, this is a huge advantage. 
The procedures consumers must follow to enforce their rights, and the remedies at 
their disposal in terms of the CRA are now highlighted. 
6.5 Procedures and remedies for consumers when dissatisfied 
When a consumer is dissatisfied with the goods, services, or digital content he has 
bought, the CRA offers various remedies.330 These statutory remedies are in 
addition to his or her common-law remedies, and he or she may elect whether to 
use the statutory or common-law remedies.331 The remedies differ depending on 
whether the consumer bought goods, services, or digital content, and are dealt with 
briefly below.332 
 
(7) If there are two or more languages in which the information could be provided under 
paragraph (6), the trader must give the consumer the opportunity to nominate one of 
them and – 
(a) where the consumer does make a nomination, the information must be 
provided in the nominated language; 
(b) where the consumer does not make any nomination, the information may be 
provided in any one of those languages. 
(8) A trader who contravenes paragraph (5) of this regulation commits an offence.’ 
328 For further information see regs 12(5), 12(8) and 27-34 of the Timeshare Regulations. 
329 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.9. 
330 Also see Devenney (2018) JBL 506-507. 
331 For a detailed discussion of the enforcement of private rights see Andrews Enforcement 262-
274. 
332 See Devenney (2018) JBL 498-505. 




Consumers can reject faulty goods within 30 days of concluding the contract.333 
There are no formal requirements in the CRA for such notice provided that the 
consumer indicates to the trader, either verbally or by his or her actions that he or 
she intends to end the contract. Such notice should, however, be clear and should 
be understood by the trader. 
The Act provides for a two-staged remedy:334 
• The consumer’s first line of remedy is his or her right to have the goods 
repaired or replaced within a reasonable time. The trader has one 
opportunity to repair or replace the goods after which the consumer can 
move to the next stage/tier of remedies.  
• The consumer’s second-stage remedy is to have the price reduced. 
• Finally, if all else fails, the consumer can reject the goods and cancel the 
agreement.335 Where the consumer rejects the goods after expiry of more 
than six months since taking possession of the goods, the trader is 
entitled to claim deductions to the purchase price as compensation for 
use by the consumer. The consumer must return the goods to the trader 
upon rejection of the agreement and is entitled to a refund of the 
purchase price, depending on the nature of the contract and the goods. 
6.5.2 Digital content  
Digital content cannot be rejected, as the CRA does not provide the consumer with 
the right to reject digital content.336 Consumers have the right to repair, replacement, 
or in applicable circumstances, a price reduction in respect of digital content.337 
 
333 Section 20 read in conjunction with s 22 of the CRA. This period could be shorter due to the 
specific nature of the goods in question. If the goods are replaced or repaired by the trader within 
the prescribed period, the consumer’s right to reject will be extended by seven days. 
334 This is similar to s 56(2) read with s 20 of the CPA. 
335 Section 20(5) of the CRA. Digital content cannot be rejected, consumers have the right to 
repair, replacement, or in applicable circumstances, a price reduction. Sections 42-46 of the CRA. 
336 See ss 42-46 of the CRA which sets out the rights of the consumer to enforce terms in respect 
of digital content. There is no equivalent provision in the CPA in South Africa. The only comparable 
provision in the CPA is s 20(3) which deals with goods that cannot be rejected, and digital goods 
are not likely to be covered by this section. 
337 See Devenney (2018) JBL 505-507; this is comparable to the rights of the consumer in ss 54-56 
of the CPA in South Africa. 




Services must be performed with a reasonable degree of skill and care339 and within 
a reasonable time.340 Consumers do not have the right to reject services rendered 
but the trader must repeat the performance of the service or services within a 
reasonable time and without inconveniencing the consumer to a significant degree. 
If the trader cannot repeat the performance, or fails to do so within a reasonable 
time, or cannot do so without causing significant inconvenience to the consumer, 
the consumer is entitled to a price reduction. 
6.5.4 Concluding remarks: Remedies, dissatisfied consumers 
All of these remedies are additional to the consumer’s common-law remedies.341 
This position of a consumer, who wishes to access remedies in terms of consumer 
law in the UK, is similar to that in Singapore under the Lemon Law.342 An analogous 
provision in the CPA would benefit South African consumers – and, in particular, 
consumers in section 14 fixed-term contracts. 
Although jurisdiction and enforcement are not discussed in detail in this thesis, the 
next relevant aspect for consumers is how to seek redress and enforcement of their 
rights in terms of consumer law. 
6.5.5 Jurisdiction and enforcement 
When a consumer seeks redress in terms of a consumer contract, he or she will 
have to institute court action against the trader. However, in the UK, consumer law 
litigation is regarded as a last resort in resolving disputes.343 Parties involved in a 
dispute should rather consider entering into negotiation or other form of ADR, even 
 
338 Part 2 and Schedule 2 to the CRA apply to retail financial services. See 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f4d71703-0e55-4009-91b2-0f2c065b8ac6 (date of 
use: 20 March 2020); https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/finalised-guidance/fg18-07.pdf (date of 
use: 20 March 2020). 
339 Section 49 CRA which deals with the consumer’s statutory rights under a service contract. 
340 Section 52 CRA; see Devenney (2018) JBL 508-510. This is similar to s 19 of the CPA which 
regulates the consumer’s right to the delivery of goods or the supply of services; and s 54 which 
regulates the consumer’s right to demand quality service. See Ch 4 para 4.3.3.4. 
341 See the discussion in para 6.3.5 above. 
342 Andrews Enforcement 214; see Practice Direction – Pre-action Conduct and Protocols available 
at http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/pd_pre-action_conduct#8.1 (date of 
use: 8 September 2019) para 8. Also see Ch 5 para 5.3.2.7. 
343 Civil Procedure Rules and Practice Directions and Pre-action Conduct Practice Direction. For 
more information see http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/practice-direction-
57ab-shorter-and-flexible-trials-schemes (date of use: 13 August 2019); 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/pd_pre-action_conduct (date of use: 
13 August 2019). 
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after having instituted litigation.344 Forms of ADR available are mediation,345 
arbitration,346 adjudication,347 expert determination,348 early-neutral evaluation,349 and 
ombudsman schemes.350 
There is no special small claims court in the county courts of England and in the 
sheriff courts in Scotland. Small claims are instituted in the county and sheriff courts 
respectively, regardless of the amount involved.351 Courts must also consider if 
dispute resolution is possible, or suitable, at all stages of the proceedings.352 Failing 
to use ADR could result in cost implications for the parties.353 
 
344 Andrews Enforcement 214. The court can require proof that parties have tried to make use of 
ADR even after proceedings have been instituted. 
345 Mediation in the UK follows the EU trend, is facilitative, and is described as follows: ‘[T]he 
mediator does not express a judgment or view on any party’s case but instead creates a voluntary, 
confidential environment where people involved in conflict are helped by a mediator as a neutral 
third party to resolve their problems collaboratively’. See Andrews Enforcement 1045. 
346 Arbitration is referred to in CRA, eg, in s 31(4). Arbitration in England and Wales is governed by 
the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996. See Andrews Enforcement 1046 for a discussion. 
347 Adjudication is mentioned in Schedule 8 Part 1 to the CRA. Adjudication is similar to arbitration 
but is not governed by the Arbitration Act 1996. It is dealt with under an adjudication scheme. See 
Andrews Enforcement 1047 for a discussion of adjudication. 
348 Expert determination is not mentioned in the CRA. See Andrews Enforcement 1047 for a 
discussion. Expert determination is similar to adjudication but is rarely used in disputes between 
consumers and traders. 
349 Early neutral evaluation is not mentioned in the CRA. Andrews describes this as ‘… a process 
under which the parties submit their dispute for consideration to a suitably qualified and respected 
individual who will give the parties a decision as to what the outcome would, in his view, be if the 
matter were to go to Court’. See Andrews Enforcement 1047. 
350 Ombudsman schemes are not mentioned in the CRA. For more general information on these 
see Andrews Enforcement 1045-1047, 1094-1095. There are similarities to the position in South 
Africa under the CPA where there is provision for a Consumer Goods and Services Ombud, see 
http://www.cgso.org.za/ (date of use: 26 January 2020). 
351 See Andrews Enforcement 217-219 for more information. 
352 The court can also direct parties to make use of ‘early neutral evaluation’, see Seals and Seals 
v Williams [2015] EWHC 1829 (Ch) 15 May 2015; Andrews Enforcement 215. There is no special 
small claims court in the county courts of England and the sheriff courts in Scotland – the claims 
are instituted in the county and sheriff courts respectively, regardless of the amount involved. See 
Andrews Enforcement 217-219 for more information. An interesting development in 2002, was an 
online claims service. See Andrews Enforcement 219-220. This forum of litigation could relieve 
pressure on the normal court system if used effectively and wisely. See the user guidance for more 
information available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
762843/mcol-userguide-eng.pdf (date of use: 13 August 2019). 
353 Andrews Enforcement 216-217. The court has the discretion to deviate from this – eg, when 
considering the nature of the dispute, the merits of the respective cases, or where the costs of 
ADR would be very high. 
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Consumers can approach a variety of enforcement bodies to enforce their 
consumer-related complaints.354 However, these bodies – and ombuds in particular 
– have been severely criticised for bad service to the public.355 
UK case law is now discussed to establish if there are lessons to be learnt from the 
way these disputes are handled by the judiciary in the UK. Most of these judgments 
were decided under earlier legislation. However, the decisions remain relevant as 
courts will consult these judgments for guidance in future CRA litigation. 
 
6.6 Case law 
6.6.1 The Office of Fair Trading v Ashbourne Management Services & 
Others356 
In The Office of Fair Trading v Ashbourne Management Services and Others the 
Office of Fair Trading357 complained about certain practices by Ashbourne 
Management Services, who recruited members for various gyms and health and 
fitness clubs358 using standard-form contracts and managing consumers’ payments 
to these gyms.359 The OFT entered into discussions with Ashbourne to amend the 
contracts to adhere to legislation, and the parties agreed that the final and approved 
version would be used to enter into agreements with consumers. Despite this, there 
were thirteen versions still in use.360 The relevant aspect of this judgment is that the 
OFT deemed some of the contracts unfair in terms of the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations. 
 
354 For example, the Local Authority Trading Standards Services Financial Conduct Authority, the 
CMA, Ofcom (Communication’s Regulator), Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland) OFGEM 
(Office of Gas and Electricity Markets), OFWAT (The Water Services Regulation Authority), ORR 
(Office of Rail and Road), CAA (Civil Aviation Authority), Utility Regulator for Northern Ireland. See 
Practice Note Overview 91-92; Conway 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06759/SN06759.pdf (date of use: 16 
May 2019) 17; For consumer guidance on enforcement of consumer protection see 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
546521/cma58-consumer-protection-enforcement-guidance.pdf (date of use: 15 August 2019); 
Andrews Enforcement 1015-1016. 
355 Cook https://www.ft.com/content/510b5344-279b-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0 (date of use: 19 
May 2020). 
356 [2011] EWHC 1237 (Ch) (hereafter Ashbourne). 
357 Hereafter the OFT. The OFT was a non-ministerial department that existed from 1973 to 1 April 
2014. It was responsible for protecting consumer interests throughout the UK. Upon its closure, its 
responsibilities were passed on to a number of different organisations such as the CMA (discussed 
in para 6.3.4.3.1.6 above). 
358 Hereafter ‘gyms’ for brevity. 
359 This case was decided under earlier legislation, but as it is based on fairness and deals with the 
fairness of longer-term contracts, it remains relevant. 
360 A detailed discussion of all the circumstances and facts in the case will not be possible and only 
the parts relevant to this thesis will be discussed. 
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The court found that in considering the fairness of a term in a consumer contract, 
regard should be had to the consumer involved, and, although the term ‘average 
consumer’ is well known in European consumer law,361 the standard used to 
evaluate the consumer varies.362 This standard should be adapted to suit the specific 
consumer in question, as the typical consumer is important for the consideration of 
fairness, and to evaluate whether a term is expressed clearly and intelligibly.363 
The contracts further provided a minimum term for membership,364 and the court 
decided that the clause describing the minimum term was clear and intelligible.365 
The court decided that the test for fairness is:366 
• Are the terms in a contract worded such that they result in a significant 
imbalance to the parties’ respective rights and obligations? 
• Are the terms and conditions so detrimental to the consumer that their 
inclusion is contrary to good faith? 
The court considered various factors when deciding on fairness, for instance the 
consumer’s overestimation of his use of the gym, the advantage of oversubscription 
to gyms, advice on the defendant’s website, and the fact that the consumer is not 
made aware of all these factors. The court decided the defendants exploited these 
factors, and that the contracts,367 specifically those in excess of twelve months, were 
weighted significantly against the consumer. This caused an imbalance in the 
parties’ relationship which was sufficiently serious to qualify as contrary to good 
faith.368 The court emphasised that consumers do not fully appreciate the 
detrimental effect of early termination of contracts.369 It found that several aspects 
of the various standard-form agreements were unfair and did not comply with the 
requirements of the UTCCR and that Ashbourne was guilty of unfair commercial 
practices.370 
The significant aspect of this judgment is the court’s suggestion that traders should 
do the following to ensure a tie-in period would be regarded fair:371 
 
361 Ashbourne para [128]. 
362 Ashbourne para [128]. 
363 Ashbourne para [128]. 
364 Twelve, 24 and 36 months, Ashbourne para [129]. 
365 Ashbourne paras [158]−[161]. 
366 This is the test now reflected in the CRA. 
367 Those longer than 12 months’ duration, see Ashbourne para [174]. 
368 Ashbourne para [174]. 
369 Ashbourne para [175]. 
370 Ashbourne para [238]. 
371 For the general discussion see Ashbourne paras [129]−[153]; Practice Note Overview 45. 
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• The trader should ensure in advance that the consumer is aware, either 
by information during the marketing process or during the order and 
negotiations, that he or she will be bound for a minimum term.372 
• If the consumer commits to the agreement, the trader should make the 
risks involved very clear to him or her373 and propose alternative options 
available to the consumer – eg, payments for individual visits – instead 
of a tie-in period.374 
• The trader should consider the possibility that a consumer would possibly 
have to terminate the contract, for instance because of unemployment, 
illness, or a change in circumstances.375 
This judgment in Ashbourne is important for the comparison to fixed-term contracts 
under section 14 of the CPA, as it provides guidelines on the establishment of 
fairness in agreements that bind the consumer for a tie-in period.376 
6.6.2 Du Plessis v Fontgary Leisure Parks Ltd377 
Du Plessis bought a caravan stand in 2006 for £36 500. The annual pitch fee378 at 
that time was £1 692.379 The park owner spent money to upgrade the park, graded 
the stands,380 and gave due notice of the grading and increase in pitch fees to the 
owners. Stand owners were given the option of moving their caravans to stands with 
a lower-graded pitch attracting more affordable pitch fees. Because of the grading 
process, Du Plessis’s annual contribution was raised.381 She refused to pay this 
amount and removed and sold her caravan. Du Plessis based her claim on a 
number of grounds which the court a quo found to be without merit. The court 
reduced her claim to one for damages based on the wrongful termination of 
contract.382 
The court a quo found that when considering all the factors set out in the pitch 
agreement, Fontgary was entitled to the increase in fees it had charged and that Du 
Plessis’s failure to pay the increased pitch fee was a breach of contract. Du Plessis 
appealed on the following grounds: 
 
372 Ashbourne para [171]. This is an example of information-based consumer protection that 
improves transparency. 
373 Ashbourne para [171]. 
374 This is another example of information-based consumer protection that improves transparency. 
375 Ashbourne paras [164], [167]. 
376 See para 6.6.5 below. 
377 [2012] EWCA Civ 409 (hereafter Du Plessis). This case was accessed on Westlaw @ 2019 
Thomson Reuters and does not contain paragraph numbers or the correct page numbers. I 
therefore use the page numbers on the Westlaw version for reference purposes. 
378 This is the term used for the annual fee payable in terms of the agreement. 
379 All owners paid the same pitch fee, whether the stand had a sea view or not. 
380 Du Plessis 9. Based on the size and the quality of location of the particular stand.  
381 The fee was raised to £2160. Fontgary offered to buy back Du Plessis’s caravan for £16 000.00 
– she refused, removed her caravan, and sold it for £14 000 so suffering financial loss. 
382 Du Plessis 9. 
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• the aspects which Fontgary had considered when reviewing pitch fees 
did not fall within the scope of clause 7d of the licence agreement;383 
• if found to be within the scope of regulation 7d of the UTCCR, the clause 
was unfair within the provisions of the 1999 Regulations; and 
• the effect of the arbitration provisions in the agreement.384 
The court considered whether clause 7d created an imbalance in the parties’ 
respective rights detrimental to Du Plessis. It decided against Du Plessis as the 
clause reflected a carefully weighed and considered review procedure of the annual 
licence fees.385 The contract provided for a three-month notice period of an increase 
– which Fontgary had given. In addition, Fontgary had even offered to move the 
caravan to a cheaper site free of charge. The contract further obliged the defendant 
to give reasons for the increase (excluding factors such as increase in profits) which 
Fontgary had done; and any individual owner could challenge such increase. The 
court found that clause 7d was not an unfair term within the 1999 Regulations as it 
did not entitle Fontgary to increase the fees unilaterally without providing valid 
reasons.386 The court also found that the grading of sites had been done fairly. The 
court held that the 1999 Regulations applied, that clause 7 was a fair term, and 
therefore dismissed that element of Du Plessis’s appeal.387 
It is submitted that this is the correct decision and that the court weighed up all 
relevant factors in deciding on fairness. This sets a good example for South African 
courts to follow in disputes based on fairness or contract terms.388 A similar case, 
where a contract was amended by the trader, will be discussed next. 
6.6.3 Rochdale Borough Council v Dixon389 
In the judgment of Rochdale Borough Council v Dixon, Rochdale let a property to 
Dixon. In the original contract the charges for water was payable to Rochdale who 
paid it to the relevant water authority. Rochdale subsequently amended this 
agreement390 so as to provide that the water fees were to be paid directly to the 
water authority. Dixon refused to pay the water accounts directly to the water 
authority on a number of grounds.391 The ground relevant to the present discussion 
was that he considered the variation of the water payment clause unfair. The court 
a quo decided against Dixon and he appealed. In deciding whether the clause was 
 
383 Du Plessis 9. 
384 Not relevant for purposes of this discussion. 
385 Du Plessis 13. 
386 Du Plessis 13. 
387 Du Plessis 13. 
388 See para 6.6.5. 
389 [2012] PTSR 1336 (hereafter Rochdale). 
390 Rochdale 1336. 
391 Rochdale 1337. 
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unfair in terms of the 1999 Regulations, and to establish whether Rochdale had 
followed the correct procedure, the court considered the following factors:392 
• Was there a significant imbalance in favour of Rochdale to an extent 
which tipped the contract in its favour? The court found that there was no 
such imbalance.393 
• Was there good faith and openness in varying the term? The court found 
there was as the term was authorised by a statutory power394 and 
Rochdale had followed the correct procedure in varying the term.395 
• Rochdale had not taken advantage of the tenants.396 
• Whether the dilemma Dixon found himself in was a result of his refusal 
to pay for the water service he had used and enjoyed, although he was 
able to do so, and not because of the amendment of the tenancy 
agreement.397 
Again, the court here adopted a balanced and fair view. The judge considered the 
facts of the case, several matters not relevant to this thesis, and the unfair terms 
issue in which he examined twelve factors398 to establish whether Rochdale’s 
conduct could amount to creating a significant imbalance. In addition, nothing in 
Rochdale’s conduct was found to be contrary to the requirement of good faith.399 
The court correctly dismissed Dixon’s appeal.400 
6.6.4 ParkingEye Limited v Beavis401 
In ParkingEye Limited v Beavis, Beavis parked his vehicle in a car park. The 
conditions for parking there were, amongst others, that parking was free for two 
hours, and after two hours an amount of £85 was payable.402 These conditions were 
brought to the attention of consumers by way of a large notice board at the entrance 
to the parking area, and by additional notices inside the parking area. By parking in 
the car park, Beavis consented to these conditions. Beavis only left the car park 
after two hours and 56 minutes and ParkingEye demanded payment of the £85. 
Beavis objected to this on a few grounds; the only ground relevant to this discussion 
is whether charging £85 in the parking agreement violated the provisions of the 1999 
 
392 Rochdale 1339-1340. 
393 Rochdale 1358-1359. 
394 Rochdale 1357-1359. 
395 Rochdale 1358-1359. 
396 Rochdale 1358-1359. 
397 Rochdale 1359. 
398 Rochdale 1358-1359. 
399 Rochdale 1359. 
400 Rochdale 1361. 
401 [2015] UKSC 67, 2015 WLR 1373 (hereafter Beavis). See Beale Chitty on Contracts 2nd 
cumulative supplement 38-251A for a discussion and for the view of the minority; MacDonald & 
Atkins Law of Contract 232-234. 
402 This amount was reducible to £50, if paid within 14 days. £85 was the equivalent of 
approximately R 1800 on 18 June 2020. 
 The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection and fixed-term agreements 
275 
 
Regulations. Beavis alleged that this condition was unfair in that no distinction in 
cost was drawn between a consumer who was one minute late and one who was 
one hour late.403 Beavis’s appeal was dismissed as the majority of the court 
confirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court that:404 
• The provision that latecomers had to pay a fixed charge was a simple 
and straightforward condition. The condition was clear and given to the 
consumer in advance.405 
• The condition in question, although it caused a significant imbalance 
between the rights and obligation of the parties, especially as the 
consumer had the advantage of parking in the car park free for two hours, 
was fair. In determining fairness, the court considered the purpose of the 
charge and concluded that it aimed to manage the parking spaces 
available by making efficient use of the parking for potential shoppers, 
and also, to ensure income for ParkingEye to cover its costs and profit 
from the service to customers.406 
• In addition, the amount in question was not disproportionately high, the 
amount charged was not against good faith and also not prejudicial to 
the consumer.407 
This decision serves as an example that terms provided in the grey list in Schedule 
2 of the CRA could be found fair when all circumstances have been considered.408 
South African courts should take cognisance of well-considered UK decisions such 
as Beavis. 
6.6.5 Concluding remarks: UK case law 
All of the factors considered by courts in the judgments above could be relevant in 
deciding on fairness when evaluating whether the duration of a fixed-term contract 
is fair.409 The case law in the UK was decided correctly taking all relevant 
circumstances into account. All relevant documentation was considered at length, 
and although all the judgments discussed above went against the consumer, it is 
submitted that they were correct. The effect of these decisions is not to limit the 
rights of traders unnecessarily, as this could be detrimental to both traders and the 
economy. The balance of rights and obligations between the parties must be fair in 
 
403 Also see Aziz on the consideration of unfair terms paras [65]–[76]. 
404 For a well- balanced review of the case, see Samuels 2015 Legal Update Commercial 12-13. 
For an opinion criticising the judgment see Morgan (2016) CLJ 11-14. 
405 This relates to the transparency requirement. See Beavis para [100]. 
406 Beavis para [107]. 
407 Beavis paras [104]-[107]. 
408 Beavis para [105]. 
409 Especially in South Africa, under s 14 of the CPA – if, and when the duration of contracts is not 
limited. 
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order to pass the reasonable and fair test. The lessons to be learnt from these 
decisions are: 
• to consider all factors in the context of the contract; 
• detailed decisions which give in-depth reasons for deciding on the 
fairness or other merits of a dispute are required; 
• the parol evidence rule is excluded by implication in certain sections of 
the CRA;410 
• these decisions are fair despite the presumption in UK consumer law in 
favour of the consumer in cases of ambiguity; 
• the decisions protect and promote business by being fair, and in the long 
term this will be to the advantage of the consumer; 
• The fact that EU Directives, Guidance, and case law must be considered 
provides valuable guidance to UK courts411 and, of course, contributes to 
effective legal comparison in judgments.412 This, in turn, creates legal 
certainty as there is a measure of predictability for consumers and 
traders.413 
I conclude by considering the advantages and disadvantages of relevant consumer 
law related to fixed-term type contracts in the UK, and compare these to the situation 
under the CPA. 
 
6.7 Conclusion: Chapter 6 
Although it represents a distinct improvement on the previous position in the UK, it 
is difficult at this early stage to judge whether the CRA achieved the purposes and 
addressed the shortcomings that were the main reasons for enacting it.414 Generally, 
as it is relatively new, there are not many detailed publications, opinions, or cases 
on the effect of the CRA in practice. Devenney contends that the CRA has brought 
significant benefits to the consumer-law regime in the UK.415 The fairness test in Part 
 
410 See the discussion in para 6.3.6 above. 
411 Although it can be argued that this adds to the fragmentation and incoherence of law and case 
law as more systems or sources must be considered. This could lead to a delay in delivering 
judgments and extend the duration of hearings. 
412This could also be cumbersome as such a large volume of case law must be studied and 
considered by legal representatives and courts before coming to a decision. 
413 In SA predictability (with specific reference to fairness) is still lacking to such an extent that 
traders do not know how to act. Most of the factors that must be considered under s 52(2) of the 
CPA in deciding on the fairness of a transaction or agreement are subjective (which also 
complicates predictability). See Stoop LLD 216-218. 
414 See para 6.3.2 above. 
415 Devenney argues that the reform in consumer law in the UK achieved the following results: 
• A better differentiation between consumer and commercial contracts, 
• A more consistent use of the same terminology across consumer law legislation and 
Regulations, 
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2 of the CRA adds considerable value.416 And although the consolidation process is 
still open to criticism and unavailable as a single Act, it is an improvement on its 
predecessor.417 
When compared to the consumer law regime in Singapore and South Africa, the UK 
source materials – the CRA, the Regulations, EU Directives, and EU case law – 
remain fragmented and complicated, and it is difficult to establish the position on a 
certain aspect without consulting approximately ten sources. Whether the CRA and 
the applicable regulations and EU Directives will be applied and enforced evenly 
(post Brexit) can only be answered in time as it is too early to evaluate this aspect 
with certainty. 
The main advantages of the CRA and the UK consumer-law regime, in general and 
relating to fixed-term contracts, are: 
• It keeps pace with modern technology, for example, provisions governing 
digital-content contracts. 
• The Explanatory Notes issued by the legislature assist in interpreting and 
applying the CRA. 
• The Guidance issued is useful and comprehensive for all market sectors, 
including consumers. 
• Everyone can access the Explanatory Notes and Guidance on the 
internet. 
• The fact that courts in the UK can consult a wealth of EU consumer-law 
cases widens the field of expertise and sources available to courts.418 
• The UK retains common-law rights and remedies in most circumstances 
for both parties, and this could potentially benefit both parties and assist 
courts in reaching fair decisions. 
• The continued importance of the principle of the freedom of contract and 
the function of the free market in the economy as reflected in the CMA 
Contract Terms Guidance 2015 is advantageous, specifically when used 
in the core exemption. 419 
 
• The unification of the law on the supply of goods to consumers, 
• The refinement of particularly problematic aspects of consumer law, 
• The modernisation of consumer law to provide for aspects such as contracts for digital 
content, 
• The provision of private redress remedies to consumers for unfair commercial practices by 
traders, and 
• Overall, a consumer law system that is consolidated and harmonious. 
He also highlights a few disadvantages. See Devenney (2018) JBL 510-511. 
416 For example, when introducing a similar provision for s 14 could be useful – when specified 
maximum duration is abolished. 
417 Beale Chitty on Contracts vol II 38-196.  
418 This could, of course, also be a disadvantage given the sheer volume of case law that must be 
studied and considered by practitioners and courts. 
419 See para 6.3.4.3.1.5. 
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• UK consumer law does not limit the duration of fixed-term contracts, but 
rather makes use of fairness to assess the balance of rights and 
obligations between parties, this is of considerable importance to 
consumers. 
• Consumers have a 30-day right to reject goods and this promotes 
fairness and balances unequal contractual power. 
• Unfairness can be considered in all consumer contracts and notices – 
this is an advantage, especially as the court may consider terms for 
fairness mero motu – even during the enforcement stages of 
proceedings. 
• The parol evidence rule does not apply in prescribed circumstances and 
the court can take notices and other circumstances into consideration to 
reach a fair decision. This works to the advantage of the consumer as he 
is normally in an inferior bargaining position. Allowing additional evidence 
to prove the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the agreement 
would most likely benefit the consumer and improve access to justice. 
• Consumers in time-share contracts can cancel by giving fourteen days’ 
notice when payment of the second or later instalment is due. 
• Although lease agreements of immovable property are covered only by 
Part 2 of the CRA, there is no section or provision which limits the 
duration of leases, whether in respect of movable or immovable property. 
Also, to further protect consumers in lease agreements, the CRA 
compels letting agents to publicise their fees. 
The shortcomings of the CRA and consumer-law legislation in the UK generally and 
in respect of fixed-term contracts are: 
• The legislation and Regulations are lengthy and difficult to read – even 
after the consolidation efforts neither the Act nor the consumer regime 
can be described as ‘straightforward’. 
• The fact that the Act applies differently in different areas of the UK and 
that terminology differs in these areas, as well as certain sections not 
applying in certain parts of the UK complicates the understanding and 
application of the CRA.420 
• The fact that EU Directives were brought in, in addition to UK law, results 
in a lengthy, bulky, and fragmented consumer law regime.421 
• Because EU legislation was introduced into UK consumer law and 
legislation only recently, Brexit will complicate the certainty regarding the 
position, continued relevance, and the continued effect of EU consumer-
law measures. 
 
420 Explanatory Notes para 26. 
421 Although there could be advantages as courts and practitioners have a wider field of reference. 
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The importance of this comparison for the position of a consumer in terms of a 
section 14 of the CPA contract lies in the following aspects: 
• UK consumer law is not as prescriptive and rigid as the CPA in that it 
does not prescribe a specific maximum duration for fixed-term contracts. 
This is important as it could be to the advantage of a consumer to have 
a longer-term lease agreement.422 
• The consumer has a 30-day period in which to cancel or state 
dissatisfaction.  
• The consumer is empowered and has effective rights he or she can 
exercise, for example, section 28(3), read with section 28(6) expressly 
entitles the consumer to terminate the agreement when delivery has not 
been effected in accordance with the contract. 
• The consumer does not have to give 20 days’ notice to cancel an 
agreement based on defective or non-performance by the trader and is 
not liable for instalments or penalties during the notice period if these are 
a result of breach by the trader.423 
• The consumer is protected in all instances by the fairness test,424 
transparency, and good faith in Part 2 of the CRA. 
• The time-share right of the consumer to cancel from the second or later 
instalment by giving fourteen days’ notice is an advantage, as the 
consumer will not be bound for an extended or unlimited period.425 
• The fact that the parol evidence rule does not apply in all circumstances 
should also benefit the consumer, as the consumer is normally in an 
inferior bargaining position and it would therefore be to his or her 
advantage to point out and provide testimony or proof of surrounding 
circumstances. 
The position of the trader in the South African regime differs from the position of a 
trader in the UK in the following respects: 
• Traders’ rights are theoretically better protected in South Africa, as the 
parol evidence rule will normally benefit the trader, and the parol 
evidence rule applies in South Africa. 
• Traders in South Africa are better protected in terms of section 14 as they 
have an unfair advantage when the consumer is liable to give notice and 
remains liable for interim payments where the breach was caused by the 
default or defective performance by the trader. 
• A trader in the UK can enter into longer-term agreements, for example 
lease agreements, which could be to his or her advantage when 
compared to the position of the trader under section 14 of the CPA. 
 
422 See, eg, guidelines provided in Ashbourne para 6.6.1. 
423 Section 14 CPA. 
424 Section 52(1)(b) of the CPA; Ch 4 para 4.3.2.6. 
425 In contrast to the position in South Africa. See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.9. 
 The Law of the United Kingdom: Consumer protection and fixed-term agreements 
280 
 
• The trader in the UK is also well protected by the fairness principle, and 
judgments decided in favour of traders illustrate this, despite the 
presumption in favour of consumers in cases of ambiguity. 426 
• The free market and freedom of contract principles are protected in the 
UK to a certain extent, by the core exemption in section 64 of the CRA. 
There are no similar exemptions in the CPA. 
The completion of the analysis, comparison, and conclusion on consumer protection 
legislation relevant to fixed-term contracts in the UK, enables me to conclude this 
study. In Chapter 7, I highlight the findings of this study and provide two tables to 
represent the best practice regarding specific aspects analysed in this study in 
visual terms. After that, I illustrate the findings of this study by analysing a very 
simple set of facts after which I conclude by offering recommendations to improve 
the position of consumers in a fixed-term contract under section 14 of the South 
African Consumer Protection Act. 
.
 
426 See para 6.6.5 above. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  Conclusion and recommendations 
7.1 Introduction and general remarks 
Consumer protection is the cornerstone of a fair, modern, and competent economy 
and market place. It aims to ensure competitiveness,1 instill confidence in 
consumers, and enable businesses to thrive.2 
In Chapter 2, I briefly set out the history and philosophy behind consumer principles 
and policies of consumer protection as a prelude to the analysis of pertinent 
common-law of consumer contracts in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 I considered the 
regulation of fixed-term agreements under the CPA and compared the position of 
both the consumer and supplier in fixed-term agreements under the CPA with their 
position under the common law. Chapters 5 and 6 saw an examination and 
comparison of fixed-term contracts in Singapore under the CPFTA, and the UK 
under the CRA, respectively. This was aimed at establishing whether the consumer-
law regimes of these two foreign jurisdictions had anything to offer in improving 
South Africa’s consumer protection under the CPA in the focus area of this thesis. 
A detailed analysis of all aspects of contract law under fixed-term contracts falls 
outside the scope of this thesis and only the aspects specifically highlighted in 
Chapter 1 and at the beginning of each chapter have been addressed. 
Although the Constitution is of paramount importance from a South African 
perspective, legal comparison of the constitutional aspects and ideals of South 
African consumer law and those of Singapore and the UK, is untenable in that the 
South African ideal of transformative constitutionalism is not shared by Singapore 
and the UK.3 The constitutional aspect is essential to the interpretation of the 
common law and the CPA in a South African context and had to be taken into 
account for purposes of Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. The absence of a 
constitutional goal in Singapore and the UK does not affect the outcome of the 
thesis. This is because the principal problems generated by section 14 arise from 
the limitation of the freedom of contract as regards the duration of fixed-term 
agreements, and in the lack of protection under section 14 for the consumer when 
a supplier is guilty of material default. The CPFTA and the CRA do not limit the 
duration of fixed-term contracts and neither of these Acts has a provision akin to 
section 14. This is a further validation of the comparison of these three jurisdictions 
as it points clearly to the conclusion that section 14 is at best superfluous – if not 
excessive – and in fact acts to the disadvantage of the very people it seeks to protect 
and benefit. 
 
1 Thus, the strong link to competition law. See Ch 2 para 2.4.2; Ch 4 para 4.2.2.3; Ch 5 para 5.1; 
Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3.1.6. 
2 Preamble and foreword to Green Paper. See Ch 4 para 4.2.2.3. 
3 Also see in this respect Bhana PhD 241. 
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Many useful lessons emerged from the comparative study of Singapore and the 
UK’s statutory consumer-law regimes, both section 14-specific and to South African 
consumer protection legislation in general. 
After highlighting the most relevant findings of the study, I preset them in summary 
form as a table for easy reference. These findings are then used to illustrate – by 
way of a basic problem – the practical implications by virtue of the rights and 
remedies provided under the common law, under section 14 of the CPA, in terms of 
the CPFTA in Singapore, and in terms of the CRA in the UK. This, in turn, enables 
me to identify best practice. The thesis closes with a presentation of the conclusions 
drawn from the study and recommendations to address the shortcomings in the 
fixed-term contract regime in South Africa under the CPA. 
7.2 Findings4 
From the historic-philosophical study in Chapter 2 it emerges clearly that 
technological advances, mass production, the increase in the number of products 
and services available to consumers, and the increasingly remote nature of 
transactions, have rendered consumers more vulnerable to problems related to 
quality, safety, and the availability of remedies. This increased vulnerability of 
consumers internationally spearheaded a shift to consumer activism and awareness 
among governments of the need to protect consumers. It became clear that despite 
consumers’ duty to inform themselves and make rational decisions in concluding 
agreements, they still required the protection which could be offered by consumer 
organisations and consumer legislation to promote fairness and protection, prevent 
exploitation, and provide protection once exploitation had taken place. 
This led to a waning of the individualist theory and emphasises that the application 
and interpretation of the principle of freedom of contract impacted unfairly on 
vulnerable consumers. Furthermore, the strict interpretation of freedom of contract 
by courts, their rigid application of pacta servanda sunt, and the potential detriment 
this held for vulnerable consumers contributed to an awareness of the shortcomings 
of individualism. This led, in turn, to a shift towards collectivism and resulted in, 
amongst others, consumer protection measures. As a result, legislatures the world 
over intervened with measures to protect consumers. 
However, despite the decline in support for the freedom of contract principle, and 
the move towards improved consumer protection, the standard-form contract 
thrived as it was shown to be cost effective and to save suppliers time. It was soon 
realised that the mere fact that a consumer had signed a standard-form agreement, 
in no way meant that he or she had read, and still less understood, the contract. 
Standard-form contracts, boilerplate, and contracts of adhesion, are all 
manifestations of the demise of the ideals of freedom of contract, individualism, free 
 
4 Cross references to the discussion of all the different aspects mentioned in the findings are 
provided in Tables A and B in para 7.3 where these aspects are compared and best practice 
recommended. 
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and open negotiation, equal bargaining, and ultimately, the sanctity of contracts. At 
the same time, they signal the rise of collectivism. However, despite these criticisms, 
standard-form contracts remain a reality which have an important impact on the 
economy – they affect the rights of sellers or suppliers, and ultimately affect the 
consumer. All this emphasised the need for consumer protection measures. 
In Chapter 3, I analysed the South African common law relating to fixed-term 
contracts. From this analysis, it emerged that the common-law of contract is 
governed by Roman law principles, Roman-Dutch writers’ texts, South African case 
law, and principles of English law. Breach of contract, rescission, specific 
performance, and damages are equally well regulated by principles, maxims, 
exceptions, and sources to promote and ensure the fair and reasonable treatment 
of parties to an agreement on the breach and/or rescission thereof. These principles 
have developed over centuries and have been refined to provide fair treatment for 
almost every eventuality. 
Adding value to these already well-developed and historical principles of fairness, 
are the beneficial effects of more recent factors in the form of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, its Chapter 2 – the Bill of Rights – and the concept 
of ubuntu. As illustrated in Chapter 3, there are shortcomings in some areas of the 
common law, mainly in the form of contradictory judgments and the incorrect 
interpretation of statutes and Roman and Roman-Dutch principles. The advantages 
are that it is a sophisticated and equitable contract-law regime which aims to protect 
both parties in equal measure, and allows the courts the discretion to develop the 
law within bounds of the Constitution and public policy. The common law remains 
relevant as the common-law regime is expressly preserved in section 2(10) of the 
CPA, and all agreements – whether under the common law or in terms of legislation 
– are regulated by the common-law of contract. 
In recognition of the international move towards consumer protection, the South 
African legislature enacted the CPA, which is the topic of study in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. Under the CPA, the supplier drafts his or her own section 14 standard-form 
agreement on his or her own terms. He or she is well-protected by section 14 and 
is entitled to payments up to the date of cancellation. In addition, a supplier may 
impose a penalty in his or her discretion, using the guidelines provided in section 
14(4) and regulation 5 – which are neither prescriptive nor clear – even when he or 
she is guilty of default or lack of performance. Conversely, the consumer may, on 
20 days’ notice to the supplier, cancel the agreement at any time without providing 
reasons for his or her decision. This clearly interferes with the supplier’s common-
law rights in respect of the pacta servanda sunt maxim, and is a disadvantage to 
the supplier. 
The consumer, who is in an unequal bargaining position, must accept the terms of 
the supplier’s standard-form agreement, and this is who section 14 specifically aims 
to protect. But, unfortunately, section 14 of the CPA does not expressly give him or 
her active rights to enforce his or her rights, neither are there sufficient protection 
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measures for the consumer in the section – save for the right to cancel at any time 
by giving 20 days’ notice. Because of his or her inferior bargaining position, the 
consumer will not be able to include the common-law protective measures generally 
available to purchasers in the agreement. However, in terms of section 2(10) of the 
CPA he or she retains these common-law rights, and can choose when enforcing 
his or her rights either the CPA or the common-law of contract as the basis of the 
claim. 
The main disadvantages of section 14 of the CPA, are the limitation on the duration 
of the agreement in terms of section 14(3) read with regulation 5, and the fact that 
the exception to this maximum limitation on duration in section 14(4) offers no 
guidance on how the supplier must prove advantage to the consumer of a longer 
duration. In addition, the provision is unclear as to when exactly the supplier has to 
prove or record the advantage. As far as could be established this aspect has not 
been the subject of litigation. Section 14 does not provide the consumer with the 
right summarily to cancel or repudiate the contract in cases of non-performance or 
default by the supplier in that section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) still requires him or her to give 
20 days’ notice. Furthermore, he or she remains liable for payments under the 
agreement for the 20- day notice period. In addition, he or she is liable under section 
14(3) read with regulation 5, for a reasonable penalty when he or she cancels in 
terms of section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) even when cancellation is based on the supplier’s 
default or non-performance. There is no formula for the calculation of the reasonable 
penalty, and also no sliding scale based on the duration of the contract or the 
amount at stake to provide guidance or certainty as to the amount the consumer will 
have to pay. A further disadvantage is that smaller juristic persons are not protected 
as consumers under section 14(1) when the contract is entered into between juristic 
persons. This exclusion deprives small juristic persons of the protection afforded to 
consumers under section 14 in these circumstances, and could be a serious 
disadvantage as they can also be vulnerable or in a less favourable bargaining 
position. 
Secondary disadvantages of the CPA’s provisions for fixed-term and other 
agreements are that the consumer must follow the sequence of procedures in 
section 69 before turning to the courts. The only way in which a consumer can 
access a court directly is by way of section 52 when the dispute is based on 
unfairness. However, here too the right of access is limited by section 52(1)(b) which 
typifies such action as a remedy of last resort. The position in terms of section 2(10) 
which retains consumers’ common-law rights is also not clear in some regards and 
needs to be clarified. Notable here, is whether suppliers also retain their common-
law rights. The effectiveness of bodies and courts to effect dispute settlement, the 
improved implementation of responsible transformative constitutionalism that is 
sustainable and does not disadvantage the consumer, and the improved financial 
literacy of consumers, are also factors that could greatly contribute to an 
improvement in the consumer sphere. 
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The important advantage of section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) for the consumer is that he or 
she can cancel the agreement at any time under the section and so is able to avoid 
the negative aspects arising from the application of the common-law maxims of 
pacta servanda sunt and caveat emptor, or his or her inferior bargaining position. 
Secondary advantages of the CPA are the limited application of the parol evidence 
rule. However, the total abolition of the parol evidence rule in consumer-related 
cases is preferable, as consumers are in an inferior bargaining position and would 
benefit from presenting all evidence in disputes. Other positive factors in the CPA 
are the retention of the common-law rights of the consumer in section 2(10), the 
fairness provisions in Chapter 2, Part G, and the plain language provision in section 
22. In addition, the CPA aims to comply with the United Nations Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection, and has resulted in an overall improvement in consumer 
protection when compared to South Africa’s previous dispensation. 
Moving abroad to Singapore in Chapter 5, the purpose of that country’s consumer 
legislation – the CPFTA – is neither ideological nor socio-political. An analysis of 
the deceptively simple purpose of the CPFTA and its effect, interpretation, and 
implementation, shows that the Act, together with the UCTA where applicable, the 
improved investigative and proactive powers of the Commission, the CASE, and 
decisive court adjudication, have empowered and improved protection for 
consumers. The maxim caveat emptor still applies, as does the application of pacta 
servanda sunt in certain circumstances. The CPFTA does not limit the duration of 
contracts and empowers consumers with effective rights, education and information 
and stays true to purpose. The fairness provisions are effective and the Lemon Law 
protects consumers when goods do not conform to contract. The CPFTA, and 
especially the CASE, provide consumers with assistance and information and 
ensure just and equitable fair-trading circumstances for traders. The fact that section 
18A of the CPFTA vests the burden of proof in the supplier when a consumer lodges 
a complaint, is also an advantage and an important lesson to be learnt from this 
jurisdiction. The proactive and improved enforcement powers of the Commission, 
the name-and-shame policy, and continued supervision of errant suppliers are also 
all positive aspects of the Singaporean system. 
The disadvantages of the CPFTA in Singapore as regards fixed-term agreements, 
and in general, are the financial limitation of claims under the CPFTA, and the lack 
of criminal sanctions against perpetrators. In addition, the alleged overlap between 
the definitions and provisions of the CPFTA and the Lemon Law, and the lack of 
protection for smaller businesses as consumers under the CPFTA, could also be 
improved. 
In Chapter 6 the focus turned to an analysis of the CRA relating to fixed-term 
contracts in the UK. There has been a definite improvement of the position under 
the CRA compared to the previous disposition. However, at this early stage in the 
implementation of the CRA, and with Brexit further complicating matters regarding 
the future status of the EU Directives, Guidelines, and case law, it is difficult to 
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evaluate whether the CRA has achieved its purposes and adequately addressed 
the shortcomings which necessitated its enactment. The consolidation of the 
consumer regime can still be criticised, but is an improvement on the previous 
dispensation – its continued fragmentation notwithstanding. There is no provision 
similar to section 14 of the CPA, and there is no limitation on the duration of 
contracts. Guidelines have, however, emerged in case law – eg, in Ashbourne – for 
establishing what a reasonable and fair duration will be. Further advantages of the 
CRA are that it keeps abreast of modern technology, the Explanatory Notes and 
Guidance provided are extremely useful in practice, and the Act retains common-
law rights and remedies. The continued importance of freedom of contract in certain 
circumstances, such as in the core exemption, is a further advantage. And fairness 
is well-regulated and can be considered mero motu by courts under section 71(2) 
of the CRA at all stages in the proceedings. The parol evidence rule is also not 
applicable in certain prescribed circumstances, and the time-share provisions are 
beneficial to consumers. In addition, section 28(6)(b) and (c) of the CRA provides 
the consumer with the right summarily to cancel the contract when the supplier does 
not deliver or does not deliver timeously. The fact that UK consumer law is infused 
by EU consumer law and EU Directives is a mixed blessing. While it provides a wide 
spectrum of sources for the judiciary to consult, it can also be regarded as a 
disadvantage as it is cumbersome to establish with certainty what the position on a 
certain aspect in law is. 
Overall, the findings in all the regimes studied – the common law and the CPA in 
South Africa, the CPFTA in Singapore, and the CRA in the UK – point to the fact 
that the over-regulation of contractual terms and a lack of freedom of contract can 
do more damage to and disadvantage the very people the legislature aims to 
protect. This is not to imply that I do not regard consumer protection legislation 
essential, merely that the way in which the legislation is drafted and applied is vital, 
especially from the point of view of the consumer. Flexibility is always an advantage, 
and the rigidity and limitations in section 14 of South Africa’s CPA hold little benefit 
for the consumer. 
I have compiled two tables to capture and illustrate the essence of the outcome of 
the thesis and highlight some of the aspects studied and observed. Table A reflects 
mainly the essential aspects of section 14 and fixed-term contracts, and table B 
contains other observations relevant to fixed-term agreements and consumer 
protection in general – but which could, of course, also affect the interpretation and 
adjudication of fixed-term contracts in certain circumstances. The distinction 
between these factors is not always clear, and in certain circumstances the factors 
in Table B can be essential to the rights of parties to a fixed-term consumer 
agreement. The factors were organised in two tables merely to effect a more orderly 
depiction of the findings. 
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7.3 Tables to summarise findings5 
7.3.1 Table A 





• Common law. 
• UK and Singapore. 
 
Abolish the limitation on the 
duration of fixed-term contracts 
under the CPA, as there are other 
ways to achieve fairness, eg, the 
fairness provisions in the CPA. In 
any event, under section 
14(2)(b)(i)(bb) the consumer is 
entitled to terminate the 
agreement at any time, so the 
limitation is obsolete and could 
potentially disadvantage both the 
supplier and the consumer. 
Giving of notice and 
payment of instalments 
during notice period. 
based on repudiation7 
or breach of contract8 
by the supplier.9 
 
• Common law. 
• Singapore. 
• UK. 
A reasonable notice period when 
the seller breaches the contract, 
eg, 14 days should be sufficient. 
Consumers should under no 
circumstances be liable for 
payment of any amount during the 
prescribed notice period if the 
cancellation is based on a valid 
reason for cancellation, eg, breach 
by the trader. 
Right of consumer to 
cancel immediately 
• Common law (based on 
repudiation). 
• UK – section 28(6). 
Consumers should never have to 
give a prescribed period of notice 
if based on default or non-
performance by the supplier, and 
 
5 Aspects relevant to fixed-term contracts under s 14 of the CPA observed in the course of this 
thesis are mentioned in this table in no specific order, whether strictly speaking integral to fixed-
term contracts, or merely relevant to the interpretation or application thereof in a more indirect way. 
This table is not by any means a full representation of all aspects analysed and discussed in the 
thesis, and merely aims to highlight a few important aspects. 
6 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.9; Ch 5 para 5.3.2.1.2; and Ch 6 para 6.3.8. 
7 See Ch 3 para 3.3.3 for a discussion of repudiation, as the remedy for repudiation differs from 
other forms of breach of contract, in that it establishes anticipatory breach, and entitles the 
innocent party to cancel the contract without giving notice to the other party. 
8 See Ch 3 paras 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 for breach of contract where the innocent party has to give 
notice. 
9 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.7; Ch 6 para 6.3.8. 
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Aspect studied Best practice system/s Recommendation/s 
when seller defaults or 
fails to perform. 
• Position in Singapore 
not as clear. 
should not be liable for payments 
and charges during the notice 
period. In addition, no penalty 
should be payable to the supplier. 
A provision similar to section 28(6) 






Equal payments and an annual 
right to cancel from the second 
instalment onwards should be 
enacted (as in the UK) to improve 
the protection of consumers and 
prevent them from being bound for 
an unreasonably long period. 
Leases.11 • Common law, UK and 
Singapore. 
Leases are regulated by other 
legislation, including the CPA – 
and should not be included under 
section 14.  
Does section 14 of the 
CPA achieve the 
purpose of the Green 
Paper, the Bill, and the 
CPA?12 
• No, section 14 of the 
CPA does not achieve 
the aims and purposes 
of any of these to 
protect the consumer in 
section 14. 
• Singapore, and the UK 
fare better in this 
regard.  
Amend the CPA and section 14 to 
achieve this purpose, namely 
protect consumer in section 14 for 
all foreseeable circumstances, 
without being too rigid. Do not 
place the consumer at a 
disadvantage, by obliging him or 
her to give notice, remain liable for 
payments, and even a penalty, 
when the supplier is guilty of 
default or non-performance. Do 
not limit the maximum duration of 
contracts. 
 
10 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.9; Ch 5 para 5.3.2.5; and Ch 6 para 6.4. 
11 See Ch 3 para 3.2.16; Ch 4 para 4.2.3.8; Ch 5 para 5.3.2.1.2; and Ch 6 para 6.3.7. 
12 See Ch 4 paras 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.7.13. 
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Aspect studied Best practice system/s Recommendation/s 
Does section 14 reflect 
the aims in the UN 
Guidelines?13 
 
• South Africa to an 
extent. 
SA has achieved the aims in 
general terms, consumers are 
better off than before, eg, the right 
to cancel at any time, but the rest 
of the provision does not meet the 
aims as it clearly disadvantages 
the consumer. 
Constitutional values 
protected in section 
14.14  
Other jurisdictions do not 
consider transformative 
constitutionalism. 
Even so, when measured 
against our Constitution the 
UK and Singapore fare 
better as regards the 
protection of consumers 
under fixed-term 
agreements. 
Not in section 14, amend to 
improve the position of the 
consumer regarding liability for 
payments and penalty when 
supplier defaults or fails to 
perform, abolish maximum 
duration of fixed-term contracts. 
 
Freedom of contract, 
caveat emptor and 
pacta servanda sunt15 
 
• Common law. 
• Singapore – still tries to 
adhere to freedom of 
contract, for instance for 
the importance of 
caveat emptor, see 
Parliamentary debates. 
Also applies pacta 
servanda sunt in the 
Lemon Law. 
• UK has freedom of 
contract  to an extent in 
the CRA, eg, they retain 
the freedom of contract 
in the core exemption, 
and value pacta 
servanda sunt, for 
Consumer should have greater 
freedom, eg, to negotiate the 
duration of the fixed-term contract. 
Unfortunately, consumers are 
generally in an inferior bargaining 
position and therefore consumer 
protection legislation is necessary. 
However, consumers should still 
be cautious, and take 
responsibility for their own actions, 
and inform themselves of their 
rights and obligations. 
 
 
13 See Ch 2 para 2.6. 
14 See Ch 4 paras 4.2.2 and 4.4. 
15 See Ch 2 paras 2.2.6, 2.3.1, 2.4 and 2.5; Ch 3 para 3.2.2, 3.6; Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.7.7, 4.2.3.7.10, 
4.2.3.7.11, 4.3.1, 4.3.2.5, 4.3.2.3, and 4.5; Ch 5 paras 5.3.2.7, 5.3.3, 5.5.3 and 5.6; and Ch 6 paras 
6.3.4.2.7, 6.3.4.3.1.5, 6.3.5,6.5.5, 6.6.1 and 6.6.3. 
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Aspect studied Best practice system/s Recommendation/s 
instance by implication 
in s 58 of the CRA 
regarding specific 
performance. 
Reasonable penalty.16 • Common law. 
• Singapore and UK. 
Regulate this in the CPA or 
regulations by providing a formula 
to calculate the penalty, or a table 
indicating sliding scales based on 
the duration and amount in 
question, and disclose this amount 
in the agreement to ensure 
transparency. 
Protection of smaller 
juristic persons.17 
 
• UK when dealing in 
personal capacity. 
• Singapore in certain 
circumstances. 
 
Smaller juristic persons should be 
protected because they could also 
be in a weaker bargaining position 




7.3.2 Table B 
Aspect studied Best practice system/s Recommendation/s 
Protection of 
consumers or effective 
enabling rights for 
consumers.18 
• Common law, in theory. 
• Singapore (although the 
name of the Act does 
not indicate it).  
• UK. 
Consumers must play an active 
role with enabling rights in 
consumer related matters, not be 
passive (eg, the position under 
section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb)) – 
otherwise consumers will never 
achieve successful 
empowerment, confidence, and 
independence. 
 
16 See Ch 3 para 3.2.11; Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.7.8 and 4.2.3.7.10. 
17 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.6; Ch 5 paras 5.3.2.1.1 and 5.4; Ch 6 para 6.3.4.2.1. 
18 See Ch 4 para 4.3.5; Ch 5 paras 5.2 and 5.6; and Ch 6 para 6.6. 
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• Common law has most 
scope for individual 
negotiation, although 
not necessarily fair in 
practice because of the 
consumer’s inferior 
bargaining position. 
• SA, Singapore, and UK, 
and other regimes the 
contra proferentem rule 
applies and courts have 
tried to implement 
various principles to 
correct the situation but 
no clear solution has 
been found. 
All bodies and courts must 
consider the lesser bargaining 
position of the consumer to 
achieve fair adjudication when 
standard-form contracts are 
concluded. The difference in 
bargaining position was taken 
into account when drafting 
consumer legislation. Consumers 
should therefore generally be in a 
better position when basing their 
claims on consumer legislation (s 
14 of the CPA is an exception). 
Parol evidence.20  
 
  
• Singapore expressly 
excluded certain 
circumstances, but quite 
a wide exclusion. 
• The UK, in the CRA by 
implication, also 
excludes the parol 
evidence rule in 
different sections. 
• CPA in certain 
circumstances. 
Abolish the parol evidence rule 
expressly, not only in certain 
circumstances, for all consumer 
agreements. This is based on the 
weaker bargaining position of 
consumers. They should be 
allowed to present all evidence to 
prove their cases. 
Lemon Law type 
protection.21 
 
• Singapore, UK, and 
South Africa. 
All three jurisdiction have these 
provisions where goods do not 




• Singapore appears to 
have the best system 
for adjudication. 
 
Amend and clarify legislation to 
ensure efficient and quick 
solution to consumer complaints. 
 
19 See Ch 2 para 2.5; Ch 4 para 4.2.3.3. 
20 See Ch 3 para 3.2.9; Ch 4 para 4.3.2.7; Ch 5 5.3.2.9.1, Ch 6 para 6.3.6. 
21 See Ch 4 para 4.3.3.4; Ch 5 para 5.3.2.7. 
22 See Ch 4 para 4.3.7; Ch 5 para 5.3.2.10; Ch 6 para 6.5.5. 
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Aspect studied Best practice system/s Recommendation/s 
Consumers should have direct 
access to court if they wish, 
although proof that ADR or other 
dispute settlement was attempted 
could be helpful in limiting 
overloading of the court system. 
The cost of court litigation and the 
time involved in litigating should 





• Common law. 
• Singapore. 
• UK. 
Consumer protection provisions 
should be principle based – not 
as prescriptive as section 14. By 
being as prescriptive it deprives 
the consumer of the right to 
cancel when the seller defaults or 
fails to perform and the consumer 
remains liable for payments. 
It also prevents parties from 
contracting on a duration for 
agreements that would be to their 
advantage. 
Good faith, public 





• Common-law position in 
SA could improve with 
transformative 
constitutionalism. 
In SA section 14 is not fair 
despite the noble purposes and 
aims to reform, and is contrary to 
constitutional principles, ubuntu, 
public policy. Rather look at the 
duration of contracts from a 
fairness point of view than being 
too prescriptive and in the 
process harming one or both 
parties. Consumer should not be 
liable for payment during notice 
 
23 See Ch 2 para 2.4; and Ch 3 para 3.2.3. 
24 See Ch 4 paras 4.3.2.4 and 4.4; Ch 5 para 5.3.2.2 on fairness; and Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3.1. Ubuntu 
is not a principle known in UK or Singapore, but can be included under public policy and the other 
principles. 
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Aspect studied Best practice system/s Recommendation/s 
period, or for a penalty when 
seller breaches the agreement. 
Fairness, transparency, 
clarity, and the full 
disclosure of all 
essential and relevant 
information that could 




• UK, Singapore. 
• South Africa 
 
This is not a requirement for 
common-law contracts, 
unless bordering on 
fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
The plain language provision in 
SA could be improved. Traders 
should always be obliged to make 
full disclosure of all relevant 
information in consumer contracts 
because of the weaker bargaining 
position and vulnerability of 
consumers. 
Protect vulnerable 
consumers by taking 
special vulnerability into 
account in suitable 
circumstances.26 
 
• South Africa. 
• Singapore. 
• UK (this concept is not 
yet fully developed in 
the CRA, but is 
mentioned in the 
UCTA). 
Yes, this is a requirement in the 
CPA, and should remain. 
Political aims in 
legislation.27 
 
• Singapore and UK. In general, it is not recommended 
to use legislation to effect political 
aims, especially when political 
regimes change regularly. It is 
preferable to stay true to the real 
purpose of legislation when 
formulating the aims and 
purposes of legislation to ensure 





There should always be a drive to 
inform and educate consumers. 
This aspect could be improved in 
SA, eg, by a body similar to, and 
 
25 See Ch 4 para 4.3.2.5; Ch 5 paras 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.2.3; Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3.1.6. 
26 See Ch 4 paras 4.2.2.3, 4.3.5 and 4.4.5.3; Ch 5 paras 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.2.9.1; Ch 6 para 6.3.4.2.1. 
27 See Ch 4 paras 4.3.5 and 4.4.4; Ch 5 para 5.6; Ch 6 para 6.3.1. 
28 See Ch 4 para 4.3.5; Ch 5 paras 5.1, 5.2, 5.3.1 and 5.6; Ch 6 para 6.3.4.1. 
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Aspect studied Best practice system/s Recommendation/s 
as effective as, the CASE in 
Singapore. 
In addition, provide explanatory 
notes and guidance on the CPA 
on the website of the NCC or 
NCT. In addition, the NCC should 
make advice freely available at 
the touch of a button, perhaps 
also draft a simple test and make 
it a prerequisite for concluding a 
consumer agreement to ensure 
the consumer understands the 
consequences and liabilities 





• South Africa. 
Ensure that sufficient resources 
and effective procedures are 
available to make use of existing 
procedures. Section 69 should be 
simplified to make it easier to 
interpret, and provide easier 
access to enforcement 
procedures in practice. 
Proactive powers.30 • Singapore. 
• UK. 
• South Africa. 
Although the Commission has 
proactive powers in theory, it 
appears not to have the 
resources to implement these 
powers satisfactorily. Provide 
sufficient resources to give effect 
to proactive powers. 




The burden of proof should vest 




29 See Ch 4 para 4.3.7; Ch 5 paras 5.3.2.4, 5.3.2.9.5 and 5.3.2.10; and Ch 6 para 6.5.5. 
30 See Ch 4 para 4.3.5; Ch 5 paras 5.1, 5.3.2.10. 
31 See Ch 5 para 5.3.2.9.4. 
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The findings of this thesis will be illustrated by the analysis of a simple set of facts 
to summarise the consumer’s most relevant basic rights and remedies in each of 
the consumer-law regimes analysed.32 
7.4 Set of facts to illustrate the comparison 
Andrew approached ABC, a cell phone service provider, on 1 September 2019 to 
enter into a 36 months’ cell phone agreement33 for the purchase of a new cell phone-
package for airtime, voice, data, and short messages.34 Andrew’s cell phone had 
been stolen, and he urgently needed a replacement cell phone by 4 September. 
This was explained to ABC. On 1 September, he signed a purchase agreement for 
the phone and received a copy of the agreement. ABC then informed him the 
specific phone was not in stock but would be available for collection and activation 
on 4 September at the latest. The monthly payment was scheduled to commence 
on 20 September 2019, and the payments would be debited to Andrew’s account 
monthly, from that day onwards for the duration of the agreement. On 4 September 
ABC informed Andrew that it could not deliver the cell phone on 4 September. By 
15 September 2019, Andrew had still not received his phone, or been contacted at 
all by ABC, despite several phone calls, e-mails, and visits to ABC’s premises at 
regular intervals to enquire. Andrew wants to cancel the agreement urgently so that 
he can purchase another cell phone from a different supplier as he needs a cell 
phone urgently for work purposes. 
The remedies and provisions applicable to these circumstances in the four 
consumer law regimes analysed, will now be applied to the set of facts to illustrate 
their respective impacts on Andrew’s rights and remedies. 
7.4.1 The position under the common-law of contract in South Africa 
Under South African common law, Andrew will be permitted to enter into an 
agreement for 36 months as the duration of contracts can be freely negotiated. 
Therefore, Andrew will be able to afford the monthly payment.35 
Based on the facts, Andrew can regard the conduct of the supplier as repudiation 
of contract, as ABC has expressly acknowledged that performance on the specified 
date was not possible, and has since, by way of its conduct, refused to perform. The 
advantage of repudiation is that Andrew can cancel the agreement without notice to 
ABC from 5 September 2019 onwards. This would be to his advantage. He can also 
stop or reverse the payment immediately, and enter into a contract with a different 
supplier. 
 
32 The findings based on the set of facts will merely be listed and summarised, and will not be in 
the form of a detailed analysis or court judgment. 
33 He wants a longer duration to be able to afford a more expensive phone with improved features 
and fast internet connectivity, and large memory. 
34 Hereafter referred to as SMS, the acronym for Short Message System. 
35 Before the operation of the CPA. 
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7.4.2 The position under the CPA in South Africa 
Under the provisions of the CPA Andrew would only be allowed to enter into an 
agreement for 24 months as the duration of contracts is limited in section 14(4)(a), 
read in conjunction with regulation 5 of the CPA. The shorter duration would mean 
higher monthly payments, or downgrading to a cheaper cellphone and service 
contract option. 
Andrew would have to use the remedy in section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb),36 and give ABC 20 
days’ notice of cancellation. He would remain liable for payments until date of 
cancellation, and the reasonable penalty in terms of section 14(3) read in 
conjunction with regulation 5. 
Andrew would, of course, also retain his common-law rights and remedies in terms 
of section 2(10) of the CPA.37 
7.4.3 The position under the CPFTA in Singapore 
Andrew would be able to enter into a 36-month agreement because there is no 
limitation to the duration of contracts in Singapore. 
As there is no provision equivalent to section 14 which specifies a notice period or 
renders him liable for payments till cancellation or penalties, he should be entitled 
to cancel immediately without incurring liability for payments. The reasonable time 
in Lemon Law applies only if the goods do not conform to the contract at time of 
delivery, which does not apply in our facts as there has been no delivery. As far as 
could be established, there is no judgment or precedent on this set of facts in 
Singapore. Singapore courts still consult English law and will probably refer to 
section 28(6) of CRA and allow the immediate cancellation of the agreement. 
Andrew will also have the common-law rights or remedies as provided for in section 
15 of the CPFTA.38 
 
36 Theoretically he would be able to rely on the common law – see s 2(10), but as the provisions of 
the CPA will be inserted in the agreement, he will have to follow these provisions – in any case an 
average consumer would not be aware of his exact common-law rights. 
37 In theory, Andrew would also have his common-law rights and remedies available, although the 
average consumer does not have sufficient legal knowledge to realise that he or she retains these 
rights, to know exactly what they are, and which would be most beneficial. See s 2(10) of the CPA. 
A consumer can also base his or her case on unfairness in ss 48-52 under the CPA, then only the 
court will have jurisdiction. It is submitted that this is not suitable in these circumstances, and will 
take much longer and be more expensive even if he could have used his unfairness remedies. One 
also has to bear the restrictions on direct access to court in mind in terms of s 52(1)(b) of the CPA. 
38 However, the common-law of contract in Singapore was not analysed as it falls outside the 
scope of this thesis. See Ch 5 para 5.3.2.6. 
 Conclusion and recommendations 
298 
 
7.4.4 The position under the CRA in the United Kingdom 
Andrew would be able to enter into a 36 months agreement in the UK, as there is 
no provision similar to section 14 of the CPA to limit the duration of fixed-term 
contracts. This also means that he need not give a specified period of notice (as 
under section 14 of the CPA) or remain liable for payments and penalties. 
Andrew may, therefore, call on the remedy in section 28(6) of the CRA which entitles 
the consumer to treat the contract as at an end if the trader fails to deliver the goods 
as agreed under section 28(6)(b) or (c). 
In addition, Andrew will also have his common-law rights and remedies as stipulated 
in section 28(13).39 
7.4.5 Concluding remarks: Set of facts 
As illustrated by the above set of facts, Andrew will theoretically be in the best 
position under the South African common-law regime by basing his cancellation on 
the supplier’s repudiation of contract, and under the CRA in the UK by relying on 
section 28(6) of the CRA. Both these regimes enable him to enter into a 36-month 
agreement which he can cancel immediately based on repudiation under South 
African common law, or in terms of section 28(6) of the CRA. He will be in the least 
favourable position under section 14 of the CPA. It is therefore submitted that it is 
imperative that section 14 be amended to allow consumers to contract freely as 
regards the duration of their contracts, and assist and protect consumers where a 
supplier defaults or fails to perform. 
I now conclude by presenting matters arising from section 14 of the CPA and a few 
other issues directly affecting the position of the consumer in fixed-term contracts. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Section 14 of the CPA protects the consumer where he or she decides of his or her 
own accord to cancel a fixed-term contract. He or she need not even offer a valid 
reason to the supplier for the cancellation. In effect this means that section 14 
relaxes the maxim pacta servanda sunt for the consumer but not for the supplier. 
However, as shown in this thesis, when the consumer needs to cancel a fixed-term 
agreement based on default or failure to perform by the supplier, he or she will be 
at a disadvantage under section 14 of the CPA. This disadvantage runs counter to 
the purpose of the section, which is to protect the consumer who is in an inferior 
bargaining position. 
 
39 Similar to Singapore, the analysis of the common-law of contract in the UK falls outside the 
scope of this study. 
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When a reasonable penalty must be paid, the consumer is also at a disadvantage 
as he or she does not know, or cannot establish beforehand with certainty, how 
much the reasonable penalty will be. 
A further disadvantage of section 14 is the limitation placed on the duration of fixed-
term contracts. As the consumer can, in any event, terminate the agreement at any 
time, the provision serves no purpose other than to disadvantage the consumer in 
circumstances where the supplier defaults or fails to perform.40  
Small juristic persons are also affected negatively in that they are not protected in 
the circumstances provided in section 14(1) despite the fact that they too can also 
be detrimentally affected by their weaker bargaining position in certain 
circumstances. 
Consumers would benefit if fairness could be taken into account at all stages of the 
proceedings mero motu by courts and adjudicating bodies;41 if the burden of proof 
were always to rest with the supplier;42 and if the parol evidence rule were to be 
excluded by the CPA for all consumer-related disputes.43 
Finally, and most importantly, when tested against the preamble to the CPA, the 
purpose and aims of the CPA, and the Green Paper, there can be little doubt that 
section 14 falls far short of achieving the purposes and goals envisaged for the Act 
– ie, to protect the consumer.44 Barnes contends that the law should consider the 
limitations and lack of good judgement of the individual, and strive to balance these 
for the benefit of society45 – this section 14 of the CPA has not achieved. 
To conclude, consumer law should protect both the consumer and supplier fairly. 
Based on the findings and conclusion in this thesis I now recommend principled 
amendments to the CPA to improve the position of the consumer specifically under 
fixed-term contracts in terms of the CPA, and in a few pertinent other matters. 
7.6 Recommendations 
Detailed amendments to the provisions of the CPA to protect parties under fixed-
term agreements will not be proposed, as these would not provide the necessary 
relief and protection to consumers. Therefore, general, principle-based 
recommendations for the amendment of the regulation of fixed-term agreements 
under the CPA are suggested. The following measures as regards the regulation of 
 
40 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7. 
41 See Ch 6 para 6.3.4.3.1.1. 
42 See Ch 5 para 5.3.2.9.4. 
43 Ch 3 para 3.2.9; Bekker LLD 530-532. 
44 Ch 4 para 4.5. 
45 Barnes (2007) WLR 273. 
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fixed-term agreements, would greatly enhance the position, in particular of 
consumers, under the CPA: 
• The maximum duration of fixed-term agreements should not be regulated 
by the CPA as the consumer can give notice to cancel the agreement at 
any time in terms of section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb) of the Act. 
• In cases of default or failure to perform by the supplier, the consumer 
should be allowed an immediate cancellation right without being liable for 
payments owed to date of cancellation or a cancellation penalty in terms 
of section 14(3) read with regulation 5 of the CPA.46 
• A formula or sliding scale for the calculation of the penalty in section 
14(3), read with regulation 5 of the CPA,47 should be included in the Act 
or regulations, and this penalty amount, or formula, should also be 
included in the fixed-term contract to enable the consumer to establish 
the amount he or she will be liable to pay in case of cancellation. 
• The consumer should not remain liable for payments during the 20 days’ 
notice, and not be obliged to pay a penalty, when the consumer bases 
his or her cancellation notice on material breach or malperformance by 
the supplier. 
• A section similar to section 28(6) of the CRA should be inserted in the 
CPA to provide for cases of non-delivery or non-performance by 
suppliers.48 
• Small businesses should be included in the protective mechanisms in 
terms of section 14 of the CPA.49 
• The parol evidence rule should be abolished for all consumer-related 
disputes.50 
• The burden of proof in consumer disputes should rest with suppliers.51 
• Fairness should be considered mero motu by courts and adjudicating 
bodies at all stages of consumer proceedings.52 
 
 
46 See Ch 4 paras 4.2.3.7.8 and 4.2.3.7.10. 
47 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.10. 
48 See Ch 6 para 6.3.4.2.4. 
49 See the discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.3.7.6; Ch 5 para 5.4. 
50 See the discussion of parol evidence in Ch 3 para 3.2.9; Ch 4 para 4.3.2.7; Ch 5 para 5.3.2.9.1, 
and Ch 6 para 6.3.6. 
51 See the discussion Ch 5 para 5.3.2.9.4 and Ch 6 paras 6.3.4.2.1 and 6.3.4.3.1.4 – there is no 
such provision in the CPA. 
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